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Abstract 
 
The thesis considers ethno-territorial conflicts in which  there are two conflict groups 
with corresponding ‘reference states’. ‘Reference states’ are internationally-
recognised states with co-nationals in the aforementioned disputed territory. The 
literature on ethno-national conflict regulation largely neglects the potential 
constructive role of ‘reference states’. In particular, Arend Lijphart’s work on 
consociational democracy focuses on elite accommodation within the conflict zone, 
but views other agents as ‘external’ to the dispute. Unlike most of the current ethnic 
conflict literature, the thesis will use a theoretical approach to derive the features of a 
settlement, not distil traits from purely empirical research. An informal model is 
employed assuming that that a military option is not open to reference states and that 
disengagement from the co-nationals is costly. The actions of the reference state are 
simplified to four options: remaining at the same level of conflict, escalating the 
dispute, attempting cooperation, or disengaging from the dispute. The features derived 
for the resulting transnational consociation settlement are: durable reference state/co-
national links, bipartisanship within reference states, intergovernmentalism between 
reference states, and consociational democracy internal to the disputed territory. The 
thesis then focuses on the post-conflict power-sharing settlements in Bosnia-
Hercegovina and in Northern Ireland to investigate the features of transnational 
consociation in these two cases. The settlement after the Belfast Agreement exhibits 
the traits of transnational consociation, with a strong intergovernmental Dublin-
London axis acting as reliable long-term guarantors of the settlement. By contrast, 
there is little intergovernmentalism between Zagreb and Belgrade regarding the 
settlement in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The post-conflict institutions are held together by 
international agencies that do not have as durable a link to the conflict zone as the 
‘reference states’. Therefore, a durable transnational consociation with the ‘reference 
states’ as guarantors is more likely in Northern Ireland than in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
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Chapter I: Ethnonational Conflict Regulation Beyond Borders1 
Ethnonational Conflict Regulation  and the End of History 
 
The twilight of the last century heralded the end of the bipolar battle between Moscow 
and Washington. The latter that won the Cold War, seemingly confirming the move 
towards a liberal-democratic ‘end of history’. However, the world also witnessed 
some of the most brutal events in the second half of the 20th century, such as the mass 
killing of Tutsis by ruling Hutus in Rwanda and the series of wars that followed the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, it was in the same era that foes in long-
standing ethnonational conflicts concluded political agreements in hitherto 
‘intractable conflicts’, including the end of apartheid in South Africa, the Oslo 
Accords in the Middle East and the Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland. 
 
In two of the examples mentioned above, the events were strongly influenced by 
external actors. In the case of Northern Ireland, the multiparty talks that led to the 
Belfast Agreement were chaired by former US Senator George Mitchell. The secret 
‘shuttle diplomacy’ in the Middle East was brokered by individuals from the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Institute for Applied Social Science (Oslo) 
and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). In the case of South 
Africa, the geostrategic changes in the region resulting from the end of the Cold War 
facilitated  ‘political liberalisation’.2 
 
There were more aggressive ‘external’ interventions in other parts of the world. 
Although state sovereignty was based on the principle of ‘non-interference’, a new 
norm of inter-state ‘humanitarian intervention’ came into the fore in the 1990s. In 
Somalia, US military forces tried to restore the rule of law after the overthrow of the 
Barre regime in 1991. NATO bombing of military positions above Sarajevo ended the 
shelling of the Bosnian city and accelerated the end of the war. NATO also intervened 
                                                 
1
 I am grateful to the support of my supervisor Paul Mitchell, as well as the valuable insights provided 
by the two examiners, Brendan O’Leary and Stefan Wolff. I would also like to thank Vesna Bojičić-
Dželilović, Nina Caspersen, John Heathershaw, Pieter van Houten, Bjørn Høyland, Ayşe Kaya, 
Camille Monteux, Brad Roth and Tome Sandevski for their helpful comments on my thesis. As per 
usual, any errors or omissions in the following chapters are my own responsibility. 
2
 For example, see A. Guelke, South Africa in Transition: the Misunderstood Miracle, London: I.B. 
Tauris (1999): 25-27. 
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in 1999 to stop violence in Kosovo against ethnic Albanians by state military and 
police. In both Kosovo and Bosnia-Hercegovina, the peace agreements were enforced 
by international organisations. 3  In the latter case, the international community 
imposed the constitution, complete with stipulations for the state and local political 
institutions. 
 
The above examples show the tectonic changes in international political practice. In 
the past, peacebuilding was largely an internal matter. That is, conflict groups in an 
intra-state conflict would have to settle on their own. Any outside intervention, 
especially without the invitation of the government, was considered a breach of state 
sovereignty. The internationalisation of ethnonational conflict regulation in the 1990s 
represents a significant divergence from previous interstate norms. It is the 
examination of a subset of these ‘external’ actors, hitherto seen as ‘interlopers’, that 
provides the basis for the following chapters. 
Bringing in ‘External’ Actors 
 
The genealogy of relevant conflict regulation theories in divided societies starts with a 
focus on ‘internal’ mechanisms. That is, these approaches look at processes between 
the conflict groups within the disputed territory. 
 
The notion of consociational democracy was developed by Arend Lijphart through his  
investigation of democratic stability in the ‘fragmented’ Dutch political system. 4 
Lijphart’s initial work was a critique of Gabriel Almond’s typology of democratic 
systems. Almond asserted that fragmented systems would lead to institutional 
instability. However, Lijphart claimed that the history of Dutch democracy suggested 
than even though the country was pillarised by a combination of religious and class 
cleavages, the institutions survived. Lijphart surmised that the factor missing in 
Almond’s analysis was that elite cooperation could lead to a long-term settlement.  
 
                                                 
3
 The name of the state Bosna i Hercegovina translates to Bosnia and Hercegovina. However, the 
following chapters will use the shorter term ‘Bosnia-Hercegovina’, except when the official English 
name of an organisation uses an alternative spelling. For example, EUFOR is the European Union 
Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
4
 A. Lijphart, ‘Consociational Democracy’, World Politics, vol. 21, no. 2 (January 1969): 207-225. 
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This concept of consociational (or ‘power-sharing’) democracy was generalised in a 
later work.5 The term ‘power-sharing’ can be used more widely, but will be used in 
the following chapters, as Lijphart does, to connote ‘consociational power-sharing’. 
Thus, the terms ‘power-sharing’ and ‘consociational’ will be used interchangeably.6 
 
Consociational democracy contains four features. First, instead of having bare 
majority governments in which one group dominates over others, consociational 
democracies have parties from major conflict groups in power, thus forming a grand 
coalition, though qualifications for this feature will be examined in the following 
chapter.  Second, to ensure that a numerical majority does not lead to the domination 
of one group over another, there is a mutual veto in the decision-making process. 
Instead of using the term ‘minority veto’, it is better to use ‘mutual veto’, since either 
group in such systems can override decisions that threaten their national interest. 
Third, in contrast to the majoritarian systems that developed in the US and Britain, 
allocation of political representatives and resources are done with proportionality. 
Finally, the system is set up so that each constituent group has a high degree of 
control over important matters within their community, leading to segmental 
autonomy. In addition to these features, Lijphart lists a set of ‘favourable conditions’ 
that predispose a pillarised society to consociational democracy: numerical balance 
among the groups, multi-party system with dominant parties in each segment, small 
country, crosscutting cleavages, overarching loyalties, and traditions of elite 
accommodation. 
 
Brian Barry noticed that the ‘favourable conditions’ were rarely fulfilled for 
ethnonational conflicts, so Lijphart’s framework was not applicable to these deeply-
divided societies. First, the condition of ‘tradition of elite accommodation’ may be 
circular, since this seemingly leads to the conclusion that democratic elite 
accommodation leads to elite accommodation. The second problem is that of 
                                                 
5
 A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press (1977). 
6
 Matthijs Bogaards critiques the relationship between ‘consociational’ and ‘power-sharing’ in M. 
Bogaards, ‘The Uneasy Relationship Between Empirical and Normative Types in Consociational 
Theory’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 12, no. 4 (2000): 395-423. In his response to Bogaards in 
A. Lijphart. ‘Definitions, Evidence, and Policy: A Response to Matthijs Bogaards' Critique’, Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, vol. 12, no. 4 (2000): 425-431, Lijphart writes that the term ‘consociational 
democracy’ had been discarded for ‘power-sharing’. However, Lijphart still uses ‘consociational 
deomcracy’ and ‘consociational theory’ in his debate with Horowitz at the ‘Constitutional Design 
2000’ conference at Notre Dame (Dec. 1999). 
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‘overarching loyalties’. In ‘national conflicts’ such as the ones that will be used to 
investigate post-settlement power-sharing in this thesis, the problem is a more 
fundamental one about the very existence of ‘the country’.7 In this way, the context is 
different from the ‘ideological’ cleavages in the classical examples of fragmented 
systems in continental Europe (i.e. the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and 
Switzerland). Since the very nature of the dispute is different in these cases, McGarry 
and O’Leary suggest three different ‘favourable conditions’ for consociational 
democracies in ‘national conflicts’, which will be enumerated in Chapter 2. 
 
In his defence of the durability of consociational democracy, Lijphart pointed out that 
power-sharing in Cyprus and in the Lebanon broke down due to ‘external’ 
intervention by Turkey and Syria/Israel, respectively. However, the interplay between 
neighbouring states, their co-nationals, and the neighbouring territories outside the 
‘homeland’ is an important part of the study of conflict, especially in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The territorial settlements breaking up the Austro-Hungarian and 
Ottoman Empires which defined ‘new’ states invoking self-determination left many 
people on the ‘wrong’ side of the border from ‘their’ nation-state. There have been 
similar periods of revolutionary changes of international borders after World War II 
and the Cold War. The tensions in some of these cases have escalated to violent 
conflict. This sort of phenomena is not only confined to Europe. Decolonisation in 
Africa and Asia also left states and ‘their’ co-nationals in different territories. Thus, 
there are potentially many cases throughout the world in which conflict groups have 
co-national neighbouring states, and it is unlikely that the resulting disputes are purely 
‘internal’. 
 
It is in the context of post-Cold War nation-building that Rogers Brubaker develops a 
‘triadic’ conceptualisation of ethno-national conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. 
According to Brubaker, there are three actors. First, there are nationalising states, 
which are nationally heterogeneous, newly-forming states in which political elites are 
trying to construct a civic or national state identity. Second, there are national 
minorities that are politically self-aware and organised who demand certain nation-
based concessions such as territorial or non-territorial autonomy. Finally, there is an 
                                                 
7
 B. Barry, ‘Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy’, British Journal of Political 
Science, vol. 5, no. 4 (October 1975): 477-505. 
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‘external’ national homeland of the aforementioned national minorities that act as 
guarantors for ‘their’ people in the ‘nationalising states’, asserting the obligation to 
defend their co-nationals.8 Although Brubaker describes the principal actors, he does 
not investigate conflict regulation practices in this ‘triadic’ structure. Moreover, 
Brubaker’s framework neglects the broader ‘Euro-Atlantic space’, thus extending 
from a ‘triadic’ to ‘quadratic’ nexus.9 
 
The role of the ‘external’ national homeland has become an important consideration 
in conflict regulation for minorities on the ‘wrong side of the border’ in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In 2001, the Venice Commission considered the Hungarian Law on 
ethnic Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries.10 The law had been challenged 
by Slovakia, which saw the legislation as interfering in the affairs of Bratislava. The 
Venice Commission found that there was a potential method of conflict regulation 
through bilateral treaties between the ‘kin-state’ and host state.11 The kin-state secures 
a set of extensive cross-border cultural and linguistic rights for its co-nationals. In 
return, the ‘kin-state’ agrees to recognise the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the host state. Thus, minority rights are underpinned by bilateral relations. 
 
The importance of ‘external’ state relations in conflict regulation can also be seen in 
the comparative politics literature. For example, Michael Kerr examines the role of 
neighbouring ‘external’ powers in the power-sharing settlements in Northern Ireland 
(1973 and 1998), and the power-sharing agreements in the Lebanon (1943 and 1989). 
In the case of Northern Ireland, he concludes that this regional stability was 
underpinned by an ‘intergovernmental unity of purpose’ in which the London-Dublin 
axis presented a joint strategy for settling the constitutional dispute in Northern 
Ireland between ‘British’ and ‘Irish’ ethno-national aspirations.12 Thus, Kerr’s work 
                                                 
8
 R. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in New Europe, 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press (1996): 57. 
9
 DJ Smith, ‘Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe. A Quadratic Nexus?’ 
Ethnopolitics, vol. 2, no. 1 (September 2002): 3-16. 
10
 Venice Commission, Report on the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities By Their Kin-State, 
Strasbourg: CoE Publishers (2001). 
11
 Corresponding to Brubaker’s notions the ‘external’ national homeland and nationalising states, 
respectively. 
12
 M. R. Kerr, ‘Comparative Power Sharing Agreements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon: An 
Evaluation of Consociational Government from Sunningdale to Belfast (1973-98), from the National 
Pact to Ta’if (1943-89)’, PhD Thesis (LSE, 2003). 
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brings together the connection between ‘external’ intergovernmentalism and ‘internal’ 
power-sharing. 
 
The work of Stefan Wolff looks at a broad universe of cases that resemble Brubaker’s 
‘triadic’ framework to investigate settlement of cross-border ethno-territorial conflicts. 
The universe of cases studied by Wolff (Alsace, Saarland, South Tyrol, Northern 
Ireland, Andorra and the New Hebrides) is wider than the scope of the present study. 
Three of the cases have ‘external’ national homeland links, but are qualitatively 
different from those in this thesis. In Alsace, the annexation by France was not 
dangerous for the legitimacy of the German state. The annexation of Saarland by 
Germany was marked with a significant lack of interest in France. The resolution of 
South Tyrol was also concluded due to the renunciation of territorial aspirations by 
Austria, though the dispute took some time to be resolved.13 Northern Ireland is one 
of the case studies for the present study and is examined in greater detail in later 
chapters. The case of the condominium in New Hebrides is one in which two colonial 
powers decided jointly to rule an overseas territory. Thus, many of the ‘transnational 
dynamics’ present in Wolff’s other cases are not present in the New Hebrides.14 The 
current study will not examine the cases in which one of the reference states fully 
disengages from the disputed territory, and only looks at situations in which these 
states must navigate conflicting political objectives to achieve a settlement. 
 
The most recent research on the transnational nature of conflict regulation brings 
together Lijphart’s power-sharing with the effect of external agents, combining 
‘external’ involvement with internal power-sharing. The ECMI Complex Power 
Sharing project selected the cases with the following criteria: recent cases; 
international or external involvement in the settlement; excluding cases that were 
solely ‘internal’ constitutional reform; excluding cases in which the root cause is not 
national self-determination; and the conflict is not resolved fully in the favour of one 
of the conflict groups.15  The cases that fulfil these criteria are: Northern Ireland, 
Georgia, Moldova, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Bougainville, and 
Mindanao. Although the comparative empirical studies are valuable, there are 
                                                 
13
 S. Wolff, Disputed territories: the Transnational Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict Settlement, New York: 
Berghahn Books (2003): Chapters 4-6. 
14
 Ibid.: Chapter 8. 
15
 See: http://ecmi.de/cps/about_criteria.html. 
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significant differences between the cases. Most importantly, the criteria for complex 
power-sharing do not distinguish between the different types of ‘external’ 
involvement. The type of intervention by supranational organisation such as the 
OSCE and UN has a different mandate and motivation compared to neighbouring 
‘kin-states’. 
 
A summary of conflict regulation practices relevant to the thesis is presented in the 
table below. 
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Conflict Regulation Author Nature of 
Conflict 
Conditions Examples 
Consociational 
Democracy 
Lijphart (1977) Segmented 
cleavages in 
conflict zone 
Balance of power; 
multiparty system; 
small country; 
overarching 
loyalties; traditions 
of elite 
accommodation; 
crosscutting 
cleavages 
Netherlands, 
Belgium, Austria, 
Switzerland. 
Consociational 
Democracy (deeply-
divided society) 
McGarry & 
O’Leary (1993) 
Segmented 
cleavages in 
ethnonational 
conflict 
Elites not interested 
in assimilating the 
‘other’ group in the 
short-term; future 
elites are committed 
to the system; elite 
manoeuvrability 
Northern Ireland 
(?) 
Bilateral Treaties Venice 
Commission 
(2001) 
Rights for co-
nationals beyond 
national borders 
Host state confers 
minority rights; in 
return, kin-state 
respects host state 
sovereignty 
Treaties by 
Hungary with 
neighbouring 
states 
Intergovernmental 
Unity of Purpose 
Kerr (2003) Ethno-national 
conflicts, external 
agents with 
irredentist goals 
Settlement built 
‘outside in’; 
externally-imposed 
power-sharing 
Northern Ireland, 
Lebanon 
Democratic 
Condominium 
Wolff (2003) Ethno-territorial 
cross-border 
conflict 
Compromising 
territorial claims both 
within the disputed 
territory and 
between states 
Andorra, New 
Hebrides 
Consociation and/or 
Territorial Autonomy 
Wolff (2003) Ethno-territorial 
cross-border 
conflict 
Kin-state withdraws 
claim; host state and 
external minority 
reach internal 
compromise 
South Tyrol, Åland 
Islands; Northern 
Ireland 
Irredenta Wolff (2003) Ethno-territorial 
cross-border 
conflict 
Host state withdraws 
territorial claim, but 
both external 
minority and kin-
state persist 
Saarland 
International 
Protectorate 
Wolff (2003) Ethno-territorial 
cross-border 
conflict 
Both states withdraw 
territorial claim; 
third-party 
intervention 
Kosovo, East 
Timor 
Integration Wolff (2003) Ethno-territorial 
cross-border 
conflict 
Withdrawal of claims 
by external minority 
and kin-state 
Danes in 
Germany; Alsace 
Complex Power-
Sharing 
ECMI  Recent self-
determination 
disputes 
Recent cases;  
international 
involvement in 
negotiation or 
implementation; not 
internal 
constitutional 
reform; not complex 
peacekeeping 
settlements; 
resolution not in 
favour of one side  
Northern Ireland; 
Bosnia-
Hercegovina; 
Transdniestria; 
Gaugauzia; 
Abkhazia; South 
Ossetia; 
Bougainville; 
Mindanao  
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An Analytic Turn 
 
Most of the current conflict regulation literature is empirically driven. That is, a 
systematic examination of particular conflicts in particular historical contexts leads to 
the generation of conflict regulation theory. However, this thesis aims to use methods 
to derive a network of relationships, given a set of initial conditions and essential 
actors. 
 
The conditions for the geometry of the conflict are that there is a disputed area with 
two or more nationally-defined groups. For at least two of the conflicting national 
groups, there are internationally recognised ‘reference states’, a term used by Pieter 
van Houten, that represent the ‘homeland’.16 
 
The term ‘reference state’ is used for two reasons. The first is that the directionality of 
the word ‘reference’ is neutral, so that both links emanating from the state and vice 
versa are considered. The relationship is not wholly dependent on the unilateral action 
of the reference state, but also constrained by the co-nationals’ aspiration to retain 
links with ‘their homeland’. Thus, the ‘reference’ state is more appropriate for the 
analysis than ‘patron’ state. The second reason to use the term ‘reference state’ is that 
it is agnostic on whether the link is biological, as can be implied by the term ‘kin-
state’. 
 
It is also assumed that it is costly for reference states to withdraw their links with co-
nationals in the disputed area. Drawing on the work of Ian Lustick, the possibility of 
abandoning the co-nationals is affected by various thresholds of ‘state contraction’.17 
For many states, such as for Hungary, there is a constitutional clause to protect all 
members of the ‘nation’, irrespective of their state of residence. Consequently, there is 
a significant effect of the ‘national’ connection between reference states and their co-
nationals, which leads to a relatively stable level of commitment. 
                                                 
16
 P. van Houten, ‘The Role of the Reference State in Ethnic Relations’, Archives européenes de 
sociologie, vol. 39 (Spring 1998): 110-146. 
17
 I. Lustick, ‘Thresholds of Opportunity and Barriers to Change in the Right-Sizing of States’, in 
Rightsizing the State: the Politics of Moving Borders, ed. B. O’Leary, I. Lustick and T. Callaghy, New 
York: Oxford University press (2001): 83. 
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A further assumption is that the two reference states are somewhat evenly-matched or 
at least neither reference state can impose its preferences on the other militarily or by 
other means. If this were the case, the solution would be trivial: the ‘stronger’ 
reference states and their co-nationals would ‘win’. The final assumption is that 
conflict groups, like their reference states, have similar policy preferences. It would 
also be costly for groups in the disputed territory to renounce their connection to their 
‘metropole’ and integrate into the other reference state. 
 
Starting with the above initial conditions, the notion of transnational consociation 
will be derived in Chapter 3. The phenomenon differs from the traditional formulation 
of consociational democracy as power-sharing within the disputed area. By contrast, 
transnational consociation includes the role of the neighbouring ‘reference states’ in a 
model of conflict regulation. 
Network of Relationships 
 
Consider the simple case in which there are two reference states α and β with groups 
A and B, respectively. Within each state, there are groups A and B that are more 
antagonistic (+) and those that are less antagonistic (-) towards the other reference 
state. There is a territory disputed by at least two ethno-national groups. Within this 
territory, there are co-nationals of A called a and B called b. This does not exclude the 
possibility of other national groups and their elites within the conflict area. In the 
conflict zone, there are groups that are more antagonistic to the other conflict group 
(+) and those that are more conciliatory (-). 
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Thus, using this notation, there will be eight key groups: 
 
• more antagonistic group in α (A+) 
• less antagonistic group in α (A-) 
• more antagonistic group  in β (B+) 
• less antagonistic group in β (B-) 
• more antagonistic co-nationals of A in the conflict zone (a+) 
• less antagonistic co-nationals of A in the conflict zone (a-) 
• more antagonistic co-nationals of B in the conflict zone (b+) 
• less antagonistic co-nationals of B in the conflict zone (b-) 
 
Using the above notation, this type of ethno-national conflict can be represented as 
follows: 
 
A 
  
 
B 
 
The box denotes the distinct territory that is the subject of the dispute. The conflict 
groups prefer to ‘move’ towards their reference state. For example, this ‘move’ could 
be a demand for autonomy and transnational institutions (e.g. an Irish dimension in 
Northern Ireland), or more violent secessionist movements. In any case, the result is 
centrifugal pressure in the conflict zone, which reduces the likelihood of stable 
institutions within the territory. Thus, any regulation of the dispute needs to address 
these centrifugal forces (i.e. reversing the direction of the arrows).  
 
The links between the various groups are largely channelled through the elites. Thus, 
there is an underlying assumption that the elites have a degree of ‘structured elite 
predominance’.18 Although political elites for all of the groups are constrained by the 
preferences of their followers, leaders are able to command the obedience of their 
                                                 
18
 E.A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, Cambridge, MA: Center for International 
Affairs Harvard University (1972). 
a 
b 
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electorate. If the elites can pursue conciliation, so will the followers. If political 
leaders are more antagonistic, the respective national groups will also be less 
conciliatory towards ‘other groups’. Hence, assuming an ‘elite-led’ process allows the 
analysis to be reduced to the constrained interactions of the political leaders of the 
conflict groups and reference states. 
 
Transnational consociation is a network of relationships between groups of elites in 
the conflict zone and the reference states (which may be friendly or unfriendly), 
which can be represented in the following manner: 
 
More antagonistic (e.g A+) and more conciliatory elites (e.g. A-) in the reference 
states may be connected. If there are hostile connections between the two groups, 
there may be ethnic flanking. On the other hand, if there is harmonisation between the 
two groups of elites, there is bipartisanship: 
 
 
 
There are also links between conflict groups with the disputed area. Initially, these are 
antagonistic, so there is an ethnonational conflict. However, there may also be 
cooperative relationships as a part of an internal consociation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are significant links between reference states and their co-nationals. It is 
assumed that these links are cooperative: 
 
 
 
 
 
A+ A- B+ B- 
a+ b+ 
 
a- b- 
 
A+ A- 
 
a+ a- 
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There is a corresponding set of links for the other reference state. 
 
Finally, there are links between the reference states. If the links are unfriendly, there 
is interstate conflict. On the other hand, if there is a cooperative relationship between 
the reference states, there is intergovernmentalism: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A simplified diagram of transnational consociation can be represented as follows, 
assuming that there is a durable connection between reference states and their co-
nationals in the disputed territory: 
 
POL  GOV  CON  SET 
 
 
A settlement based on transnational consociation develops over time in the following 
manner: 
 
1) First, there is bipartisan policy continuity within reference states (POL) 
regarding the disputed area. 
2) Since there is constant cross-party policy in both reference states, a 
cooperative intergovernmentalism (GOV) may then develop. 
3) Reference state elites may then use their cooperative links with co-nationals 
to influence them towards a settlement. 
4) Inclusive, cooperative and institutional internal consociation  (CON) might 
then be established. 
5) This forms the basis of a durable, self-enforcing transnational consociation 
settlement (SET) 
 
A+ A- 
 
B+ B- 
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These features will be derived in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
In addition to intergovernmentalism, the reference states must be seen as durable and 
acceptable brokers for a long-term settlement. To ensure this, it is crucial that 
reference states are not only seen as guarantors by their co-nationals, but also by the 
other conflict groups. This is more difficult to do when only one reference state is 
involved, it is less likely that such an arrangement would be agreeable to other 
conflict groups.19 Thus, transnational consociation relies on a triangular configuration 
in which there is intergovernmentalism between reference groups as well as 
cooperative institutional links between each of the reference states and the disputed 
territory. 
Possible Cases 
 
There are many disputes that have two reference states with corresponding co-
nationals within an area of ethnoterritorial conflict. As mentioned above, there may be 
also other conflict groups in the disputed area. For example, Kashmir, Vojvodina, 
Cyprus, Transylvania, Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Hercegovina exhibit the relevant 
configuration of reference states and co-nationals. A table summarises the relevant 
characteristics of these ethnonational conflicts, which is not an exhaustive list of 
possible cases: 
 
Conflict Zone Reference States Conflict Groups 
Kashmir Pakistan, India ‘Muslims’, ‘Hindus’ 
Vojvodina Hungary, Serbia Hungarians, Serbs 
Cyprus Greece, Turkey Greeks, Turks 
Transylvania Hungary, Romania Hungarians, Romanians 
Northern Ireland UK, Ireland Unionists, Nationalists 
Bosnia-Hercegovina Croatia, Serbia Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks 
 
However, there are some ethnonational conflicts can be excluded, even though they 
have a similar structure to the above cases. Although there are two main conflict 
                                                 
19
 For example, the British Government attempted to establish devolved institutions in Northern Ireland 
in the 1970s and early 1980s, but without cross-border all-Ireland institutions. The rationale was that 
London could be a ‘neutral arbiter’ between Unionists and Nationalists, but this was unacceptable to 
the latter (as well as political parties in Dublin). 
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groups in Kosovo that can be connected with reference states, Serbia and Albania, the 
latter does not have significant institutional links with Kosovor Albanians. In the case 
of (FYR) Macedonia, Albanians have significant ties with Kosovor Albanians. 
However, there is no corresponding second reference state for the majority Slav 
Macedonian population. 
Why Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Hercegovina? 
 
The theory of transnational consociation will be applied to Northern Ireland and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina in Chapters 4-7. Although the two territories have been shaped 
by different historical and political contexts, both have significant parallels that make 
a comparative study instructive. 
 
First, both Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Hercegovina are in the first stages of a ‘post-
settlement’ situation. In Northern Ireland, the Belfast Agreement (1998) incorporated 
republican and loyalist ceasefires as a part of an inclusive multi-party accord. In 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Dayton-Paris Agreement (1995) ended one of the more 
brutal episodes of the ‘dissolution’ of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by 
concluding a framework for peace between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs.  
 
Second, the aforementioned ‘peace’ agreements were the first steps as a part of a 
political process that led to the creation of constitutional structures to manage the 
conflicts between particular constitutionally-defined groups. The Belfast Agreement 
signalled a change in the language of the conflict, since Dublin, London, and the 
parties in Northern Ireland acknowledged that there were two ‘traditions’ in the 
disputed region since the joint Downing Street Declaration (December 1993). The 
first were ‘Unionists’ loyal to Westminster, the second were ‘Nationalists’ whose 
political and cultural aspirations were directed towards Dublin. In Bosnia-
Hercegovina, the complex mechanisms were designed to protect Serbs, Croats and 
Bosniaks. It is important to point out that both conflicts are often mistaken as 
‘religious’ conflicts. Despite the conflation of national and religious identity (e.g. 
‘Muslims’ in Bosnia), both are ethno-national conflicts. 
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Third, the constitutional mechanisms that were established in both Northern Ireland 
and Bosnia-Hercegovina broadly match the features of consociational democracy. 
Both Annex 4 of the Dayton-Paris Agreement and Strand 1 of the Belfast Agreement 
have provisions for proportionality and safeguards to protect the will of the 
constitutionally-protected groups in areas of vital national interest through a mutual 
veto. Moreover, there is also grand coalition and segmental autonomy in both cases, 
as will be illustrated in Chapter 4. 
 
The fourth important parallel is that conflict groups in both cases have ‘metropoles’, 
internationally-recognised states that were the guarantors of the two peace agreements. 
In Northern Ireland, the British and Irish governments have historical links to their 
respective ‘people’ in Northern Ireland. Moreover, the bilateral Dublin-London axis 
continues to be the driving force of the peace process in Northern Ireland. In fact, the 
only signatories to the British-Irish Agreement (1998) to which the Belfast Agreement 
is attached are the British Prime Minister, the Irish Taoiseach and the respective 
Foreign Ministers. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, the wars facilitated a more direct 
connection between Serbia and Croatia and ‘their’ respective people in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Zagreb was a guarantor of the Washington Agreement (1994) that 
established a confederation between the Republic of Croatia and the Bosniak-Croat 
Federation. The role of Belgrade during the war is well-recorded by international 
observers, especially through the workings of the ICTY. Not only did Belgrade fund 
the Bosnian Serb military (and paramilitaries), but sent its own army into Bosnia. The 
Dayton-Paris Agreement was finally signed with the leaders of Croatia and Serbia as 
the guarantors along with the President of Bosnia-Hercegovina (a Bosniak).  
 
The final significant parallel between Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Hercegovina is 
that both the conflicts (and settlements) were shaped by their location within Europe. 
The legacy of the two ‘world’ wars is significant in both places, as are the various 
empires that ruled over the continent. More recently, EU Programmes in Northern 
Ireland are one of the cross-border bodies established by Strand 2. More importantly, 
most of the major strides in intergovernmental cooperation between London and 
Dublin (e.g. AIA, DSD, GFA) occurred after 1973, when both countries joined the 
European Union (then the European Community). Since then, the relationship 
between the two governments has been characterised as an equal partnership within 
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Europe. The processes of Europeanisation are significant in the Western Balkans, and 
the promise of rehabilitation into Europe is politically salient. The government in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina has embarked on defence reforms to join the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) in order to ultimately gain membership into supranational European 
institutions. Moreover, occasional investigations by the European Commission on the 
status of democratisation and market liberalisation in the Western Balkans (most 
recently in April 2004) encourage countries like Bosnia-Hercegovina to pursue 
political and economic reforms to fit into ‘Europe’. 
 
Although both cases have important parallels, there are some limitations to the 
comparison between Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Hercegovina. First, both Northern 
Ireland and Bosnia-Hercegovina are within the geo-political and historical influence 
of Europe, but the cases under study fall on either side of the boundary between 
Europe and ‘other’. Northern Ireland is perceived  (wrongly) as an aberration within 
‘Europe’, an anachronism of Protestant/Catholic antagonism surrounded by more 
civilised neighbours. On the other hand, Bosnia-Hercegovina is seen as the product of 
ancient hatreds on the ‘doorstep of Europe’ in the ‘Balkans’. More importantly, the 
on-going transformation of Bosnia-Hercegovina (as with all post-transition 
Communist countries) into a ‘normal’ state has involved democratisation, creation of 
liberal markets and the institutionalisation of state frontiers. Although Northern 
Ireland did not have the market transformation of the post-communist countries, it did 
have fundamental political changes similar to those in Bosnia-Hercegovina due to 
devolution. Significantly, institution building in both cases has moved the locus of 
political power and decision-making from non-local administrators (in Belgrade or in 
London) to local institutions run by local policymakers in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, 
Mostar and Belfast. 
 
The second potential limitation of the comparative analysis is the connection of the 
reference states with the number of constituent groups. In the case of Northern Ireland, 
there are two constituent groups protected in the Strand 1 institutions, Nationalists and 
Unionists. There are two corresponding reference states for these groups, centred in 
Dublin and London. By contrast, there are three constituent groups in Bosnia-
Hercegovina: Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. However, there are only two ‘reference 
states’, Serbia (and Montenegro) for Bosnian Serbs, and Croatia for Bosnian Croats. 
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The constituent group with the plurality of the population in Bosnia-Hercegovina does 
not have a ‘reference state’. It is sometimes mentioned that Turkey acts as a patron to 
the Bosniaks. Additionally, the Gulf States have reportedly contributed to the cultural 
and religious development in predominantly Muslim areas in Bosnia. Finally, 
Izetbegović called on fellow Muslims to defend Bosniaks during the wars, bringing 
many mujeheddin from all over the world to Bosnia-Hercegovina. The existence of a 
non-neighbouring ‘reference state’ appears to problematise the analysis. However, 
there are two ways to address the third constituent group in the case of Bosnia-
Hercegovina. 
 
The first is to recall the directionality of the network of relationships introduced above. 
The theoretical underpinning of transnational consociation assumes that the payoffs 
and conditions in the reference states affect the settlement in the disputed area. The 
process of conflict regulation is started by reference states, and they utilise links with 
‘their’ co-nationals to influence the settlement, not vice versa. The second reply to the 
lack of a reference state (or non-regional reference state) for Bosniaks is again 
through the underlying assumptions of transnational consociation, which will be 
derived in Chapter 3. The theory of transnational consociation assumes that the 
reference states prioritise absolute gains over relative gains for their co-nationals. 
That is, it is not as significant for reference states whether or not other constituent 
groups have higher or lower payoffs. It is important for reference states that certain 
safeguards are guaranteed for ‘their’ co-nationals in the implementation of the post-
conflict political structures. Thus, it does not matter how many constituent groups 
there are. Transnational consociation focuses on the role of reference states and how 
they ensure payoffs for their co-nationals under certain conditions through 
bipartisanship within the reference states  and intergovernmentalism. 
 
A third limitation in the comparability of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Northern Ireland is 
that the former is an internationally-recognised state and has membership in 
supranational organisations such as the United Nations and Council of Europe. By 
contrast, Northern Ireland is explicitly an integral part of the United Kingdom. Thus, a 
distinction can be made between a potential sovereign transnational consociation in 
which the disputed territory is seprate de jure from either of the reference states (e.g. 
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Bosnia-Hercegovina) and a potential regional transnational consociation in which the 
disputed terrirory is a part of one of the reference states de jure (e.g. Northern Ireland). 
 
These differences should not detract from the similarities. Although Northern Ireland 
is a part of the UK, there are provisions for it to leave the Union if a majority of its 
citizens so wish, which is different from any of the other devolved UK regions. 
Moreover, if there is any social unrest in Belfast, there is often a military response 
unlike in other parts of the UK. There are also different provisions for dual citizenship 
(with the Republic of Ireland) in Northern Ireland. Thus, an investigation of Northern 
Ireland as a unit of analysis separate from the UK is not as problematic as it initially 
appears. 
 
More importantly, the legal status of the disputed territory does not adversely affect 
the following investiagtion. In both case studies, there is an ethno-national conflict in 
which conflict groups have different national affiliations, leading to centrifugal 
tensions that reduce the likelihood of shared post-settlement institutions in the conflict 
zone. A transnational consociation in both case studies would require cooperative 
‘triangular relations’. That is, in addition to intergovernmentalism between Dublin 
and London, Dublin must convince Nationalists to participate in power-sharing in 
Belfast and be an acceptable arbiter to Unionists, while London encourages Unionists 
to share power in Belfast and be acceptable arbiters to Nationalists. Similarly, in 
addition to the Zagreb-Belgrade axis, Zagreb should encourage Bosnian Croats to 
participate in Bosnian institutions while remaining an acceptable broker for Bosniaks 
and Bosnian Serbs, and Belgrade should do the same for Bosnian Serbs while being 
seen as an acceptable broker by the Croats and Bosniaks in BiH. Thus, transnational 
consociation requires cooperative relations within the ‘Dayton Triangle’, but also the  
‘GFA Triangle’. The conflict geometry is the same in both cases. 
Methodology 
 
The methodology used in the following discussion is the ‘comparative method’ as 
suggested by Arend Lijphart.20 He asserts that the comparative method has a similar 
                                                 
20
 A. Lijphart, ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’, American Political Science Review, 
vol. 65, no. 3 (Sep. 1971): 682-93. 
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methodology to the statistical method in all ways than one: ‘The crucial difference is 
that the number of cases it deals with is too small to permit systematic control by 
means of partial correlations.’21 In other words, the comparative method is used when 
there are too few observations to make a statistical inference. The problem arises 
when each case has a complex structure, such as a state or a sub-state administration. 
In such complicated cases, there are many variables that need to be accounted for to 
be able to make the cases comparable. In short, there are more variables than the 
number of cases. 22  Peters translates this in statistical language as the dependent 
variable being ‘over-determined’.23 
 
Although using the comparative method is fraught with difficulties, it is not an 
inherently flawed methodology that is used because of scarce resources and time 
afforded to the researcher.24  Collier argues that the comparative method is not a 
second-best to the statistical method, but provides detailed, systematic thick 
description and political science analysis for a few cases, as opposed to superficial 
data processing in statistical and other large N studies.25 
 
A potential problem arises if the researcher wants to ensure that the dependent 
variable actually varies. If the values of the response variables for the case studies are 
similar, then it is difficult to conclusively infer a correlation between the causal 
variables and the response.26 However, tackling this issue creates further problems. As 
Peters asserts: 
 
One potential pitfall is choosing cases on the basis of the dependent variable rather than the 
independent variable. This is a human tendency. Researchers identify cases because of their success or 
failure, and study them because they are interesting. Unfortunately, there is no real variance to 
explain.27 
 
                                                 
21
 Ibid.: 684. 
22
 B. Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative 
Politics, Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press (2003): 136. Lijphart describes this as ‘many variables, 
small number of cases’ in Lijphart, ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’: 685. 
23
 B. Guy Peters, Comparative Politics: Theories and Methods, New York: NYU Press (1998): 65. 
24
 Lijphart, ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’. 
25
 D. Collier, ‘The Comparative Method’, in Political Science: the State of the Discipline II, ed. A. 
Finifter, Washington DC: APSA (1993).‘N’ is statistical short-hand for the number of cases. 
26
 Peters, Comparative Politics: 31. 
27
 Ibid.: 71. 
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This leads to the well-known problem of selection bias. It appears that the present 
investigation suffers from selection bias, since both the Northern Irish and Bosnian 
cases have power-sharing mechanisms. Internal consociation is actually an 
independent variable. The factors that make up transnational consociation derived in 
Chapter 3 are the causal variables, and the dependent variable is durable settlement. 
That is, looking at the differences in the factors that constitute transnational 
consociation, the empirical examination of the two cases will examine whether the 
political structures established after the respective peace agreements are likely to lead 
to a durable settlement. 
 
The problem remains that there are more potential causal variables than the number of 
cases. The literature generally suggests two strategies. The first is to increase the 
number of cases studies.28 This may mean widening the research to other countries or 
other sub-state political institutions. However, there is an alternative tactic in 
increasing the effective number of cases. If the same variables are recorded over an 
extended period of time, the values for each time can increase N. Extending the 
effective number of cases in this way also addresses the problem of maturation, where 
the conditions in the case study gradually vary over time (an thus cannot be seen as 
constant).29 This strategy is not useful for the present study, since the data for one 
instance of institutional structures in both Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Hercegovina 
have been collected over an extended period of time. The other strategy that can be 
employed is to reduce the number of variables. This can either be done empirically or 
theoretically.30 Empirically, this means that the researcher can carry out experiments 
to establish the connections between variables, resulting in fewer variables for the 
analysis. Theoretically, the researcher may employ a theoretical approach such as 
rational choice to deduce connections between variables in the study. It is the second 
approach that is used in the thesis. 
 
Before proceeding, it is instructive to briefly address another issue in the comparative 
politics literature. As a defence of the ‘favourable conditions’, Lijphart states that the 
                                                 
28
 Lijphart, ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’. See also King, et al, Designing Social 
Inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press (1994). 
29
 Peters, Comparative Politics: 53. 
30
 Ibid.: 70. 
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conditions are meant to be probabilistic, not deterministic.31 This follows Lijphart’s 
framework for the comparative method, which posits: 
 
All cases should be selected systematically, and the scientific search should be aimed at probabilistic, 
not universal generalisations. The erroneous tendency to reject a hypothesis on the basis of a single 
deviant case is rare when using the statistical method.32 
 
However, this is a misrepresentation of the statistical method. Each ‘deviant’ case can 
be used to infer characteristics based on distributions of statistics. These methods are 
only valid for large N studies and cannot be used in small N comparative politics 
research. Lieberson maintains, following Skocpol, that the methods used in small N 
studies are deterministic in their conception.33 On the other hand, Peters believes that 
Liberson’s framework is too stringent. 34  The rational choice approach that will be 
used is probabilistic (see below). Although the approach is often mis-interpreted as 
being deterministic, rational choice takes the following form: 
 
if the actor has the goals the analyst claims, and if the information calculations are plausible, and if the 
actor faces the particular benefits and costs for pursuing a particular action according to the analysis, 
only then will certain behaviour occur.35 
 
At every if in the statement above, agents may not make the correct calculations, but 
the approach only assumes that actors will behave in a certain way on average.36 Thus, 
the study of transnational consociation establishes probabilistic claims of the 
relationship between the features derived in Chapter 3 and a likely long-term 
settlement. 
Reducing Variables 
 
It is useful to return to the central problematic of the comparative method and how it 
affects the study of transnational consociation in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-
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33
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Hercegovina. There are four features of transnational consociation (internal 
consociation, intergovernmentalism, cross-border connection, and reference state 
bipartisanship), but only two case studies. However, this can be simplified for the 
following analysis. By using a theoretical framework, variables can be connected and 
assumed to be correlated. In Chapter 3, an informal rational treatment starting from 
the relationship between reference states will be used to derive the features of 
transnational consociation. Once the theoretical framework is derived, the empirical 
chapters will examine the presence or absence of the four features that comprise 
transnational consociation in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina: reference 
state/co-national links, bipartisanship, intergovernmentalism and internal consociation. 
The thesis will then show whether the presence of the features are likely to result in a 
durable settlement. 
Chapter Structure 
 
In chapter 2, the three concepts underlying transnational consociation will be 
examined. First, the nationalism literature contains primordialist, modernisation and 
instrumentalist strands. The thesis will employ an approach of time-varying national 
boundaries, since it combines the main strands of the nationalism literature to explain 
both the persistence of ethno-national boundaries as well as the historical variation in 
the salience of ethno-national ties. Second, the pluralist notion of the state cannot 
accommodate deep cleavages between groups. However, Arend Lijphart found that 
fragmented countries could still achieve a stable consociational democracy through 
inter-group elite accommodation. Although Lijphart identifies the possibility of 
democratic stability in divided societies, he neglects the potential constructive role of 
external actors. In particular, the role of neighbouring ‘reference states’ can be 
significant in the negotiation, implementation, and operation of power-sharing, as 
seen in the work Stefan Wolff and the Flensburg-based think-tank ECMI. Moreover, 
the influence of external actors can be crucial to the stability of the power-sharing 
settlement. Thus, the varying level of group affinity, Lijphart’s work on 
‘consociational democracy’, and the aforementioned projects on the influence of 
external actors all inform the notion of transnational consociation.   
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The theory of transnational consociation is derived in Chapter 3 using an informal 
model. It is first assumed that the governments in the reference states can act in one of 
four ways: sever its ties with the conflict zone, escalate the conflict, maintain the same 
level of conflict, or seek coordination with the other state to manage the conflict. The 
relative payoffs of pursuing different actions are then deduced. The features of 
transnational consociation are then developed in three steps. First, the conditions for 
intergovernmentalism between the reference states is derived. Second, once the 
dominant strategy is bilateral coordination, the offer to the conflict groups resembles 
consociational democracy, since neither reference state wants ‘their’ co-nationals to 
possibly lose power in the disputed territory. Co-nationals losing power can be 
symbolically and/or instrumentally costly to the reference state. Third, conflict groups 
choose whether to settle depending on the benefits and costs of inclusion versus 
exclusion. If all of the major parties in the conflict prefer settlement, there will be a 
transnational consociation. The four features of transnational consociation that will be 
derived using the informal model are: persistent links between reference states and 
their co-nationals; bipartisanship within reference states regarding the disputed 
territory; coordination between the two reference states regarding the conflict; and 
consociational democracy within the conflict zone. 
 
The explanatory theory of transnational consociation extends Lijphart’s notion of 
internal consociation by introducing reference state/co-national links and reference 
state coordination into the analysis. These three dimensions are used to organise the 
empirical chapters. 
 
Chapter 4 provides a description of the Belfast and Dayton-Paris Agreements. The 
institutions established by the two accords both exhibit the features of consociational 
democracy put forward by Lijphart. However, both documents also have provisions 
that protect reference state/co-national links. In addition to these structures, there are 
institutions both in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina that fall outside the 
scope of transnational consociation, but these will only be described briefly. 
 
Chapters 5-7 will empirically examine the implementation of post-settlement power-
sharing in the two cases along the three dimensions mentioned above. In Chapter 5, 
durable reference state/co-national links are illustrated between Dublin and Irish 
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Nationalists, London and Unionists, Zagreb and Bosnian Croats, and Belgrade and 
Bosnian Serbs. In Chapter 6, there is an investigation of the reference states to see 
whether there is bipartisanship and intergovernmentalism regarding the conflict zone. 
The findings in this chapter suggest a lack of intergovernmentalism along the Zagreb-
Belgrade axis regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina. Thus, there is no equivalent to the 
cooperation between London and Dublin that steers the political process in Northern 
Ireland. In Chapter 7, the settlements within the disputed territories are examined. By 
employing criteria developed by Ulrich Schneckener, it is possible to differentiate the 
long-term prospects for durable internal consociation in the two cases. It will be 
shown that a long-term power-sharing settlement is more likely in Northern Ireland 
than in Bosnia-Hercegovina given the present situation. 
 
The final chapter will summarise the thesis, but also provide normative 
recommendations to improve the institutions in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-
Hercegovina to fit with transnational consociation. The final sections will provide 
possibilities for further research, which include formalisation of the theory and 
examining other case studies. 
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Chapter II: Consociational Democracy and Transnationalism 
 
Introduction 
 
Any study of politics and conflict regulation in deeply divided societies contains 
underlying concepts that are often not made explicit. First, there is a nation or ethnic 
group at the focus of the study. Second, there is a territorial boundary within which 
the social interactions under investigation take place. Third, there is an area outside 
the territorial boundary external to the study, which includes neighbouring states, 
states outside the region, and the ‘international community’. That is, there are 
underlying assumptions about the different levels of analysis: ‘internal’, ‘border’ and 
‘external’. 
 
The pivotal actors in the following chapters are groups of people. These groups are 
organised into self-conscious, self-defined communities based on a notion of extended 
kinship with a linguistic, religious or other cultural focus. The first section will briefly 
examine the main threads of the nationalism literature by looking at ways in which 
ties in ‘ethnic groups’ may be formed. By studying the notions of nationalism, it is 
possible to lay bare the underlying assumptions about the communities that will be the 
subjects of the thesis. The primordialist perspective posits that there is an essential (i.e. 
natural) link within an ethnic group, while other perspectives claim that the ties are 
linked to either the agency of elites or the level of modernisation. However, 
primordialists cannot account for the changes in the level of group cohesion, and 
instrumentalists cannot explain why certain boundaries are not crossed or blurred. It 
may be more fruitful to look at approaches that combine the main threads of 
nationalism, such as the ‘matrix’ formulation by McKay and Brubaker’s concept of 
‘groupness’.  
 
The second underlying concept is that of ‘the state’. In theory, a state with liberal 
pluralist foundations can accommodate heterogeneity. However, recent normative 
writings from this perspective are more cautious about the amount of difference that 
can be managed in a pluralist society. Rawls suggests that there is a difference 
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between ‘deep pluralism’ that is insurmountable within a society and a manageable 
pluralism that can be bridged within a society. Will Kymlicka suggests group-
differentiated rights for all. Even with these more modest claims, these pluralist 
perspectives underplay the congruence of majority culture and ‘overarching’, ‘neutral’, 
or ‘universal’ norms that are the basis of citizenship in diverse societies. In societies 
in which there are cumulative cleavages, there are centrifugal tensions pulling the 
state apart. It is in these contexts that an ethnonational conflict results. Following the 
work of Gabriel Almond, a society in which there is strong fragmentation should 
exhibit institutional instability. However, Arend Lijphart found that certain states in 
Western Europe with fragmented political communities were able to produce stability 
through elite accommodation in a ‘consociational democracy’. 
 
The third section examines the origins of consociational democracy. The formulation 
put forward by Lijphart consists of four institutional criteria: a grand coalition of the 
major parties; mutual veto by each of the major groups; proportionality in electoral 
systems and the corresponding political representation; and segmental autonomy for 
each group to run its own affairs. The consociational model has been exported around 
the globe to establish power-sharing in divided societies, including the two cases 
examined in this thesis. 
 
Though Lijphart claims his formulation has been applied widely outside the original 
cases in Western Europe, consociational democracy has come under attack since its 
conception. There are collected criticisms in many articles and books, but only four of 
the critiques are relevant for this study. First, Lijphart’s reasoning seems to be circular, 
since he claims that traditions of elite accommodation lead to elite accommodation. 
Second, Lijphart’s work does not establish whether elite accommodation led to 
institutional power-sharing or vice versa. Third, the basis of consociation is elite 
accommodation, but there is no motivation for elites to accommodate. Finally, and 
most crucially, the theory might not be relevant for societies in which the cleavage is 
not ideological, but rather ethnonational. However, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, it may be possible to retrieve a more appropriate set of favourable conditions 
for consociational democracy in divided societies. 
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The third underlying component of the thesis, the distinction between ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ territory, is examined in the final section. Lijphart focuses on ‘internal 
settlement’, but by doing this, he commits the ‘territorial trap’ of assuming societies 
are congruent with their territorial borders.1 By critiquing this assertion, it is possible 
to undermine the reification of territoriality. However, it is important to stay away 
from the poststructuralist precipice of erasing borders, since positing that ‘anything 
goes’ is dangerous in the context of deeply divided societies. It is more fruitful in the 
context of this study to utilise a weak defence of territorial borders as suggested by 
John Williams.2 
 
This weak defence of territoriality is useful in the study in the following chapters. The 
concept of transnational consociation can be situated within the literature by 
combining the approaches of the complex power sharing project from the ECMI and 
the cross-border ethnic conflict framework proposed by Stefan Wolff. Transnational 
consociation is explored in the thesis in the context of Bosnia-Hercegovina and 
Northern Ireland in Chapters 4-7. 
Nations and Reference States 
 
Any study that investigates the relationships between the ‘elites’, ‘people’, ‘nations’, 
and ‘states’ implicitly utilises the literature on nationalism and ethnicity. There are 
several strands in the literature on nationalism. Primordialists argue that there is an 
essential, almost biological link between members of a national, religious, ethnic, or 
tribal group. 3  Other threads of the literature include the ‘instrumental’ and 
‘modernisation’ perspectives on nationalism. The former corpus posits that leaders of 
ethnic groups use aspects of the culture to promote the interest of the group, and the 
                                                 
1
 Although the four classical cases (Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland) were all ‘internal’ 
settlements, Lijphart later applies consociational democracy to examples where this is not the case, 
such as Cyprus, Lebanon and Northern Ireland. 
2
 J. Williams,  ‘Territorial Borders, International Ethics and Geography: Do Good Fences Still Make 
Good Neighbours?’ Geopolitics, vol. 8, no. 2:25-46. 
3
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Journal of Sociology, vol. 8 (1957): 130-145. Although Clifford Gerrtz was not a primordialist, the 
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Sociological Perspective’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 1, no. 4 (1978): 402-411. 
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latter approach concludes that national ties are connected to the level of techonology 
(e.g. linguistic nationalism developed after the invention of the printing press).4 
 
Primordial perspectives cannot explain the variability of the salience of the 
boundaries between communities. On the other hand, although the name of a 
collectivity may change due to different political objectives and contexts, there are 
certain community boundaries that are not traversed. 5  That is, there are certain 
identities that are not easily compatible (such as being bi-religious), nor is it easy to 
transform between certain identities (e.g. from being ‘Serb’ to becoming ‘Albanian’ 
in Kosovo). 
 
It is more fruitful not to ask what a nation is, but rather, to use a turn of phrase by 
Walker Connor, ‘when is a nation?’ Thus, it is more instructive to look at more 
complex formulations that combine the primordialist and other approaches to 
nationalism. McKay suggests a ‘matrix’ framework on two axes: ethnic 
manifestations based on primordial factors versus ethnic manifestations based on 
material factors.  Thus, one can plot different national groups on such a two-axis 
system based on whether primordial and instrumental factors are ‘low’ or ‘high’.6  
The added advantages of such a framework are two-fold.  First, such a framework can 
be used to differentiate between groups within a community, such as Irish 
paramilitaries (material as well as primordial manifestations) and individuals who join 
Irish cultural and Gaelic athletic associations (mainly primordial manifestations).7 
Secondly, the two axes can chart the evolution of a certain group along the two axes 
in different historical periods.  Not only can the historical levels of nationalism within 
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 P. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Practice, London: Sage Publications: 75. Proponents 
of the modernisation perspective such as Benedict Anderson argue that nationalism is linked to the rise 
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Change, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson (1964). An optimistic theory is put forward by Karl 
Deutsch in Nationalism and Social Communication. Deutsch writes that when modernisation is 
achieved, nationalism becomes obsolete. See K. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 
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5
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6
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phenomena’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 5, no. 4: 401-413. 
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a community be variable, but also the definition of the group itself. For example, the 
identification of  ‘Yugoslav’ was more pronounced at certain times than others. 
 
The work of Rogers Brubaker develops a concept of ‘groupness’, which suggests that 
the very notion of group identification being immutable is flawed.8 The phenomenon 
of ‘groupness’ suggests that there are certain periods of history where the group 
boundaries become ‘fuzzier’, and the distinction between groups becomes more 
pronounced at other times. 
 
One can apply approaches that appreciate both the durability of certain identities and 
the time-varying salience of these identities.  Although there are often underlying 
economic and material factors in deeply divided societies, one cannot wish away 
certain ‘ethnic’ identifiers when managing ethno-national disputes. It is in this way 
that Brubaker’s own analysis, though sceptical of a purely instrumentalist approach to 
ethnic groups, nonetheless claims that approaches that focus on group identities are 
strengthened by ordinary language, the ‘parochial scholarly tradition’, the codification 
of group identities in policy, and the ‘group-making, group-strengthening endeavours 
of ethno-political entrepreneurs’.9 Thus, Brubaker proposes that group identities are 
malleable and constructed, and his critique of  ‘groupism’ does not appreciate the 
persistence of particular ethno-national groups.  
 
This does not suggest that ethno-national groups have some ‘natural’ or ‘biological’ 
foundation. As mentioned in the first chapter, the present analysis is agnostic about 
such intra-group links. More importantly, primordial analyses have largely failed to 
include the importance of historical context of conflict regulation. 
 
Thus, conflict regulation should aim to appreciate both the persistence of ethno-
national boundaries within divided societies, but also the economic and political 
contexts in which settlements are reached. 
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CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND TRANSNATIONALISM 
 43 
The study of the consociational settlements in Northern Ireland and Bosnia-
Hercegovina will be examined with particular attention to the historical context of 
conflict regulation in the respective divided societies. Thus, the following 
investigation of consociational conflict management uses an underlying formulation 
of nationalism that combines material  and primordial approaches. 
 
The literature on nationalism is particularly significant in the following chapters, since 
it is this bond of ‘nation’ that connects the ‘reference state’ to its co-nationals, even 
across internationally-recognised boundaries.  Thus, with human boundaries as the 
starting point, with concepts of nationalism, the thesis will privilege the link between 
the reference state and co-nationals as qualitatively different from other types of 
‘external’ actors.10 In fact, the following chapters will show that ‘reference states’ are 
not ‘external’ to the implementation of power-sharing at all. 
The State and Its Citizens 
 
At the centre of the modern organisation of society is the liberal pluralist notion of the 
state. Pluralism refers to a political philosophical defence of diversity in institutions, 
beliefs and societies, which is an attack on the concept of the unitary, over-centralised 
monist state.11 This is not the same as the plural societies that are the subject of 
Lijphart’s work, which refer to a society characterised by ‘religious, ideological, 
linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, or ethnic’ divisions. 12  The result of the neo-
Madisonian pluralist prescription extends the state to encompass a variety of groups 
and belief systems and protects them through inalienable universal rights. Advocates 
of pluralism are strongly against centralisation of state authority, so thinkers from the 
literature propose societal checks and balances, not institutional ones. Madison argues 
that for a large enough geographical area and enough social diversity, it would not be 
possible to construct a majority, and thus, not possible to have the ‘tyranny of the 
majority.’13 
                                                 
10
 Presuming human boundaries are durable is not tantamount to a confirmation of a ‘socio-biological’ 
link within an ethnonational group. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the term ‘reference state’ 
is used to remain agnostic about whether there is a primordial connection with ‘their’ co-nationals.  
11
 P. Dunleavy and B. O’Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan (1987): 13.  
12
 A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press (1977): 3-4. 
13
 R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago: University of Chicago (1964): 104. 
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND TRANSNATIONALISM 
 44 
 
In less diverse societies, even if numerical majorities are difficult to organise, they are 
not impossible. In such situations, a system of checks and balances must be 
established to thwart the domination of the majority. However, it is challenging to set 
up a system that guarantees the protection of the minority without giving the minority 
disproportionate power to block political decisions. One possible solution would be to 
divide the territory into smaller units with local autonomy (i.e. federalisation), so that 
minorities have political power at the local level. 14  This notion of ‘scattered 
sovereignty’ has been proposed as a potential strategy to address the conflict in 
Jerusalem.15 
 
The driving force behind the liberal pluralist programme is that heterogeneity can be 
accommodated through the application of universal principles of citizenship, 
institutional checks and balances and an appeal to a cross-group societal culture. This 
assumes that there is some neutral standpoint from which such morals can be derived.  
These tenets can be enshrined in universal ‘inalienable’ rights in state constitutions. 
However, these types of ‘common’ cross-cutting notions have an underlying 
integration/assimilation effect. That is, within a particular society, the ‘common 
culture’ will tend towards that of the majority group. Such a framework conflates the 
‘multi-ethnic’ and majority identities (e.g. Soviet and Russian, Yugoslav and Serb, 
American and ‘WASP’), leading to the assimilation of other national affiliations.  
Minorities in multi-ethnic states are often treated as an underclass, though they are 
legally conferred ‘equal citizenship.’  Examples include the Chinese in Malaysia, 
Arabs in Israel, and African-Americans in the USA.16 The problems of managing 
differences between different groups above a certain level of heterogeneity has led to 
a softening of the conventional pluralist conception. Rawls suggests that there are 
varying levels of pluralism, and that there is ‘deep pluralism’ between state borders 
(assuming that these borders are congruent with political communities), and less 
pluralism within a state, so that agreement about societal norms can only be reached 
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in the latter.17  A further amendment was suggested by Will Kymlicka, where all 
minority groups have separate sets of rights. However, his formulation is based on the 
example of Canada, in which specific rights are granted to minority groups, but an 
overarching Western Judeo-Christian perspective still prevails. The same can also be 
said for India, where there are multi-cultural rights for different linguistic, religious 
and tribal groups, but the identification of ‘Indian’ culture is strongly North Indian 
and Hindu-Bramhin. 
 
Pluralists maintain that a society with many ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ is stable. There 
is a greater chance of fragmentation in societies in which there is one significant 
cleavage.18 The definition of cleavage used here consists of three parts proposed by 
Lipset and Rokkan, though the concept itself is older. First, groups are socially 
separate from other groups. Secondly, the group must be aware that it is a separate, 
distinct group. Third, there are organisations that affirm the group’s distinct status 
(political parties, sports clubs, religious institutions, etc.). In societies where cleavages 
are cross-cutting, the divisive impact of each cleavage, for example, class and religion, 
are attenuated, since there is overlap between the cleavages. In other words, in the 
above example, by knowing an individual’s religion, it is difficult to ascertain the 
individual’s class. 
 
Madison and more recent commentators argue that overlapping memberships allow 
for members of the majority group to concur with members of the minority on certain 
issues.19 On the other hand, if the cleavages coincide, then the society is divided, and 
there is ‘deep pluralism’ within the state. In the two case studies investigated later in 
the thesis, these cumulative cleavages exist. In Northern Ireland, there are reinforced 
cleavages of nation (Irish v. British) and religion (Catholic v. Protestant). In Bosnia-
Hercegovina, there are cumulative cleavages along national, (arguably) linguistic and 
religious axes. In such a situation, if one of the sides of the cleavage controls the state 
apparatus, there will be a crisis for the state. 
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Gabriel Almond proposed a typology by which Western democracies can be 
categorised by their structure and political culture. Using Almond’s criteria, Lijphart 
suggests that there are two resulting sub-groups: Anglo-American and Scandinavian 
democracies; and other European democracies. The latter group of countries have 
cumulative cleavages, so Almond would predict unstable governing systems for all of 
them. However, this group includes unstable democracies (such as the Weimar 
Republic) and stable ones (such as the Netherlands). This led Lijphart to posit that an 
underlying variable, elite accommodation, accounted for the differences. This results 
in an alternative typology based on elite accommodation and level of fragmentation 
(i.e. whether cumulative cleavages exist). With elite accommodation, it is possible to 
have fragmented yet stable systems in so-called consociational democracies.20 
Introducing Consociational Democracy 
The origins of the consociational democracy literature can be traced back to the 
comparative politics corpus from Western Europe.  These studies focus on four states: 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland. 
The classical consociational literature falls broadly into three categories.  First, the 
elite accommodation comes out of a segmented social structure. In the work by 
Lorwin, an institutionalised cleavage is the starting point, and then the amount of 
cooperation in the resulting political system is examined.21  Second, consociational 
democracy is posited as a form of elite behaviour.  This dominant approach in the 
literature is put forward by Lijphart.  The crucial subject of investigation for authors 
such as Lijphart and Lehmbruch is the goodwill of elites within a fragmented society.  
The third thread in the literature focuses on the role of political tradition.  That is, in 
places where there has been a long history of accommodation between leaders and a 
culture of mutual understanding, there will be accommodative practices.  Such an 
approach is used by Daalder in examining the Netherlands and Switzerland.22  
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 A. Lijphart, ‘Consociational Democracy’, World Politics, vol. 21, no. 2 (1969): 207-225. 
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Certainly, the three approaches are related, since they all examine the stability of 
democractic institutions in ‘fragmented’ societies within Western Europe. The 
difference is the main focus of the three strands. Lorwin pays particular attention to 
institutions; Lijphart and Lehmbruch look at elite behaviour; and Daalder examines 
political traditions. However, the work by Lijphart, who remains most closely 
associated with consociational theory, has incorporated the two other approaches in 
his later work.23  Although there have been useful contributions to the literature on 
consociational democracy by many authors, contributions by Lijphart will be the 
focus of the rest of the thesis, since his work is most closely associated with 
consociational democracy. 
Lijphart suggests four features of consociational democracy.  First, the members of 
the political elite from all of the major segments in a divided society work together to 
govern the country. This requirement contrasts with the Anglo-American system of 
having a government and an opposition in bare-majority legislatures.  The second trait 
is that there is a mutual veto in decision-making such that smaller segments are not 
dominated by larger ones.  Third, the principle of proportionality is paramount to the 
operation of consociational democracy.  It contrasts with the political procedures in 
Anglo-American electoral systems in which the ‘winner takes all’.  This principle also 
refers to the proportional allocation of political positions and resource allocation 
between the segments.  Finally, there is a high level of autonomy for each segment to 
run its own affairs.  This sort of autonomy need not be territorial, but it can also be 
used in conjunction with territorial management techniques such as federalism.24 
Lijphart’s original formulation has been rigorously defined by O’Leary in examining 
more ‘complex’ formulations of consociational democratic institutions: 
Grand Coalition. A distinction should be made between the ways that a 
consociational executive is formed. One possibility is that all of the major political 
parties from major groups from across the main cleavage are represented. This can 
either be achieved voluntarily or by constitutional requirement. Such a scenario 
represents a ‘complete’ consociation and is a ‘grand’ coalition. On the other hand, it is 
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possible for cross-community coalitions to form that exclude certain major parties 
from the executive. This situation of ‘concurrent’ consociation occurs when the cross-
cleavage coalition represents a majority from each segment, despite the exclusion of 
certain parties. This difference is relevant to the case studies examined in the 
following chapters. The Northern Ireland Act establishes a coalition between all of the 
major parties. In fact, there is no official ‘opposition’ in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. On the other hand, oversized cross-community coalitions include the 
largest parties from the three constituent nations of Bosnia-Hercegovina, while other 
parties are in opposition. A third distinction is also highlighted by O’Leary. A 
consociation is ‘liberal’ if voters are allowed to choose freely between political parties, 
but ‘corporate’ if voters must declare their group identity and only be able to vote for 
‘their’ parties. The former system encourages the formation of cross-community or 
cross-ethnic parties.25 
Segmental Autonomy. A distinction needs to be made between non-territorial and 
territorial formulations of autonomy. Special rights for minorities can be extended 
territorially where they have a local numerical advantage. Non-territorial autonomy 
means that members of major constituent groups in a divided society enjoy rights by 
virtue of their identity irrespective of their location within the territory. This non-
territorial autonomy is corporate if group members can form organisations anywhere 
in the state, such as separate schools for minority groups. Individuals can also have 
personal autonomy, such as choosing to read newspapers in ‘their language’.26 
Proportionality. Proportionality can be applied in two main areas. First, 
proportionality means a translation of demographic strength to electoral 
representation in formal political institutions. Secondly, the principle of 
proportionality can be applied to ensure a fair allocation of public expenditure and 
public jobs.27 
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Mutual Veto Rights. Although Lijphart makes a distinction between ‘informal’ and 
‘formal’ veto rights, it is only in the latter case when there are explicit, legally 
enforceable directives that veto rights really exist.28 
Lijphart’s original formulation also provides a set of favourable conditions for 
consociational democracy: a multiple balance of power instead of either dual 
segments or single-group hegemony; multiparty systems that will ensure the 
representation of the major segments; the smallness of a country that will both make 
the country easier to govern and allow for elites to know each other better; the 
structure of the religious and linguistic cleavages; the existence of cross-cutting 
cleavages; possibility of overarching loyalties such as ‘Christian’ for Calvinist and 
Catholics in Switzerland; political parties that have cross-cutting electorates such as 
the parties in the Netherlands that cross-cut class; segmental isolation and federalism; 
and a tradition of elite accommodation. 
Although the consociational model proposed by Lijphart was originally an 
explanatory framework for the deviant case of democracy in the Netherlands, it has 
become more prescriptive in recent years. Even from the first book on consociational 
democracies, Lijphart broadcasted his message to would-be constitutional engineers.  
He tells his audience: 
 
This book’s message to the political leaders of plural societies is to encourage them to engage in a form 
of political engineering: if they wish to establish or strengthen democratic institutions in their countries, 
they must become consociational engineers.29 
 
In 1985, Lijphart used consociational theory to suggest institutions for a post-
apartheid South Africa.  His prescriptions followed a critical assessment of 
consociational, semi-consociational and quasi-consociational proposals for South 
Africa since the late 1970s.30  
According to Lijphart, existing consociational systems were established through 
conscious decisions by political elites in: Canada (1840), the Netherlands (1917), 
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Lebanon and Switzerland (1943), Malaysia (1955), Colombia (1958), Cyprus (1960), 
Belgium (1970), and Czechoslovakia (1989).31  
Two examples that could be added are Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Hercegovina, the 
cases examined in this thesis. It is vital to acknowledge that conscious decisions by 
local, regional and international actors led to consociational settlements in both BiH 
and Northern Ireland.  The case of Bosnia-Hercegovina is interesting, where the 
negotiations, with a strong element of international backing, formulated a settlement 
to create a multi-national ‘Bosnia’.  Moreover, within Bosnia, one of the sub-state 
‘entities’ contains federal mechanisms between Croats and Bosniaks.  It is important 
to note that the international community backed a multi-ethnic ‘solution’ in Bosnia, 
though it had legitimated and helped consolidate mono-ethnic states in Slovenia and 
Croatia.  Instead of power-sharing, the latter two states have a privileged constituent 
nation and explicit protections for subordinate minorities. A more thorough discussion 
of the institutional architecture of consociation in the case studies will be deferred to 
Chapter 4.   
Critiques of Consociational Democracy 
There have been many articles and books that have been sceptical of Lijphart’s notion 
of ‘consociational democracy’. 32  However, this discussion will not contain an 
exhaustive list of empirical and methodological complaints against Lijphart, except 
for the critiques that will directly affect the study undertaken in the following chapters. 
 
The first relevant criticism is that the formulation of consociational democracy uses 
circular reasoning.  This is because one of the favourable conditions in Lijphart’s 
original framework states that ‘traditions of elite accommodation’ are conducive for 
consociational democracy. However, this is a misinterpretation of his ‘condition’, 
which draws on the aforementioned work of Daalder. Daalder found that ‘ancient 
pluralism facilitated the development of a stable, legitimate and consistently pluralist 
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modern society’.33  In other words, pre-modern/pre-democratic elite accommodation 
is likelier to lead to democratic elite accommodation. Thus, Daalder (and Lijphart) are 
not making circular claims, but rather posit that a history of accommodative practices 
pre-dispose a society, even a segmented society, to consociational practices. 
 
Another critique is that, even from the original case study of the Netherlands, it is 
unclear whether elite accommodation led to ‘concordant democracy’, or whether 
‘concordant democracy’ (which is akin to ‘democratic stability’) led to elite 
accommodation. For example, the Pacification of the Netherlands in 1917 led to the 
ad hoc creation of a grand coalition between the zuilen that depended on a tradition of 
elite accommodation. 34   It appears that elite accommodation has led to the 
characteristic institutions of consociational democracy, not the other way around.  
This critique was first deployed by Boynton and Kwon, though it has been used later 
by other authors.35  Thus, Lijphart’s empirical study is ambiguous about the causal 
direction of the phenomena he is studying.36 
 
However, the theoretical framework for transnational consociation developed in the 
next chapter does not assume that there is a tradition of  elite accommodation.  It will 
be shown that after the onset of reference state cooperation, the institutions in the 
disputed area are set up such that exclusion is costly for conflict groups. Thus, 
cooperating with the ‘other side’ in internal power-sharing is the best strategy. 
 
A sustained critique of Lijphart’s project has been levelled by Horowitz and his rival 
research programme of ‘integrative’ methods for conflict regulation.37   The main 
observation by Horowitz is that consociational democracy depends on inter-elite 
                                                 
33
 H. Daalder, ‘On Building Consociational Nations: Cases of the Netherlands and Switzerland’: 114. 
34
 A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: 101-102. 
35
 G.R. Boynton and W.H. Kwon, ‘An Analysis of Consociational Democracy’, Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 1 (February 1978): 11-25.  See also van Schendelen, op cit., I. Lustick, op cit., 
and R. Andeweg, ‘Consociational Democracy’, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 3 (2000): 520-
521. 
36
 For a discussion of causality and causal inference, refer to G. King, et al., Designing Social Inquiry, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press (1994): 75-114.  In particular, see ibid., 107-108 to see the 
significance of discerning between dependent and independent variables.  Not doing so would lead to 
the type of problem highlighted by Boynton and Kwon. 
37
 For example, Horowitz and Lijphart provided alternate views for political engineers at a conference 
at Notre Dame in 1999.  The papers can be found as the first two chapters of  The Architecture of 
Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, ed. A. Reynolds, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press (2002). 
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND TRANSNATIONALISM 
 52 
accommodation, but there is no mechanism to encourage this cooperation between 
segmental politicians.  There is no evidence to suggest that political elites are more 
accommodating than the rest of their community.  In fact, the elites benefit most from 
the perpetuation of conflict.38 Thus, Horowitz suggests that the best institutions are 
those that encourage moderation, and then the construction of a common state identity. 
 
Similar to the above, the conditions derived for transnational consociation in the next 
chapter will be such that it is costly for groups in the disputed area to be excluded 
rather than participate in the settlement. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the 
settlement comes about after cooperating reference states use their links with co-
nationals to conclude a power-sharing settlement. Thus, elites in conflict groups do 
not cooperate because they are inherently more ‘accommodating’ than their followers, 
but rather that non-cooperation is a costlier option.  
 
The most relevant critique of the classical formulation of consociational democracy 
was deployed by Barry, who argued that communities that are bound by ethnic or 
national or ethnic solidarity are not as appropriate for a consociational solution as 
societies in which the main cleavages are ideological or religious.39  In fact, Lijphart 
himself questions the applicability of power-sharing in Northern Ireland, including the 
lack of an overarching loyalty (i.e. shared ‘Northern Irish’ identity).40 
 
However, Lijphart claims successful consociations have included ethnically divided 
societies, such as Malaysia, Belgium and Switzerland.41  In the case of the Alliance in 
Malaysia, Malays were the dominant members, and the constituencies were arranged 
such that rural areas (where there were more Malays than non-Malays) were over-
represented. Thus, stability was maintained through majority control.42  In the two 
other cases, although there were different ethno-linguistic groupings, the salient 
schisms in the society were religious or ideological.  In more recent times, the 
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linguistic cleavage has become more pronounced in both Belgium and Switzerland, 
and there has been a weakening of the consociational nature of the political system in 
both places. 
 
Thus, Lijphart’s original formulation for the classical cases needs to be revised to be 
applicable to deeply divided societies. McGarry and O’Leary propose a more 
‘demanding’ set of conditions to replace Lijphart’s ‘favourable conditions’: 
 
First, the rival ethnic segments must not be unreservedly committed to immediate or medium-term 
integration or assimilation of others into ‘their’ nation or to the creation of their own nation-
state…Second, successive generations of political leaders must have the right motivations to engage in 
conflict regulation and sustain the consociational system…Third, the political leaders of the relevant 
ethnic communities must enjoy some political autonomy themselves, so they can make compromises 
without being accused of treachery.43 
 
To attain these conditions in deeply divided societies is indeed more challenging than 
for the classical examples of Western European consociational democracy and 
highlights the critique that Barry and others have levelled about the relevance of the 
prescriptive power of consociational theory. Nonetheless, domestic and international 
political elites opted for consociational arrangements in both Northern Ireland and in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina. A least-bad attempt was better than continued violence in these 
deeply divided societies. 
 
More recently, international  ‘constitutional engineers’ are looking at consociational 
democratic institutions in Iraq. The interim structures imposed by the international 
community in Iraq resemble three of the  features of consociational democracy. 
Proportionality in the election of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) was 
ensured using a closed list proportional representation (PR) electoral system. That is, 
the lists were constructed to allow for diverse groups to have representation in the 
TNA (including a stipulation for 25% women). Lijphart prescribes a PR list system in 
general for consociational democracies. The draft of the Iraqi constitutions has 
provisions for linguistic/cultural groups within the country (such as the Turkomen, 
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Chaldeans and Assyrians) to have segmental autonomy over education. 44  The 
institutions also include federal structures to foster territorial autonomy. Moreover, 
although not a written provision in the constitution, the prime minister appointed a 
Kurd, a Shia and a Sunni  as the deputy prime ministers in May 2005.45 Thus, there is 
an informal grand coalition. 
 
In the next section, it will be shown that the classical consociational democracy 
literature assumes that accommodation need only involve elites ‘within’ a disputed 
territory. However, by questioning the conflation of territory and ‘society’, it is 
possible to extend the analysis to include regional actors, thus providing a more useful 
framework for certain cross-border conflict situations. 
Critiquing (But Not Discarding) Borders 
 
In Lijphart’s extended defence of consociational theory, he counters the claim that 
consociational democracy is not empirically valid. 46   Lijphart examines the two 
‘consociational failures’ of Lebanon and Cyprus.  He concludes that, although the 
Lebanese consociational arrangement was not ‘blameless’, the root cause for the 
outbreak of civil war was, in the words of Ghassan Tueni (a Lebanese diplomat), 
‘external conflicts projected upon internal divisions [emphasis added].’47  Lijphart’s 
diagnosis for Cyprus is the same: the consociational agreement of 1960 ended in 1963 
(with the outbreak of civil war) and was ultimately ‘doomed by a Turkish invasion in 
1974 [emphasis added].’48  Moreover, in formulating a series of favourable conditions 
that foster inter-elite cooperation, Lijphart cites the ‘existence of  ‘external threats to 
the country.’49 
 
The above shows that Lijphart assumes that the site for power-sharing is internal to 
the conflict zone and discounts the possibility that ‘external’ actors may play a 
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constructive role.50 Although the formulation of transnational consociation provides a 
reconceptualisation of the inside/outside dichotomy, it will not be a sweeping critique 
of territory and state sovereignty.51 
 
Radical critical (including constructivist) approaches are wanting on several levels. 
First, critical approaches have only deconstructed the present states system by 
revealing underlying meanings of ‘space’, but have not progressed beyond this. That 
is, a deconstruction of territorial borders might offer interesting insights, but does not 
propose how things might have been constructed in a different world.52 As a result, 
the study of borders has not resulted in a theory of borders.53 An approach that does 
not have a theoretical account of territorial borders is inappropriate for the study of 
ethnonational conflict since it does not address the current concept of sovereignty in 
the states system. 
 
Second, critical approaches aim to show the hegemony inherent in the system in order 
to remove these hegemonic structures. However, all that remains when everything 
else is removed (according to postmodern approaches) is power. Thus, the status quo 
realist approaches and the postmodern approaches that attempt to undermine them 
come full circle, and again, no alternative is offered. It is naked power that would 
triumph. Since this implies ‘might makes right’, hypercritical notions advocating the 
‘end of the state’ or the ‘end of sovereignty’ would have unintended negative 
consequences, especially in deeply divided societies. 
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Third, postmodern and constructivist formulations attempt to step back from the 
current states system, so intersubjectivity and contextuality are neglected.54 Radical 
constructivist views assume that territory is a tabula rasa upon which any narrative 
can be projected, and thus, any spatialisation and temporalisation of the political space 
is ‘valid.’ However, although no material objects can be understood without the lenses 
of social perception, the resulting narratives are not arbitrary, but constrained by a 
‘reality’ beyond human discourses.55 
 
For the current study, though it is useful to appreciate the observations offered by 
‘critical’ accounts, it is vital that this not lead the discussion over the nihilist precipice 
of a ‘borderless world’ where ‘anything goes’. Similarly, adhering to a conservative 
state-centric gaze would prolong the zero-sum nature of the contest for sovereignty 
between communities in ethnonational conflicts. A possible way forward is to move 
beyond the dichotomy of ‘problem-solving’ or ‘critical’ theories, and provide a more 
gradualist or ‘transformative’ approach.56 This sort of transformative framework for 
territoriality is suggested by John Williams. Instead of an entrenchment of the status 
quo or complete de-territorialisation, Williams offers a ‘limited defence of the ethics 
of territorial borders.’57 Instead of a discontinuous break with current notions, it is 
more instructive to employ the concept of a gradual transformation (or ‘cascading’) of 
international norms. 58  Thus, the boundaries between the constituent units of the 
international system have evolved: between absolutist empires governed by religion, 
between absolutist empires governed by monarchs, between states established through 
national self-determination, and arguably, between supra-national entities such as the 
European Union. 
 
Thus, the constitution of the state system is not pre-determined. There is an 
underlying reason for choosing the guiding principles of territoriality: the result of the 
states system is the least bad system that ensures individual security. A similar 
distinction is proposed by David Miller. An individualistic notion of liberalism starts 
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with a set of ‘inalienable’ (read ‘deontological’) rights and deduces the traits of the 
state.59  On the other hand, a sociological approach looks at the consequences of 
selecting different ways to address the organisation of political space, and follows 
more pragmatic principles to ensure liberal rights in the resulting concept of the 
state. 60  Williams’s approach suggests the latter (more consequentialist) logic. By 
employing a weak defence of territorial borders, it is possible to propose a conception 
of inside and outside that ensures individual human security, even in deeply divided 
societies in which territorial boundaries do not coincide with national boundaries. 
 
By employing a weak defence of territoriality, there are two implications that are 
significant for the rest of the thesis. The first is that it is possible to formulate 
cooperative trans-border structures that afford groups separated by state borders 
extensive econo-politico-social links. The important factor is that these structures can 
be cooperative, and not fall into winner-takes-all norms of the states-system. Thus, it 
is possible in certain places, even with territorial boundaries, for cross-border 
influence to not be ‘irredentist’. Using some of the ideas from the ‘critical’ literature, 
it is possible to explore new ways of incorporating group identities. 
 
The second implication is an update of Lijphart’s formulations. Re-visiting the 
traditional conception of consociational democracy, the political space within which 
political elites interact is territorially defined.  The deeper consequence of Lijphart’s 
territorial ontology is that identity and difference are only relevant on a ‘local’ basis.    
By putting forward a weak defence of the status quo international states system, it 
presents the opportunity to incorporate ‘translocal’ identities ignored by Lijphart.61 
 
The ‘cleavages’ that divide the two case studies examined in the following chapters 
have human boundaries, where ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are characterised by a non-
territorial ‘society container.’ Barthes suggests that studies should focus on ethnic 
                                                 
59
 D. Miller, ‘Liberalism and Boundaries: A Response to Buchanan’, in States, Nations and Borders: 
The Ethics of Making Boundaries, ed. A. Buchanan and M. Moore, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press (2003): 264. Miller cites Robert Nozick’s conception as epitomising ‘individualistic’ approaches. 
60
 Ibid.: 263. 
61
 A. Appuradai, ‘Sovereignty Without Territoriality,’ in The Geography of Identity, ed. P. Yaeger. Ann 
Arbor, MI: Univ. of Michigan Press (1996). 
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND TRANSNATIONALISM 
 58 
boundaries. 62  The social cleavages mentioned by Lijphart in divided societies are 
human. Though they may have a ‘local’ manifestation (e.g. Northern v. Southern 
Sudanese, etc.), the core difference between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ should look beyond 
state-centric frameworks. However, the focus on ‘ethnic’ boundaries should not 
justify discarding territorial notions of politics, since doing so would lead to 
instability. Softening the traditional requirements of territoriality has resulted in a 
two-step advance on Lijphart’s original framework. 
Stage I: Complex Power-Sharing 
 
The complex power-sharing project from the European Centre for Minority Issues 
(ECMI) proposes a ‘third way’ between the integrationist and consociationalist 
approaches by seeking alternatives to either strand in its pure form.63 By softening the 
requirement for exclusivist territorial authority in deeply divided societies, complex 
power sharing opens up the possibility of  ‘external’ agents in the investigation of 
conflict regulation. 
 
There are two related phenomena connected with the project. The first is complex 
autonomy, which means that autonomy (either territorial or non-territorial) can be 
combined with another strategy of conflict regulation. 64  Complex power sharing 
results when consociational institutions are combined with other types of conflict 
regulation.65 
  
The most important innovation put forward by the ECMI is the inclusion of 
international intervention in the establishment of conflict regulation in deeply divided 
societies.  Although this subject is mentioned by Sisk,66 international elements in 
                                                 
62
 D. Conversi,  ‘Nationalism, Boundaries, and Violence,’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 
vol. 28. no. 3 (Special Issue 1999): 553. 
63
 See ECMI, http://www.ecmi.de/cps/about_approaches.htm; ECMI, 
http://www.ecmi.de/cps/about_what.htm. 
64
 These strategies are outlined in Rightsizing the State. The first set of strategies aims to eliminate 
differences: genocide, expulsion (ethnic cleansing), assimilation and integration. The second set of 
conflict regulation practices attempts to manage differences: control, arbitration, autonomy, and 
consociation. 
65
 For example, the Human Rights Chamber in Bosnia-Hercegovina allows for international arbitration 
of disputes; the principle of consent allows for a self-determined secession of Northern Ireland.  
66
 TD Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, Washington DC: United 
States Institute of Peace (1996): 86-117. 
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND TRANSNATIONALISM 
 59 
power sharing are necessary in complex power-sharing.67   The commentators on 
complex power sharing claim that the power-sharing agreements that are concluded 
with international mediation/intervention are qualitatively different from the 
agreements that are formulated internally.  Moreover, the effect of ‘outside’ elements 
extends beyond the negotiation stage and also affects the success or non-success of 
power-sharing implementation.  This international element can either be individual 
states or international organisations such as the OSCE and the United Nations.  
Furthermore, there is a distinction made between ‘international mediation’ and 
‘international intervention’.  The former refers to a situation in which the parties in a 
conflict are willing to settle the conflict, but are unable to do so without external help.  
The latter refers to a conflict in which international actors impose a settlement.  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the four other criteria for the project are: cases 
should be recent; the cases will not be those that solely provided autonomy for a 
minority group; cases that are not conflicts just for sole control of the state (e.g. 
Somalia and DR Congo); and agreements that are not solely resolved in favour of one 
party over the other (e.g. East Timor), which is similar to Nordlinger’s definition of 
‘concession’. 68   Summing together all of the criteria, the following definition of 
complex power-sharing is proposed: ‘Complex power-sharing generates a multi-level 
process of inclusive access to resources and to public decision making by nominated 
groups with international involvement.’69 
Stage II: Transnational consociation 
 
The attention to the ‘external’ involvement is significant to this project, and complex 
power sharing provides a good starting-point for this thesis.  However, at this early 
stage of the ECMI project, there is no differentiation between the types of external 
actors.  The involvement of the Republic of Ireland in the settlement in Northern 
Ireland is qualitatively different from the role of NATO for Bosnia-Hercegovina and 
of Syria in Lebanon.  Subsequent work for ‘complex power sharing’ will differentiate 
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between the different external actors.70  The work in the following chapters will be an 
extension of the complex power sharing model. Unlike the current complex power 
sharing literature, the thesis will differentiate between the types of ‘external’ actors, 
and pay particular attention to the role of ‘reference states’ in the operation of power-
sharing. 
 
Stefan Wolff has also investigated the role of ‘external’ actors in conflict regulation.71 
His research examines ethnic conflict settlement in Alsace, Saarland, South Tyrol, 
Northern Ireland, Andorra and the New Hebrides. The conflict geometry is that there 
is a disputed territory with a significant ‘external minority’ separated from their 
‘homeland’. 
 
If the external influence and institutionalisation investigated in the complex power 
sharing project is combined with the geometry (i.e. two reference states and their co-
nationals) of the ethno-territorial cross-border conflict examined by Wolff, the 
resulting phenomenon is one of transnational consociation. 
 
The concept of transnational consociation differs from Wolff’s framework, in which 
some of the settlements required that either the reference state or ‘host state’ withdraw 
its claims, but in both cases examined in subsequent chapters, reference states 
continue to have formalised involvement in the disputed territory. On the other hand, 
complex power sharing does not distinguish between different ‘external’ agents, and 
thus, does not prioritise the influence of reference states in complex power sharing 
settlements. 
 
Hence, the concept of transnational consociation is a special case of complex power 
sharing where the ‘external’ agent is a neighbouring reference state. It is also a special 
case of ‘ethno-territorial cross-border conflict’ that Wolff terms ‘consociation with 
permanent external formal involvement.’ 
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Considering the existing literature, the statement of the central hypotheses for this 
project is the following:  
 
First, in an ‘ethnonational conflict’, the role any reference state  is more important 
than any other ‘external’ actor. Second, the long-term implementation of power-
sharing institutions cannot occur without the cooperation of neighbouring reference 
states.  
 
Reference states are vital, since ‘national ties’ available to elites (both in reference 
states and in the conflict zone) are quite durable. It is difficult for other actors (non-
reference states or international organisations) to override the durable links between 
the reference state ‘homeland’ and the co-nationals in the disputed territory. This does 
not imply that nationalism is static and natural, but also that it cannot be wished away, 
so a more time-varying approach towards group affinity must be employed. Such an 
approach looks at the evolution of group ties and examines the political contexts in 
the reference states during which transnational consociation can develop. In 
transnational consociation, reference states may have a constructive role to enforce a 
durable settlement. It is for this reason that the reference state, which is seen both by 
the reference state and co-nationals as the guarantors for ‘their nation’, is pivotal to 
the analysis. 
 
The predominance of reference states does not imply that other ‘external actors’ are 
insignificant. Non-reference states (e.g. Israel vis-à-vis Syria), a coalition of non-
regional states (the ‘international community’ in Kosovo)  and diasporas living in 
other countries (e.g. Tamils outside Sri Lanka) can still have a significant role in the 
perpetuation or regulation of an ethnoterritorial conflict. However, reference states 
have both a national link to the co-nationals (unlike non-regional states and the 
international community) as well as the advantages of legitimacy and leverage in the 
state-centric international system (unlike non-state actors such as diasporas in other 
states). 
 
The thesis will address one of the questions posed by Wolff: ‘What modifications of 
the consociational process will occur because of the altered structure of agents 
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involved?’72 The model in Chapter 3 derives the features (independent variables) that 
lead to a likely settlement (dependent variable) when there are reference states. 
 
Answering the question will require an investigation of the influence of reference 
states in the shaping of the institutions. By examining the evolving political context in 
the reference states, it is possible to see how reference state dynamics influence 
consociational stability in the disputed territory. 
 
In addition to this question, a further question will also be explored: does the 
reference state/co-national link have a more significant role than any other agent? 
That is, if the reference state does not moderate, the claim in this thesis is that even 
with active ‘international’ involvement, a stable settlement cannot be concluded.  
Concluding Remarks 
 
The preceding discussion examined the underlying notions of nations, territory and 
the boundary of inside and outside in the political sphere to introduce the concept of 
transnational consociation. The first section focused on the two ends of the spectrum 
in the nationalism literature. On the one hand, primordialists argue that the cohesion 
between certain groups is natural and ahistorical. On the other hand, modernists and 
instrumentalists propose that the cohesion of ‘nations’ is either due to the 
modernisation process (modernists) or through the rational calculations of elites 
(instrumentalists). However, primordialists cannot account for the variation of group 
affinity, while the other threads cannot explain why certain identity boundaries persist. 
Thus, approaches that combine the two strands must be utilised, such as the concept 
of ‘groupness’ developed by Brubaker that appreciates the historical context within 
which groups interact. 
 
After looking at the ‘nation’, it is important to look at the territory on which the 
groups interact. The pluralist conception of liberal democracy assumes that 
heterogeneous groups can be accommodated within the same political unit through 
universal human rights. Thus, such a notion suggests a view of the liberal pluralist 
state as some of the modernist theorists did. Deutsch wrote that nationalism, and 
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national fragmentation would just vanish through progress and modernisation towards 
the Enlightenment ideal of cosmopolitan values. 
 
However, there is no neutral standpoint from which common cultures can be 
constructed, so one or another group identity becomes dominant. This suggests that if 
pluralism cannot accommodate above a certain level of diversity, the resulting 
societies will be fragmented, and there will be pressures to not belong to the same 
society. However, Lijphart examined the cases of ‘fragmented’ societies in the 
Netherlands, Low Countries, and Austria. He found that despite a fragmented society 
along cumulative cleavages, there was political stability due to elite accommodation. 
The resulting political institutions were called consociational democracy. 
 
The classical formulation of consociational democracy has four traits: grand coalition, 
proportionality, mutual veto, and segmental autonomy. There are also associated 
favourable conditions for the development of consociation: multiple segments, a 
multiparty system, a small country, cross-cutting cleavages, overarching loyalties, 
political parties that reflect these overarching identities, isolated groups, federalism, 
and elite accommodation in the past. There are some distinctions that need to be made 
to develop the criteria fully: there needs to be a distinction between grand coalition 
and oversized coalitions; a distinction between proportionality for public posts and for 
elected representation; territorial and non-territorial autonomy; and insistence on 
mutual veto rights to ensure the protection of the minority. 
 
Although consociational democracy has been used throughout the world by so-called 
‘constitutional engineers’, there are four critiques of Lijphart’s framework that are 
relevant for the discussion. First, the ‘fragmented’ countries used by Lijphart are not 
that fragmented, since there had been elite accommodation in the past. Moreover, 
Lijphart does not ascertain whether elite accommodation led to power-sharing or vice 
versa. Third, there is no incentive for elites to be accommodating and seek political 
support from other segments of the population. Most importantly, the literature on the 
classical cases assume that there is no fundamental conflict about whether the country 
should exist at all. Thus, there needs to be an adjustment in the favourable conditions 
to make them more appropriate for ethnonational conflicts: elites must not be 
committed to integration of other groups in the short-term; future elites must be 
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faithful to the consociational system; and elites can negotiate with elites from other 
segments without being accused of betrayal. 
 
The discussion then focused on the norm of territoriality in the state system. The call 
for certain post-positivist and radical constructivists for de-territorialisation or re-
terrorialisation has ‘real’ destabilising consequences for deeply divided societies. 
Thus, a better approach is a ‘weak defence of territorial borders’.  
 
After ‘weakening’ the demarcation between inside and outside, transnational 
consociation is contrasted with Stefan Wolff’s research and with complex power-
sharing. This leads to the primary hypothesis for the project: there will be no 
sustainable consociational democracy without cooperation between reference states, 
even with strong intervention from actors such as international organisations and 
other states. 
 
Using the above conceptual foundations, there are two research foci for the following 
chapters: 
 
• What modifications of the consociational process will occur because of the 
role of reference states? 
• Is the influence of reference states more important than any other ‘external 
agents? 
• Does cooperation between reference states over a disputed territory lead to 
likely operational stability? 
 
The following chapter will develop a theoretical framework for transnational 
consociation using an informal model, deriving the characteristics of the phenomenon 
and the linkages between the constituent features. It is this theoretical framework that 
will be used to examine power-sharing settlements in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-
Hercegovina in the empirical chapters in order to address the above research questions. 
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Chapter III: A Theory of Transnational Consociation 
Introductory Remarks 
 
The theory of transnational consociation is only applicable in situations with the 
appropriate conflict geometry. That is, there are two sufficiently evenly-matched 
reference states (such that the military option is unviable for either state) and an 
ethnonational dispute between co-nationals of the reference states (and perhaps other 
groups in the conflict zone). The method used to derive the traits of transnational 
consocation is through a simple model. The features of conflicts in which reference 
states are significant will form an analytic narrative.1 The studies by Bates and others 
were ‘analytic’ since they used rational choice methods to derive the features of a 
social phenomenon, and were ‘narratives’ since they also relied heavily on case study 
work to confirm or refute the theory. The same methodology will be used to construct 
and illustrate the theory of transnational consociation.  
 
The following discussion will add constraints that take account of particularities of 
conflicts in which reference states are significant to deduce the features of a possible 
settlement. However, the resulting findings are not deeply-embedded in one specific 
situation, such as Lijphart’s use of the Netherlands as a basis for consociationalist 
theory. Thus, this leaves the possibility for the framework derived in the following 
sections to not only be applied to the two case studies in this thesis, but extended in 
the future to other relevant contexts. 
 
The chapter will begin with a justification for using rationalist methods to develop the 
theory, followed by a short review of the existing the literature using similar methods 
to examine ethnonational conflict regulation. After that, the pivotal actors in the 
reference states and conflict zone are identified, and the conditions by which a power-
sharing agreement underpinned by reference state intergovernmentalism will be 
derived. The four features of transnational consociation that are extracted from the 
analysis are: internal consociation, reference state/co-national links, 
intergovernmentalism, and bipartisanship. The first is the same as Lijphart’s 
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framework for pillarised societies. However, in addition to the ‘internal’ power-
sharing, the theory shows the importance of reference state/co-national links and 
external (i.e. intergovernmental and bipartisan) reference state dynamics that have 
been neglected in the literature. The three dimensions of internal, reference state/co-
national, and external features form the organising principle for the empirical inquiry 
in Chapters 4-7. 
Disclaimer 
 
The use of game theory and rational choice models has often been eschewed by 
commentators on ethnic conflict regulation and nationalism. Ethnic conflicts are 
sometimes described as ‘irrational’ expressions of competing nationalisms and 
ancient antagonisms that prevent ‘rational’ dialogue between members of conflict 
groups. However, that would neglect the strategic character of elite behaviour in 
ethnic conflict regulation (or perpetuation). Brendan O’Duffy makes a distinction 
between ‘sectarian’ and ‘ethno-national’ conflicts.2 The former refers to conflicts in 
which the only objective is to eradicate the other conflict group, whereas the latter 
refers to a conflict that can be explained by strategic objectives. The disputes 
examined in this thesis fall into the latter category. 
 
The ‘utility’ maximised by ethnic entrepreneurs in ethnonational conflicts is not 
necessarily economic. The ‘payoffs’ obtained by elites are related to homeland, nation, 
and other concepts that can only be understood through nationalism. Thus, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the account of nation underlying the thesis is one 
that combines features of both the instrumental and primordial readings of 
nationalism.  
 
The other qualification for the use of rational-actor models in examining ethnic 
conflict is that these descriptions are models. That is, the framework provides a 
limited account of a phenomenon that holds under specific contextual constraints. The 
value of using these methods in this study is to derive certain outcomes under specific 
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conditions, not to provide a universal script for all elite behaviour in ethnonational 
conflicts. 
The Existing Literature 
 
The approach used below combines other game-theoretical formulations of ethnic 
conflict. A pessimistic framework suggests that due to the consolidation of democratic 
institutions, it is rational for a minority group to escalate the conflict in the present, 
instead of waiting.3 However, Fearon and Laitin suggest that interethnic cooperation 
can be explained by looking at two alternative scenarios. In the first, antagonism 
escalates into a ‘spiral’ of retribution between conflict groups, and the fear of this 
leads to cooperation. In the second scenario, interethnic conflict does not escalate due 
to individuals from one group aggrieving individuals from the other, since the injured 
parties are assured that the other group will ‘police’ appropriately within their own 
community.4 
 
Weingast finds that the type of interethnic system that arises from ‘constructing trust’ 
includes proportionality and a mutual veto to ensure that the payoff from cooperation 
is higher than either fighting or becoming a victim.5 These findings are relevant to the 
type of settlement pursued by cooperating reference states and will be mentioned 
again later in the chapter. Tsebelis provides a more formalised account of elites 
negotiating within a power-sharing democracy.6 
 
Pieter van Houten’s work examines the strategies of reference states in certain conflict 
zones. The reference state can intervene, or not get actively involved with the conflict 
in the disputed area.7 
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As explained in the introductory chapter, the term ‘reference state’ will be used since 
it is preferable to ‘kin states’ and ‘patron states’. The following derivation will extend 
the work of van Houten by including a second reference state to the analysis. 
 
Perhaps most relevant to the conflict geometry examined below is the work of 
Barbara Walter. From a game theoretical approach, Walter posits that power-sharing 
agreements can be guaranteed by third-party intervention. However, the likelihood of 
the parties within the conflict accepting the power-sharing depends on the probablility 
that the third-party will enforce the terms of the power-sharing.8 It is here that the 
persistence of the reference state connection is vital in the implementation of a power-
sharing settlement and addresses the ‘commitment problem’ of ‘external’ involvement 
in ethnonational conflicts. 
Important Actors 
 
The important players in the framework are the political leaders of the four groups in 
the reference states and the four groups in the conflict zone. As mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, the process is elite-led since it is assumed that leaders have a 
certain level of ‘structured elite predominance.’ 
 
The actors that will be considered will be from two reference states, α and β, and 
within a conflict zone. Within α and β, there are groups of elites (A and B, 
respectively). In the conflict zone, there are corresponding groups of co-national elites 
(a and b, respectively). Moreover, in each reference state, there is a more 
accommodating (-) and less accommodating group (+). Correspondingly, there are 
more and less conciliatory groups in the conflict zone.9 
 
To simplify the theory, the actors are treated as internally homogeneous groups. In 
reality, these ‘players’ may be quite complex, with complicated interactions between 
various factions and battling personalities. However, accounting for all of the nuances 
of political party formation and cohesion would unnecessarily complicate the 
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following discussion. Another simplification is the assumption that reference states 
have substantial links with their co-nationals, but weaker relationships with members 
of the ‘other side’ in the disputed territory or groups (e.g political parties) that 
represent cross-community interests. This assumption can be supported empirically by 
looking at the level of support among cross-community/multiethnic parties in 
ethnonational conflict zones compared with monoethnic parties.  
 
Assumption: The pivotal actors in the reference states and disputed area are internally homogeneous. 
 
Assumption: Reference states have significant links with their co-nationals in the conflict zone, but 
weaker contacts with groups from the ‘other’ side in the disputed area or with cross-national groups. 
 
Events leading to transnational consociation occur in three stages. First, there are 
relative payoffs for groups in the reference states to either be more conciliatory or not 
with the other reference state regarding the conflict zone. There are certain equilibria 
such that the long-term gain from coordinating with groups in the other reference state 
is higher than not doing so. Second, once there is a situation when all of the groups in 
reference states coordinate their policy towards the conflict zone, they will make a 
joint offer to the conflict groups. In the third stage, the conflict groups either accept or 
reject the settlement. If the settlement is accepted, there is transnational consociation. 
 
Initial Conditions 
 
There are three important assumptions about the reference states. The first is that the 
two reference states find it costly to escalate the conflict. The type of escalation may 
be direct hostilities towards the other reference state or the disputed area, or indirect 
escalation through arming their co-nationals. Thus, the ‘military’ option is not open to 
either reference state. This may be due to actual military capabilities, but also the 
threat of enforcement from the international community. For example, Serbia is still 
militarily superior to military/paramilitary Albanian forces in Kosovo, but the threat 
of a renewed NATO campaign prevents open hostilities. If escalation is not costly, the 
probable solution of the situation becomes trivial. If one state is clearly stronger than 
the other, and this power is unchecked, the dominant reference state can impose its 
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ideal position on the other reference state as well as forcing a coercive solution in the 
conflict zone. The aggressive actions of the stronger reference state would incur 
relatively little cost. However, if escalation is costly, the strategy becomes more 
complex. 
 
The second assumption is that it is relatively costly for reference states to sever ties 
with co-nationals in the conflict zone. Disengaging from conflict zones need not be 
costly a priori. The whole process of decolonisation in Africa by the European 
powers suggests that it is possible to ‘quit’ in some cases without much cost in the 
‘colonising’ state itself. In fact, in the disputed area in conflict zones, there is a 
significant financial and human burden due to the maintenance of co-nationals. 
However, the cases that will be examined in the following chapters will be those in 
which the cost of disengagement would be high. The most appropriate framework to 
justify this are the ‘thresholds’ formulated by Ian Lustick to explain state-building and 
contraction.10 Lustick suggests that there are three stages in examining the conflict 
within the retreating state: 
 
Incumbency stage: if the government were to disengage from a territory, the resulting 
conflict within the reference state might lead to the fall of the government. However, 
the dispute will be contained within the competitive political institutions of the state. 
 
Regime stage: if the government retreats from a particular territory, the resulting 
dispute may not be contained within the political institutions of the state. There may 
be ‘extra-legal’ challenges to the government’s legitimacy in its authority to 
disengage from the conflict zone. 
 
Ideological hegemony stage: the territory in question is fully integrated institutionally 
in the operation of the state functions. Those on the territory of the state (including the 
area incorporated) believe that the borders of the state are permanent. Thus, there is 
no debate among the political elite about whether or not the area is part of the state or 
not. 
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The three stages are not on a continuum, but are distinct and separate stages of 
territorial incorporation into the ‘homeland’ going from incumbency to ideological 
hegemony. For a particular region to become either more integrated or more separated 
from the state, it can pass through two ‘thresholds’. The first is between the 
incumbency to the regime stages. That is, if the inclusion of a particular geographic 
area becomes more salient, disengaging does not only threaten the government of the 
day, but there may be extra-legal challenges to maintain sovereignty over the territory. 
When inclusion of the territory goes from the regime to incumbency stage, leaving the 
area is less politically salient, so disputes can be handled within the political 
institutions. The second ‘threshold’ is between the regime and ideological hegemony 
stages. That is, if the area crosses the ‘ideological hegemony threshold’, its inclusion 
into the state becomes unquestioned, and the region is as integral a part of the state as 
any other. However, if the threshold is crossed in reverse, it means that a once-
integral part of the state is now ‘loosened’. Although there could be internal instability 
if the state ‘disengages’, its inclusion into the territorial borders of the country are not 
as solid as before, such as Nagorno-Karabakh and former German territories in 
Poland, respectively. 
 
For transnational consociation, it is assumed that if the reference state fully 
disengages, it will be costly both for the ‘abandoned’ co-nationals and the reference 
state, since citizens in the latter feel some sense of responsibility for ‘their’ people in 
the conflict zone. Another related assumption is that if their reference state removes 
its support, the co-nationals do not have the strength to ‘go it alone’ against the 
competing reference state or other conflict groups. Thus, being ‘abandoned’ would 
lead to a swift defeat for the co-nationals. If this is not the case, the resolution is again 
trivial. The reference state can simply leave with little cost and loss of legitimacy at 
the ‘core’ of the state and little cost to the co-nationals. Using Lustick’s typology, 
losing the ‘disputed land’ has not crossed the threshold from the incumbency to 
regime stage for the reference state. 
 
The third assumption is also linked to costly disengagement. The connection of the 
reference state is qualitatively different from that of other ‘external’ actors in their 
commitment to agreements in the disputed area. Since it is difficult to exit the conflict, 
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it is more likely that the reference state will maintain a durable link in the dispute. In 
the case of reference states, the probablility is quite high that once they are involved 
in the regulation of the conflict, they will remain engaged. There are two reasons for 
this. The first is, as mentioned above, it is costly for the state to disengage because of 
the potential destabilising effects to the legitimacy of the reference state itself. Second, 
reference states are usually contiguous to the disputed area. Thus, not remaining 
connected to the conflict regulation can result in destabilising factors such as the 
spread of the conflict and an influx of displaced persons. However, these constraints 
are not relevant to extra-regional states or multilateral institutions. The costs and 
benefits are driven largely by domestic factors usually not connected with the conflict. 
Thus, the certainty of the engagement is lower than for reference states. Using the 
aforementioned finding by Walter, reference states are better at ensuring persistent 
influence in enforcing a power-sharing settlement.  
 
Assumption: The reference states are sufficiently evenly-matched, such that neither wants to impose its 
ideal solution on the other. 
 
Assumption: It is costly for reference states to disengage from the conflict zone. 
 
Proposition: Because it is costly for reference states to disengage from the dispute, the commitment is 
more durable than other ‘external actors.’ 
Different Possible Outcomes 
 
From the initial assumptions about the reference states, it is possible to set up a 
theoretical framework approximating the actions of reference states and 
corresponding conflict groups in a ethnonational cross-border conflict.  
 
The payoffs are approximately symmetrical. That is, the preferences are ordered in the 
same way for both reference states. It is assumed that the benefits for reference states 
increase with higher political, economic and cultural influence in the disputed 
territory. Moreover, the payoff for the reference state is higher if the co-national has 
more political power in the disputed territory. 
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To simplify the strategies available, it is assumed reference states can move in one of 
four ways: 
 
• The reference state can invade or arm the co-nationals in the disputed territory, 
thus escalating the level of conflict (ESC). 
 
• The reference state can reach a cooperative settlement (COOP). 
 
• The reference state can do nothing, and stay at the status quo level of conflict 
with the other reference state (SQ). 
 
• The reference state can quit the disputed territory (GO). 
 
A more formal treatment of the relative benefits for the reference states is contained in 
Appendix I. 
 
Since the preferences of the reference states are symmetric (as explained above), it is 
only necessary to complete the analysis for one of the states. 
 
First, looking at the payoffs when both states pursue the same action, it is very costly 
when both escalate the conflict. However, both states disengaging from the conflict 
zone is assumed to be even more costly, since this can destabilise the reference states 
themselves and be highly detrimental to the co-nationals. If the two states reach a 
cooperative agreement, this is preferable to the status quo level of conflict. 
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Thus, in order, the best outcomes for the reference state if they both follow the same 
action (e.g. both states simultaneously decide to escalate the dispute) is: 
 
1. Mutual cooperation 
2. Neither state changes the level of conflict 
3. Interstate conflict 
4. Both states disengage from the conflict zone 
 
If states do not both follow the same action, then there are further hypotheses about 
the relative payoffs. 
Reference state α escalates the conflict 
  
If the reference state decides to escalate the conflict, then the other state would be a 
‘sucker’ if it has not also escalated the conflict.11 However, the penalty incurred by 
the other state depends on the action it pursues. If the second reference state 
disengages when the first escalates the conflict, this will result in an unopposed 
intervention by the latter. The attacking reference state will reap the most benefit, 
since it will be able to impose its ideal political setup without the interference of the 
other reference state. If the other state tries to cooperate when the reference state 
escalates the conflict, it will be less of a ‘sucker’ than if it exits the disputed area, 
since both states still have links to the co-nationals. However, the reference state will 
gain more if the other state tries to cooperate compared versus the other state doing 
nothing. This is because the second state devotes some of its resources to creating 
cooperation, so that the first state catches it ‘off-guard’ by escalating the conflict. The 
worst outcome for the first state is if the second state also escalates the conflict, since 
they are ‘evenly-matched’.  
Reference state α stays at the status quo level of conflict 
 
On the other hand, if the reference state remains at the status quo level of conflict, it 
will do best if the other reference state leaves. As mentioned in the previous section, if 
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the other reference state becomes divorced from the conflict, it is possible for the 
remaining state to impose its preferred settlement without hindrance. If the other state 
seeks cooperation, it is better for the first state than if the second state does nothing. 
The second state is a bigger ‘sucker’ if it makes arrangements to cooperate, but this is 
not reciprocated. Of course, the first state staying at the status quo is better for the 
second state than if the first state escalates the conflict. Finally, if the second state 
escalates the conflict, then the first state is a ‘sucker’ by doing nothing and will have a 
low payoff. 
Reference state α tries to cooperate with the other state 
 
If the reference state sets up the means to cooperate with the other state, but the other 
state decides to leave the conflict zone, this is the best result for the former. The first 
reference state is left to pursue its policy unhindered. However, if the other state 
escalates the conflict, then it will be very costly for the first state. Finally, as with the 
other scenarios, the first state is a bigger ‘sucker’ if the other state chooses to not to 
reciprocate the cooperative overtures than if the other state returns the favour and 
pursues mutual cooperation. 
Reference state α disengages from the disputed territory 
 
As mentioned above, disengaging from the disputed area is costly in all scenarios. 
However, the worst situation would be leaving the conflict zone while the other 
reference state escalates the conflict, since this will lead to a swift defeat for the co-
nationals. If the second reference state stays at the status quo, it will still be 
unopposed in the disputed area. Doing nothing is slightly better for State β than 
cooperating, since extending cooperation requires resources. The least bad scenario 
for State α is if the other state also disengages from the conflict. 
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In all four scenarios, the relative payoffs for State α, in order from best to worst, result 
when: 
 
1. The other state disengages from the conflict zone and severs its ties with its 
co-nationals 
2. The other state attempts to set up cooperative political structures with the first 
state 
3. The other state stays at  the status quo 
4. The other state escalates the conflict 
 
However, State α  is a bigger ‘sucker’ if it disengages from the conflict, compared to 
cooperation, status quo, and escalating the conflict, in that order. Moreover, there are 
further factors that govern the action pursued by reference state α. The relative 
payoffs for the two reference states are assumed to be symmetric, so that the order of 
the preferences for the two states are the same. Reference state α knows this and will 
include this information in its tactics. 
 
A more mathematical treatment is included in Appendix I.A, where a possible 
equilibrium is shown.12 That is, there is not a unique solution, but one is chosen that 
has implications for the current study. 
 
For all of the scenarios, the reference state will always do badly if it tries to disengage 
from the conflict. Thus, it will pursue one of the three other possible actions. 
 
Assumption: The order of the benefits the various scenarios is the same for both reference states. Thus, 
the payoffs are symmetric. 
 
Hypothesis: Since disengaging is costly, all other actions will be preferable for both reference states. 
 
                                                 
12
 Refer to the inequality at the end of Appendix I.A. 
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Stage I: Reference State Co-operation 
One Shot Situation 
 
The simplest version of the scenario is that each state acts simultaneously in a ‘one-
shot game.’ The first thing that can be inferred from the previous section is that 
disengaging from the disputed area incurs higher cost than other actions, so neither 
state will pursue this action. Moreover, looking at the relative benefits from the four 
possible actions and taking into account the relative benefits for the other state, the 
best way to ensure that the reference state does not come out a ‘sucker’ is by 
escalating the conflict. The other reference state makes the same calculations and will 
also escalate the conflict. Recalling the relative gains from pursuing the same action, 
although mutual escalation of the dispute is worse than mutual cooperation or even 
staying at the status quo level of conflict, the sub-optimal payoff is akin to the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. That is, although reference states could get higher payoffs, the 
dominant strategy is such that they will do worse than the optimal outcome of mutual 
cooperation. 
 
Assumption: The reference states will act simultaneously, and will consider the possible actions by the 
other reference state in their calculations. Moreover, the reference states will assume that the other 
state is seeking to maximise its benefit. 
 
Hypothesis: In the one-shot version of the interaction between the reference states, the preferred action 
for both will be to escalate the conflict, even though this is sub-optimal. This is to insure that a state is 
not a ‘sucker’ if the other reference state escalates, and the first state does not. 
Finite Iterations 
 
Instead of a ‘one-shot game’, if the situation is extended such that there are a finite 
number of actions, the result will still be that both reference states will choose to 
escalate the conflict at every stage. The reason for this is that in such a finite iterative 
context, reference states will escalate the conflict in the final stage. However, each of 
the states knows that this will be the case, and will escalate the conflict at the previous 
stage. The states will then repeat the same calculation, so that they use backwards 
induction and pursue escalation of the conflict at each stage. 
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Hypothesis: In the finite iteration version, reference states will escalate the conflict at each stage, since 
they will escalate at the last stage. Using backward induction, they will also choose to escalate the 
dispute at all other stages. 
Infinite Iterations 
 
Although both the one-shot and finite iterative versions of the conflict end with an 
escalation of hostilities between the reference states, it is possible to find scenarios 
with the infinite iterative version in which it is possible for the reference states to 
prefer mutual cooperation over either the status quo or conflict escalation. ‘Infinite’ 
iterations does not imply that the interaction between the reference states will go on 
forever, but rather that the end of the ‘game’ is not included in the calculations carried 
out by the two reference states. 
 
The folk theorem posits that in such ‘infinitely’ repeating games, it is possible for 
actors to seek a cooperative solution, even if such a solution does not exist in the one-
shot version. The only assumptions are that actors choose their actions based on long-
term payoffs, and are thus sufficiently patient to consider future costs and benefits.13 
 
The findings in the discussion below are not meant to suggest that there is only one 
unique solution to a ‘ethno-territorial cross-border conflict’ with two reference states 
and their co-nationals. The thesis will not deduce a determinist theoretical framework. 
However, it will be shown below that one of the possible equilibria is mutual 
cooperation given a set of constraints. Before continuing with the discussion, it is 
useful to introduce two further a priori assumptions about the reference states. The 
first is that the governments in the reference states are ‘impatient’. In other words, 
they value getting a certain payoff now versus getting the same payoff in the future. 
This impatience is a part of the calculation when reference states calculate their long-
term benefits from pursuing particular strategies. The second concept to introduce is 
risk-aversion. In other words, reference states want to pursue a policy in the conflict 
area such that they do not take risks. This means that each reference state would rather 
                                                 
13
 For example, see K. Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume II: Just Playing, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1998): 293-328. R. Gibbons, A Primer in Game Theory, Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester-Watersheaf (1992): 56. 
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play it safe and take a certain benefit over taking a chance, even if the expected 
benefit over the course of infinite iterations works out to be the same. 
 
Hypothesis: Following the folk theorem, there are equilibria in the ‘infinite’ version of the situation, 
where the reference states do not include the end in their calculations. 
 
Assumption: In line with the Folk Theorem, reference states are assumed to make their calculations 
based on long-term benefits, and are patient enough to consider long-term gains in deciding on their 
actions. 
 
Assumption: Reference states are impatient and  risk-averse. 
Preferring Long-term Intergovernmental Cooperation 
 
The first piece of the intergovernmental cooperation puzzle is that it is possible to stay 
at the status quo level of conflict instead of escalating the conflict. Assuming that the 
reference states both start at the status quo, if one of the reference states escalates the 
conflict and the other state continues to stay at the status quo, the former state will 
benefit by the latter state’s inaction. However, the state that remained at the status quo 
level of conflict can retaliate by escalating the conflict at the next opportunity. The 
result is a heightened level of conflict between the two reference states. As mentioned 
above, mutual escalation of the conflict is not preferable to both states staying at the 
status quo. However, if the extra benefit from catching the other reference state off-
guard is not cancelled by the cost of mutual escalation, then the states will prefer 
conflict to staying at the status quo. On the other hand, if the long-run benefit from 
escalating is lower than staying at the status quo (since the ‘bonus’ from surprising the 
other state is not high enough to compensate the long-term costs), then reference 
states will prefer to stay at the status quo. Thus, the decision to escalate or stay at the 
status quo depends on the benefit of staying at the status quo, the lower payoffs 
associated with mutual escalation, and the temporary advantage the reference state 
gets by escalation if the other does nothing. Taking into account the ‘impatience’ of 
actors, the conditions for this scenario are shown in Appendix I.B. 
  
If the conditions above remain, there are additional constraints by which mutual 
cooperation is better than staying at the status quo. If one of the states extends 
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cooperation, but the other state remains at the status quo, the latter will be a ‘sucker’. 
However, the cost of being a ‘sucker’ short-term is worthwhile if the other reference 
state returns the overtures and there is mutual cooperation. If the short-term cost of 
extending ‘the olive branch’ is outweighed by the long-term benefit of 
intergovernmentalism, then the reference state will try to cooperate. From the 
perspective of the second reference state, when the first reference state attempting 
cooperation, it can either respond in kind or remain at the status quo level of conflict. 
If it remains at the status quo, the first state will remove its offer of cooperation at the 
next opportunity. However, for the second state, if the long-term gains from mutual 
cooperation outweigh the short-term benefit from staying at the status quo, then the 
second reference state will also prefer to cooperate. Thus, there are situations where 
attempting cooperation is preferable to staying at the status quo, taking into account 
the relative long-term benefits of mutual cooperation, the short-term cost of extending 
cooperation without the other state reciprocating, the short-term benefit of 
withholding cooperation if the other state extends the olive branch, and staying at the 
status quo. The conditions for this scenario are shown in Appendix I.C. 
 
Thus, if the conditions are present for reference states to prefer staying at the status 
quo to escalating the conflict, and they also prefer cooperating to staying at the status 
quo, then the reference states will favour cooperation. 
 
Hypothesis: There are equilibria such that the short-term gain from escalating the dispute from the 
status quo (catching the other reference state unaware) is offset by the long-term costs when the other 
state also escalates the conflict. Thus, there are equilibria in which reference states prefer to stay at the 
status quo rather than escalate the dispute. 
 
Hypothesis: There are equilibria that the short-term cost of extending cooperation without reciprocity 
(i.e. the other state stays at the status quo) is outweighed by the long-term benefits if the other 
reference state also seeks cooperation. 
 
Hypothesis: If the two above hypotheses hold, there are equilibria where the reference states will 
prefer long-term cooperation. 
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A Short Note on Flanking in Reference States 
 
Although there are conditions by which groups in reference states would prefer 
staying at the status quo to escalating conflict, and cooperating rather than staying at 
the status quo, this is not tantamount to all of the groups in the reference states 
seeking cooperation. Less conciliatory elements within reference states are less likely 
to fulfil the conditions by which the preferred course of action is cooperation. The 
payoff from mutual cooperation is lower for antagonistic elites than for their moderate 
counterparts, since this would be seen as ‘selling out’ their supporters. Moreover, 
escalation of the conflict or refusal to respond to cooperative overtures from the other 
reference state are seen as defending ‘their’ people in the disputed area and carries a 
relatively higher benefit than for more conciliatory groups in the reference states. 
Thus, it is more difficult for the benefit of long-term mutual cooperation to outweigh 
the advantages of staying at the status quo, or even escalating the conflict. 
 
This suggests that an accord between moderate groups will not be long-lasting if the 
other (i.e. less conciliatory) groups gain power in government and do not prefer long-
term cooperation. In other words, making an agreement with a more conciliatory 
government would not survive a change of government to more antagonistic parties if 
it is preferable for the latter to break the agreement. The only way for an accord to 
survive between the two reference states is that cooperation is preferable for all four 
groups (conciliatory and less conciliatory groups in each reference state). This does 
not require any strong harmonisation of policies within a reference state, since it is not 
necessary for the four groups in the reference states to have identical payoffs. It is 
only important that long-term cooperation is more beneficial than other actions. Thus, 
the conditions derived in Appendix I.B and Appendix I.C must hold for both 
conciliatory and less conciliatory groups in each reference state. Under these 
conditions, reference state intergovernmentalism can develop. 
 
Proposition: Long-term intergovernmentalism can only develop if cooperation is preferable for both 
conciliatory and less conciliatory groups in the reference states. Otherwise, any intergovernmental 
agreement of ‘moderates’ (conciliatory groups) is susceptible to default when the antagonistic groups 
gain power in the reference states. 
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Stage 2: Making an Offer 
 
Once it is preferable for all of the groups in the reference states to pursue a 
coordinated policy towards the conflict zone, the current governments from the 
reference states will come to an agreement and offer this to the conflict groups. For 
simplicity, it will be assumed that the offer to the conflict groups is halfway between 
the ideal policy positions of the respective reference state governments. The more 
antagonistic groups in the reference states have a more ‘nationalist’ policy regarding 
the conflict zone than their conciliatory counterparts within the reference state. Thus, 
a settlement between a more ‘nationalist’ government in one state and a more 
conciliatory government in the other will be biased towards the co-nationals of the 
former. There are four possible scenarios for the settlements offered to conflict 
groups: 
 
State α and State β both have conciliatory governments. The resulting concord of 
moderates will offer a balanced (i.e. unbiased) agreement. However, the co-nationals 
in the disputed area for both states would wait for a less conciliatory government in 
their own reference state so that there could be an offer more biased in their favour. 
 
State α and State β both have antagonistic governments. The two more extreme 
elements come to an agreement and offer this unbiased settlement to the conflict 
groups. However, the co-nationals of both reference states in the conflict zone know 
that they might have a better offer if the government in the other reference state 
becomes more conciliatory. Thus, the groups in the disputed territory do not settle. 
 
State α has an antagonistic government and State β has a conciliatory government. 
The agreement reached will be more beneficial to the co-nationals of State α in the 
disputed territory, since it will biased towards them. Of course, this is unacceptable to 
the conflict groups connected to the other state, so there will be no settlement. The co-
nationals of β will wait for a change of government in either reference state, which 
would result in a better deal. 
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State α has a conciliatory government and State β has an antagonitic government. 
The situation is reversed from the above paragraph. In this scenario, co-nationals of 
State α will hold out for a better deal, which results if there is a change of government 
in either state. 
 
Thus, in none of the cases will there be an agreement between the conflict groups. 
However, if the situation is extended to infinite iterations, there are possible equilibria 
in which an inclusive settlement is preferable to refusing the offer from the reference 
states. An inclusive settlement is preferable to a concord of moderates in the conflict 
zone, since leaving more ‘nationalist’ groups unchecked outside the settlement allows 
these more ‘extreme’ groups to escalate the conflict without the stigma of ‘selling out’. 
Thus, an offer that is also acceptable to the less conciliatory conflict groups is 
necessary for an inclusive settlement. 
 
In considering the offer, conflict groups (both conciliatory and antagonistic) must 
weigh the cost of short-term exclusion against the possibilities of a better deal in the 
future. The reference states can levy a penalty against non-cooperative conflict groups, 
but this may ineffective if the long-term benefits of waiting for a better deal exceed 
the short-term sanction. However, if the best case scenario of a future offer biased in 
favour of the group still yields lower gains than taking the offer, then the conflict 
group will settle. Because the less antagonistic groups are more likely to settle than 
their more ‘extreme’ counterparts, an inclusive settlement must be one in which the 
more antagonistic groups accept settlement or in which they can be effectively 
sidelined. 
 
There are two strategies that reference states can pursue to push their co-nationals 
towards settlement. The first is by setting the penalty high enough such that there is 
no incentive to wait for a better deal from the reference states. Although this strategy 
can be shown to work out mathematically, it is more difficult to execute. Since it is 
costly for reference states to ‘abandon’ their co-nationals, taking a hard line on ‘their’ 
co-nationals in the conflict area might be countered by accusations of ‘selling out’ the 
people in the disputed area. Pushing penalties too far also encourages the co-nationals 
to follow an extra-legal path and may have dire long-term consequences. An 
alternative way to encourage settlement in the conflict zone is by narrowing the gap 
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between the ideal positions of political parties within a reference state. That is, even if 
the conflict groups hold out for a better offer in the future, the best-case scenario will 
still yield less benefit than taking the settlement. Thus, it is best for all of the conflict 
groups to accept the offer from the reference states. Thus, bipartisanship within 
reference states is important in seeking cooperation with the other reference state and 
in encouraging conflict groups to accept an inclusive settlement. This will be shown 
in Appendix I.D. 
 
Hypothesis: The reference states’ offer will be accepted by all of the groups in the conflict zone if 
either or both of the following are true: (1) The reference states levy a high enough penalty on non-
compliant groups such that the benefits of waiting for a better deal are cancelled by short-term 
penalties; (2) The groups within the reference states close their policy distance, so that conflict groups 
do not benefit from waiting for a better deal. 
 
Hypothesis: Since exclusion is destabilising, the type of mechanism used will be (2) from the previous 
hypothesis. This suggests that bipartisanship between more and less conciliatory groups in the 
reference states is a trait of settlement. 
Stage 3: The Settlement 
 
If all of the conflict groups accept the offer from the reference states, it is important to 
examine the institutional form the resulting settlement would take. The objective in 
this section is not to derive the exact setup of the institutions. The goal is to deduce 
the guiding principle for the settlement. The two reference states could offer a simple 
majoritarian system in the conflict zone. If this is the case, the conflict group with the 
numerical majority will hold power, leading to potential domination of the numerical 
minority. This setup is not acceptable to the reference state corresponding to the 
minority. The majoritarian system can also be accepted by the minority under the 
assumption that it will eventually become the numerical majority. However, if this 
assumption is shared by the reference state of the conflict group currently the 
numerical majority, then this will also not be an acceptable solution. It is also possible 
that other ethnic groups will join the numerical minority to out-poll the majority. The 
most ‘fair’ situation to use the majoritarian system when the two conflict groups are 
almost identical in numerical strength. If it assumed that there is some 
disproportionality in the system, the results can be such that each group will win all of 
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the power half of the time. However, the reference states will still not prefer this 
chance to definite shares of the political power in the conflict zone. This is because it 
is assumed that the reference states are risk-averse. They would rather conclude a 
settlement with a sure payoff rather than an expected payoff at the same level. 
 
This suggests that reference states will propose a system in which no side ‘wins’ or 
‘loses’. This is because the two reference states benefit most if they pursue a 
coordinated settlement in the disputed area, but they still have differing constitutional 
commitments to their respective co-nationals. The result will be a system conferred by 
the reference states in which the political gains for each group of co-nationals will not 
diverge significantly from parity. This is illustrated in Appendix I.E. This safe option 
is to divide political power evenly among major groups in the disputed area. This 
would ensure that demographic changes would not lead to the permanent loss of 
power for the smaller group. For disputed areas with more groups (with or without 
reference states), this also ensures that other groups cannot join and permanently out-
vote particular co-nationals. 
 
Hypothesis: Given the risk-aversion of reference states, the institutions will be such that no group in 
the disputed area will win or lose. The reference states will seek arrangements that will guarantee 
long-term or permanent equality between major groups. 
Resembling Consociational Democracy 
 
Risk-averse reference states will not ensure that their co-nationals win, but rather that 
they not lose. Creating a political system to reflect these strategies relies on 
institutional design, since institutions alter the payoffs for co-nationals. Assuming 
utility maximisation, actors have to navigate the political system differently from 
before. This, in turn, may lead to a change in the behaviour of the actors.14  However, 
this does not mean that the preferences for the actors change. The groups in the 
disputed area still prefer to be closer to ‘their’ reference state, but institutions will 
constrain their actions. There are several ways that institutions could be designed to 
codify the ‘no win, no loss’ principle explained above. 
 
                                                 
14
 B. Weingast, ‘Constructing Trust’: 172-3. 
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The first strategy is to alter the electoral system. There are problems with the 
prevailing majoritarian electoral systems. A more ‘proportional’ electoral design 
would reduce the discrepancy between political representation and share of the vote. 
Some electoral systems that provide proportional results are open list systems (e.g. 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Finland, South Tyrol) and those with a single transferable vote 
(e.g. Republic of Ireland, Malta, Northern Ireland). 
 
The political system could also be designed to allocate executive political offices 
based on the number of seats earned in an election, or according to previous census 
returns. This ensures that the losing group is not completely excluded from political 
power in the disputed area. This political system also ensures that the winning group 
does not have all the power and must share executive authority with other national 
groups. 
 
The underlying principle for institutional design for a settlement by reference states is 
one in which ‘their’ co-nationals are not powerless in the political structures. There is 
a strong incentive for reference states working in tandem to offer a settlement so that 
each group of co-nationals is able to exercise self-determination. 
 
To ensure that national self-determination is protected, there are two additional 
strategies that can be employed. 
 
First, decisions can be made to require a supermajority. Starting from the principle of 
self-determination, reference states would prefer that their co-nationals are ensured a 
share of decision-making. However, since reference states are risk-averse, they do not 
want a system in which there is a possibility of losing heavily. Thus, the settlement 
may also include arrangements for supermajority requirements to ensure that ‘their’ 
co-nationals are included. The supermajority is a weaker version of Lijphart’s ‘grand 
coalition’ criterion, since it is possible to induce similar behaviour if the required 
majority is large enough to require the majority consent of all groups, without 
requiring all groups to be in government together. This is O’Leary’s distinction 
between ‘concurrent’ and ‘complete’ consociation explained in Chapter 2. 
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Secondly, there can be mechanisms to ensure a threshold level of parallel support 
within each major conflict group, so that a decision that is unpopular to one group will 
not be imposed on them. It has been argued that such a veto mechanism can ‘construct 
trust’ by ensuring that neither group can use the legitimate political apparatus of the 
conflict area to dominate the other group or groups.15 In so doing, reciprocal trust is 
created in the resulting political arena. When the political structures cannot be used 
aggressively against any of the national groups, groups that may otherwise feel 
vulnerable and may pre-emptively escalate the conflict are assured that this is 
unnecessary.  Moreover, the veto mechanism ensures that the political rules are 
difficult to change, including attempts to remove the veto. Thus, the veto is self-
enforced, providing security under which trust can be developed.16 
 
Finally, such a settlement that protects the self-determination of the reference states’ 
co-nationals may contain specific group-defined rights. This may be in the form of 
linguistic or cultural rights that are conferred on a non-territorial basis, but may also 
be extended on a territorial basis in the form of territorial autonomy or federalism. 
 
Thus, starting from self-determination for co-nationals in the disputed territory, the 
resulting institutions include requirements for proportionality, supermajority decision-
making, veto mechanisms and group-defined autonomy. These characteristics (i.e. 
veto, proportionality, supermajority and autonomy) are similar to the four features put 
forward by Lijphart for consociational democracy. It seems that despite some of the 
critiques levied against Lijphart’s formulation of consociational democracy, the 
general features of his system are borne out in the above analysis. Significantly, the 
above findings differ from Lijphart’s, since all four features emanate from the risk-
averse reference states ensuring self-determination of their co-nationals is protected. It 
is the securing of self-determination that can assure conflict groups to accept the 
settlement from the reference states. Thus, the reference states will offer a settlement 
to their co-nationals similar to consociational power-sharing democracy. 
 
                                                 
15
 B. Weingast, ‘Constructing Trust’: 174. 
16
 Ibid.: 174-5. 
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Hypothesis: The resulting settlement will be based on self-determination  such that no group can 
dominate the others. The institutional arrangements within the conflict zone will resemble 
consociational power-sharing, with the reference states as guarantors. 
 
Adding to Lijphart 
 
The previous section illustrated how most of the features of consociational democracy 
would follow from the principle of a group-based mutual veto. Thus, the internal 
mechanisms Lijphart proposed in the 1960s seem to be confirmed by the theoretical 
investigation in this chapter. Assuming the persistence of certain group boundaries, 
the resulting system is one in which there are safeguards by which none of the major 
groups in the disputed territory ‘lose’. These protections include mutual veto, 
autonomy, proportionality and supermajority. 
 
However, the ‘internal’ consociation is enforced and developed through factors 
neglected by Lijphart. Lijphart’s list of favourable conditions included ‘external 
threats’, and consociational democracy in Lebanon and Cyprus failed due to meddling 
by external agents (see previous chapter). Lijphart does not account for the possible 
constructive role played by reference states. 
 
By including reference states, two additional dimensions are added to the original 
notion of consociational democracy. The first is that there are cases in which the 
internal consociation is related to significant links between certain groups and their 
‘homeland’. These ties are important both in allowing reference states to encourage 
their co-nationals towards a settlement, and also constraining reference states by 
making it difficult to ‘abandon’ their co-nationals. This suggests that there is a lower 
commitment problem from reference states compared to other potential ‘external’ 
actors. Thus, not only do reference states push their co-nationals towards settlement, 
but they are reliable guarantors as well, since it is difficult for reference states to 
disengage, provided that there is moderate bipartisanship and sufficient leverage over 
co-nationals in the disputed territory. 
 
A third dimension not addressed by the classical literature on consociational 
democracy is the role of intergovernmental cooperation between reference states 
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regarding the disputed area. The potential for building consociational democracies 
‘outside in’ is not included in Lijphart’s framework. That is, the above theory 
suggests that ‘internal’ power-sharing is less likely without the cooperation between 
the reference states towards the conflict zone. 
 
Conditions for Transnational Consociation 
 
The above findings lead to a framework of transnational consociation. The 
phenomenon is transnational, since the influence of reference states cross 
international boundaries to affect the settlement. The phenomenon is consociation due 
to the features of the institutions within the conflict area. There are four characteristics 
of transnational consociation: 
 
First, there is a particular geometry of the conflict that includes two reference states, 
and their co-nationals intermixed in a disputed area. The demographic context is not 
conducive towards partition, so that some other configuration is necessary. This is 
tantamount to the existence of an ethno-territorial cross-border conflict.17 
 
Second, under certain conditions, the two reference states coordinate action to jointly 
offer a settlement to the conflict groups that are sub-optimal to the latter. Thus, the 
form of the offer resembles a principal-agent scenario where the owner presents the 
manager a contract in which the incentive structure drives the agents to accept. The 
coordination of reference states demonstrates an intergovernmental unity of purpose.18 
 
Third, since there are two different types of elites in each reference state, reference 
state elites are uncertain whether a change of government in the other state will 
undermine bilateral accords regarding the disputed territory. The agreement is 
susceptible to flanking from elites in each reference state, and conflict groups can 
choose to wait and see whether future leaders in the reference states would offer a 
                                                 
17
 S. Wolff, Disputed territories : the transnational dynamics of ethnic conflict settlement, New York: 
Berghahn Books (2003). Wolff develops the concept in Chapter 1 of his book. 
18
 M.R. Kerr, Comparative Power Sharing Agreements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon: An 
Evaluation of Consociational Government from Sunningdale to Belfast (1973-98), from the National 
Pact to Ta’if (1943-89), PhD Dissertation, London School of Economics (2003). 
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better deal. Thus, it is crucial to create mechanisms to harmonise the policy positions 
of the groups within the reference state, so that the level of the future payoffs for 
conflict groups are relatively stable. This requires bipartisanship, which is intra-
reference-state coordination. 
 
Finally, the cooperation between reference states leads to an offer in which both states 
ensure that neither they nor their co-nationals lose (i.e. integration into the other 
reference state). In this context, the strictly risk-averse reference states will prefer a 
settlement where the difference in payoffs between winning and losing is small. Thus, 
the reference states will offer the conflict groups a non-majoritarian system. The 
political institutions in the conflict area will include a veto mechanism, 
proportionality, supermajority and autonomy. This framework will ensure that the 
legitimate state structures cannot be used to dominate any of the conflict groups. 
There is also an assurance that the political rules are difficult to change, so that the 
protection of self-determination is self-enforcing. The resulting framework resembles 
features of internal consociation.19 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the four features of transnational consociation 
can be re-organised along three axes: 
 
Internal. The investigation above shows that the institutions internal to the conflict 
zone will most likely resemble consociational democracy. This shows that Lijphart’s 
original framework can be used for conflict regulation in certain ethnoterritorial 
disputes. 
 
External. In addition to Lijphart’s ‘internal’ consociation, settlement is more likely 
when the reference states pursue a coordinated policy towards the conflict zone. This 
requires both intergovernmentalism and intra-reference state coordination. 
 
Reference state/co-national links. The term ‘cross-border’ is not used, since the 
legitimacy of the territorial boundary is often disputed in such conflicts, either by 
reference states, conflict groups, or both. The pivotal relationships are the persistent 
                                                 
19
 A. Lijphart, The politics of accommodation : pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley: 
Univ. of California Press (1975). 
A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL CONSOCIATION 
 91 
links between the ‘metropole’ and the co-nationals. This bond is important both in 
allowing the reference states to influence the terms of the settlement, but also to the 
durability of the commitment of the reference states as guarantors for the settlement. 
 
These three dimensions frame the empirical investigation of transnational 
consociation in the next four chapters. The next chapter will look at the architecture of 
the agreements in the case studies, examining them along internal, external and 
reference state/co-national axes. 
 
Chapters 5-7 will examine the implementation of the power-sharing agreements in the 
case studies, devoting a chapter each to internal, external and reference state/co-
national dimensions. 
 
Thus, the following empirical chapters will confirm the resemblance between the 
institutions within the disputed territory and consociational democracy. However, the 
case studies will also reveal that Lijphart’s work needs to be extended to inter-
reference-state and reference state/co-national dimensions to better appreciate the 
complex nature of conflict regulation in situations where reference states are 
significant. 
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURES 
 92 
Chapter IV: Comparative Institutional Architecture of the Belfast 
Agreement and the Dayton-Paris Agreement 
Introduction 
 
The peace agreements both in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH) 
were complex bargains between conflict groups. The Belfast and Dayton-Paris 
Agreements did not appear within a political vacuum, but are culminations of longer 
political processes. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, the institutions echo some of the 
structures installed during the constitutional reforms in 1990. In particular, the use of 
a proportional representation (PR) list system and a ‘rotating’ presidency among the 
three constituent peoples (i.e. Bosniak, Serb and Croat) are still a part of the political 
institutions. In Northern Ireland, a PR electoral system has been used in elections on 
and off since 1920. Moreover, the power-sharing structures both at local and 
executive levels have been attempted intermittently since the 1970s. 
 
After briefly considering some of the features of the institutional heritage in the two 
cases, the institutions of the Dayton-Paris Agreement and the Belfast Agreement will 
be examined using the three dimensions of transnational consociation: internal 
consociation, reference state/co-national links, and reference state dynamics.1 
 
The post-settlement institutions in both cases exhibit the four features of internal 
consociation: proportionality, grand coalition, mutual veto and segmental autonomy. 
The use of PR electoral systems in nearly all levels of government, rules for seat 
allocation, and special rules for executive formation ensure proportionality for the 
constituent communities both in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The so-
called ‘involuntary coalition’ in Northern Ireland was designed to ensure a grand 
coalition between unionist and nationalist ministers, and the dual-premiership of the 
First Minister/Deputy First Minister has been a joint ticket of one unionist and one 
nationalist in practice. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Speakers and Deputy Speakers are 
                                                 
1
 The Dayton-Paris Agreement also included annexes that are not relevant to this study. The following 
chapters will mainly examine the executive and legislative institutions (Annex 4) and the Office of the 
High Representative (Annex 10), but also mention human rights provisions (Annex 6) and return of 
displaced persons (Annex 7).  
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selected in legislative bodies on a joint Serb-Croat-Bosniak ticket, and there are 
explicit quotas for the three constituent peoples in entity-level cabinets. There are also 
‘mutual veto’ provisions in both case studies . The Northern Ireland Assembly has 
two procedures (which will be explained below) to ensure cross-community support 
for certain ‘key decisions’. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, members of the Upper Chamber 
at the entity and state level parliaments can trigger a vote requiring ‘parallel consent’ 
if one of the constituent peoples deems that an issue threatens its ‘vital national 
interest’. Although there are few provisions for ‘segmental autonomy’ in Northern 
Ireland, the territorially-decentralised Bosnian framework allows a high degree of 
autonomy over matters at the entity, cantonal and municipal levels. 
 
In addition to the features of internal consociation, there are reference state/co-
national links written into both agreements. In Northern Ireland, Strand 2 of the 
Belfast Agreement indicates the role of Dublin, and part of the Strand 3 institutions 
set up and East-West framework for London. Moreover, although bound by the terms 
of the British-Irish Agreement (1998), the British government retains sovereignty 
over Northern Ireland, so this is another connection between unionists and London. 
The Dayton-Paris Agreement guaranteed entities could form ‘special parallel 
relationships’ with other states. In practice, this  has allowed the majority Serb 
Republika Srpska to sign an agreement with Belgrade, and the Federation of BiH 
(with a significant Croat minority) to have an agreement with Croatia. 
 
Finally, there are intergovernmental links between the reference states. First, both the 
Belfast Agreement and the Dayton-Paris Agreement are not signed by the conflict 
groups, but rather the reference states. In the former case, the Prime Minister and 
Taoiseach regularly conduct high-level meetings regarding Northern Ireland through 
the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIGC). 
 
There are significant institutions that do not involve either local parties or reference 
states, which are outside the scope of transnational consociation. Some of these, such 
as the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia-Hercegovina, have power 
to make binding decisions. Other institutions, such as the International Independent 
Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) in Northern Ireland, provide reports, but 
cannot impose decisions. 
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Bosnia-Hercegovina: Before 
 
The starting-point for political institutional analyses of Bosnia-Hercegovina tend to 
focus on the early 1970s. There are two significant events in this period. First, the 
‘Muslim’ identity is recognised as separate in the 1971 Yugoslav census. Until that 
point, the term ‘Muslim’ was considered a religious identity, not a national one. For 
example, the 1948 census only allows ‘Muslims’ to be recognised in one of three 
ways: ‘Serb Muslim’, ‘Croat Muslim’ and ‘ethnically undeclared Muslim.’ 2 
‘Muslims’ were recognised as a ‘constituent people’ in Bosnia-Hercegovina along 
with Serbs and Croats in the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina (SRBiH). Thus, ‘Muslims’ are seen constitutionally as a people 
(narod) of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and more than a mere nationality (narodnost). The 
latter designation is used for other groups such as Hungarians, Slovaks, Czechs, 
Italians, and Albanians. The preamble of the 1974 Constitution for SRBiH states: 
 
BiH is a socialist democratic state and a self-managing democratic community of the working people, 
citizens and nations of BiH – Muslims, Serbs and Croats, and of members of other nations and 
nationalities living in it.3 
 
Although ‘Muslims’ are considered a ‘people’ in the preamble, Bosnia-Hercegovina 
is recognised as a multi-ethnic ‘state’, unlike the other republics, which are ‘state 
nations’ with a titular people (Croats in Croatia, Macedonians in Macedonia, etc.).4 
By contrast, ‘Bosnia’ is not the land of the ‘Bosnian narod’, but rather a republic with 
‘Muslims’, Croats and Serbs as constituent ‘peoples’. The 1974 constitution gave 
extensive autonomy at the republic level.5 At the Centre, the Yugoslav federation had 
a collective presidency with one member from each of the republics as well as one 
seat for the two autonomous regions within Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo), with 
rotation to the presidency of the Presidency every year. However, it was not a 
democratic system, but was merely a reorganisation of a one-party totalitarian 
                                                 
2
 S. P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia: 1962-1991, Bloomington: Indiana Univ. 
Press (1992): 179-180. 
3
 Ibid.: 184 
4
 Ibid. For example, the Socialist Republic of Slovenia was defined as “a state based on the sovereignty 
of the Slovene nation and the people of Slovenia”. 
5
 For an overview of the history leading up to the 1974 Constitution, see: D. Rusinow, The Yugoslav 
Experiment, 1948-1974, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press (1977); S. L. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion 
in Socialist Yugoslavia, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press (1983). 
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communist regime. Tito was still at the head of the constitutional order as the 
president of the state, and the constitution was set up so that the delicate balance 
between centralisation and de-centralisation could only function with Tito at the helm.  
 
A more instructive starting-point for the institutional heritage of Bosnia-Hercegovina 
is from the constitutional amendments of 1990. The rotating presidency in SR Bosnia-
Hercegovina consisted of a seven-member executive consisting of two ‘Muslims’, 
two Croats, two Serbs and one Other’.6 The 1990 multi-party elections in Bosnia-
Hercegovina returned: Fikret Abdić (SDA) and Alija Izetbegović (SDA) as the 
Muslim representatives; Nikola Koljević and Biljana Plavšić (both SDS) were the 
Serb members; Stjepan Kljuić and Franjo Boras (both HDZ) were the Croat 
representatives; and Ejup Ganić, although a member of the SDA, was the ‘Yugoslav’ 
member of the collective presidency.7  The presidency was elected by a ‘relative 
majority’. Voters could cast one vote for ‘their’ candidate as well as one vote each for 
candidates for the other constituent groups including the Yugoslav/Other.8 In addition 
to the presidency, the constitutional amendments from 1990 included provisions for a 
bicameral legislature. The Council of Municipalities had 110 seats and was elected 
using a traditional two-stage run-off system in single-seat constituencies. If no 
candidate earned more than 50% of the votes cast in the first round, the top two 
candidates have a run-off election to determine the winner. The Council of Citizens 
had 130 seats, and used a proportional representation system in seven multi-member 
constituencies using the Hare quota.9 The seats in both houses were won largely by 
the newly formed national parties.10 
 
Despite the ‘external’ influence in constructing the post-Dayton constitutional order, 
the present-day political institutions in Bosnia-Hercegovina bear some resemblance to 
                                                 
6
 F. Bieber, ‘The Case Study of Bosnia and Hercegovina’ (forthcoming) writes that the seventh 
representative is a ‘Yugoslav’. However, a publication from the Electoral Commission of BiH writes 
that the seventh member of the presidency is ‘Other’. 
7
 The election results are reproduced in Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini, ed. N. Herceg and Z. Tomić, 
Mostar: Sveučilište u Mostaru Centar za studije novinarstva (1998). 
8
 Association of Election Officials in BiH, ‘Retrospective of Elections’. URL: 
http://www.aeobih.com.ba/documents/Technical%20series%20ENG%20III.pdf: 8. 
9
 Ibid. See also S. Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, London: Hurst (2002): 228.  The Hare quota determines 
the number of votes necessary to be elected. The formula is V/s, where V is the number of votes cast 
and s is the number of seats. 
10The largest parties after the 1990 elections -- Seats in the Chamber of Citizens: SDA 44, SDS 34, 
HDZ 21, Party of Democratic Changes (ex-Communist) 15, Reformists (ex-communists). Seats in the 
Chamber of Municipalities: SDA 43, SDS 38, HDZ 23, Party of Democratic Changes 4. 
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the 1990 framework. First, the rotating presidency at the head of the post-Dayton 
Bosnia-Hercegovina is elected in a one-round election where the candidates with the 
most votes from each of the constituent narodi earn a seat. Second, the municipal 
seats are decided by employing the Hare quota with largest remainders.11 Third, a PR 
electoral system is used to distribute the seats in the House of Representatives at the 
federal level, though the system used is different. The description of the electoral 
system will be given in the following sections. Finally, and most importantly, the 
Yugoslav system had entrenched the privileged position of the constituent peoples of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina (i.e. Serb, Croat, Muslim), and it is along these cleavages that the 
1990 multi-party system took shape,12 as well as the constitutional design for Annex 
IV of the General Framework Agreements for Peace (GFAP). In addition to the 
institutional heritage from the Yugoslav system, the other unique feature of the 
political settlement is also shaped by actors from the ‘international community’. 
 
There were three significant attempts at external mediation to resolve the conflict in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina. First, Jose Cutilero brought representatives from the three 
constituent groups together during the Portuguese presidency. An agreement was 
initially reached to divide the territory into ethnic ‘cantons’, which still respected the 
independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, Izetbegović pulled support for the 
Lisbon plan, since the SDA opposed creating ethnicised cantons. In March 1992, a 
second version of the Lisbon plan was produced. Although Belgrade accepted the 
plan, it was rejected by Bosnian Serbs, with Karadžić not accepting anything less than 
an independent Serbian state with confederal ties to the other cantons and a special 
relationship with Serbia. A third round of negotiations proposed to settle the cantonal 
boundaries based on the 1991 census. Each community claimed victory: for Serbs, the 
plan created three ‘Bosnias’; for the SDA, the result would be a unitary state; and for 
Croats, there would be a separation from Belgrade and the opportunity for relations 
with Croatia. However, in the end, all three parties rejected it.13 The Vance-Owen 
Plan was the second attempt at an externally mediated political settlement. The plan 
envisioned ten ethnically-defined units, such that three would be Croat, three Serb, 
                                                 
11
 After the seats are allocated based on the number of V/s quotas received from each party, any 
unallocated seats are distributed by the highest remainder when the quotient V/s is calculated. 
12
 S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. 
13
 The summary of the Lisbon Plan is from S.L. Burg and P.S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, London: M.E. Sharpe (1999): 108-111. 
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three Bosniak, and Sarajevo would be controlled jointly. However, the plan was 
widely criticised for rewarding ethnic cleansing. Nonetheless, both the Bosnian 
government (largely Bosniak) and the Bosnian Croats accepted the plan, since it 
preserved the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina. On the other hand, the 
Bosnian Serbs led by Karadžić (who initially supported the plan) did not endorse the 
Vance-Owen framework, since NATO would not agree to stop air strikes. This was 
followed in 1993 by the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, which proposed a three-way partition 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Unlike the earlier offers by the international community, the 
Serb and Croat units could secede through self-determination and join their patron-
state. Surprisingly, the Serbs rejected the plan, since they wanted more geo-
strategically advantageous lands, including an outlet to the Adriatic Sea. 
 
Thus, the institutional heritage of the Dayton system is a recent one, combining the 
homegrown elements of recognition of constituent peoples and a rotating ‘collective 
presidency’, as well as imported democratic structures of ethno-territorial autonomy 
to end hostilities. Both have shaped the most recent institutional design of the Dayton-
Paris system. 
Northern Ireland: Before 
 
In contrast to the wholesale importation of a constitutional system and a relatively 
recent history of multi-party electoral politics in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the genealogy 
of democratic structures in the case of Northern Ireland is far older. Arguably, some 
of the institutional features can be traced back to the Government of Ireland Act 
(1920). It is this act of Parliament that created two separate jurisdictions in Ireland, 
establishing a parliamentary body in each entity and providing a harmonising Council 
of Ireland. In both parliaments, the rarely used PR-STV system was applied. 14 The 
PR-STV electoral system is also used in Malta, Estonia (for the transitional 1990 
election), the Australian Senate and Tasmania. In 1929, the Unionist government in 
Northern Ireland passed an Act that abolished the PR system (except for the Queen’s 
                                                 
14
 Proportional Representation – Single Transferable Vote: The quota for election under PR-STV is 
V/(s+1), where V is the number of votes cast and s is number of seats. Voters mark ordered preferences. 
If a candidate reaches the quota, she is elected, and the surplus votes are distributed to the other 
candidates based on the next preferences. If no candidates reach the quota, the candidate with the least 
votes is eliminated, and the votes are distributed to the others based on the next highest preference. The 
process is repeated until s candidates are elected. 
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University seats), and created 48 single-member constituencies that would be elected 
using the Westminster ‘winner takes all’ system. 
 
It is sometimes alleged that the changes in the electoral system ensured Unionist 
dominance through ‘gerrymandered’ constituencies. Although the legacy of the 
‘Stormont regime’ is one of Unionist domination and Nationalist marginalisation, the 
accusations of gerrymandering are debatable.15 At the local level, there is convincing 
that the constituencies were gerrymandered, and that there was limited manipulation 
at the parliamentary level.16 At the local level, comparing the 1920 (proportional 
representation) and 1922 (plurality) elections showed that Nationalists had lost their 
majority in 13 local councils, and that by the late 1920s, Unionists controlled 85% of 
councils with 66% of the population.17 Osborne posits that the allocation of an extra 
seat in the parliamentary elections to Fermanagh before Antrim or Londonderry/Derry 
was questionable, since it resulted in the consistent return of two unionists and one 
nationalist in Fermanagh. 18  However, there is no evidence of widespread 
gerrymandering of parliamentary seats.19 As John Whyte argues, the Irish geography 
and history literature questions the effects of the redrawing of constituency 
boundaries for the Northern Ireland House of Commons election in 1929.20 Before the 
change of the electoral system and the constituency boundaries, Nationalists earned 
twelve seats in the legislature, while after the change, this was only reduced to 
eleven.21 On the other hand, what did change was that smaller parties such as the 
NILP and independent Unionists lost out, and the new system consolidated local 
Unionist and Nationalist hegemony in certain constituencies. Instead of being 
discriminatory towards Nationalists, the true legacy of the Stormont regime between 
1929 and 1972 was to polarise the political terrain in Northern Ireland.22 In fact, ‘the 
                                                 
15
 A summary of the various  methods of controlling Northern Ireland by majority Unionists 1920-1969 
can be found in B. O’Leary and J. McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern 
Ireland, London: Athlone Press (1996): 111-133. 
16
 P. Mitchell and G. Gillespie, 'The Electoral Systems', in Politics in Northern Ireland, ed. P. Mitchell 
and R. Wilford, Boulder, CO: Westview Press (1998): 69-70. 
17
 J. McGarry and B. O’Leary, The politics of antagonism: 120-121. 
18
 R. D. Osbourne, ‘The Northern Ireland Parliamentary electoral system: The 1929 reapportionment’. 
Irish Geography, vol. 12: 45. 
19
 Ibid.: 53. 
20
 J. Whyte, ‘How much discrimination was there under the unionist regime, 1921-68?’, URL: 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/discrimination/whyte.htm. 
21
 The claim by John Whyte can be confirmed by looking at N. Whyte, ‘The Northern Ireland House of 
Commons, 1921-1972’, http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/hnihoc.htm. 
22
 J. Whyte, ‘How much discrimination was there under the unionist regime, 1921-68?’. 
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electoral system was significant in establishing areas of either Unionist or Nationalist 
domination.’23 
 
Although the institutional heritage spans back to the establishment of Northern 
Ireland, it is more instructive to examine the institutions after the return to direct rule 
in 1972. There was a ‘failed’ attempt at power-sharing self-government after the 
Sunningdale Agreement (1973). In 1972, the British Government (in the form of the 
Northern Ireland Office) compiled proposals from the constitutional political parties 
in Northern Ireland and used this input to suggest a plan of action for the governance 
of the province.  The Alliance Party, SDLP, NILP and Northern Ireland Liberal Party 
advocated the establishment of a unicameral legislature directly elected in multi-seat 
constituencies through PR-STV.24 Based on these submissions, the paper concluded 
that there is a great deal of support for the reinstatement of PR-STV in any devolved 
‘Assembly’ established in Northern Ireland.25 The recommendation is echoed in the 
White Paper from 1973 presented by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to the 
Westminster Parliament, which suggested that a Northern Ireland ‘Assembly’ should 
consist of around eighty members elected using PR-STV applied to multi-member 
versions of the Westminster constituencies.26 When the elections for the Assembly 
were conducted in June 1973, PR-STV was used to fill 78 seats in multi-member 
constituencies using the Westminster parliamentary boundaries.27 In addition to the 
electoral system, there are other features from the political innovations in the early 
1970s that resemble the institutional features of the Belfast Agreement. 
 
The important features of both the Sunningdale and Belfast Agreements are: principle 
of consent; policing; North-South cross-border cooperation; ‘Irish’ dimension; and 
British-Irish cooperation.28 
 
                                                 
23
 R. D. Osbourne, ‘The Northern Ireland Parliamentary electoral system’: 54. 
24
 Northern Ireland Office, The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion, London: HMSO 
(1972): para. 28-31. The Document is reproduced on the CAIN web site at: 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/nio1972.htm. 
25
 Ibid.: para 53. 
26
 Northern Ireland Office, Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals, London: HMSO (1973): para. 
116. The White Paper is reproduced on the CAIN web site at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cmd5259.htm. 
27
 S. Wolff, ‘Context and Content: Sunningdale and Belfast Compared’, in Aspects of the Belfast 
Agreement, ed. R. Wilford, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2001): 14. 
28
 S. Wolff, ibid.: 13. 
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The first section of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act (1973) re-affirms that 
Northern Ireland would remain a part of the United Kingdom as long as a majority of 
her people wished to remain within the Union.29 The ‘principle of consent’ does not 
originate in this act, but had been on the statutes since the Northern Ireland Act 
(1949). 30  The British Government also proposed that managing Northern Ireland 
would include police reform in 1973, long before the recommendations of the Patten 
Report. The White Paper includes the establishment of a review of police practices.31 
 
More importantly, the overall structure of the Belfast Agreement is similar to that of 
the Sunningdale Agreement. The internal component of the institutional framework 
was the aforementioned devolved, cross-community Assembly. After the Assembly 
elections in 1973, Brian Faulkner’s pro-White Paper section of the UUP secured 24 
seats, but anti-White Paper unionists earned 26 seats. 32   The Northern Ireland 
Executive was formed through a negotiated settlement between the pro-power-sharing 
parties and the Secretary of State, despite the concerns by some in the Irish 
Government that excluding anti-agreement parties would de-stabilise the devolved 
institutions.33 Nonetheless, Whitelaw and the pro-agreement parties agreed on the 
composition of the Executive, which balanced six UUP posts with four SDLP and one 
APNI member. In addition to the executive departments, four non-voting departments 
were added to the administration (two SDLP, one APNI and one UUP). Moreover, 
like the Executive formed under the Belfast Agreement, the Chief and Deputy Chief 
Executive were members of the UUP and SDLP, respectively. Unlike the Belfast 
Agreement, the executive did not require approval by cross-party consensus (see the 
section below on ‘mutual veto’). The second ‘strand’ of the Sunningdale proposal 
                                                 
29
 Section 1 states: ‘It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland remains part of Her Majesty's dominions 
and of the United Kingdom, and it is hereby affirmed that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part 
of it cease to be part of Her Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the 
majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll…’ 
30
 B. O’Leary, ‘Complex Power-Sharing in and Over Northern Ireland’ (forthcoming). 
31
 Northern Ireland Office, Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals. The intention to reform policing 
in Northern Ireland is also included in the Sunningdale Agreement: para. 12. 
32
 This includes DUP (8), anti-White Paper UUP (7), Vanguard Party (7), and the West Belfast Loyalist 
Coalition (3). A summary of the election results can be found at: 
http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fa73.htm. 
33
 M. R. Kerr, Comparative Power Sharing Agreements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon: An 
Evaluation of Consociational Government from Sunningdale to Belfast (1973-98), from the National 
Pact to Ta’if (1943-89), PhD Dissertation (LSE, 2004): 92. 
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included the ‘Irish dimension’, which was mentioned in the constitutional proposals.34 
Moreover, the Northern Ireland Act (1973) stated that: 
 
A Northern Ireland executive authority may consult on any matter with any authority of the Republic 
of Ireland [and] enter into agreements or arrangements with any authority of the Republic of Ireland in 
respect of any transferred matter.35 
 
The institutional arrangements for this ‘Irish dimension’ were two-fold. First, there 
would be a Council of Ireland consisting of seven ministers from the Northern Ireland 
Executive and seven from the Irish Government. Decisions could only be made 
through unanimity. Second, there was an all-Ireland consultative body with thirty 
members from the Dáil and thirty from the Northern Ireland Assembly selected 
through PR-STV. 36  The third component of the institutional geometry of the 
Sunningdale institutions was the intergovernmental aspect.37 Thus, the three-strand 
institutional framework in the Sunningdale framework resemble later incarnations of 
devolution: power-sharing between unionists and nationalists within an Assembly 
elected through PR and headed by a community-balanced Executive; an ‘Irish 
dimension’ with institutions to harmonise in areas of common concern; and an 
intergovernmental axis between Dublin and London.  
 
Despite the similarities between the Sunningdale and Belfast Agreements, there were 
crucial differences which undermined the feasibility of the former.38 Both inclusion 
and balanced intergovernmentalism are crucial to the current process, but were absent 
in the 1970s. 
 
Unlike the establishment of power-sharing after the Belfast Agreement, elements 
antagonistic to the agreement were outside the process of executive formation and 
                                                 
34
 NIO, Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals: para. 2. 
35
 Quoted in M.R. Kerr, Comparative Power Sharing Agreements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon:  
84. 
36
 Sunningdale Agreement: para. 7, explained in M.R. Kerr, ibid. The submissions from both the SDLP 
and Sinn Féin for the five-year review of the Belfast Agreement both include a recommendation to 
establish an all-Ireland parliamentary body. Besides the Westminster elections, the only elections since 
1973 that did not use PR-STV used another PR system. The Forum elections 1996 used a PR list 
system, with the party seats designated by the d’Hondt formula (see below). 
37
 Sunningdale Agreement: para. 5, 6, 10. 
38
 For an overview of the Sunningdale Agreement, see J. Leavy, Political Thinking Behind Sunningdale. 
Dublin: Talbot (1973). 
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governance in Northern Ireland following the Sunningdale Agreement. As mentioned 
before, anti-White Paper unionists were not included in the discussions in executive 
formation, although they earned more seats than their pro-agreement rivals. Paisley’s 
DUP, although refusing to take part in the negotiations in 1997-8, worked within the 
devolved institutions. Paisley himself was the chair of the Agriculture committee, and 
two other DUP members took their ministerial posts, even though the Belfast 
Agreement includes provisions for parties to exclude themselves from the Executive. 
During the short-lived power-sharing government after Sunningdale, the IRA 
continued its ‘long war’, undermining the support for the institutions among unionists. 
In contrast to the 1970s, the PIRA had called a cease-fire in August 1994 and its 
political arm, Sinn Féin, was an integral (though controversial) part of the multi-party 
talks leading up to the Belfast Agreement. Moreover, the republican movement had 
reversed its abstentionist policy and were participating in the electoral game. In May 
1974, the loyalist paramilitaries reacted to the republican campaign by carrying out 
bombings in Dublin and Monaghan that left 33 people dead. In stark contrast to their 
actions in th 1970s, a loyalist cease-fire followed the PIRA cease-fire of 1994, and the 
political arms of the UVF and UDA (i.e. PUP and UDP, respectively) participated in 
the multi-party talks as pro-Agreement parties. The elements that were behind the 
general strike by the UWC that brought down Sunningdale (loyalists and anti-
agreement Unionists) were co-opted into the political process in the 1990s.  Even 
though anti-Belfast-Agreement unionists walked out of the talks, when the institutions 
were established, both the DUP and UKUP chose to voice their dissent from within 
the debating chamber. 
 
The other important aspect of contrast between the Sunningdale and Belfast 
Agreements is the level of intergovernmentalism. Although there were some areas of 
Dublin-London cooperation in the past, there was an impetus for stronger co-
ordination between the two governments in the 1990s. When Faulkner needed 
assurances on the status of Northern Ireland, the two governments were unable to 
issue a joint statement.39 The Irish Government did not go far enough in reassuring 
unionists that it did not have irredentist aspirations, and the declaration by the Irish 
Government went far short of abandoning Articles 2 & 3 of the Irish Constitution. On 
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 M. R. Kerr, Comparative Power Sharing Agreements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon: 115. 
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the other hand, the two governments have learned their lessons from the past failures 
and achieved a more coordinated approach to Northern Ireland during the current 
‘peace process’. More importantly, Dublin and London are not only acting in concert, 
but also in a more balanced manner towards the communities in Northern Ireland. 
That is, the recognition of the ‘two traditions’ in Northern Ireland by the British and 
Irish Governments means that Dublin has to engage with unionist concerns and 
London with nationalist concerns. Thus, the political parties could not look to their 
‘patron’ state for unquestioned support. 
 
The deeper level of cooperation between the governments also removed the 
expediency of unionist intransigence, since both Dublin and London were willing to 
work over the heads of unionists to reach a settlement.40 The possibility of a Dublin-
London settlement that bypasses the so-called ‘unionist veto’ was evident from the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in 1985. In particular, Articles 2 and 3 of the AIA 
extended the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference established in 1981. The 
Intergovernmental Conference allowed for Dublin-London co-operation in areas of 
security, legal, and political matters, as well the promotion of cross-border co-
operation. Moreover, policy coordination between the two governments in these 
issues could be conducted without input from the parties in Northern Ireland. 
 
The evolution of Anglo-Irish relations suggests that the Belfast Agreement was the 
culmination of a longer process, and that senior civil servants behind the scenes had 
been working for decades to gradually learn a way to manage the conflict, though it is 
often their captains at the helm who receive the credit.41 The strategy of a three-strand 
institutional approach to Northern Ireland originating from the Sunningdale 
Agreement reappeared periodically as the principles of inclusion and British-Irish 
intergovernmentalism were developed. 
 
In 1982, James Prior, then-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, suggested an 
initiative for ‘rolling devolution’.42 The proposals included a 78-member Northern 
Ireland Assembly. There would also be six statutory committees monitoring the 
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departments from direct rule on transferred matters. The six statutory committees 
were: agriculture; education; economic development; environment; health and social 
services; and finance and personnel.43 In addition to the statutory committees, the 
Assembly was permitted to form non-statutory committees. The most significant of 
these were devolution and security.44 Moreover, the Prior Initiative had elements of 
the three-strand approach. Prior’s initiatives included suggestions to continue Anglo-
Irish intergovernmentalism and establish a British-Irish Parliamentary body. 45 
Moreover, it would be within the stipulations of any framework that a devolved 
government in Northern Ireland could establish bilateral agreements with the 
Republic of Ireland on ‘transferred’ functions.46 
 
However, any prospects for long-term success for the Assembly was undermined 
from the start. The political terrain had changed since the Sunningdale Agreement. 
After the resignation of Gerry Fitt in 1979, the SDLP took a more nationalist ‘green’ 
stance, and did not advocate a framework for internal settlement. The only ‘solution’ 
would be British withdrawal.47 The actions of the SDLP were constrained by three 
factors. First, the Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison confirmed widespread support for 
republicanism in Northern Ireland. Second, following the propaganda victory of the 
hunger strikes, Sinn Féin started their dual strategy of ‘an armalite in one hand a 
ballot box in the other’ advocated by Danny Morrison at the 1981 Sinn Féin Ard 
Fheis, which meant that the SDLP had competition for the nationalist vote. Finally, in 
contrast with the Sunningdale Framework, Prior’s proposals did not guarantee an 
‘Irish Dimension’. Moreover, the committee system devised in the 1982 initiative did 
not have structures for executive power-sharing between unionists and nationalists, 
which were an important part of the Sunningdale Agreement. Thus, the framework 
gave the SDLP less than what had been promised in 1973, and combined with the 
‘greening’ of nationalist politics, accepting the 1982 assembly would have exposed 
the SDLP to electoral flanking from Sinn Féin.48 
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In Dublin, the Fine Gael-led coalition was ousted by a Fianna Fáil majority led by 
Charles Haughey, who, like Hume, rejected any internal solutions to Northern 
Ireland.49 The SDLP (like Sinn Féin) chose to contest the Assembly elections, but for 
the reasons outlined above, declined to take their seats.50 The refusal of all major 
strands of nationalism to participate in the Assembly weakened the legitimacy of the 
institutions, and the Assembly was eventually dissolved in 1986. 
 
The most recent chapter in the institutional process in Northern Ireland before the 
Belfast Agreement started with the publication of the Framework Documents 
(1995).51 The first sections of the declaration underline that the initiatives are jointly 
put forward by London and Dublin and foreshadow the deep intergovernmentalism 
leading up to the Belfast Agreement.52 Moreover, the Framework Documents set out a 
three-strand framework, with proposals for institutions within Northern Ireland, 
North-South cooperation, and East-West cooperation. 53  Although the Framework 
Documents were published in 1995, the actual process leading up to the Belfast 
Agreement stretches back over three decades, starting with the proposals from the 
Sunningdale power-sharing experiment. Thus, the institutions set up after the 
Northern Ireland Act (1998) are a culmination of a longer process during which the 
governments in Dublin and London (especially the civil servants) learned from their 
past mistakes to put forward a three-strand approach to governance with a local 
legislature selected through PR-STV, underlined with the principles of balanced 
intergovernmentalism and inclusion. 
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Institutions and Rules: Now 
 
After examining the institutional influences from the past, the discussion now turns to 
the constitutional design of the current political system both in Bosnia-Hercegovina 
and in Northern Ireland. It is also important to look at the electoral rules by which the 
representation in these institutions is selected. The importance of the term rules 
instead of using the phrase electoral system highlights that the rules themselves are 
only a part of the puzzle in governing electoral politics, and do not take into account 
the political party system and other socio-historical factors.54 Reilly and Reynolds 
identify three dangers in Western intellectual thought in electoral design: free and fair 
elections are the best way to manage conflict; winner-takes-all systems provide clear 
winners and stable government; and successful electoral rules can be transplanted 
from the West to the ‘developing world’.55 The contexts through which the electoral 
rules develop differ in the two cases studied. The PR-STV system in Northern Ireland 
was first established by the Government of Ireland Act (1920). On the other hand, the 
electoral rules in Bosnia-Hercegovina were imported from ‘outside’. In fact, much of 
the structure of the present-day Bosnian state was put together by the US State 
Department.56 Carl Bildt, the first High Representative, believed that the constitution 
was ‘by international decree’, not local consensus.57 However, Richard Holbrooke felt 
that this was necessary, writing ‘it was better to be criticised for too much leadership 
[from Washington] than for too little’ to conclude the Dayton-Paris Agreement.58 
 
The following sections will examine the complex agreements in Northern Ireland and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina along the dimensions derived in Chapter 3. First, both the Belfast 
Agreement and Dayton-Paris Agreement exhibit characteristics of ‘internal’ 
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consociation as described by Lijphart. However there are also significant links 
between reference states and the conflict zone. The agreements also include bilateral 
institutions between reference states. In addition to the dimensions that comprise 
transnational consociation, institutions that have power of implementation or 
arbitration will briefly be considered. Interestingly, there is no explicit mention of 
bipartisanship in either institutional architecture. However, policy coordination 
between groups with reference states can be found in political practice and will be 
investigated in Chapter 6. 
Internal Consociation 
 
The features of the institutional design in the Belfast Agreement and the Dayton-Paris 
Agreement can be organised the original features of consociational democracy put 
forward by Lijphart. 
Proportionality 
 
a. Electoral System and Legislative Seat Allocation 
 
Both in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the electoral rules are designed 
to result in proportional representation for the constituent groups. 
 
In Northern Ireland, local councillors are selected in District Electoral Areas in multi-
seat constiuencies of between five and seven members using the PR-STV electoral 
system. In turn, the local councils are comprised of three to five District Electoral 
Areas; there are 26 such local councils in Northern Ireland. 
The lynchpin of devolved authority in Northern Ireland is the legislative Assembly at 
Stormont. The Assembly consists of 108 seats, with each Westminster constituency 
returning six members through a direct election using PR-STV. The final size of the 
Assembly was disputed by the parties during the negotiations. According to the 
Mitchell Draft Proposal, suggestions included increasing the seats in each 
constituency from five (as recommended in the Framework Documents) to six, or to 
provide ten to twenty ‘top-up’ seats to ensure proportionality between electoral 
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strength and seat allocation. 59  Both proposals were designed to benefit smaller 
political parties. Ultimately, it was the first suggestion that was included in the Belfast 
Agreement60 and the Northern Ireland Act (1998)61.  
The architecture of the settlement in Bosnia-Hercegovina is more complex than in 
Northern Ireland, so the electoral provisions to guarantee proportionality between the 
constituent peoples will be summarised for each level of governance. There are 185 
municipalities in Bosnia-Hercegovina (including Brčko District), more than before the 
war, since some municipalities were split by the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL). 
The electoral system has evolved at the municipal level both in Republika Srpska and 
in the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina (FBiH). The electoral law for municipal 
councils in both entities initially used the system from the multi-party elections in 
1990, and the Provisional Election Commission employed a closed party list using the 
Hare quota with largest remainder.62 Over the next two elections, there were major 
changes to the electoral law. In the 1998 elections, the Hare quota with largest 
remainder was replaced with the Sainte-Laguë dividers to allocate seats, while 
maintaining the closed party lists. This change tends to reduce the number of seats in 
legislative bodies for smaller parties.63 The elections in 2000 used open party lists 
instead of closed party lists, so that voters would have the freedom to rank candidates 
differently from party leaders. The most recent version electoral law for 
municipalities stipulates that electoral mandates are distributed every four years 
through an open-list proportional system. The quotients for a political party or 
coalition are calculated using the Sainte-Laguë method. Political parties or coalitions 
that do not earn at least 3% of the total votes cast are not eligible for seats.64 When a 
list (i.e. political party or coalition) wins a mandate, seats are first allocated to 
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candidates on the list earning more than 5% of the votes cast for that list, with the 
quotients ordered from highest to lowest. If seats are not filled, then the remaining 
mandates are distributed among candidates from the list with less than 5% of the votes 
for that list.65 
 
There are exceptions to the electoral system for municipalities. Municipalities can be 
combined to form a ‘City Authority’  The ‘city authority’ is responsible for joint 
infrastructure of the municipalities that comprise it, and has its own statute. Moreover, 
a city authority has a unified city council with an equal number of councilors from 
each municipality, with a minimum of 15 and maximum of 30 members. The City 
Council elects its own Mayor. 66  There are two specific cases of such ‘City 
Authorities’. The first is Sarajevo, and is described in a separate section of the FBiH 
constitution. In addition to the traits off a City Authority, the decision-making bodies 
of the City of Sarajevo (i.e. City Council, Mayor and subordinate bodies) ‘shall reflect 
multiethicity and particularity of the City of Sarajevo as the Capital of the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’67 
 
The other example of a City Authority, Mostar, requires specific attention. The 
difficulty with local consensus on governing Mostar led to a provision to bring the 
‘divided city’ under EU administration for two years under the Washington 
Agreement.68 The European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM) managed the 
city until it handed over the duties to the OHR Regional Office in Mostar. The 
arrangements were intended to be temporary, until the local parties agreed on the 
governance of Mostar. However, this consensus was never reached, so the High 
Representative, Paddy Ashdown, handed down a decision on 28th January 2004 for 
the reunification of Mostar.69 The Federation constitution was amended to include a 
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separate section on the City of Mostar. 70  The unique context of the imposed 
reunification of the City of Mostar also required a separate section in the Election 
Law of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Mostar City Council will have 35 members, 17 of 
which are elected on a city-wide basis, and three each from the six municipalities 
(now known as ‘city areas electoral constituencies’). For the city-wide seats, the 
mandates are decided by an open-list proportional representation, with seats being 
allocated to political parties, coalitions and independent candidates using the Sainte-
Laguë formula. 
 
The cantonal level inherited from the Bosniac-Croat Federation established by the 
Washington Agreement forms part of post-Dayton governance in the Federation of 
BiH. The Federation consists of ten cantons, of which five are Bosniak-majority, three 
are Croat-majority and two are ‘mixed.’ The Bosniak-majority cantons are Una-Sana 
(1), Tuzla (3), Zenica-Doboj (4), Bosnian Podrinje (5) and Sarajevo (9). The Croat-
majority cantons are Posavina (2), West Hercegovina (8) and Canton 10.71 The two 
‘mixed’ cantons are Central Bosnia and Hercegovina-Neretva.72 Each canton has its 
own constitution, with provisions for the election of a cantonal executive and 
legislature. The electoral rules to choose the cantonal legislature are the same as the 
municipal elections, employing an open-list PR system with seats allocated through 
Sainte-Laguë. The size of the cantonal legislatures are specified in the Electoral Law 
for BiH.73 
 
In addition to the cantonal level of government unique to the federation, there is 
another level of governance unique to the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the sub-federal 
level of ‘entity’ administration, which arguably function as states within states. 
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Following the Dayton-Paris Agreement, the IEBL demarcated the border between the 
Federation of BiH (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS). 
 
At the legislative level, both entities have their own parliament. In the RS, the 
National Assembly consists of 83 members. Members are elected using an open-list 
PR system in six multi-member constituencies for 62 seats with Sainte-Laguë dividers 
and a minimum threshold for the party of 5%, and then using the highest remainder to 
fill any empty seats. The remaining 21 seats are allocated as compensatory seats. If 
the percentage of seats for a party or coalition from the constituencies is lower than 
the overall percentage in the RS, they receive compensatory seats to fill their 
complement. The lower house in the FBiH, the House of Representatives, consists of 
98 deputies, of which 73 are elected from 12 multi-member constituencies using the 
same electoral rules as for the national Assembly in the RS, with the remaining 25 
seats as compensatory seats. 
 
The procedures for ensuring proportionality at other levels of government are also 
evident at the federal bicameral legislature in BiH. The required designation is not 
present in the House of Representatives (lower chamber). There are 42 delegates, 28 
elected in the Federation and 14 in RS. In the Federation, 21 of the seats are elected in 
five multi-member constituencies (MMCs), and the remaining seven are 
compensatory seats. In RS, 9 members are elected from three MMCs, with five 
compensatory seats. The electoral rules used are identical to those used in the lower 
houses at the entity level. 
 
b. Executive Formation 
 
In addition to the proportionality of the electoral systems in the two case studies, this 
feature can also be seen in the allocation of the executive. 
 
Following from the Constitutional Court decision in 2000 safeguarding the rights of 
constituent peoples over the whole of Bosnia-Hercegovina, a strict formula for the 
composition of the executive was stipulated for the entity governments until the return 
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of displaced persons (Annex 7 of the Dayton-Paris Agreement) is completed.74 The 
cabinet in Republika Srpska consists of eight Serb, five Bosniak and three Croat 
ministers.75 Similarly, the executive in the FBiH includes eight Bosniak, five Croat 
and three Serb ministers.76 The formula of explicit allocation of seats in the executive 
resembles the power-sharing agreement in Lebanon, though the entity constitutions in 
BiH do not have explicit portfolio allocation. 
 
Unlike the practice of executive power-sharing in most parliamentary and semi-
presidential systems, the ministerial departments in Northern Ireland are allocated 
using a formula on the basis of the seats won in the Assembly (bigger parties will 
have more seats, so this can be seen as ‘proportional’). The result is a coalition in 
which the portfolio distribution is not done by the head of the government, but rather 
parties that are given turns in choosing ministerial departments. The number of 
ministerial departments for each political party and the order in which they will 
choose are determined by the d’Hondt mechanism. 77  The allocation of the 
chairpersons and deputy chairpersons in the Statutory Committees connected to each 
of the ministerial departments are also allocated using the d’Hondt mechanism. 
Grand Coalition 
 
The use of the d’Hondt mechanism in the Northern Ireland Executive and Statutory 
Committees bridges two of the features of consociational democracy. The d’Hondt 
formula not only ensures that these posts are allocated proportional to the number of 
Assembly seats, but also guarantees both Nationalist and Unionist representation in 
ministerial departments and as chairpersons of the corresponding Statutory 
Committees. Moreover, the choice of the number of ministries may have been 
finalised by considering the option that would lead to maximum inclusion of the four 
main political parties (UUP, SDLP, DUP and Sinn Féin). O’Leary et al. surmise that 
the SDLP drove the decision on the number of ministries and opted for ten over six 
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ministries, since this would give both the DUP and Sinn Féin two ministerial 
departments, binding them more closely with governance (compared to one portfolio 
in a six-department executive) and create a ‘grand coalition’ with five Nationalist and 
five Unionist ministers.78 After the successful running of d’Hondt, it was this grand 
coalition of five ministries each that resulted. 79  There is also a ‘grand coalition’ 
through the dual-premiership of the First and Deputy First Minister. The stipulations 
in the Belfast Agreement do not explicitly demand that there should be one premier 
from each ‘community’.80 However, requirement for cross-community support within 
the Assembly for the joint FM and DFM ticket within the Assembly encourages a 
Unionist and Nationalist partnership. 
 
Contrasting with the method in Northern Ireland, executive formation in Bosnia-
Hercegovina is not unlike other parliamentary systems. The three-person Bosnian 
Presidency (see below) nominates a Chairman, who appoints the other ministers. The 
resulting Council of Ministers (CoM) is approved by a majority vote in the House of 
Representatives. There is a further specification that no more than two-thirds of the 
Ministers can be from the FBiH, and that Deputy Ministers are from a different 
constituent people than the corresponding Minister.81 Although the constitution does 
not provide a requirement to include ‘Others’ in the Council of Ministers, the rules do 
leave room for constituent minorities (i.e. Serbs in the Federation) to be represented in 
the CoM. In practice, the ministerial portfolios have been distributed such that there is 
equal representation among the three constituent peoples, and there are two Deputy 
Ministers for each department, each from different constituent peoples from the 
corresponding minister.82 Thus, there is a grand coalition between the Serbs, Croats 
and Bosniaks in the CoM. 
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The grand coalition between the three constituent peoples is also evident in the upper 
chamber of the federal parliament and selection of Speakers in both Houses. The 
House of Peoples is a fifteen-member chamber with five Serb delegates appointed by 
the RS National Assembly, and ten delegates (five Croat, five Bosniak) from their 
‘own’ caucus in the FBiH House of Peoples.83After the legislative seats are allocated, 
the Speakers and Deputy Speakers for the two Houses in the federal parliament are 
elected by its members. The candidates run on a joint ticket with one member from 
each constituent people.84  
 
The heads of state in Bosnia-Hercegovina are the three members of the Presidency. 
The Bosniak and Croat members are elected from the FBiH with residents voting for 
Bosniak or Croat candidates, but not both. The candidate with the most votes amongst 
Bosniak and Croat candidates will be the respective representatives of the Presidency 
from FBiH. The Serb member is elected by residents in RS. 85  The Chair of the 
Presidency is initially given to the member who earned the most votes, but the Chair 
of the Presidency is rotated every year during their four-year terms.86 
 
Grand coalition between the constituent peoples can be seen elsewhere in the 
architecture of the Bosnian constitution. In the special provisions for Mostar, there is 
a requirement that the final allocation of seats in the Mostar City Council includes at 
least four of each constituent people, and least one ‘Other’. 87  In the cantonal 
legislatures, if there is a member of a constituent people, then a caucus of that people 
is formed. It is from this caucus that the nominees for Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman are drawn. If one of the constituent peoples is not represented, the post 
remains vacant.88 However, if there are caucuses for all three constituent peoples, they 
will all have either the Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson from ‘their people’. 
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The executive in both entities consists of a Presidency, and a Prime Minister and 
Ministers comprising the Government. Following the Constituent Peoples decision 
Constitutional Court (see Chapter 7), the members of Presidency in the entities 
(President and two Vice-Presidents) must come from different constituent peoples.89 
The members of the Presidency in RS are elected directly using a ‘winner takes all’ 
system. The system in the Federation is mentioned in the next section. The candidate 
with the highest vote from each constituent people is elected, with the highest vote 
overall being named President (the two others are Vice-Presidents).90 In both entities, 
as with many of the semi-presidential systems in Eastern Europe, the President 
nominates the Prime Minister, and they appoint sixteen ministers for the Cabinet. 
Moreover, two of the Ministers from constituent peoples other than that of the Prime 
Minister-designate are selected. Then, the Cabinet and Prime Minister (and Deputy 
Prime Ministers) are approved by majority vote in the lower house of the entity 
parliament. As mentioned in the previous section, the formula for the composition of 
the ministerial portfolios ensures that the cabinet will be a coalition of Serbs, Croats 
and Bosniaks. 
Mutual Veto 
 
The President of Republika Srpska is directly elected. In the FBiH, nominees for the 
President and Vice-presidents are put forward by the caucuses of constituent peoples 
in the FBiH House of Peoples. The joint ticket is approved by a majority both in the 
FBiH House of Representatives and House of Peoples, including a majority of each 
caucus.91 Thus, each constituent group (i.e. Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks) needs to 
support the ticket for President and Vice-Presidents. This mechanism of ‘parallel 
support’ allows for constituent national groups to block decisions if they are not 
supported. This allows each group a veto on important decisions and removes the 
possibility of being outvoted on issues of national interest. 
 
                                                 
89
 Agreement on the Implementation of the Constituent Peoples Decision of the Constitutional Court of 
BiH, Art. 5.II. URL: http://www.oscebih.org/documents/54-eng.pdf. 
90
 Constitution of RS, Article 80. 
91
 Constitution of FBiH, Art. IV.B.1 
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURES 
 116 
There are also provisions to ensure parallel consent of the constituent peoples at the 
cantonal level. The aforementioned caucuses are also used in cases where legislation 
is seen to affect ‘vital national interest’. If more than one of the Chairman/Vice-
Chairmen claims that a law is of ‘vital national interest’, then the law requires the 
majority vote of each caucus in the legislature. Alternatively, if one of the caucuses 
votes by a two-thirds majority that a particular law is of ‘vital national interest’, then 
the procedure for parallel consent is invoked.92 
 
The Bosnian state constitution lays out the parallel consent procedure in the federal 
legislature. If a majority of Croat, Serb or Bosniak delegates in the House of Peoples 
decide that a particular issue is ‘destructive’ to national interest, then it is necessary 
for a majority of Bosniak, Serb and Croat representatives to approve the law. If the 
majority of one of the other constituent peoples objects to the invocation of ‘national 
interest’, then the matter is decided by a Joint Commission of delegates from the 
House of Peoples. If there is still no agreement, the matter is sent to the Constitutional 
Court.93 
  
Following the Decision on Constituent Peoples by the Constitutional Court, the two 
entity constitutions were amended to protect the ‘vital national interest’ of the three 
constituent peoples similar to the federal constitution. For example, in the Federation 
constitution, issues of ‘vital national interest’ are: 
 
exercise of the rights of constituent peoples to be adequately represented in legislative, executive and 
judicial authorities; identity of one constituent people; constitutional amendments; organisation of 
public authorities; equal rights of constituent peoples in the process of decision-making; education, 
religion, language, promotion of culture, tradition and cultural heritage; territorial organisation; public 
information system, and other issues treated as of vital national interest if so claimed by 2/3rd of one of 
the caucuses of the constituent peoples in the House of Peoples.94 
 
As a part of the constitutional reforms, an upper house was established in RS, which 
is called the Council of Peoples (not House of Peoples). However, the list of issues 
relevant to ‘vital national interest’ in the RS Constitution are identical to those in the 
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Federation, except that ‘House of Peoples’ is replaced with ‘Council of Peoples’.95 
The procedure to decide on issues of ‘vital national interest’ can be done in two ways: 
two of the Chairperson/Deputy Chairpersons in the upper chamber claim that a law is 
vital national interest; or two-thirds of one of the constituent peoples in the Upper 
Chamber deems an issue to affect the national interest.96 If this procedure is started, 
then laws can be adopted only if a majority each of the caucuses in the Upper 
Chamber approves. This upper house can also agree to amend legislation and 
resubmit the law to the House of Representatives.97 If no agreement is reached, then 
the law is sent to a Joint Commission of members of the House of Representatives 
and the Upper House. If there is no agreement, then the issue is referred to the entity 
Constitutional Court to decide whether the legislation does fall under vital national 
interest. If it does, the legislation fails; if not, it is resubmitted to the House of 
Representatives, where a simple majority is necessary to pass the law. In other words, 
if the entity Constitutional Court  decides, there is no scope for a mutual veto.98 
 
A similar type of mutual veto provision is a part of the setup of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly through the cross-community requirement for certain ‘key decisions’. 
Areas explicitly mentioned in the Belfast Agreement are ‘election of the Chair of the 
Assembly, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, standing orders and budget 
allocations’.99 The two decisionmaking procedures are: 
 
(i)either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of 
the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting; 
  
(ii) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the 
nationalist and unionist designations present and voting.100 
 
Both mechanisms require that a critical proportion of both Unionists and Nationalists 
in the Assembly support a measure in key decisions. This threshold is 50% for 
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parallel consent and 40% for the weighted majority. For example, the cross-
community procedure used to elect the FM and DFM is parallel consent, so a majority 
of unionists and a majority of nationalists must support the joint ticket. In addition to 
the areas specified as ‘key decisions’, other issues can require cross-community 
support if a ‘petition of concern’ is brought by 30 of the 108 members of the 
Assembly. If there is a petition of concern, then parallel consent or weighted majority 
will be needed for the motion to pass. 
Segmental Autonomy 
 
The final feature of consociational democracy is segmental autonomy, and can be 
realised in two ways. It can either be ‘non-territorial’ and be connected to the 
individual, such as cultural or religious rights. For example, there are different rights 
attached to Flemish and Walloons in Belgium. Similarly, there are separate rights for 
different religious groups in India. This is not a strong component of the Northern 
Ireland case. However, due to the recognition of two equal traditions in Northern 
Ireland, there is state-funded single-religion education that approximates non-
territorial autonomy. There are also cross-border implementation bodies that protect 
the use of the Irish and Ulster Scots languages.101 
 
Although single-religion education matters profoundly in Northern Ireland, segmental 
autonomy is not strongly evident otherwise. By contrast, there are numerous examples 
of both territorial and non-territorial autonomy for constituent peoples in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. 
 
At the municipal level in FBiH, there are rules to protect constituent peoples when 
they are a majority in a municipality within a canton where the same people are a 
minority. Each Canton may ‘delegate functions concerning education, culture, tourism, 
local business and charitable activities, and radio and television to a municipality or 
city in  its territory, and is obliged to do so if the majority of population in the 
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municipality or city is other that of the Canton as a whole.’102 This safeguard for a 
minority (when the group is one of the constituent people) ensures autonomy for 
constituent peoples, even when they are a minority within the canton. These 
provisions are important in the two ‘mixed cantons’ in the Federation, Hercegovina-
Neretva and Central Bosnia.103 
 
Since most of the cantons in the Federation have either a Croat or Bosniak majority, 
there are provisions to cede territorial autonomy from the entity level to the canton. 
Some functions are under ‘joint responsibility’ between the two levels of government: 
human rights; health; environmental policy; infrastructure for communication and 
transport; social welfare; laws concerning citizenship; laws and regulations for BiH 
citizens in FBiH and foreigners; tourism and natural resources. These areas are 
managed either by the Federation or canton, or by coordination of the Canton by the 
Federation.104 
 
In addition to the areas of joint responsibility, there are crucial subjects where the 
canton is the lead, underlining the de-centralised governance in the Federation: 
policing; education; cultural policy; housing; public services; regulating land use; 
local business regulation; energy production facilities; broadcast media; implementing 
social welfare; implementing tourism policy; and powers of taxastion for operation of 
local government. 105  Because of the decentralised arrangement, the canton is the 
decisive layer in the decision-making in the Federation, having exclusive control over 
policing, education, and distribution of public housing, the latter being a highly 
contentious subject due to the demographic changes due to the war. 106  These 
responsibilities at the canton level ensure that the local majority has a high degree of 
territorial autonomy. 
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Before the Agreement on the Implementation of the Constitutional Court Decision on 
Constituent Peoples in March 2002, the two entities had strongly ethnisised 
constitutional frameworks. The previous wording of Artcle 1 in the RS Constitution 
was that  ‘Republika Srpska is a State of the Serb people and of all its citizens.’107 
Similarly, the Federation Article I.1 (1) refers to ‘Bosniacs and Croats as being 
constituent peoples’. 108  Thus, the pre-2002 entity constitutions reflected that 
Republika Srpska belonged to the Serbs, and the Federation to the two other 
constituent peoples. Thus, this is a further example of territorial autonomy for the 
constituent peoples. 
 
The reason for this ethnic definition of the two entities is the legacy of the war, and 
the two-stage settlement brokered by the parties and the international community. The 
first stage was the Washington Agreement (1994), ending the conflict between 
Bosniaks and Croats, and establishing power-sharing institutions in the Bosniac-Croat 
Federation, which later became the Federation of BiH. When the Dayton-Paris 
Agreement was finally concluded in 1995, it just added the Serb-dominated territories 
in the form of Republika Srpska and adjusted the IEBL. The ‘adding on’ of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is evident in Article XI of 
the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), which reads: ‘The Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize each 
other as sovereign independent States within their international borders.’ In other 
words, the mutual recognition between Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia was in force 
from the Washington Agreement, so it was unnecessary to reiterate this in the GFAP. 
The final agreement arguably solidified the effects of population changes during the 
war, and this was affirmed by the constitutions in the two ‘entities’ in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. 
 
Both entities have a high degree of autonomy over wide policy areas, including land 
use, public services, and fiscal policy. 109  However, the most interesting area of 
autonomy is in military or defence matters.110 The two entities have had separate 
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armies, with the Serb ‘Army of Republika Srpska’ (VRS) in one entity111, and the 
Bosniak ‘Army of BiH’ and ‘Croatian Defence Council’ (HVO) in the other. The 
three armies have retained the names from the war. However, the requirements to join 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) as a prologue to full NATO accession have 
encouraged military reform. These requirements include a central ‘Standing 
Committee for Military Matters’ at the federal level under full civilian control as a 
part of the state’s Council of Ministers. There has been such centralisation of the 
military in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Following these stipulations, the Law on Defence 
was passed at the state and entity levels in May 2004, creating a Ministry of Defence 
with the corresponding Minister, a Joint Staff, and an Operational Command. The 
Minister has control over the unified Armed Forces of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 112 
Despite these changes, the failure to meet the requirements of PfP membership are 
partially due to inertia in centralising the military command structure, including: 
 
failure to nominate candidates for key State-level positions with qualifications that meet NATO’s 
expectations; failure to secure adequate funds for State defence institutions; failure of the Federation 
parliament to pass legislation required to harmonise Federation defence laws with the new BiH Law on 
Defence; inability of the National Assembly and Council of Peoples of Republika Srpska to conclude 
the passage of the amendments to their defence legislation; and minimal progress on the selection and 
recruitment of personnel for State-level defence institutions.113 
 
The constitutional reforms from 2002 have ensured that there is required inclusion of 
Serbs in FBiH governance, and Bosniaks and Croats in RS governance. This process 
has been started through the amendment of the entity constitutions to include quotas 
and other specifications to require power-sharing. This has changed the nature of the 
‘autonomy’ endowed to the three constituent peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina. By 
divorcing the safeguards of the constitution from the entity level (by including all 
three peoples in the constitutions), the focus has moved to a more non-territorial 
autonmony, where identification with either the Serb, Croat or Bosniak segments is 
sufficient to guarantee constitutional rights over the whole of the state territory. 
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Reference States 
 
In addition to the features of internal consociation, there are components of the 
Belfast Agreement and Dayton-Paris Agreement that reflect the complex relationships 
between conflict groups and their reference states. The dimensions that will be 
considered in turn are reference state/co-national links and intergovernmentalism. 
Reference State/Co-National Links 
 
There are institutionalised relationships between reference states and the conflict zone 
both for Northern Ireland and Bosnia. These connections will be described for each of 
the ‘metropoles’. 
 
a. Dublin 
 
The Strand 2 institutions in the Belfast Agreement include the North-South 
Ministerial Council (NSMC), which consists of the Taoiseach and relevant ministers 
from the Republic of Ireland, and the FM and DFM and relevant ministers from the 
Northern Ireland Executive. The objectives of the NSMC are to provide a framework 
to discuss areas of common interest for both North and South, reach agreement on 
areas of common interest, agree on implementation, and take action on these areas 
through implementation bodies established through an agreement between North and 
South.114 The areas of implementation, harmonisation and cooperation were pared 
down from three annexes with 49 areas and eight implementation bodies down to 
twelve areas of implementation or cooperation. 115  The six areas in which 
implementation bodies were ultimately developed were: inland waterways; food 
safety; trade and business development; special EU programmes; Irish and Ulster 
Scots language; aquaculture and marine matters. The six areas for cooperation were: 
transport, agriculture, education, health, environment, and tourism.116 
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b. London 
 
The confederal component of the Belfast Agreement was a weak East-West 
component in the form of the British-Irish Council (BIC). The BIC consists of the two 
governments as well as the other devolved institutions on the two islands, including 
Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland, Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.117 The BIC 
consists of plenary summits twice a year, and sectoral meetings with the appropriate 
ministers and the appropriate personnel on cross-sectoral issues. The objective of 
these meetings is to discuss areas of common concern and agree on areas of 
cooperation. At the inaugural meeting, the different administrations were given 
responsibility for five sectoral areas: drug trafficking and abuse (Irish Government); 
social exclusion (Scotland and Wales); transport (Northern Ireland); environment 
(British Government); and knowledge economy (Jersey).118 Although the BIC does 
have some parallels with the NSMC, there are two important differences. First, the 
above competencies mean that the BIC has harmonisation and cooperation as a part of 
its remit, but no executive implementation powers. In fact, the members can opt out of 
any common policies or actions.119 
 
Another site of reference state/co-national links is not as evident in the Belfast 
Agreement, but is crucial in studying British sovereignty over Northern Ireland. The 
guiding principle for the devolution in Northern Ireland is the less-familiar notion of 
federacy.120 This differs from the notion of federation, since self-government is not 
conferred on an equal basis to constituent parts. That is, there is a difference between 
the Union of Great Britain, and the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In 
particular, the principle of consent only applies to Northern Ireland. None of the other 
parts can leave the Union if a numerical majority agree to do so. This unique 
relationship with Westminster also allows Northern Ireland to establish special cross-
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border relationships with the Republic of Ireland, while the other devolved 
governments can not. 
 
Nonetheless, this means that ultimate legislative authority lies with the Parliament in 
Westminster, not Dáil Éireann. The significant veto-player remains the British 
Government through the Northern Ireland Office. The British-Irish Agreement 
repealed Section 75 of the Government of Ireland Act (1920), which read: 
 
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the supreme authority of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters and things in [Northern] 
Ireland and every part thereof. 
 
The above suggests that the Westminster parliament can take unilateral action. 
However, according to the Belfast Agreement: 
 
If difficulties arise which require remedial action across the range of institutions, or otherwise require 
amendment of the British-Irish Agreement or relevant legislation, the process of review will fall to the 
two Governments in consultation with the parties in the Assembly. Each Government will be 
responsible for action in its own jurisdiction.121 
 
However, when there was a crisis in February 2000, the then-Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland Peter Mandelson pushed primary legislation (Northern Ireland Act 
2000) through Westminster Parliament amending the Belfast Agreement to allow 
unilateral suspension of the institutions without consultation. For nationalists and the 
Irish government, this meant that despite the repeal of Section 75, the British 
Government still had an all-powerful veto. For Bertie Ahern, ‘suspension raises issues 
of concern for the [Irish] Government and any significant extension of it could make 
the situation more difficult.’ 122  To address this issue, the joint Dublin-London 
proposals for the resumption of the devolved institutions mention repealing the 
Suspenison Act (2000). London remains bound by the British-Irish Agreement (1998) 
which they cannot violate unilaterally, the British continue to have de jure authority 
over Northern Ireland. 
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c. Dublin and London: Federal Aspects 
 
In addition to the confederal features in the political structures regarding Northern 
Ireland, there are also federal features to the Belfast Agreement. First, the 
federalisation of the Union is a fundamental change to the Act of Union. Instead of a 
centralised, unitary state, with political sovereignty resting with the Westminster 
Parliament, powers have not only been devolved to Northern Ireland, but also to a 
Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly. 123  In both of these devolved 
administrations, certain powers are transferred to local governments and legislatures. 
A unionist reading of the organisational change of the UK is that the decentralisation 
is equivalent in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, since the Agreement does 
affirm the position of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom. On 
the other hand, a nationalist reading of the BIC could suggest a federal Ireland, a body 
in which the two parts of Ireland have multilateral discussions with the constituent 
parts of Great Britain. The changes in the Irish Constitution (Articles 2 &3) do not 
abandon the aspiration of eventual Irish unification. However, the rewording of the 
articles refers to ‘both jurisdictions’ on the island. Thus, the constitution 
acknowledges partition, and that self-determination must be exercised in a separate 
Northern jurisdiction. O’Leary points out that if there is an eventual nationalist 
majority in Northern Ireland, nationalists might be reluctant to fully integrate into the 
Irish state, since they would have a local majority. The Irish government might want 
to maintain the boundary to maintain the same amount of political power. By contrast, 
unionists might prefer a non-federal Ireland, since they would constitute a large 
enough electoral group to affect government formation.124 
 
d. Zagreb 
 
The confederal features for BiH are most evident in the relationship between Zagreb 
and FBiH, which has the majority of the Bosnian Croat population. The Washington 
Agreement (1994) concluded the fighting between Bosniaks and Croats and 
established a Bosniac-Croat Federation in Bosnia. The Washington Agreement set out 
arrangements for the Confederation between the newly formed Federation and the 
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Republic of Croatia. As mentioned above, the Dayton-Paris Agreement appended a 
Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and established the Republic of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. The Preamble to Annex IV proclaims that the constituent peoples (and 
Others) are ‘[c]ommitted to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Similarly, ‘the Parties’ (which include the 
two reference states) ‘refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise, 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.’125 
 
Confederal links can be established, as long as the Republic of Croatia recognises the 
sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Zagreb re-
affirms the principle of non-interference in a neighbouring, sovereign state. 126 
However, the Croatian Government appreciates the position of Croats as a numerical 
minority among constituent peoples, and has programmes of cooperation with the 
FBiH entity, but not the federal Bosnian government. The areas of cooperation 
include education, culture, technology and health, where Zagreb has devoted 25 
million kunas to the Federation.127 This includes funding for a separate university in 
West Mostar, as well as importing lecturers from Split and Zagreb. Moreover, the 
confederal link between Zagreb and FBiH are enshrined through bilateral agreements 
on cooperation in higher education, technology and tourism.128 The implementation of 
these ‘special parallel relationships’ between Zagreb and Croats in FBiH will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
 
e. Belgrade 
 
Republika Srpska and Belgrade have concluded two significant agreements since the 
Dayton-Paris Agreement on ‘special parallel relationships’. In 1997, the President of 
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FR Yugoslavia and the Serb member of the BiH presidency signed an agreement that 
established a cross-border Council for Cooperation between RS and FRY.129  The 
agreement re-affirmed the sovereignty of BiH (Article 8), and listed areas in which 
the two parties would ‘encourage, plan and harmonise comprehensive cooperation.’ 
(Article 6)  The Council consists of the President of FRY, the Serb member of the 
BiH Presidency, and five others appointed by the two. As with the BIC, the remit of 
the Council does not include executive implementation, since this would, arguably, 
derogate from the principles of Bosnian sovereignty. Similarly, the then-High 
Representative oversaw the drafting of the agreement for Special Parallel Relations 
between RS and FRY signed in March 2001 and concluded that the compact did not 
endanger the Bosnian state. The agreement included areas such as law enforcement, 
education, tourism and defence.130 These Serb-RS links will be mentioned briefly in 
the following chapter. 
Intergovernmentalism 
 
In addition to the links between reference states and the conflict zone, the institutional 
settlements include a significant role for bilateral relations between reference states. 
That is, Zagreb-Belgrade axis for Bosnia-Hercegovina and London-Dublin axis for 
Northern Ireland play a crucial role. 
 
a. Signatories 
 
Although there is no explicit intrgovernmental institution between Zagreb and 
Belgrade regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina, the importance of the axis between Croatia 
and Serbia in the implementation of the post-Dayton settlement is undeniable. The 
peace agreement from which the constitutional structures emanate were concluded 
between Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The signatories in Article XI of the 
GFAP were the three presidents. However, the Bosnian representative was Alija 
Izetbegović, a Bosniak. Although the constituent peoples of the Bosnian state are 
Bosniak, Croat and Serb, the latter two are not represented by their ‘host state’. The 
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Presidents of the reference states are proxies for their co-nationals in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Thus, the reference states are guarantors of the Agreement for Bosnian 
Serbs and Bosnian Croats. 
 
The reference states have a similar role in the ‘signing’ of the British-Irish Agreement 
(1998). Although the negotiations and final structure of the three strands were 
strongly influenced by the multilateral talks between the two governments and local 
parties, the treaty itself is only signed by the reference states. The closing of the 
Annex to the Belfast Agreement reads: 
 
In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by the respective Governments, have 
signed this Agreement. 
 
Done in two originals at Belfast on the 10th day of April 1998. 
 
It is then signed by Tony Blair (British Prime Minister), Mo Mowlam (Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland), Bertie Ahern (Irish Taoiseach), and David Andrews (Irish 
Minister for Foreign Affairs). 
 
b. Bilateral Institutions 
 
There are institutions in the Belfast Agreement that allow London and Dublin to act as 
‘veto-players’. That is, the Irish and British Governments have set up structures that 
bypass decision-making procedures within Northern Ireland. The Anglo-Irish 
Agreement suggested a common front in Northern Ireland, such that London and 
Dublin might impose a solution in Northern Ireland over the heads of local actors. 
This intergovernmentalism carried over to the British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference (BIIGC), a part of Strand 3 of the Belfast Agreement (the antecedent to 
the Intergovernmental Conference established in 1985). 
 
The BIIGC is designed such that there are regular meetings between the British Prime 
Minister and Irish Taoiseach at the ‘Summit’ level to ‘promote bi-lateral cooperation’ 
for non-devolved issues related to Northern Ireland that are of common interest to the 
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two government. The meetings are co-chaired by the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland and the Irish Foreign Minister. In particular: 
 
Co-operation within the framework of the Conference will include facilitation of co-operation in 
security matters. The Conference also will address, in particular, the areas of rights, justice, prisons and 
policing in Northern Ireland (unless and until responsibility is devolved to a Northern Ireland 
administration) and will intensify co-operation between the two Governments on the all-island or cross-
border aspects of these matters.131 
 
The Conference is designed as a forum in which the two governments can address any 
disagreements between them, and does not include any regular role for local Northern 
Ireland officials. 
 
Beyond Transnational Consociation 
 
There are also institutions in both Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina that do 
not depend on reference state influence, but should be mentioned for completeness. 
These other institutions either have authority for implementation or for arbitration. 
That is, institutions can either give binding, enforceable decisions (implementation), 
or can provide non-binding decisions (arbitration). 
 
Implemention 
 
The most significant of these ‘institutions’ in the Bosnian context is the International 
Community (IC), which is comprised of the international organisations taking part in 
the building of the Bosnian state: the OSCE, UN, and especially the Office of the 
High Representative (OHR) in BiH. The latter was established in Annex X of the 
DPA as the OHR, headed by the High Representative (HR), who is the ‘the final 
authority in theatre regarding interpretation of this agreement on the civilian 
implementation of the peace settlement.’ 132  The wording of the original annex 
suggests that the role of the HR is more consultative, having authority for ‘monitoring 
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 Annex X, Art. V. 
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implementation; promoting compliance; coordinating civilian agencies; facilitating 
conflict resolution; meeting donor agencies; and reporting on progress.’133 However, 
the 1997 Peace Implementation Conference (PIC) in Bonn re-interpreted the mandate 
in Annex X to prescribe a more proactive HR with executive powers. The PIC is a 
group of 55 countries and international agencies that ‘sponsor and direct’ the 
implementation of the peace plan following Dayton. 134  The Bonn conference 
concluded that the HR can make binding decisions, which include instituting 
temporary measures (i.e. laws) that are consistent with the Dayton-Paris Agreement, 
and removing office holders that are acting contrary to the aims of the peace 
implementation plan.135 The HR’s decisions include vital issues such as a unified 
system for car license plates, and the national hymn and flag of the state.136  In 
addition to the OHR, the OSCE was significant, since it was in charge of conducting 
elections, though it has slowly ceded the responsibility to local authorities. The 2004 
local elections were the first to be completely handled by Bosnian officials. The UN 
has been in charge of reforming the border and police services, with support in the 
latter from the EU. 
 
The Human Rights Commission in Bosnia-Hercegovina set up under Annex VI of the 
GFAP consists of two bodies. The first part of Annex VI establishes the Human 
Rights Chamber. The Human Rights Chamber has fourteen members, four of which 
are appointed by the Federation and two by Republika Srpska. The remaining eight 
members are appointed by the Council of Europe and cannot be drawn from Bosnia-
Hercegovina or any neighbouring country (i.e. Croatia or Serbia). The President of the 
Chamber is selected from the ‘international’ members, not ‘local’ appointees. 137 
Investigations brought before the Human Rights Commission are usually handled first 
by the Ombudsman (see next section), unless the applicant explicitly requests the 
Chamber or the case is referred to the Chamber by the Ombudsman. The scope of the 
investigations include alleged human rights violations that contravene either the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
or other human rights agreements explicitly mentioned in the Appendix to Annex VI. 
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 Ibid., Art. II.1. 
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 From the OHR web site. URL: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/. 
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 PIC Bonn Conclusions, Art. XI.2. URL: http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=5182. 
136
 F. Bieber, ‘The Case Study of Bosnia and Hercegovina’ (forthcoming). 
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 GFAP, Annex VI, Art. VII.2. 
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The cases are heard in panels of seven members, in which four will be ‘international’. 
Once the decision is made, it is forwarded to the OHR and OSCE. Unlike the 
decisions form the Ombudsman, Annex VI explicitly states that decisions by the 
Human Rights Chamber ‘shall be final and binding’.138 The Chamber is set up such 
that a majority of the members in each panel and the President of the Chamber will be 
neither from Bosnia-Hercegovina or the reference states, so there is effectively an 
‘international veto’ on issues referred to the Chamber. 
Arbitration 
 
The other part of the Human Rights Commission is the Human Rights Ombudsman, 
appointed by the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE. The Ombudsman cannot be a 
citizen of Bosnia-Hercegovina or a neighbouring state.139 The Ombudsman initiates 
an investigation of alleged human rights violation either independently or at the 
request of another party. Once the Ombudsman completes the investigation, a report 
is published with recommendations. If these recommendations are not heeded, the 
findings of the report are forwarded to the OHR. Thus, the decisions from the 
Ombudsman are not binding (unlike the decisions from the Human Rights Chamber), 
but are sent to the High Representative, who can demand compliance. 
 
One of the most divisive issues in the Northern Ireland peace process has been the 
decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. The British and Irish governments signed 
an agreement in August 1997 creating the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning (IICD). The mandate of the IICD was to consult with the two 
governments and political parties in Northern Ireland about decommissioning; present 
the two governments with proposals for decommissioning; carry out tasks such as 
monitoring and verification of decommissioning; and reporting the findings of the 
IICD back to the two governments and parties in Northern Ireland.140  The three 
members are General John de Chastelain (Canada), Ambassador Andrew D. Sens 
(USA) and Brigadier Tauno Nieminen (Finland), none of whom are from the 
reference states. The independent Weapons Inspectors that report back regularly on 
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IRA weapons dumps are headed by former South African ANC negotiator Cyril 
Ramaphosa and former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. 
 
As in the previous section, the Human Rights Ombudsman in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
the members of the IICD, and the weapons inspectors in Northern Ireland are not 
from the conflict area or the reference states. Thus, these institutions go beyond the 
parameters of transnational consociation, but unlike the bodies in the previous section, 
the above institutions provide advisory opinions, not binding decisions. However, 
their recommendations can be forwarded to institutions that have power to impose 
decisions. 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The institutions of the Belfast Agreement and the Dayton-Paris Agreement exhibit the 
characteristics of consociational democracy. Both ensure proportionality through the 
electoral system, seat allocation in legislative bodies, and executive formation. 
Moreover, the formula to allocate ministerial portfolios and the selection of the dual-
premiership in Northern Ireland result in a grand coalition between unionists and 
nationalists. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, there are explicit provisions for the composition 
of the cabinets at the entity level that stipulate a grand coalition between Serbs, Croats 
and Bosniaks. Moreover, the Speakers and Deputy Speakers run on a joint ticket with 
one of each constituent people, and the rotating Presidency is a three-person 
institution with one Croat, one Serb and one Bosniak. The Belfast Agreement 
provides for mechanisms on certain ‘key decisions’ or those that are petitioned by 
thirty members of the Assembly that require cross-community support. There are 
procedures at the entity and state level in Bosnia-Hercegovina for any caucus of 
constituent peoples in the upper chamber to trigger ‘parallel consent’ on issues that 
threaten ‘vital national interest’. Such measures are considered approved if they earn a 
majority of each caucus in the upper chamber. Finally, the ‘parity of esteem’ in the 
Belfast Agreement allows for single-religion education in Northern Ireland. However, 
segmental autonomy is more developed in the Dayton-Paris Agreement. The 
devolution in certain areas for cantons in FBiH ensure that local majorities have a 
high degree of control over their own affairs. There are similar stipulations for 
municipalities in mixed cantons. The entities themselves were initially defined along 
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ethnic terms due to the legacy of the demographic changes during the war. However, 
the Constitutional Court decision on Constituent Peoples protecting the rights of 
Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats over the whole of the territory of the state changes the 
largely ‘territorial’ autonomy regime to a ‘non-territiorial’ one based on the protection 
of the constituent peoples over the whole of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
 
In addition to the traits of consociational democracy, there are significant links 
between the conflict zone and the reference states within the institutional framework. 
The Strand 2 institutions allow Dublin to cooperate with ministers in Northern Ireland 
in areas of mutual concern such as tourism. The British government has links to 
unionists through the maintenance of the Union and the Strand 3 British-Irish Council. 
In addition to these arrangements, the Belfast Agreement can also be seen as a 
‘federalising’ process. In the BIC, the constituent parts of the UK sit in a forum with 
the Republic of Ireland. However, if there is ever a change in the sovereignty over 
Northern Ireland, there may still be two jurisdictions on the island, since there are 
advantages for both unionists and nationalists to keep some territorial autonomy in a 
‘united Ireland’. The provisions in the Dayton-Paris Agreement allow for ‘special 
parallel relations’ between entities and other states. The Serb-majority Republika 
Srpska has concluded such agreements with Belgrade, while Zagreb and the 
Federation of BiH have also signed such agreements. 
 
The bilateral relations between reference states comprise the final dimension of 
transnational consociation. In both agreements, the reference states are signatories, 
and are thus guarantors of the accords. The institutional framework is more developed 
in Northern Ireland, where the Intergovernmental Conference of the AIA in 1985 has 
been succeeded by the BIIGC, allowing high-level summits between the Prime 
Minister and Taoiseach on non-devolved matters such as security. 
 
There are some institutions both in Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Hercegovina that are 
not a part of transnational consociation. Some of these institutions have a role offering 
non-binding decisions, such as the IICD and Human Rights Ombudsman. On the 
other hand, the OHR and Bosnian Human Rights Chamber can give binding decisions. 
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From the formal rules of the institutions, three of the features of transnational 
consociation are evident: internal consociation, reference state/co-national links and 
intergovernmentalism. However, bipartisanship within the reference states is not a 
part of the formal institutions. Nonetheless, policy continuity within reference states 
regarding the disputed area is a crucial part of political practice in ensuring 
transnational consociation. Thus, the focus of the thesis will move from the formal 
institutions to the political practice to examine whether the four features of 
transnational consociation are present in the implementation of the agreements in 
Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
 
The investigation in the next three chapters will be organised along the axes of 
transnational consociation derived in the previous chapter. The first will look at the 
significant links between the reference state and its co-nationals in the disputed area. 
The second chapter examines the factors in transnational consociation at the reference 
state level: intergovernmentalism and bipartisanship. The final empirical chapter will 
investigate the performance of the power-sharing institutions internal to the conflict 
zone, and evaluate whether the structures are self-enforcing and durable. 
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Chapter V: Reference State/Co-National Links 
 
Introduction 
 
The persistence of links between reference states and their co-nationals in the disputed 
territory is crucial to the rest of the analysis. Clearly, if there were no links between 
the reference states and the conflict zone, then a policy change in the reference states 
would not have any effect on the conflict. For example, if there are no significant and 
durable links between nationalists in Northern Ireland and Dublin, then changes in the 
Republic of Ireland regarding policy in Northern Ireland would have limited effect in 
the latter. 
 
The following sections will illustrate that this link between certain groups and their 
‘metropoles’ was not only significant in the negotiations of the respective settlements, 
but also a means by which the reference states could drive the implementation of the 
settlement (which will be illustrated in subsequent chapters). 
 
To establish that it is possible to have transnational consociation, it is necessary to 
show four reference state/co-national relationships: 
 
• A durable link between Unionists in Northern Ireland and British institutions 
in London. 
• A durable link between Nationalists in Northern Ireland and the Irish 
institutions in Dublin. 
• A durable link between Bosnian Serbs and Serbian institutions in Belgrade. 
• A durable link between Bosnian Croats and Croatian institutions in Zagreb. 
 
It is only if all four of these conditions are fulfilled can there be a basis for 
transnational consociation in both cases. However, if one of the two reference states 
for a case study does not have substantive links with the conflict zone, then the 
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preconditions for a possible transnational consociation are not satisfied in this 
particular case. 
 
The types of links that can be investigated are numerous, but the following discussion 
will be limited to six areas.1 The first is that a connection between reference states and 
co-nationals can be verified by personal pronouncements by policymakers within the 
reference states and disputed territory. That is, representatives from the political 
parties within the conflict zone and reference states all mention these ties. These 
personal pronouncements take two forms. The first is that the reference states have a 
responsibility to protect ‘their’ side. The second, existing in case of Bosnia-
Hercegovina and reference states, is that there is a unified ‘ethnic space’ interrupted 
by state borders. 
 
Much of the evidence of these personal pronouncements is based on primary 
interview data with policymakers and journalists in the two disputed territories and 
the corresponding reference states. 2  The interviews in Northern Ireland were 
conducted from October to December 2002, and the interviews with reference states 
were completed in spring 2003. The interview material from the other case study was 
collected May to September 2003. Since the Bosnian political system is decentralised, 
in addition to interviews in the three national capitals (i.e. Sarajevo, Belgrade and 
Zagreb), fieldwork was also done in Mostar and Banja Luka. The objective was to 
obtain material from the main political parties in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-
Hercegovina as well as the corresponding reference states. Additionally, the goal of 
the fieldwork was to get some supplementary information from different levels of 
governance in the two places, such as the perspectives from parties in government and 
others that are not. Ultimately, it was not possible to obtain interviews with two major 
political parties: HDZ in Croatia and SRS in Serbia. However, using secondary 
material and interviews from other sources, it is possible to include HDZ and SRS in 
the analysis. 
 
                                                 
1
 Other possible areas to study could include state-supported civil society links such as cultural 
organisations and commerce. 
2
 I would like to thank Vesna Bojičić-Dželilović, Saša Božić, Zdravko Grebo, Kishore Mandhyan, 
Silva Mežnarić and Rick Wilford for helping me arrange my fieldwork. I am especially grateful to the 
staff at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies (Sarajevo) and the staff at the Institute for 
Migration and Ethnic Studies (Zagreb) for hosting me during the summer of 2003. 
REFERENCE STATE/CO-NATIONAL LINKS 
 137 
The second area for such relationships are the constitutional links by reference states 
for their ‘nation’ outside the borders of the state. These types of ‘status laws’ are 
found in many states in Central and Eastern Europe, such as the Hungarian law that 
promises responsibility for all members of the Hungarian nation, as mentioned in the 
introductory chapter. 
 
The third area for co-national/reference state links is institutional. That is, both the 
Belfast Agreement and the Dayton-Paris Agreement contain provisions for 
transnational institutions co-existing with internal power-sharing. In the Belfast 
Agreement, all-Ireland implementation bodies were set up under Strand 2, and the 
British-Irish Council as part of Strand 3. The Dayton-Paris Agreement allowed for 
entities to conclude agreements with other states. Since the entities are dominated by 
certain national groups, this allows for co-nationals to have links with their reference 
states. 
 
The political terrain in the reference states and disputed territory are not independent. 
That is, for both case studies, political parties in the reference states have strong links 
with particular parties in the conflict zone, and even have ‘sister parties’. These direct 
political links comprise the fourth area investigated. 
 
In both of the case studies, there has been a history of military/security links which 
persist to this day. Although these connections could have been included with the 
‘institutional links’ mentioned above, it is instructive to discuss the security sector 
separately.  
 
The first five sections focus on legal mechanisms through which reference states and 
‘their’ co-nationals are linked. However, more shadowy relationships have been and 
continue to exist. The sixth section will look at possible illicit financial flows, 
organised crime and state collusion in the two case studies. 
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Pronouncements by Policymakers 
 
A vital aspect underlining the relationships between reference states and their co-
nationals is through personal pronouncements by political elites regarding Northern 
Ireland and Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
 
In the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the public declarations from politicians in the 
reference states link the ‘homeland’ with ‘their’ co-nationals in the conflict zone. 
 
During the presidential campaign in 2002, Kostunica made an appearance at Mali 
Zvornik, just on the Serbian side of the Drina. He remarked that Republika Srpska 
was ‘part of the family, temporarily separated from the Serbian motherland.’ 3 
According to an ICG report from 2001, ‘FRY officials at the highest level, including 
President Kostunica and Foreign Minister Goran Svilanović, openly link the status of 
Republika Srpska with the future status of Kosovo.’4 Serbian intellectuals in Belgrade 
underlined the notion of a unified ‘Serb ethnic space’ that includes Republika Srpska 
in a round-table of the Institute of Geopolitical Studies in 1997.5 Although the round-
table was convened in the time of Milošević, the notion of a Serb ethnic space 
remains salient with hard-line nationalists. As one SRS-aligned journalist remarked 
that ‘it is funny that there is a border between members of the same nation.’6 The 
public positions of the MFA and political parties are less irredentist. There is a 
consensus that Dayton should be followed to the letter. Thus, representatives from the 
Serbian MFA, SPS, and DSS assert a right to form special relationships with RS 
under the Dayton-Paris Agreement.7 
 
In Croatia, Zdravko Tomac once remarked that Tuñman’s wartime policy towards 
Bosnia-Hercegovina had been correct and that a third Croat entity should be 
                                                 
3
 M. Saponja-Hadžić, Serbia: ‘Kostunica Remarks Frighten Bosnia’, Balkan Crisis Report, no. 368 
(18th Sep 2002). URL: http://www.iwpr.net/archive/bcr2/bcr2_20020918_1_eng.txt. 
4
 ICG, ‘A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for Regional Stability’, June 2001. URL: 
http://www.icg.org//library/documents/report_archive/A400316_15062001.pdf. 
5
 HCHR (Serbia), ‘New Serbian Nationalism’, 11th Feb. 2000. URL: 
http://www.helsinki.org.yu/focus_text.php?lang=en&idteks=304. The salience of this ‘ethnic space’ 
was also mentioned in an interview with Sonja Biserko. 
6
 Interview with Vlada ðukanović 
7
 Interview with Dušan Crnogorčević; interview with Aleksandar Vulin; interview with Nikola Lazić. 
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established.8 Echoes of the unified ‘ethnic space’ from Serb nationalists can be heard 
from Zagreb. One member of the HSLS remarked: ‘Part of our Croatian people are in 
Bosnia. The border passes through the same people, so relations are important.’9 
However, the public declarations of the Croatian government and other political 
parties assert the constitutional obligation (mentioned in the next section) as well as 
the special relationships protected by DPA. The obligation to protect Croats in BiH is 
mentioned by representatives of the MFA, SDP, HSLS, HSS, HNS, and the 
President’s office.10 The obligation to support Croats in BiH is also asserted within 
the Zagreb human rights community. The Director of the HCHR in Croatia 
emphasised  that both Zagreb and Belgrade should have provided support when 
Bosniak politicians in Sarajevo suggest that Bosnia-Hercegovina is a Bosniak state.11 
The Croatian MFA posits it has an obligation to help minority return of Croats to the 
RS.12 
 
There are also political pronouncements from policymakers in the disputed area. 
Advisors of the Croat Presidency in BiH all referred to Croatia as the ‘homeland’ or 
‘metropole’, despite a commitment to the political structures in Sarajevo.13 However, 
they also see that with the normalisation of bilateral relations, Croats are pushing 
away their ‘poor cousins’ in Hercegovina.14 Regarding the Bosnian Serb connection 
with Belgrade, most in Banja Luka see Belgrade as their capital, the relations are 
more ‘realistic’, and Serbs know that Sarajevo is their capital.15 In Belgrade, the 
issues of BiH are not researched, and Kosovo gets more attention.16 Refugees from 
Bosnia-Hercegovina are not liked, as they are seen as bringing trouble.17 The focus 
has moved towards the economic situation within Serbia, Kosovo, and occasionally 
Montenegro.  
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 ICG, ‘Bosnia’s Nationalist Governments’, 22nd Jul. 2003. URL: 
http://www.icg.org//library/documents/report_archive/A401057_22072003.pdf. 
9
 Interview with Željko Glavan 
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 Interview with Davor Vidiš; interview with Mirjana Ferić-Vac; interview with Željko Glavan; 
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 Interview with Žarko Puhovski. 
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The feeling of ‘abandonment’ by the reference state is more evident in the case of 
Northern Ireland. Although there are differences of between Dublin and London, the 
policy from both governments has been ‘even-handed’. From the London perspective, 
‘the government has regular meetings with all the political parties in Northern Ireland. 
There is no distinction between Unionist and Nationalists.’18 
 
According to a former David Trimble advisor, Unionists expect support from the 
British government, but are unhappy since London has been ‘even-handed’. 19 
Trimble’s special advisor, Steven King, appreciated the difficult position of the 
British Government: ‘The London government is in a difficult position: it must be 
seen as a counterweight [to Dublin], but also fair.’20 However, King also says that the 
NIO is ‘not committed to this place [Northern Ireland].  That really needs to change. 
The NIO officials still don’t see Unionist parties the way the Irish government sees 
the SDLP as a part of the process.’21 Other unionist politicians say that the promises 
made by the Labour government have not been delivered, so unionists feel 
‘alienated’.22 Robert McCartney, an anti-Agreement unionist, adds that the British 
policy since Peter Brooke’s statement in 1990 has been to ‘dispose of Northern 
Ireland.’23 
 
Similarly, for the Irish Government, ‘one of the major changes has been the growing 
relationship with Unionists. There was a relationship with the UUP, but now there is 
contact with the DUP.’24  The fair approach by the two governments has elicited 
complaints from some republican policymakers. Francie Molloy (SF) says that 
‘Dublin has not delivered. They did not complain very publicly about the suspensions. 
Republicans definitely felt let down.’25 Dara O’Hagan (SF) comments: 
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 Interview with Senior Official (NIO); another official at the NIO, William Stevenson, commented 
that the problem in Unionism has been that the British governments have been ‘too fair’, while it is still 
seen that Dublin speaks for nationalists. 
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 Interview with Graham Gudgin 
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 Ibid. 
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 Interview with Peter Weir 
23
 Interview with Robert McCartney. Peter Brooke, then Secretary of State for NI, made a speech in 
London on 9th November 1990 declaring that the British had no ‘selfish economic or strategic interest’ 
in Northern Ireland. 
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There are times when the Dublin government can be stronger. You get the impression it acts as a junior 
partner to the British government. It has not always upheld the interests of Nationalists in the North…. 
[The Irish Government does] not always go as far as we would like them to.26 
 
Constitutional Links 
The second type of link between reference states and co-national is constitutional. 
That is, reference states declare an explicit responsibility to protect their co-nationals 
in the disputed territory. Such evidence can only be found in two of the four reference 
states. 
 
It is not surprising that the constitution of the Union of Serbia & Montenegro does not 
have a reference to protection of external Serbs, even in the Constitution of the 
Republic of Serbia (1990).27 Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina were 
still internal to Yugoslavia in 1990. By contrast, the Croatian Constitution asserts an 
explicit constitutional obligation to the Croats living abroad. Article 10 of the 
Croatian Constitution states: 
 
The Republic of Croatia shall protect the rights and interests of its citizens living or residing abroad, 
and shall promote their links with the homeland. 
 
Parts of the Croatian nation in other states shall be guaranteed special concern and protection by the 
Republic of Croatia. 
 
This article was mentioned by Croatian policymakers in Zagreb in the previous 
section to justify ties with Hercegovin Croats. The reason for these provisions was 
that the Croatian HDZ supported its twin sister party in Hercegovina (HDZ-BiH) and 
other nationalists at the inception of the Croatian state. Hercegovina was 
economically targeted by Belgrade during the communist era, so many Croats from 
the region emigrated in the 1970s and became wealthy in places like Germany, 
Canada and Argentina. These Hercegovins were predominantly religious and 
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 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (April 1992) was superseded by the 
arrangements agreed between Serbia and Montenegro in February 2003. 
REFERENCE STATE/CO-NATIONAL LINKS 
 142 
nationalist, and formed ties with the pre-independence HDZ to aid the state-building 
project. 28  The HDZ reliance on Hercegovin Croats resulted in the allocation of 
parliamentary seats in the electoral law for the ‘diaspora’, the 11th electoral unit in 
Croatian elections, since the ‘diaspora’ is composed mainly of Hercegovin Croats. 29  
The existence of the 11th electoral district follows from the constitutional obligation 
of Zagreb to protect all Croats, irrespective of state of residence. This protection has 
been used by the HDZ to ensure extra representation in the Sabor as well as extra 
support in the presidential elections, even after the end of the Tuñman regime. The 
election results below illustrate the effects of the 11th district in recent elections. 
 
The presidential election in Croatia follows a two-round run-off system common in 
Europe. That is, the two candidates receiving the highest total of votes from the first 
round have a second election just between the two of them if no candidate receives 
over 50% of the vote. The winner of the second round becomes the president of 
Croatia. In 2000, Dr. Mate Granić (then HDZ) received only 22.5% of the first round 
votes for Croatian president, but 68% of the votes from the diaspora went to Granić, 
including 90% of the votes from Hercegovina.30 For the Sabor elections held the same 
year, the HDZ government was unseated by an SDP-led coalition. Nonetheless, the 
votes from the 11th electoral unit (a majority of whom were from Bosnia-
Hercegovina) voted overwhelmingly for the HDZ, with 85.9% of the votes. All six of 
the corresponding seats in the Sabor went to the HDZ. Although the effect of the 
diaspora vote has diminished since 2000, all four seats from the 11th electoral district 
in the 2003 parliamentary elections were allocated to the HDZ.31 Nonetheless, the 
cross-border ‘diaspora’ plays a significant role in electoral politics in Croatia, and 
prevented non-nationalist parties such as the SDP from gaining power before 2000.32 
Even in the 2005  presidential election, a significant gap remains between the overall 
results and the 11th election unit.33 In the first round of the election, the incumbent 
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 Interview with Julien Berthoud (OHR, Mostar) 
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 The 12 electoral units include ten territorially-defined constituencies, one for the diaspora, and one 
for national minorities. 
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 Hercegovin numbers courtesy of Julien Berthoud. Presidential election results from the Croatian 
Electoral Commission: http://www.izbori.hr/arhiva/arhiva2000Pred/Pred1Krug.htm.  
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 Results from Croatian Electoral Commission. The HDZ list won 57.64% of the diaspora votes, with 
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 Interview with Mirjana Ferić-Vac (SDP, Head of Croatian Delegation to CoE) 
33
 The electoral unit name has changed from ‘diaspora’ to ‘foreigner’ according to the election results 
published on the Coratian Electoral Commission website. 
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Stjepan Mesić (HNS) received 48.9% of the total votes while the HDZ candidate, 
Jadranka Kosor, only obtained 20.3% of the vote (though this was enough to move to 
the second round of the election).34 However, Kosor received 59.8% of the votes from 
the 11th electoral unit compared to 13.7% for Mesić. In particular, 68.3% of the 53884 
valid ballots cast went to the HDZ candidate, while only 9.0% were for Mesić. 
Moreover, the hard-line ‘nationalist’ Hrvatski Blok candidate Ivić Pašalic (who is 
Hercegovin) only received 76 fewer votes than Mesić, although Pašalić received 1.8% 
of the overall vote in the first round. In the second round, the same pattern emerged 
between the 11th electoral unit results and the overall vote. Mesić was re-elected, 
winning 65.9% of the vote, but only getting 12.1% in Bosnia-Hercegovina in the 
second round. 
 
In the other case study, there is no ‘status law’ emanating from London regarding the 
Unionists. This is simply because the present constitutional arrangement is that 
Northern Ireland is an integral part of the United Kingdom de jure, so there is no need 
to afford special protection for her citizens in Northern Ireland. Additionally, the 
Belfast Agreement re-affirms the principle of consent to underline British sovereignty, 
such that ‘the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely 
exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union’.35 
 
By contrast, the original wording of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution asserted 
an explicit territorial claim on all of the land and seas of the island. The two articles 
were changed as a part of the Belfast Agreement. Article 2 now reads: 
 
It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its 
islands and seas, to be part of the Irish Nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise 
qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its 
special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.36 
 
The amended article still has a connotation of responsibilities across the borders of the 
internationally-recognised twenty-six county Republic of Ireland. Even the newer 
version of the text has ramifications for cross-border citizenship rights. Since Article 
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2 allows those born on any part of the island to be given citizenship, those from 
Northern Ireland are automatically eligible. There is a constituency residency 
requirement to vote in Dáil elections. However, to become President, one only needs 
to be an Irish citizen. Thus, for the last two terms, Belfast-born Mary McAleese has 
been the Head of State, an automatic citizen since the ‘birthright’ of the Irish nation 
extends beyond the border of the Republic of Ireland. 
 
Institutional Links 
 
In addition to constitutional declarations in reference state constitutions, there are also 
institutional provisions in the peace agreements for both Northern Ireland and Bosnia-
Hercegovina. 
 
The Washington Agreement predates the Dayton-Paris Agreement by a year. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, this agreement lays out the structures for power-
sharing between Bosniaks and Croats, and establishes a ‘Bosniac-Croat Federation’ 
that was the harbinger of the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The preamble of the 
Agreement suggests a confederation between the Republic of Croatia.37 Some Croat 
politicians claim that Dayton-Paris Agreement arguably ‘adds on’ Republika Srpska 
as well as weak federal structures.38 This would bolster the claim for a permanent, 
cross-border confederation between Zagreb and the Federation. However, the Venice 
Commission concluded that the Dayton-Paris Agreement superseded the earlier 
document, so the previous confederal arrangements are no longer valid. In 
considering the Preliminary Agreement (denoted as ‘the Agreement’ in the quote 
below) on the establishment of a Confederation between FBiH and the Republic of 
Croatia, the Venice Commission concluded: 
The Commission considers the establishment of a confederation between an Entity and another State as 
clearly inconsistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BH and therefore as 
unconstitutional…It is clear that, as from the entry into force of the new Constitution, the Washington 
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 For a text of the Washington Agreement, see: 
http://www.ecmi.de/cps/documents_bosnia_washington.html. 
38
 For example, Miroslav Tuñman claims that the Serbs were invited to join the Washington Agreement 
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Agreement may be used as a basis for the conclusion of agreements only to the extent the agreements 
are compatible with the new Constitution. 
This Agreement, which was concluded before Dayton, has to be regarded as superseded by the new 
Constitution.39 
Thus, the confederation is superseded by the right of entities to form ‘special parallel 
relationships’ with neighbouring countries as long as such agreements uphold the 
territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina.40 Although there is no explicit mention of 
which neighbouring countries entities can form special relationships within Annex IV, 
the measures have been used for obvious ends by both entities to create sub-national, 
legal relationships between Bosnian Serbs in RS and Belgrade on the one hand, and 
Bosnian Croats in the Federation (FBiH) and Zagreb on the other.41 
 
The Special Relations Agreement between Croatia and FBiH was signed into law in 
April 1999, resulting in cross-border cooperation in science, technology, education, 
tourism, culture, pensions, protection from natural disasters, economic co-operation, 
energy and social protection.42 There was a deeper reason for the HDZ regime to 
implement these special parallel relationships. Franjo Tuñman asserts that ‘The 
Agreement provides for the rights and continuance of the Croatian people in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’.43 
 
There has been substantive funding from Zagreb for Croat housing and education in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina During the previous regime, there was housing and resettlement 
in and south of Mostar funded by Zagreb. Although this funding has been reduced, the 
demographic shift of importing Croats has been completed, so there is no need for 
further cooperation.44 In other areas, the current Croatian government funds projects 
for Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The government gave 20000 million kuna (1 kuna 
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 Venice Commission, Draft opinion on the constitutionality of international agreements concluded by 
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= €7.4, October 2005) annually between 2001 and 2003 for building materials to help 
reconstruction.45 Moreover, the Croatian government funds Croatian cultural projects, 
just as it does for Croats in Slovakia, Vojvodina and Montenegro.46 The MFA have a 
programme of €700000 to fund cultural projects. This fund includes the 
reconstruction of cultural buildings, such as churches, and the Croatian National 
Theatre.47 According to OHR (Mostar), instead of directly funding the projects in 
Hercegovina, the Croatian government is offering these funds for re-building schools, 
churches, and other ‘cultural’ projects via Sarajevo.48 
 
The final significant area of cross-border investment is the funding of a separate 
‘Croatian’ university in West Mostar in accordance with the Special Relations 
agreement in 1998. The former Deputy Minister for Science and Education states that 
the Croatian government has supported education in Hercegovina. In particular, there 
was funding for education and science education, including funding for the West 
Mostar University. Moreover, the Croatian government supplied additional financial 
support by sending lecturers (e.g. from the medical school) from Zagreb to Mostar 
and providing scholarships for Hercegovins to study in Zagreb.49  Although these 
links are legal, there are dissenting voices in both Zagreb and Mostar. A community 
organiser in Mostar remarks that there are ‘even two universities [in Mostar]. 
Individually, both universities are terrible. If they join up, maybe they can form one 
decent university.’50 The leader of the small Liberal Party in Croatia, Ivo Banac, says 
that there should not be a separate university in West Mostar. He believes that funding 
the university is ‘cultural segregation’.51 
 
Although there is a stronger Zagreb-Sarajevo axis since 2000 and a change to fund the 
West Mostar University federally (i.e. via Sarajevo, not directly to Hercegovina), the 
current Croatian government still defends the separate university. Joško Paro, a 
former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Croatian Ambassador to the 
UK, says that West Mostar University is a private university and the only one that is 
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Croatian. Thus, it is important to preserve the history and culture of the Croats.52 It is 
perhaps this moral (in addition to financial) support from Zagreb that impeded the 
passing of the Higher Education Framework Law that would have created a state-wide 
agency for recognising qualifications, and would ensure that Bosnian diplomas would 
be recognised in the rest of Europe.53 Although there had been a lengthy consultation 
with members of all three constituent peoples and the Council of Europe, Croat 
deputies of the federal parliament invoked the ‘vital national interest’ clause in May 
2004, because they felt that the law did not make adequate provisions to protect West 
Mostar University.54 
 
In accordance with Annex IV of the DPA and the RS Constitution, the presidents of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and RS concluded an agreement in May 2001, 
which was ratified by the RS National Assembly in July 2001. Despite some 
challenges that the accord was in contravention of the constituent peoples decision of 
the Constitutional Court as well as the constitution, the High Representative 
concluded that the agreement was valid.55 The areas of cooperation were similar to 
those between Zagreb and FBiH, and are listed in Article 2.56 In addition to the 
provisions of Article 2, the agreement also established a Council for Cooperation.57 
The Council consists of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and relevant 
minister from Belgrade and from Banja Luka meeting every three months to discuss 
aspects of implementation. These arrangements are similar to the North-South 
Ministerial Council (which is mentioned below). According to Mladen Ivanić, one of 
the reasons for these agreements between entities and ‘their’ reference states is that 
                                                 
52
 Interview with Joško Paro 
53
 The law was drafted so the BiH would be in line with the ‘Bologna Process’ of harmonising higher 
education qualification throughout Europe 
54
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 OHR Press Release, 6th June 2001. URL: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-
dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=4431. 
56
 The list of areas from Article 2 are: economy and use of natural resources; planning; legislature; 
privatisation and denationalisation; science and technology; education, culture and sport; health-care 
and social policy; tourism and environmental protection; information; the protection of freedoms and 
rights of the citizens in line with the highest standards, and in particular the standardisation and 
recognition of the right to dual citizenship to the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
Republika Srpska; curbing all forms of crime; and defence (education, equipment, joint production 
etc.) to a degree that is in conformity with the Peace Agreement. 
57
 Ibid., Articles 3-6. An online translation of the agreement can be found at: 
http://dev.eurac.edu:8085/mugs2/do/blob.doc?type=doc&serial=1017236424771. 
REFERENCE STATE/CO-NATIONAL LINKS 
 148 
‘parts of the population have to be convinced that they were not lost.’58 In other words, 
the institutional connections and high-level ‘Council’ meetings between almost-
exclusively Serb RS officials and Belgrade assure Serbs in BiH that they have some 
institutional connections to ‘their homeland’. 
 
The inclusion of Dublin in matters for the nationalist community in Northern Ireland 
can be traced back to both the failed Sunningdale power-sharing arrangements and the 
AIA. The Intergovernmental Conference set up by the latter gave Dublin ‘a 
framework within which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals 
on the modalities of bringing about devolution in Northern Ireland, in so far as they 
relate to the interests of the minority community.’59 These cross-border links were 
further formalised in Strand 2 of the Belfast Agreement through the North-South 
Ministerial Council (NSMC). The NSMC is a forum in which the Northern Ireland 
First Minister, Deputy First Minister, Irish Taoiseach, and relevant ministers from the 
respective administrations could discuss matters of common concern.60 Although the 
relevant minister need not be nationalist, the Strand Two institutions negotiated by 
Dublin and London were established to satisfy the wishes of the nationalists. The NI 
Life & Times Survey (2003) illustrates the gap between nationalists and unionists 
regarding the ‘Irish dimension’. Although there is not a perfect correspondence, the 
religious labels of ‘catholic’ and ‘protestant’ are used as proxies for ‘nationalist’ and 
‘unionist’. In the 2004 survey, only 1% of the ‘catholic’ respondents described 
themselves as ‘unionist’ and 1% of ‘protestants’ described themselves as 
‘nationalist’.61 There is 34% support for ‘a lot’ of Dublin involvement, and 49% for ‘a 
little’ by ‘catholics’. By contrast, 63% of ‘protestants’ believe that the extent of 
Dublin involvement should be ‘not at all’.62 
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Strand 2 institutions took three forms before the 2002 suspension. First, there were 
high level plenary meetings that were chaired either by the Irish Taoiseach, or jointly 
co-chaired by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. These meeting allowed the 
executives from the two administrations to discuss the overall operation of the cross-
border structures. Second, there were six cross-border implementation bodies created 
by the Agreement which were accompanied by sectoral meetings between the 
appropriate ministers from the Northern Ireland Executive and Irish Government. In 
the six other areas of agreed cooperation, there were sectoral meetings, but no 
corresponding implementation bodies. 
 
 
The NSMC meetings were used by both the UUP and DUP to politicise issues outside 
the areas of cross-border cooperation. David Trimble excluded Sinn Féin ministers to 
the NSMC, though NI High Court Justice Brain Kerr ruled in January 2001 that the 
First Minister could not exert pressure on Sinn Féin in this way. The DUP minister 
did not attend the transport sectoral meetings, even though the issues discussed, such 
the improvement of  railway links across the border, were not ‘sectarian’. Nonetheless, 
the implementation bodies did identify some strategic areas for policy coordination. 
Each of the twelve areas are briefly mentioned below. 
 
InterTradeIreland recently explored the development of an all-Ireland information 
technology ‘Digital Island’ scheme and the creation of more cross-border partnerships 
in science/technology research. The Food Safety Board has created awareness about 
food safety issues through various public service campaigns. Although there have 
been complications transferring the authority from the Irish Commissioner of lights 
(requiring a change in British legislation), the FCILC has examined issues related to 
aquaculture in both the Foyle and Carlingford Lough. Waterways Ireland is 
responsible for the development of rivers and canals on an all-Ireland basis, including 
exploring the feasibility of re-opening the Ulster Canal (connecting the Shannon-Erne 
System to Lough Erne and Lough Neagh). The Special EU Programmes body 
(SEUPB) distributes EU Funds earmarked for cross-border projects for community 
building, including over €200 million from the PEACE II fund. Finally, the Language 
Body is made up of Foras na Gaeilge and Tha Boord O Ulstèr-Scotch. The former has 
developed educational resources in Irish, funded Irish-language publications and 
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funding for the compilation of dictionaries. The corresponding Ulster Scots body has 
developed education materials for a language course. 
 
In the six other areas of policy coordination, issues have been identified for an all-
Ireland strategy. In the health sector, it has been agreed that problems such as accident 
and emergency services, a strategy in case of  a major emergency, and cancer research 
could all be tackled more effectively on an all-Ireland basis. The education sector is 
working on pooling expertise on special-needs children and harmonising 
qualifications for teachers to facilitate mobility of teachers. The tourism sector, 
coordinated by Tourism Ireland, has concentrated on an all-Ireland strategy. Cross-
border cooperation in agriculture is crucial, as evidenced by the foot-and-mouth crisis. 
The agriculture sector has put together a joint plan for convergence of Animal Health 
as well as rural development with an all-island strategy. The environment sector was 
developing an all-Ireland approach to recycling and a proposed study examining the 
impact of agriculture on the environment on an all-island basis. Finally, in the 
transport sector, the focus has been on the development of an all-island plan for rail 
and road safety. Interestingly, issues such as the modernisation of the rail network 
have not been on the meeting agenda. 
 
Although the issues discussed above are mundane, the last plenary meeting before the 
2002 suspension proposed some possibly controversial measures by discussing to 
create more all-Ireland institutions. First, the joint communiqué put forward an idea 
for an all-island version of the Civic Forum, a consultative body for elements of ‘civil 
society’. The communiqué also noted that members of the Dáil and the Assembly 
should meet in order to establish a joint parliamentary North-South Forum. The 
establishment of these new North-South bodies are included in the recent joint 
Dublin-London as part of the 2004 review of the Agreement.63 
 
The important institutional connection between London and Unionists  for the latter is 
through the  maintenance of the Union, not the development of new East-West bodies. 
Thus, Unionists focused on internal Strand 1, not East-West  Strand 3 structures 
during the multi-party negotiations leading up to the Belfast Agreement. The high 
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level of ‘protestant’ support for a devolved legislature in Northern Ireland can be 
verified from NILT survey data in both 2001 and 2003.64 the establishment of a 
regional Assembly (subordinate to Parliament) represent links between Unionists and 
their reference state centred in London. 
Mutual Destruction Clause 
 
The unionist negotiating team wanted to ensure that cross-border institutions would 
be subordinate to the Assembly. On the other hand, nationalist politicians preferred 
strong, independent north-south bodies. 65  Nationalists wanted the NSMC to be 
established by legislation through the Oireachtas and Westminster to underline the 
independence of the cross-border bodies from the Assembly, while Unionists insisted 
that the NSMC be established through the Assembly and the Oireachtas, to tie it to 
devolution in NI. In the end, the NSMC and implementation bodies were brought 
about through legislation by the two governments, but the decision on the areas for 
cooperation were decided between Dublin and Belfast.66 
 
During the negotiations, Unionists were concerned that the Nationalists would 
undermine the Assembly, so that the North-South bodies would be more important, 
while Nationalists were worried that Unionists would undermine cross-border bodies 
to ensure no development of ‘all-Ireland’ institutions. To ensure that neither group 
undermines one of the strands, the Assembly and the North-South bodies had a 
‘mutual destruction’ clause.67 The Belfast Agreement stipulates that: 
 
It is understood that the North/South Ministerial Council and the Northern Ireland Assembly are 
mutually inter-dependent, and that one cannot successfully function without the other.68 
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This ‘mutual destruction’ clause was designed to reassure both sides that the 
institution-building was done in a balanced manner. Although the Assembly and 
cross-border bodies were designed to be mutually interdependent, the Irish 
Government amended domestic legislation in November 2002 so that the NSMC 
would continue to function as well as the implementation bodies during the 
suspension of the Strand 1 structures.69  This incensed unionists who are already 
worried about deals done between the two governments ‘over their heads’. While in 
suspension, the cross-border institutions operate on a ‘care and maintenance’ basis, 
meaning that the meetings are now attended by direct rule ministers from the British 
Government instead of members of the Northern Ireland Executive.70 
Direct Political Links 
 
In addition to the institutional connections with the reference states, there are also 
direct political links. These can be manifested in a few different ways. The first is that 
political parties may form cross-border alliances to further their cause. The HDZ and 
its sister party HDZ-BiH were almost indistinguishable until the change of 
government in 2000. Even now, the two parties coordinate candidates for the HDZ 
‘diaspora’ candidates, although the ‘reformed’ HDZ did refuse some of the ‘murkier’ 
offerings from Hercegovina in 2003.71 The Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), led by 
Vojislav Kostunica, is popular among nationalists in Republika Srpska (RS), since he 
opposed various peace plans supported by the West. In the run-up to the election in 
2000, DSS representatives attended SDS events in RS and supported RS candidates.72 
After the SDS election victory in RS, Kostunica and SDS leader Dragan Kalinić 
signed a formal agreement for cooperation between the two political parties in areas 
such as refugee return and education.73 
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There are strong historical links between the SDLP and Irish political parties in the 
South, though it is the Irish Labour Party that has ‘sister party’ links with the SDLP. 
The Labour Party canvassed with the SDLP for the last election, and cooperated with 
the SDLP during the referendum on citizenship in the South.74 According to an Irish 
Government official, the links are strong between Dublin and the Nationalist parties, 
since the latter see ‘Dublin as their capital’.75 The DUP reacts to these strong ties by 
dealing directly with Dublin instead of interfacing directly with Nationalist parties.76 
The links between Dublin and nationalist parties are treated with some suspicion by 
Unionist parties. According to Steven King: 
 
They are [Dublin is] still too close to the SDLP for our liking. The SDLP does not exist as an 
autonomous body. They rely on Dublin to write their speeches, research, and provide money. I think 
that relationship is too cosy.77 
 
Unionist suspicion stems from a fear that a ‘pan-nationalist’ alliance of nationalists, 
republicans and the Irish government would negotiate a deal with London over the 
heads of Unionists. The so-called ‘pan-nationalist’ front was significant in putting 
together the documents that would eventually become part of the Downing Street 
Declaration: 
 
Reynolds, having learned about the exchange of declarations, got behind the process. Reynolds and 
Hume spoke often on the phone, and the latter travelled often to Dublin to work on the declaration. 
Father Reid conveyed messages between Adams and Dublin. Hume and Dublin offered a reply, drafted 
by O hUiginn.78 
 
Historically, there have been similar links between the Ulster Unionists and the 
Conservative Party, and the former have traditionally taken the Conservative Whip at 
Westminster. However, the strength of the connection has waned since the end of the 
Stormont regime in the 1970s and there was a break after the signing of the AIA.  
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However: 
 
The Conservative Party's dependence on the Ulster Unionists and Major's consultation with the UUP 
throughout the negotiation of the Downing Street Declaration seems to have given the Ulster Unionists 
the confidence at least not to oppose that initiative from the outset. Parliamentary arithmetic at 
Westminster may have finally forced the British government to play something like the supporting role 
for Ulster Unionists that the Irish government has traditionally played for Northern Ireland 
nationalists.79 
 
Contrary to Unionist fears that a deal would be done over their heads, John Major 
‘opened private consultation with the long-serving leader of the Ulster Unionists, 
James Molyneaux: ‘To have any chance of gaining Unionist agreement, I thought it 
essential to take Jim [Molyneaux] into our confidence, listen to his views, and keep 
him briefed.’80 This contact became the basis of a united Unionist/British position, as 
Major comments: ‘I wanted Albert Reynolds to understand that the Joint Declaration, 
in its existing form, had no hope of winning British or Unionists acceptance. 
[emphasis added].’81 
 
These reference state connections were also evident during the negotiations leading 
up to the Belfast Agreement. Some observations from George Mitchell’s Making 
Peace illustrate these links: 
 
The UUP needed reassurance on those two issues [prisoner release and decommissioning]. So they 
went to the only place they felt they could get that reassurance...At about mid-afternoon, five of the 
highest UUP officials, led by Trimble, met with Blair.82 
 
The prime ministers were negotiating in London, but they were in contact with some of the parties in 
Stormont: the British side with the UUP, the Irish with the SDLP and Sinn Féin.83 
 
As to their [prime ministers'] negotiations in London, I hoped that they would come up with an 
acceptable agreement. Since Blair was keeping Trimble advised, and Ahern was doing the same for 
Hume and Adams, that was a reasonable expectation.84 
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These links between the reference state governments and political parties in Northern 
Ireland have continued into post-Agreement Northern Ireland, and were evident in the 
negotiations to re-establish the institutions in late 2004. The DUP and Sinn Féin have 
supplanted the UUP and SDLP as the electorally strongest parties in their respective 
communities. The reference states remain guarantors of ‘their’ respective 
communities in the recent attempts to resume the devolved institutions: 
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair is expected to give a document to DUP leader Ian Paisley in London on 
Wednesday.  
While, at the same time, Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern will hand the paper to Sinn Féin leader Gerry 
Adams in Dublin.85 
Military/Security Links 
 
Although Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom de jure, the cost of the 
security provisions is also borne by the Irish Exchequer. The additional expenditure 
on the Irish side was devoted to extra security and patrolling measures. According to 
the estimate from the New Ireland Forum Report The Cost of Violence Arising from 
the Northern Ireland Crisis since 1969 (published in November 1983), though the 
British Government spent more than three times as much on additional security-
related expenditure, the Irish Governmant actually spent four times as much per 
capita in 1982-83.86  
 
Margaret Thatcher once famously referred to Northern Ireland being as ‘British as 
Finchley’, though the security environment in the ‘province’ suggests that this is not 
the case. Unlike any other part of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland is in a ‘state 
of emergency’. This allows the British Government to derogate from the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). 87  In particular, the British Government 
derogates from Article 6 of the Convention to deal with alleged terrorist offences. The 
unique situation in Northern Ireland is underlined by the provisions in the Agreement 
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for security sector reform. The dismantling of observation posts and reduction of 
troop numbers is security ‘normalisation’, so that the arrangements become in line 
with other parts of the UK. Another part of the security framework from the 
Agreement is the removal of the Emergency Powers. Even though the Agreement 
incorporates the ECHR into Northern Ireland law, the derogation continues. 
 
The Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) was created by the British Parliament in 1970 to 
lend support to the police force to manage the increased level of unrest in Northern 
Ireland and drew its ranks from the local population. To symbolise that it was a cross-
community force, the first two UDR men sworn in were a Catholic and a Protestant, 
and although the security forces are often viewed suspiciously, 18% of the UDR were 
catholic when the regiment was formed in 1970.88 The UDR formed the ‘back-up’ for 
the RUC, and when the former had established itself in the 1980s, it assumed the 
predominant role as the support force for the police. Moreover, the UDR became 
mainly a full-time force.89 However, the UDR has always been seen as a ‘Protestant’ 
force with shadowy links to loyalists. Nationalists were also concerned about the 
recruitment of B-Specials (a police reserve force) to the UDR. 90  Moreover, the 
relationship between loyalist groups such as the UVF and members of the UDR has 
been investigated both in the Cory Report as well as the Stevens Inquiry. Both 
suggested that the arms for assassinations of catholics were supplied by the UDR for 
acts such as the Dublin/Monoghan bombings (see next section). Probably due to a 
combination of nationalist distrust and intimidation within the nationalist community, 
the number of catholics within the UDR dropped. By the time it was combined with 
the Royal Irish Rangers to form the Royal Irish Regiment (RIR), the UDR was only 
3% catholic.91 However, the reason given by the MoD in 1991 about the creation of 
the RIR was that the global security situation had changed since the end of the Cold 
War. Although initially denied by the Minister of Defence, there are reports from 
within the Army of plans to further reduce the local component of the British military 
in Northern Ireland in June 2003.92 The plans would disband the three RIR regiments 
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based in Northern Ireland. These plans for security ‘normalisation’ were confirmed 
two years later by the Minister. In response to the July 2005 statement by the IRA, 
Geoff Hoon said that the RIR home battalions would be disbanded and the Army 
would stop its policing support mission in August 2007.93 This would be part of  the 
broader security arrangments including reduction of troop levels and changes to anti-
terrorism legislation.94 
 
The target for the number of troops from the British Army was mentioned in the joint 
declaration of April 2003, stating that if there is an end to paramilitary violence, there 
would be around 5000 soldiers in Northern Ireland, which would be in line with other 
parts of the UK. This is a significant reduction from the current level (summer 2005) 
of 10500 troops. 95  However, the level of British Army deployment in Northern 
Ireland has historically been even higher.96 At the height of the deployment in mid-
1972, there were 21800 soldiers from British regiments and a further 8500 from the 
UDR. The total number of British Army soldiers (including UDR) remained between 
16000 and 20000 during the 1980s, with an increase at the end of the decade due to an 
upsurge in paramilitary violence. In the months before the 1994 paramilitary 
ceasefires, there were 19500 troops deployed (including RIR).  The number was 
reduced to 15500, of which 4350 are drawn from the RIR. At present, there are 10500 
troops in Northern Ireland.97 
 
There have been security/military links between Serbia and RS during and after the 
war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The JNA intervened to ‘protect’ Serbs in Republika 
Srpska Krajina (RSK) in Croatia and in Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Hercegovina.98  
 
As Milošević testified as a part of the investigation of Morten Torkildsen for the 
ICTY into the financing of military services by Belgrade in both Republika Srpska 
and RSK: 
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As regards the resources spent for weapons, ammunition and other needs of the Army of Republika 
Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina, these expenditures constituted a state secret and because of 
state interests could not be indicated in the Law on the Budget, which is a public document.  The same 
applies to the expenditures incurred by providing equipment, from a needle to an anchor, for the 
security forces and special anti-terrorist forces in particular, from light weapons and equipment to 
helicopters and other weapons which still remain where they are today, and this was not made public 
because it was a state secret, as was everything else that was provided for the Army of Republika 
Srpska….  (emphasis in original)99 
 
The significant part of this statement is that the wartime infrastructure is still in place 
today. According to the director of the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) in Sarajevo, 
the VRS was still on the payroll of Yugoslavia.100 These post-war links between 
Belgrade and the RS military are confirmed by the advisor on security matters in the 
RS National Assembly. According to Momo Sevarika, there were 2000 JNA in the 
VRS after the war paid by Belgrade. Cadets from RS were sent to Belgrade for 
training, and scholarships were provided for this training.101 Officers even held dual 
ranks in the VRS and VJ.102 In 1998, the OHR wanted reforms in the arrangements to 
ensure transparency between RS and Belgrade. However, 2002 was the first year that 
all of the officials were paid wholly by the budget of Republika Srpska. This is 
confirmed by the second expert report by Torkildsen: 
 
VRS officers and non-commissioned officers continued to be financed by the FRY right up until 2002.  
Regarding the payment of salaries to VRS members financed by the FRY, it is stated, inter alia: 
 
VRS Officers and non-commission (sic) officers received pay as members of the 30th Personnel Center 
of the Yugoslav Army, until 28 February 2002103 
 
Nonetheless, the director of the CSS asserts that those formerly on Belgrade’s payroll 
were invited back to Belgrade, with some still receiving jobs in the Ministry of 
Defence or pensions from Belgrade.104 
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The alleged links between the RS and Serbia in the security sector may also extend to 
the police. The President of Serbia may have advised Dragan Čavić, the Serb member 
of the Bosnian Presidency, to reject the provisions for police reform agreed at 
Vlasić.105  According to a Western diplomat, the lack of police reform would be 
advantageous to Belgrade, since an unstable BiH would be preferable during 
discussions about the status of Kosovo.106  
 
In parallel with the connection between the VRS and Belgrade, there are strong links 
between the HVO (the Croat component of the FBiH army) and Zagreb. During the 
previous HDZ regime, funding for the HVO was almost entirely from Croatia.  
According to the HVO declaration on the level of foreign support, 83% of the total 
budget came from Zagreb.107 The other funding came from abroad, including Brunei, 
Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, UAE and Kuwait.108 Interestingly, none of the funding in 
1998 came from the FBiH. The Army of BiH received funds from the Federation 
budget, while the aforementioned VRS received money from the RS budget. However, 
the HVO is completely funded from foreign sources. Even though the funding was 
reduced by 14% in 1999, a possible reason for continuing to support the HVO was for 
the HDZ to block the unification of the Bosniak and Croat armies in the Federation of 
BiH.109 
 
In addition to the direct funding for the HVO, the Croatian government also paid 
pensions for veterans. An advisor in the Croatian Ministry for Foreign Affairs states 
that there are still 8000 cases of pensions for veterans (Southern Front HVO) who are 
all citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina.110 The level of funding for the HVO and veterans’ 
pensions came to attention after the Hercegovačka  Banka (Mostar) affair in 2001, and 
is discussed in the next section.  There is greater transparency in the HVO funding 
now, according to the Office of the President and the MFA in Zagreb.111 This is 
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confirmed by the OHR in Mostar, who states that the HVO funding was reduced after 
the change of government in 2000. Moreover, all funding is done bilaterally with 
Sarajevo instead of through private companies, resulting in greater transparency.112 
According to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the 
implementation of a more bilateral approach to HVO funding is evidenced by the 
agreement between the Minister of Defence in Croatia with his counterpart in BiH 
signed in May 2000.113 
Illicit connections? 
 
The final area of significant links is the illegal connection between ‘metropole’ and its 
co-nationals. The difficulty with any examination about such alleged illegal 
relationships is that the evidence is hard to find, and even harder to confirm. Some of 
the information is withheld, due to the sensitive nature of the activities involved. For 
example, to protect the safety of those mentioned, British-Irish Rights Watch (BIRW) 
only provided excerpts from its report on possible British-Loyalist collusion.114 
 
British Collusion with Loyalists? 
 
The single ‘deadliest’ day during the conflict in Northern Ireland occurred on 17th 
May 1974. On that day, a car bomb exploded on Talbot Street in Dublin killing 26 
people, and a second car bomb detonated in Monaghan town killing 7 people.115 
Although the UVF claimed responsibility for the bombings in 1993, families of the 
victims believed that the attacks were carried out by loyalists colluding with British 
security forces.116 The Irish Government established an inquiry headed by Justice 
Barron to investigate these claims. The Inquiry did not find any conclusive evidence 
of ‘official’ collusion between loyalist and British security forces in the bombings. 
However, Justice Barron believed that such links existed. The ‘Hidden Hand’ 
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television programme, aired in 1993, alleged that security forces ‘looked the other 
way’ regarding loyalist killings to protect informants, and used loyalists as a ‘friendly 
guerrilla force’ by identifying targets as well as providing planning assistance.117 
These claims all focused on Robert Nairac, a Captain in the British Army. According 
to the programme, Nairac may have employed loyalists Billy Hanna, Robin Jackson 
and Harris Boyle as agents both before and after the bombings.118 In particular, Billy 
Hanna has been implicated by a former RUC officer, John Weir, as the main organiser 
of the Dublin/Monaghan bombings.119 Hanna was a senior member of the UVF in 
Lurgan, but also a former soldier in the British Army who allegedly employed the 
help of an RUC Special Branch officer and four British Army officers to carry out the 
1974 bombings as well as earlier bombings in Dublin.120 Later investigations have 
uncovered illicit links between the security forces and loyalists, especially following 
the murder of human rights lawyer Pat Finucane. In the wake of a police raid in 1999 
that uncovered files with details on republicans, it was revealed that elements within 
the regular British Army and military intelligence leaked the documents to dissident 
loyalists.121 One source reported that one of the leaked files was on Rosemary Nelson, 
the human rights lawyer killed by a loyalist car bomb in 1999.122 
 
The Stevens Inquiry looked into possible collusion between security forces and 
loyalists after the murder of Pat Finucane. In the overview and recommendations, Sir 
John Stevens posited: 
 
My Enquiries have highlighted collusion, the wilful failure to keep records, the absence of 
accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence, and the extreme of agents being involved 
in murder… These serious acts and omissions have meant that people have been killed or seriously 
injured.123 
 
In particular, the Stevens Enquiry looked at the actions of the Force Research Unit 
(FRU), a branch of army intelligence that used loyalist Brian Nelson as an agent to 
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infiltrate the UDA.124 According to BIRW, the FRU used Nelson to improve the 
loyalist intelligence on intended targets. This information soon spread among loyalist 
paramilitary groups.125  Stevens concluded that Nelson and a quartermaster in the 
UDA both passed information that contributed to the attack on Finucane.126 Stevens 
also found that collusion obstructed his enquiry, especially the apprehension of Brian 
Nelson. During a previous operation to arrest Nelson, the information was leaked to 
loyalists and the press so that the arrest order was aborted. Moreover, FRU ‘handlers’ 
advised Nelson to leave his home the night before. The night before the new 
operation, there was a fire in Stevens’s ‘Incident Room’ that destroyed key 
documents. Sir Stevens was convinced that it was a ‘deliberate act of arson’.127 A 
former member of the FRU claimed that the fire had been started by the FRU to buy 
time to construct a ‘cover story’ about their link to Nelson.128 The Cory Inquiry later 
found that there was collusion leading to the death of Rosemary Nelson, including the 
failure of the NIO by ‘turning a blind eye’ to the dangers faced by the solicitor.129 
Thus, there seems to be a long-standing collusion between the British security forces 
and loyalists, and this link continues in the post-Agreement period. 
 
Irish Collusion with Republicans? 
 
Unionists have long been suspicious of the collusion between the Irish authorities and 
republican paramilitaries. The suspicions seemed to be confirmed by the Dublin Arms 
Trial in 1971. A shipment of arms bound for Northern Ireland to the IRA arrived at 
Dublin airport on 19th April 1970. However, the Special Branch had been tipped off 
about the operation and intercepted the arms. In the furore following the operation, 
Taoiseach Jack Lynch sacked two members of the Fianna Fáil government, Neil 
Blaney and Charles Haughey, the Ministers for Agriculture and Finance, respectively. 
Blaney, Haughey, Haughey’s brother, a senior republican, an Irish Army captain and 
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a Belgian businessman were all charged with trying illegally to import arms. The 
charges against Blaney were dropped before the trial and the five others were 
acquitted. However, some still believe that there was a gun-running conspiracy at the 
highest levels of government. Using the testimony of a former Secretary of the 
Department of Justice, Ryle Dwyer suggests that the whole government, including the 
Taoiseach, knew about the gun-running. Lynch may have been confronted by the 
opposition Fine Gael leader, leading the Taoiseach to dismiss the two ministers as 
scapegoats.130 The Irish Army captain, James Kelly, claimed that he assumed that he 
was acting on official orders that originated in the Irish cabinet.131 
 
More recently, Toby Harnden posited that a Garda officer collaborated with local IRA 
units, passing information helping the republican paramilitaries to ambush two RUC 
officers, Chief Superintendent Harry Breen and Superintendent Bob Buchanan, on 
20th March 1989. Breen and Buchanan had been attending a meeting with Gardai in 
Dundalk.132 In the first edition of his book, Harnden attributed a series of killings 
including the murders of Breen and Buchanan to the ‘Surgeon’, the commander of the 
IRA South Armagh Brigade.133 However, in the second printing of the book, Harnden 
blames collusion between certain members of the Garda Siochana and IRA. These 
allegations were investigated by the Gardai and other Irish authorities in 2000. 
According to the Minister for Justice, there was no verifiable evidence that there had 
been any collusion.134 
 
More recently, an Independent Inquiry under Canadian judge Peter Cory investigated 
four suspected cases of British-Loyalist collusion, but also two cases of alleged links 
between the Gardai and the IRA: the aforementioned Breen/Buchanan murders, as 
well as the killings of Lord Justice and Lady Gibson. 
 
The Gibsons were driving north to Belfast to end a show at the Royal Opera. 
Although the Lord Justice had been a target of the IRA and under police protection, 
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he had not taken the appropriate security measures, and had even booked a ferry 
under his own name and car registration. Although the Gibsons were escorted part of 
the way by a Garda car, they were unaccompanied the last few miles. By this time, 
their car was followed by the IRA. They were killed by a car bomb that was detonated 
by remote control.135 Although Harnden’s claims were one of the main motivations 
for both the inquiries by the Irish Government and Judge Cory, the author was unable 
to provide any specific names or other supporting evidence. Cory was unable to find 
any documents on either side of the border that corroborated the claims in Bandit 
Country.136 Thus, he found no grounds for recommending a public inquiry regarding 
the issue of Garda collusion with republicans.137 
 
On the other hand, Cory found evidence of collusion concerning the murders of Breen 
and Buchanan. The killings of the two RUC officers may have been committed with 
information passed from the Gardai to the IRA. The inquiry is based on two types of 
information. First, an intelligence report with ‘high’ reliability claimed that a member 
of staff at the Dundalk Garda station was passing information to the IRA and another 
‘fairly reliable’  report (from 2003) claims that a certain ‘Garda B’ was passing 
information to the IRA.138 Second, the statement by British intelligence agent ‘Kevin 
Fulton’, who infiltrated the IRA, also claimed that ‘Garda B’ passed information to 
the IRA.139 By considering the possibility that the IRA still had the means to carry out 
the killings without Garda help, Cory still found that there was enough evidence to 
establish a public inquiry, since the documents ‘reveal evidence, that, if accepted, 
could be found to constitute collusion’.140  The Minister for Justice established a 
public inquiry into possible Garda collusion in the deaths of Breen and Buchanan in 
March 2005.141 
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HDZ Funding a Third Entity? 
 
There was no de facto border between Croatia and Hercegovina, especially during the 
last HDZ regime. These illicit links were underlined during the Hercegovačka  Banka 
investigations. According to the OHR administrator in charge of the investigation, 
Toby Robinson, the Croatian government  deposited 647 million German marks for 
soldiers’ salaries, pensions, and funds for widows of war veterans from March 1998 
to early 2001. However, 216 million DM were used ‘for other purposes’.142 Hard-line 
Hercegovin nationalists from the HDZ allegedly used embezzled monies from the 
bank to fund activities such as buying off soldiers for loyalty and to finance the extra-
constitutional attempt to establish a third Croat entity.143  Although there was no 
verifiable link to the Croatian government, it was alleged that the founders of the bank 
approached Tuñman in early 1998 for capital. Moreover, one of the central figures in 
the scandal was General Ljubo Češić Rojs, a HDZ deputy in the Sabor. 144  To 
investigate possible wrong-doing connected to the bank and to prevent illegal 
activities, a coordinated operation between international military (NATO), police 
(IPTF) and political (OHR) institutions in Bosnia-Hercegovina sought to secure the 
Hercegovačka Banka buildings on 6th April 2001. However, the effort partially failed 
due to the intervention of a ‘spontaneous’ mob. The banks were secured twelve days 
later and placed under international administration. In 2004, the Hercegovin founders 
of the bank were arrested and charged with corruption after an investigation started 
the year before. In a joint operation involving the police and SFOR, Ante Jelavić 
(former president of BiH), Miroslav Prce (former general) and Miroslav Rupce (head 
of Croatia Osiguranje) were arrested and detained.145 
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Serb-RS Organised Crime Links? 
  
International organisations have noted the significant organised crime link between 
Belgrade and RS. The Banja Luka Deputy HR notes that ‘in the case of Belgrade, 
there was a change in the direction of the mafia connection, from RS to 
Belgrade…There is a good chance that some of the shooters [ðinñić assassination] 
were Bosnian.’146 Zoran ðinñić, the Prime Minister of Serbia, was killed by a sniper 
in Belgrade on 12th March 2003. As mentioned by the Deputy HR, the direction of 
organised crime emanated from RS to Belgrade. An ICG report written soon after the 
assassination posited that the parallel security structures set up under Milošević 
operated from the Serb-dominated entity, since in the period after the Dayton-Paris 
Agreement, it was easier to dodge sanctions in Bosnia-Hercegovina than in Serbia.147 
In particular, these criminal networks raised funds through tax and customs evasion 
by trafficking tobacco, arms and petroleum. 148  The report makes two further 
allegations about the link between organised crime networks in Republika Srpska and 
in Serbia. First, an audit found that Elektroprivreda RS  (the electricity supplier in RS) 
was found to be losing around a half million KM (1 KM = €0.5, November 2005) per 
day through ‘conflicts of interest, theft and neglect’.149 The HR removed the General 
Director and one of the board members, saying that the former ‘presided over a 
culture of gross mismanagement, neglect and probably criminality’. 150  The ICG 
contends that the illegal activities related to Elektroprivreda RS were probably 
connected to the parallel security structures. Some of these funds may have been used 
to hire bodyguards to hide Karadžić and Mladić.151 Second, the SFOR raids in March 
2003 of the offices of Bjelica were planned to curb the flow of money to Mladić and 
Karadžić. In particular, ‘businessmen’ associated with the security services in 
Belgrade have considerable influence in the RS Ministry of Finance.152 
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After the ðinñić murder, some of the criminal elements from RS that had moved to 
Belgrade moved back. As the political officer for OSCE (Banja Luka) comments: 
 
Go up to the hills above Sarajevo to see the big houses, big cars out front with Belgrade number plates. 
After the assassination of ðinñić, the crackdown of organised crime led to much of the activity moving 
to the RS, since security is not as tight.153 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Although not all of the links between the reference states and their co-nationals are 
legal, the above discussion showed that these are significant and durable relationships. 
The investigation focused on six areas of potential connections: personal 
pronouncements, constitutional links, institutional links, direct political party links, 
security links and illicit connections. The four reference states vary in the types of 
links they have with their co-nationals. 
 
Policymakers from all four reference states and ‘their’ corresponding co-nationals all 
mention the significance and persistence of this link. Much of the evidence is based 
on primary interview data from the two case studies and supporting secondary 
material. There are two forms of personal pronouncement. The first is ‘mutually 
reinforcing’, in which the reference states and ‘their’ people both refer to the 
responsibility of the ‘metropole’ to look after the nation. The second, which is more 
visible in the case of Northern Ireland, is that reference states that act fairly between 
conflict groups are accused by their co-nationals of ‘abandoning’ them. 
 
There are also explicit links in the constitutions of certain reference states. However, 
neither Serbia nor the UK have a ‘status law’ regarding co-nationals. The reasons are 
quite uncomplicated. For Serbia, the constitution of Yugoslavia pre-dated the 
secession/dissolution of the states, so provisions for Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina 
would not be explicitly written in the constitution. For the UK, Northern Ireland 
remains an integral part of the state de jure, so there is no need to provide special 
provisions. However, the Belfast Agreement states that the majority of Northern 
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Ireland choose to stay in the Union at present. By contrast, the two other reference 
states do have clauses in their constitutions regarding their ‘external’ members. Both 
Croatia and the Republic of Ireland separated from a state to create a new nation-state. 
Part of the legitimation of both Dublin and Zagreb hinges on the protection of 
members of the nation, even outside the state borders. 
 
The two settlements also allowed institutional links by reference states. The cross-
border Strand 2 institutions from the Belfast Agreement include six implementation 
bodies and a further six areas in which ministers from Dublin and Belfast would meet 
on a regular basis. In all of the areas, there has been significant progress in identifying 
issues for coordination, but the bodies were not running long enough for 
implementation of these plans. For example, InterTradeIreland has developed an all-
island for IT and science and technology, but this has not been executed. During the 
suspension, the Strand 2 institutions exist on a ‘care and maintenance’ basis. This 
means that the civil servant jobs in the implementation bodies are saved, and the 
Northern Ireland ministers are replaced by direct rule ministers from Whitehall. For 
unionists, the institutional focus is not on the weak Strand 3, but rather, development 
of the local Strand 1 structures internal to Northern Ireland such as the Assembly and 
Executive that are subordinate to Westminster and Whitehall. An investigation of the 
performance of Strand 1 institutions is deferred to Chapter 7. 
 
The Dayton-Paris Agreement specifically mentioned the possibility for the entities to 
conclude ‘special parallel’ relations with neighbouring states. Although this is not 
explicitly stated, this allows for the Serb-dominated RS to sign agreements with 
Belgrade, and for Zagreb to sign agreements with the Federation of BiH (which has 
most of the Croat population in Bosnia-Hercegovina). Belgrade has concluded two 
such agreements with RS (in 1997 and 2001), but the cross-border institutions are 
limited. On the other hand, there have also been ‘special parallel’ agreements between 
the Federation and Zagreb. However, unlike the Belgrade counterparts, the Croatian 
government provides substantial support to Bosnian Croats. The University of West 
Mostar is funded by Zagreb. Moreover, reconstruction of homes and cultural sites 
undertaken by Zagreb is targeted at Croats. 
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There are significant links between the political parties in the two case studies. The 
Irish Labour Party is a sister party to the SDLP and helped the Northern Irish party 
canvas in the elections. More recently, development of Sinn Féin as an electoral force 
both in the Assembly and Dáil suggest another link between both jurisdictions. The 
UUP took the Conservative whip at Westminster until 1972 and was a pivotal part of 
John Major’s slim majority in Parliament in the early 1990s. The Alliance Party (NI) 
and Liberal Democrats are sister parties. In the case of Bosnia, the HDZ in 
Hercegovina and in Zagreb were not only ‘sister parties’, but had deeper links. The 
SDS, the largest party in Republika Srpska representing a vast majority of Bosnian 
Serbs, is the sister party of the DSS, the party of the most recent Serbian president. 
 
In addition to the above areas, the Croatian government funded the HVO throughout 
the first HDZ regime (until 2000), which accounted for the majority of the HVO 
budget. In fact, none of the HVO funding was from the FBiH or state budgets. This 
allowed for the HVO to remain separate from a unified Bosnian army. Although the 
funding to the HVO is now reduced and delivered more transparently, the Croatian 
government still pays the pensions of Hercegovin Croat ex-soldiers. Belgrade’s 
support of the VRS was vital during the wars, but the commitments to the Serb-
dominated army of RS extended far after the Dayton-Paris Agreement.  Officers 
received training and pay from Belgrade as recently as 2002, and even held joint posts 
in the VRS and VJ. 
 
There are no such links between the Irish Army and Nationalist members of the 
security forces. However, in the case of the British, the maintenance of the security 
presence in Northern Ireland has had a significant contribution from the almost 
exclusively-protestant UDR (which later became part of the RIR). Moreover, other 
British regiments not originating in Northern Ireland also maintained a sizeable 
presence in the province over the last thirty years. 
 
In addition to the above connections, there have been some illegal links between 
reference states and co-nationals. The Irish Gardai may have been involved in 
collusion with the IRA in Dundalk, leading to the murders of two RUC men. The 
1970 Dublin Arms scandal may have been evidence of high-level collusion between 
republicans and the Irish Government in gun-running. Concerning alleged collusion 
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between British security forces and loyalists, the weapons for the Dublin/Monoghan 
bombings may have come from the UDR, and there were members of the UDR who 
were also involved in loyalist organisations. Members of British intelligence and 
elements within the British Army may have colluded to pass along photographs and 
other information about suspected republican paramilitaries and others (such as 
Rosemary Nelson) to loyalists in 1999. 
 
The assassination of ðinñić showed that there was a sophisticated cross-border 
Serbian organised crime problem, and support from these organisations remains 
significant in the failure to capture on-the-run war crime suspects. The Hercegovačka  
Banka scandal highlighted alleged links between Zagreb and Mostar in embezzlement 
to fund parallel institutions to create an secessionist Croat-dominated ‘third entity’ in 
Hercegovina. 
 
Thus, there are substantial links between reference states and co-nationals in the 
conflict zone in all four cases. More importantly for transnational consociation, these 
relationships not only existed at the time of settlement, but have persisted (in fact, are 
protected by the respective agreements) in the post-settlement era. 
 
These durable reference state/co-national relationships shown in this chapter allow for 
intergovernmental policy coordination between the reference states to encourage the 
conflict groups to accept a power-sharing settlement. The following chapter will 
examine whether the reference states for the case studies have developed a 
coordinated policy towards the respective disputed territories. 
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Chapter VI: Reference State Bipartisanship and 
Intergovernmentalism 
Introduction 
 
As seen in the last chapter, both case studies exhibit significant links between 
members of the conflict groups within the disputed territory and corresponding 
reference states. Most importantly, these ‘special relationships’ are durable and affect 
not only the negotiation stage of conflict regulation, but also the settlement and 
implementation. The persistence of these links from the reference states ensure that 
the relationship between the states can be channelled to the disputed area. Following 
the theoretical treatment in Chapter 3, this means that in an ethno-territorial cross-
border conflict, intergovernmental coordination between the reference states will 
increase the likelihood of a self-enforcing internal power-sharing settlement. 
Conversely, an exacerbation of inter-state relations will lead to a worsened situation 
in the conflict zone and a reduced likelihood of settlement. 
 
As derived in Chapter 3, intergovernmentalism between reference states comes about 
in two stages. In the first stage, there is bipartisanship or policy continuity between 
governments within the reference states. That is, the election of a more ‘extreme’ 
government would not undo previous agreements between reference states regarding 
the management of the conflict. Once this continuity is established, this allows 
successive governments in the reference states to establish a durable 
intergovernmentalism, provided that it is beneficial to pursue a long-term moderating 
bilateral strategy in the disputed territory. The development of this ‘outside in’ 
approach for a settlement will be examined for the reference states involved for 
Bosnia-Hercegovina and for Northern Ireland. 
 
Wars of the Past 
 
Before proceeding, it is instructive to briefly mention the past intergovernmental 
relations between the reference states. Both in the cases of Northern Ireland and 
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Bosnia-Hercegovina, the respective reference states have been at war in the previous 
century. 
London and Dublin 
 
The Anglo-Irish War followed after Sinn Féin’s electoral victory in 1918. The leaders 
of Sinn Féin then abstained from Westminster, declared an independent Irish Republic, 
and established a separate legislature (i.e. Dáil Éireann) and government in January 
1919. Soon after this, groups of ‘Volunteers’ committed acts of violence, though this 
was quite sporadic. It was only when the Dáil took responsibility for some of these 
shootings that the chain of events led to war. The Irish Volunteers increased the level 
of violence after both the Dáil and Irish Volunteers were declared illegal by the 
British.  The Volunteer and Sinn Féin organisations were not well co-ordinated, but 
British policy was also indecisive since Lloyd George did not want to legitimate the 
resistance in Ireland by declaring war. Much of the conflict was fought on the ground 
by the ‘Black and Tans’, ex-soldiers and ex-police officers, recruited for a ‘police 
operation’ who were later joined by a similar force of Auxiliaries. However, some of 
the publicised brutality of these ill-trained men caused outrage in Britain, Ireland and 
internationally.  The Anglo-Irish War continued until the truce in July 1921 and the 
signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December of the same year.1 Although there has 
not been open warfare since then, relations between Dublin and London have been 
fraught, especially during the life of de Valera. There was a tariff war between Dublin 
and London in the 1930s. During the Second World War, Ireland insisted on retaining 
its neutrality and did not allow British forces to use Irish ports. Although there is a 
long history of Irish rebellion against British rule that stretches long before the 
happenings of the previous century, there is a remarkable level of policy coordination 
over Northern Ireland today. There are three possible reasons for the improved 
relations between Dublin and London. The first is the process of European integration. 
Both the UK and Republic of Ireland joined the European Community in 1973. 
Instead of being ‘colonisers’ and ‘former colony’, the two states entered as members 
of equal standing. Moreover, European integration has highlighted regional 
dimensions on the continent so that the two islands have a ‘common destiny’ within 
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 This account is a summary of J.J. Lee, Ireland 1910-1985: Politics and Society. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press (1989): 40-3. 
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Europe. Membership in the EU (including the European Commission) allows Ireland 
veto power over EU policy, and thus have equal footing with London. On the other 
hand, Etain Tannam suggests that though the EU alters perceptions and shapes 
preferences of the two governments, intergovernmentalism is still the driving force in 
the regulation of the conflict.2 As McGarry and O’Leary point out, ‘EU membership 
may not have a significant effect on the conflict, but it has facilitate[ed] better 
working relations between the Republic [of Ireland] and the United Kingdom’.3  The 
second factor was the need for intergovernmental cross-border cooperation on 
security matters. This was one of the primary reasons that pushed the negotiations of 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) between Thatcher and Fitzgerald. The third factor, 
as posited in the introductory chapter, was that global changes in the wake of the Cold 
War allowed Peter Brooke to famously declare that it had no ‘selfish’ or ‘strategic’ 
interest in Northern Ireland and paved the way for cordial relations between the two 
states. However, it can be disputed whether the statement is evidence of British 
neutrality, since the Conservative Party (which was in government in 1990) want 
Northern Ireland to remain within the Union and have contested elections there since 
1989. 4  Nonetheless, the declaration indicates a more even-handed and 
intergovernmental approach to Northern Ireland.  
Belgrade and Zagreb 
 
The history of antagonism between Serbs and Croats is often portrayed as a ‘seething 
cauldron’ of ‘ancient hatreds’ in the Balkans, where there have been occasional 
episodes of brutality over many centuries. However, the most relevant episode to the 
current study is the war between ‘Croatia’ and ‘Serbia’ in the early 1990s.5  The 
definition of the conflict itself is disputed, since the armed conflict for ‘liberation’ by 
Croats was seen as both a war against ‘secession’ as well as a ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ by Serbs to protect the Serb minority in the Yugoslav Republic of 
Croatia (as mentioned in the previous chapter). The seeds of the conflict, were planted 
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 E. Tannam, Cross-Border Cooperation in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, New York: 
St. Martin’s Press (1998): 209. Tannam posits that this ‘liberal institutionalism’ approach most reflects 
the situation, which is developed in ibid.: 26-29. 
3
 J. McGarry and B. O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing (1993): 305-
306. 
4J. McGarry and B. O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: 57-58. 
5
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London: Penguin Books (1996). 
BIPARTISANSHIP AND INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 
 174 
after the first multi-party election in Croatia in 1990. The poll was won 
overwhelmingly by the newly-formed nationalist HDZ. The HDZ leadership under 
Tuñman wanted to create an independent Croatian state, which meant that Serbs 
would be demoted from a constituent people to a minority. With the help of Belgrade, 
including the Serb-dominated JNA, Serbs in and around Knin armed in anticipation of 
a conflict, not to defend their position within Croatia, but to secede from Croatia.6 The 
arming of the Serbs in Knin was evident in the run-up to their ‘referendum’ to declare 
autonomy in August 1990 when Croatian forces were unable to overrun the Serbs. 
Under the guise of separating Croats and Serbs to keep the peace, the JNA continued 
to lend political and military support to the latter. The Croatian Sabor declared its 
independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991. Starting the following month, the JNA 
attacked targets in Croatia more openly with help from local Serb volunteers. 
Eventually, the JNA (which had ceased being an impartial ‘state’ army) and Croatian 
Serbs controlled around a third of the territory of Croatia. However, Tuñman had won 
international support, especially from Germany. The Germans unilaterally recognised 
the independence of both Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991. A ceasefire 
between the sides was enforced by a large peace-keeping force from 1992. However, 
Croatian borders were not finalised until the military operations by the Croatian 
military annexed the Serb Krajina and Eastern Slavonia in 1995. Although the history 
of hostilities between Zagreb and Belgrade has been recent, there has been progress. 
Much of this process has been pushed by the promise of Euro-Atlantic integration and 
the conditionality of economic aid from major donor-states such as the US. Thus, 
positive developments in open issues such as the demilitarisation of Prevlaka and 
refugee return have been goaded by international pressure. 
 
The above section highlights the previous level of conflict between reference states in 
both case studies. In both cases, the reference states were one-time adversaries in war. 
However, the investigation of the reference state dynamics only look at the post-
settlement period. 
 
The following section contains two sub-sections corresponding to the two 
‘intergovernmental’ features of transnational consociation. The first section will look 
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at bipartisanship in each of the four reference states regarding the disputed territory. 
The second section will look at the level of intergovernmental coordination regarding 
the conflict zone. In the previous chapter, all of the reference states exhibited 
significant long-standing links with their co-nationals. However, in the following 
sections, a fundamental difference will be evident between the two case studies. Due 
to the legacy of the recent wars, the intergovernmentalism is less developed along the 
Zagreb-Belgrade axis compared to Dublin-London relations. Moreover, more 
‘nationalist’ policymakers both in Zagreb and Belgrade do not have a coordinated 
bipartisan approach with their ‘moderate’ counterparts regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina 
as parties in Dublin and London do concerning Northern Ireland. 
Bipartisan Policy Continuity 
 
Transnational consociation relies on policy continuity within the reference state. If a 
change of government leads to different levels of cooperation between reference 
states, then neither state will be willing to settle, since an agreement may not survive a 
change in government. Similarly, co-nationals in the disputed area would not be 
willing to negotiate, since changes of government in the reference states may yield a 
better deal. These arguments are fully developed in Chapter 3. Policy continuity 
regarding the conflict zone will be investigated for all four ‘metropoles’: London, 
Dublin, Zagreb and Belgrade. 
 
 
London. Paul Dixon asserts that there has been ‘bipartisanship’ between the two 
largest British parties on social and economic policy, but also the broad constitutional 
position of the province.7 The bipartisanship was especially strained during the last 
half of the 1970s. Although there had been disagreements on both sides of the house 
regarding Northern Ireland, both Conservative and Labour politicians  nonetheless 
claimed that bipartisanship was still intact.8 
 
                                                 
7
 P. Dixon, ‘British Policy Towards Northern Ireland: 1968-2000’,. Paper presented at the PSA (UK) 
conference (April 2000). Other authors suggest that the ‘bipartisan’ policy goes back to the 1920s. See 
P. Arthur, Special Relationships: Britain, Ireland, and the Northern Ireland Problem, Belfast: 
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8
 Ibid. 
BIPARTISANSHIP AND INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 
 176 
This may be an oversimplification of bipartisanship between Conservatives and the 
Labour Party regarding policy over Northern Ireland.  Continuous, public 
bipartisanship between the two largest parties in Westminster has been a more recent 
development. In the wake of the breakdown of the Sunningdale power-sharing 
Executive, both the leaders of Labour (Harold Wilson) and the Conservatives (Ted 
Heath) believed that a power-sharing solution was possible. Merlyn Rees, Secretary 
of State for NI under Wilson, attempted to convene a constitutional convention in 
1975. Elections to the Convention were held in May. The UUUC platform was 
devolved government along the Westminster model (i.e. one-party rule) and an 
explicit rejection of an ‘Irish dimension’.9 By contrast, the SDLP advocated executive 
power-sharing and both a British and Irish dimension. 10  Not surprisingly, the 
Convention itself did not reach a consensus. The Report of the Convention was 
published in November 1975 and attempted to provide a ‘neutral’ solution. On the one 
hand, the receommendations rejected any all-Ireland institutions such as a Council of 
Ireland or any other cross-border bodies, thus counter to SDLP proposals.11 On the 
other hand, the Report’s prescriptions to ensure proportionality were not in line with 
the UUUC majoritarian position.12 Ultimately, the parties in Northern Ireland did not 
reach an agreement, Rees dissolved the convention and direct rule was re-introduced 
until 1999.13 Rees’s successor in the Callaghan government, Roy Mason, did not 
introduce any power-sharing proposals, though Mason’s ‘five points’ included both a 
consultative assembly elected by PR and devolved powers.14   
 
Contrasting with the Labour Government, there was a shift in Conservative policy 
with the start of Margaret Thatcher’s tenure as the Leader in 1975. This was 
especially evident in Thatcher’s choice for Spokesperson for Northern Ireland, Airey 
Neave. Though Neave supported a body of local policymakers to scrutinise Northern 
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Ireland legislation to fill the ‘political vacuum’ after the end of power-sharing, the 
Conservative Party advocated full integration of Northern Ireland into the UK. In fact, 
Neave officially broke the bipartisanship with the Labour party and declared that the 
Conservatives did not support power-sharing in Northern Ireland.15 Still, when the 
Conservative Party came into Government in 1979, they retreated from their policy of 
‘integration’, stating a commitment to develop local government with authority over 
local services ‘in the absence of devolved government’. 16  Each of Thatcher’s 
Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland attempted to promote a devolved legislative 
body in Northern Ireland.17 There are two possible reasons for this. The first is that 
Neave was assassinated by the INLA in March 1979. Second, O’Leary suggests that 
the Conservatives in government recognised that neither full integration nor a return 
to institutions resembling the old Stormont regime were appropriate for Northern 
Ireland.18 Although the stated position of the Conservatives diverged from devolution 
in public while in Opposition, it is difficult to assess whether the integrationist 
strategy was substantive, since it was never a part of Conservative policy over 
Northern Ireland while in Government. 
 
While in Opposition, the Labour Party changed its policy to ‘unity by consent’ for 
Northern Ireland. At the 1981 party conference, Labour party members accepted a 
resolution that it was possible to unite the island through consent by both Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This could be achieved  by advocating a devolved 
power-sharing and an Irish dimension on areas of mutual concern.19 Neil Kinnock 
endorsed the New Ireland Forum report (1984), since it included ‘unity by consent’.20 
The party officially ended this policy in 1994. In June 1994, the Labour Party 
Spokesperson for Northern Ireland, Kevin McNamara, declared that his party would 
not object to any agreement that had the support of the people of Ireland.21 In other 
words, the Labour Party officially endorsed the principle of majority consent in 
Northern Ireland. However, this change in Labour policy may be overstated. 
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 M.J. Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland 1969-89: 148-9. 
20
 M.J. Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland 1969-2000, Manchester: 
Manchester Univ. Press (2001): 48. 
21
 Ibid. 
BIPARTISANSHIP AND INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 
 178 
Endorsing ‘unity by consent’ was such that it never significantly affected its 
standpoint on Government policy. While in Opposition, Labour supported Prior’s 
initiatives for ‘rolling devolution’ (see Chapter 4), even though the proposal s did not 
have a guaranteed ‘Irish dimension’.22 Although Kinnock re-stated his party’s policy 
after the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), he did not break with the 
Government: 
 
As a matter of  policy and of commitment the Labour Party wants to see Ireland united by consent, and 
we are committed to working actively to secure that consent. However, that is not the reason for our 
action in approving the Hillsborough accord. We recognise that the priority is reconciliation in the 
communities of Northern Ireland and between the communities of Northern Ireland. It is that objective 
that brings our consent.23  
 
The Labour Party also supported the Downing Street Declaration, with Tony Blair 
backing the document at the party conference in 1994. 24  Thus, as with the 
integrationist policy of the Conservatives in the last two years of the Cunningham 
government, it is difficult to confirm that the declared policy of ‘unity by consent’ 
was substantive, since it was vague enough as to not contradict Government policy. 
 
Since 1993, there is cross-party agreement about the broad policy towards Northern 
Ireland, but there are still differences on specific issues. The most recent ‘breaks’ in 
cross-party consensus came over the Labour Government’s decision to allow Sinn 
Féin to use office space at parliament and the Government’s ‘concessions’ on 
decommissioning. Quentin Davies said after the Government decision to allow Sinn 
Féin office space in the Commons, ‘We cannot possibly have a bipartisan 
arrangement in the present circumstances.’25 Lembit Öpik, worries that ‘there is no 
harmonisation between parties. Conservatives have gone off the deep end in some 
sense.26 He adds that the position of the Liberal Democrats is that a Conservative 
Government would clamp down on the IRA, and be closer to the Unionists, thus 
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breaking with the even-handed approach between Nationalists and Unionists practised 
by previous British governments. 27  This assessment of Davies’s position is 
misinterpreted, since Davies affirmed the commitment to the Belfast Agreement as 
the only framework for peace and stability in Northern Ireland, and the Conservatives 
even accepted the findings of the Patten Report. Davies reaffirms this during a more 
recent Commons debate: 
 
We have been a responsible Opposition on Northern Ireland, and we shall remain so. We support the 
Government entirely on their objectives and the Belfast agreement. We have always supported them on 
tactics when they have done what we thought were the right things. But one thing that the Government 
and even the Whips and spin doctors in No. 10 surely cannot expect us to do in any circumstances is to 
be party to a cover-up and acquiesce in a deception of the public. That would be a veritable perversion 
of bipartisanship.28 
 
In other words, despite some of the inflammatory rhetoric about the government 
‘cover-up’, Davies continues to support the Labour Government’s overall policy of 
implementing the Agreement, though there can be disagreement on particular issues. 
This ‘constrained policy’ regarding Northern Ireland from Conservatives has been 
maintained by Davies’s replacement, David Lidington.29 According to Lidington, the 
Conservatives try to follow a bipartisan approach, but that is not a ‘blank cheque.’ 
There are differences in policy towards prisoner releases, police reform and 
inclusion/exclusion from the NI Executive. Recently, the Conservative spokesperson 
was cautious in accepting the IRA statement in July 2005 declaring the end of the 
‘armed struggle’. David Lidington believes that the increased rate of demilitarisation 
followed by the Government after the statement is premature. 30  However, ‘the 
[Conservative] party remains committed to the principles of the Belfast Agreement: 
devolution and consent.’ 31  The Liberal Democrat position is that the ‘current 
government line-up allows for sensible opposition’ regarding Northern Ireland.32 That 
is, broad consensus yet critical oversight regarding particular measures. The main 
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difference between Lib Dem and Labour policy is that the former asserts there should 
be no unilateral agreements, such as the Government’s agreement with Sinn Féin 
regarding ‘on-the-run’ suspected paramilitaries. According to Öpik, Northern Ireland 
is a place that if ‘you make a deal with one party, everyone will find out’.33 The cross-
party continuity from London is also evident from the Government. A senior NIO 
official states that there is a ‘bipartisan policy among the British parties regarding 
Northern Ireland…Everyone sees that the problem goes beyond politics.’34 
 
Thus, establishing evidence for bipartisanship is not straightforward. However, 
despite more recent disputes between the Government and Opposition, as well the 
stated Conservative preference for ‘integration’ (1977-9) and Labour preference for 
‘unity by consent’ (1981-94), policy by the two parties towards Northern Ireland is 
marked more by continuity than by fundamental dispute. In particular, successive 
governments since 1972 (both Conservative and Labour) have been committed to the 
establishment of a devolved assembly, since Northern Ireland is ‘different’ from the 
rest of the UK and thus needs different arrangements for governance.35 
 
Dublin. Examination of the harmonising cross-party continuity by successive Irish 
governments has been largely neglected in the literature. Much of the post-
independence period in the Republic of Ireland has been dominated by Fianna Fáil-led 
governments.  Fianna Fáil has always projected a more ‘green’ policy than Fine Gael. 
Nonetheless, there has been a measure of cross-party consensus among major parties 
in the Dáil. As with the British cross-party consensus on Northern Ireland, there have 
been tensions in the harmonisation of policy between Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. For 
example, when the IRA ended its ceasefire with the Canary Wharf bombing in 
February 1996, the then-opposition leader Bertie Ahern blamed the resumption of 
violence partly on John Bruton.36 According to one official, the relationship between 
Bruton and the nationalists in NI was ‘fraught’, and that may have contributed to the 
breaking of the IRA ceasefire in Canary Wharf, but the same official adds that the 
new leadership under Enda Kenny has mended relations with the SDLP. 37  The 
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ceasefires were back in place soon after a change from a Fine-Gael-led to a Fianna 
Fáil-led government. 
 
There have been other times when the bipartisanship between Fine Gael and Fianna 
Fáil has been strained, especially when Charles Haughey was leader of Fianna Fáil. 
 
The New Ireland Forum was comprised of the main constitutional political parties in 
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland: Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil, the Irish Labour 
Party and the SDLP. The New Ireland Forum Report (1984) suggested three possible 
solutions to the conflict in Northern Ireland to achieve a united Ireland: a unitary 
unified state, an all-island confederal/federal state with two jurisdictions, and London-
Dublin joint authority over Northern Ireland.38 Although Haughey participated in the 
Forum, he used the opportunity to register his preference for a unitary Irish state with 
full British withdrawal. While in Opposition, Haughey objected to the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement: 
 
By confirming what is called the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the 
United Kingdom in this Agreement we will do serious damage in the eyes of the world to Ireland’s 
historic and legitimate claim to the unity of her territory.39 
 
The vote in the Dáil on the Anglo-Irish Agreement followed party lines, with the Fine 
Gael TDs voting for the motion and Fianna Fáil members voting against. The measure 
passed 88 to 75.40 In October 1986, Haughey declared that his party would renegotiate 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement if they were in Government. However, when Haughey did 
become Taoiseach, he maintained Irish Government support for the Agreement: 
 
It is the practice of Irish Governments to honour and operate international agreements concluded by 
their predecessors. This Government will follow in that tradition and will fulfil and operate the Anglo-
Irish Agreement …The Deputy will be aware that my party and I have indicated that we do not accept 
the constitutional implications of  Article 1 but as an integral part of a binding international agreement 
that Article could be amended only by mutual agreement and there is no likelihood that such agreement 
would be forthcoming.41 
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Thus, despite earlier pronouncements, Haughey did not break nor renegotiate the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, and maintained bipartisanship over Northern Ireland policy, 
perhaps due to the high level of public support for the document in the Republic of 
Ireland.42 
 
The level of bipartisanship has been especially strong in recent times. Both sides of 
the House in the Dáil closed ranks regarding the Belfast Agreement. According to the 
parliamentary correspondent for the Irish Times: 
 
The usual robust exchanges yielded to respectful questions about the state of talks and a united 
approach to the historic accord, backed by the overwhelming support of the electorate North and South 
in referendums. The bipartisan approach has more or less continued.43 
 
Evidence of this cross-party support for the ‘peace process’ can be found in the 
transcripts of the Dáil in spring 1998. John Bruton assented to the strands of the 
eventual settlement: 
 
The three stranded approach guarantees that every aspect of the problem will be tackled; that is a great 
strength. Nor am I concerned that the outcome will be insufficiently fair. I believe the outcome will be 
very fair.44 
 
As the deadline for agreement drew closer, Bruton also said: 
 
I believe I speak for the House in wishing the Taoiseach well in the work he has to do this week in 
conjunction with the British Prime Minister and with all the participants in the talks. He has the support 
of everybody in Ireland in his work in that regard.45 
 
More recently, Enda Kenny, Bruton’s successor, has commented: 
 
Fine Gael supports the Good Friday Agreement unequivocally. It is a compromise and therefore 
imperfect, but no one, not even its most fierce detractors, has produced anything better. The Agreement 
remains our best and only hope. Fine Gael stands by the Agreement because the principles 
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underpinning it are those it has articulated and defended since its foundation…Fine Gael in opposition 
retains a patriotic and passionate commitment to Northern Ireland and its people. It has never played 
politics with this issue and has supported the Government staunchly throughout the process.46 
 
According to a political advisor in Fine Gael, ‘the support given to the Good Friday 
Agreement by all parties in [the] Dáil would suggest that there is [harmonisation of NI 
policy].’47 Moreover: 
 
The Agreement itself is a compromise that all sides signed up to. Regardless of who is in power, in 
either Dublin or London, both Governments are compelled to reach a solution and achieve lasting 
peace in Northern Ireland.48 
 
The Taoiseach has confirmed more recently that the cross-party consensus regarding 
Northern Ireland: 
 
Members on all sides of the House have always expressed their overwhelming support for the Good 
Friday Agreement…All of us have a collective responsibility to make the Agreement work. This is not 
a policy option.49 
 
According to a senior policymaker in Dublin, the Opposition is briefed regarding 
Northern Ireland and that overall, there is a similar policy for all major parties in the 
Dáil. This occurred after 1998, since the Agreement was endorsed by a large majority 
of the people in the referendum.50 
 
The third significant party in Dublin is Irish Labour. According to Fergus Finlay, 
there is cross-party support for what is agreed in Northern Ireland: consent and 
stability.51 Ruari Quinn, one of Finlay’s Labour colleagues in the Dáil, suggests that 
this cross-party support has limits: 
 
When in Government my party appreciated the support of the Taoiseach in relation to Northern Ireland 
and in Opposition we have sought to reciprocate. Of course, we would try to pursue a bipartisan 
approach even if Fianna Fáil had not done so. Bipartisanship is not a complete carte blanche. We will 
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continue to point out areas where we think progress is not being made or where it can be made more 
speedily.52 
 
Similarly, the Chair of the Fianna Fáil, Rory O’Hanlon, criticised some of the 
government policy regarding Northern Ireland when Fianna Fáil was last in 
Opposition, but he still mentioned that there was a bipartisan approach.53 
 
Thus, Finlay claims that a change in government in Dublin, it would ‘lead to a change 
of tone, not policy.’54 According to a policymaker in the current Irish Government, 
there are differences in the ‘nuances’ between the political parties in Dublin.55 Thus, 
the situation is similar to London. There is a high level of policy continuity between 
the major political parties, but this is not tantamount to a political ‘blank cheque’. The 
Opposition still plays a role in oversight of government actions, while reinforcing 
support for the Belfast Agreement. 
 
Belgrade. Much of the connection between RS and Serbia originated during the wars 
under the leadership of Milošević. There was a marked change in the institutional 
structures and the legitimacy of Serbia after Milošević was indicted and brought to the 
ICTY. According to the current Minister heading the Section for Bilateral Relations, 
after Milošević was sent to the Hague, the ‘world became more relaxed’ and Serbia 
was ‘ready to transform to Western, democratic values.’ Moreover, Serbia decided to 
change to a ‘reliable, transparent partner in any field of cooperation.’56 Serbia has 
made overtures to Europe, and according to Vejvoda, Euro-Atlantic integration is 
‘real policy’, not just lip service to impress the West. Reforms in areas such as 
defence are tantamount to reforms to become ‘decent countries’ (i.e. democratic, 
market-oriented states).57  Towards these ends, Belgrade passed a law in July 2004 to 
‘tilt’ the defence policy of Serbia & Montenegro towards the West, meaning the EU, 
NATO, OSCE and UN as a step towards Euro-Atlantic integration.58 
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However, the state has not made a clean break with Milošević’s legacy. According to 
the ICG, Serbia ‘increasingly resembles the Milošević-era without Milošević.’59 The 
same illegal security structures in place during Milošević’s regime may have been 
responsible for ðinñic’s murder, as suggested in the previous chapter. 60  More 
importantly, the last elections for the Serbian presidency and parliament have shown 
that the electorate are not as committed to ‘decent’ liberal-democratic values as 
portrayed by some policymakers. The parliamentary elections resulted in significant 
gains for the Serbian radical party (SRS), which gained the largest seat allocation with 
82 out of 250 seats.61 However, the hard-line policies prevent the SRS from forming a 
coalition large enough to control the parliament. Nonetheless, the election shows 
significant disaffection towards the ruling coalition led by the DSS and DS.62 The 
shift towards the nationalists is partly due to the split between DS and DSS, partly due 
to dissatisfaction with the economic situation, but also a protest against the move 
towards Europe. The SRS has drawn support from pensioners, farmers, and the 
unemployed, who had been protected during communist times. Moreover, cooperation 
with the Hague tribunal and other ‘Western’ organisations has remained unpopular. 
 
In the 2004 presidential elections, the first round was won by Toma Nikolić, the SRS 
leader. As in the parliamentary elections, the SRS succeeded in projecting a platform 
based on nationalism and welfare to win the first round.63 However, the SRS was 
unable to win in the second round and the more ‘pro-Western candidate’, Boris Tadić, 
was returned. Nonetheless, the strong support for the far right in Serbia has 
consequences for regional relations. During a television interview in November 2003, 
Nikolić said that he would not contemplate diplomatic relations with Croatia until the 
border dispute was settled near Karlovac.64 The SRS also oppose the Hague war-
crimes tribunal (their leader Šešelj is awaiting trial at the ICTY), and Nikolić has said 
that European integration is a waste of time. 65  Nikolić is portrayed as a less 
‘hysterical’ nationalist than Šešelj, but Nikolić continues to adhere to the aspiration of 
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a ‘Greater Serbia’ that includes Bosnia-Hercegovina and much of Croatia. In June 
2004, he said: ‘I’ll dream about that border as long as I live.’66 Nikolić sometimes 
couches the SRS territorial aspirations in terms of universal rights for all individuals 
to live and own property where they want. However, he adheres to the rhetoric of 
extending the borders of Serbia: 
 
We hope that the borders could be changed some day, but before that we hope the dream of any citizen 
of the globe will be fulfilled. That is, to live in peace and safety on his property...  
 
One day, even the Serbs will live on their property. Protected so nobody can beat them, kill them. That 
is our dream. And there is no war in it.67 
 
Although Nikolić represents the ‘new face’ of the Serb Radicals in Serbia, the rhetoric 
remains the same as SRS objectives during the Milošević era. In the 1998 party 
manifesto, the SRS suggested the ‘union of the whole Serb people and establishment 
of a governmental community in the complete Serb national territory that will include 
Serbia, Montenegro, Republika Srpska and the Serb Krajina Republic’ by 
‘democratic’ means. 68  The call for these ‘democratic’ border adjustments are 
condemned by the international community in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which concludes 
that this is a violation of the terms of the Dayton-Paris Agreement.69 More worryingly, 
the words used by Nikolić in the above quote echo the rhetoric reportedly used by 
Milošević in the 1989 speech in Kosovo Polje. 
 
Thus, although the ‘democratic reformist’ forces that ousted Milošević are largely 
committed to Euro-Atlantic integration, a plurality of the Serbian electorate recently 
voted for a party that is anti-EU, nationalist, and still publicly ‘dreams’ of a ‘Greater 
Serbia’. Although the actual policy of the SRS cannot be confirmed (since they do not 
control either the parliament or the presidency), the stated expansionist position of the 
Radicals suggests a lack of policy continuity with more moderate parties in Serbia 
regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
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Zagreb. The 2001 general election returned a coalition of ‘liberal’ democratic parties 
that were committed to severing ties with the Tuñman regime. The Office of the 
President claims that policymaking has changed from the previous HDZ government. 
Legislation comes from the president, parliament and government, not just the former. 
Moreover, all politicians, especially in public, respect the borders of neighbouring 
countries.70 As with Serbia’s ‘tilt westward’, Croatia believes that its fate lies in Euro-
Atlantic integration. There was some uneasiness about the prospects about a return to 
HDZ rule. Vesna Pusić suggested that a return to HDZ rule would put reforms in ‘the 
wrong direction’.71 The President’s Office worried that ‘if the ruling coalition stays 
the same, then policy stays the same. If HDZ wins, they will try to return to some of 
the previous policy.’72 
 
However, the HDZ election victory at the end of 2003 did not bring about a return to 
the Tuñman-era policies. After Tuñman’s death, the resulting power struggle resulted 
in a more ‘European’ leadership under Ivo Sanader, with more of the more ‘extreme’ 
elements starting their own small nationalist parties. Sanader has portrayed the HDZ 
as a centre-right party and has told the ICTY that ‘the HDZ is a responsible political 
party and this is the 21st century.’73 Sanader has also made gestures to the Serb 
minority in Croatia, promising to make conditions favourable for the return of 
Croatian Serbs displaced during the war.74 Most importantly, despite the fact that 
cooperation with the ICTY is unpopular in Croatia, two Croatian citizens, Markac and 
Cermak, voluntarily surrendered in March 2004. Significantly, the indictments alleged 
that the two ex-generals, along with Tuñman and Gotovina, ‘participated in a joint 
criminal enterprise’ against the Serbs during ‘Operation Storm’.75 This suggests that 
compliance from Zagreb was tantamount to admitting that ‘Operation Storm’ was 
wrong. Moreover, by associating Gotovina with Markac and Cernak, the indictment 
of the two ex-generals indicated that Gotovina’s handover to the Hague was imminent. 
                                                 
70
 Interview with Igor Dekanić 
71
 Interview with Vesna Pusić (Leader, HNS) 
72
 Interview with Igor Dekanić 
73
 A. McTaggart, ‘Croatia Eyes the Prize’, Balkan Crisis Report, no. 493, 22nd Apr. 2004. URL: 
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr3/bcr3_200404_493_8_eng.txt. See also A. McTaggart, 
‘”Reformed HDZ Set to take Power’. 
74
 A. McTaggart, ‘Croatia Eyes the Prize’. 
75
 The indictment can be found online at the ICTY site: http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/cer-
ii040224e.htm.  
BIPARTISANSHIP AND INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 
 188 
This progress led to Carla del Ponte declaring Croatia was cooperating fully with the 
ICTY in April 2004. Despite some reservations from the CoE regarding minority 
rights and the failure to hand over the ‘remaining indictee’ to the ICTY, the European 
Commission recommended that Croatia start EU accession negotiations. 76   Two 
months later, on 18th June, Croatia received candidate status to join the EU.77 
 
Croatian policymakers outside the HDZ confirm that there is certain policy continuity 
between governments. Željko Glavan (HSLS) says that a ‘change of government will 
not change policy towards Bosnia. [It is] state politics, not party  politics.’78 Josip 
Torbar (HSS) comments that the HDZ do not want a ‘bigger Croatia’ any more, since 
they want to keep the US happy (e.g. HDZ support for US policy in Iraq).79 Similarly, 
Ozren Žunec, a former head of the Croatian Intelligence Services, adds that a change 
of government to HDZ will change little, since ‘the historic moment has been gone’ 
for a while, and the international community ensures that there is little 
manoeuvrability.80 Finally, the Croatian Ambassador to the UK adds that a change in 
government will not lead to a change in foreign policy, as this is common in 
‘European democracies’. He added that no party opposes the government in public, 
and that there are not many open issues regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina.81 In economic 
terms, the European Commission believes that ‘Croatia can be regarded as a 
functioning market economy’.82 In fact, according to the EBRD, Croatia is classified 
economically as ‘Central European’, and not ‘SE Europe’ like Bulgaria and Romania, 
the two countries that are set to join the EU in 2007.83 
 
Despite some encouraging economic and political signs across Croatian governments, 
there are worrying signs from Zagreb. For example, in a radio debate with Ivica 
Račan, Sanader ‘qualified his support for the Hague tribunal by saying he accepted 
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the principle of cooperation but wanted "politicised" cases reviewed.’84 Moreover, 
HDZ ran a more traditional nationalist campaign at the local level. At one rally,  
Sanader blamed ‘the Račan government for neglect of the diaspora and abandoning 
the Croats of Bosnia "when we are all one nation"’.85 Finally, the capture of Ante 
Gotovina, remains an open issue. The failure of Serbia and Republika Srpska to hand 
over suspects to the ICTY was the primary reason for NATO rejection of their 
applications to the PfP, and Croatia has not handed over the third most wanted 
indictee behind Mladić and Karadžić. After explaining the non-cooperation from RS 
and Serbia, del Ponte said on 3rd November 2004: 
 
In Croatia, I have similar problems. It is a great disappointment for the ICTY that Croatia did not arrest 
General Gotovina to this day. In the course of the spring, the Government apparently intensified its 
efforts to locate this fugitive, and I was confident that he would be arrested during the summer. It is 
very unfortunate that this did not happen and that, in July and August, the momentum was lost. 
Gotovina is still in Croatia.86 
 
Despite some concerns from other parties, a return to HDZ has not led to a return to 
the policies of the pre-2000 era. In particular, the re-packaging of HDZ as a party of 
the 21st century with the reformist Sanader at the helm has ensured continued Euro-
Atlantic integration after the change in government. However, some of the 
declarations by Sanader suggest that his party has been unable to make a clean break 
from its nationalist past. Although there have been democratic changes since 2000, a 
continuous policy of cooperation with BiH and Serbia is unfulfilled as long as the 
tasks of ICTY indictments and Serb minority rights remain unfinished. 
 
Thus, an examination of cross-party cooperative policy among reference parties 
revealed a significant difference between the two case studies. Although there are 
differences in the ‘tone’ of the major parties in both Dublin and London, they all 
agree on the principles of the Belfast Agreement and share broad policy objectives on 
Northern Ireland. By contrast, hard-line nationalists control nearly half of the Serbian 
Parliament, and the SRS candidate earned a plurality of the vote in the first round of 
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the presidential elections. Such nationalist parties still use the rhetoric of ‘Greater 
Serbia’, and thus, are at variance with the ‘reformist’ coalition that takes a more 
conciliatory tone with Serbia’s neighbours. Although Croatia is further along the 
process of Euro-Atlantic integration than any country in the ‘Western Balkans’, non-
cooperation with the ICTY regarding Gotovina and HDZ’s nationalist rhetoric during 
the election campaign (2003) shows that cross-party commitment to Dayton is 
incomplete. For Northern Ireland, there is cooperative policy continuity across 
governments that are more traditionally ‘Unionist’ and those that are not in London, 
as well as those that are traditionally ‘republican’ and those that are not in Dublin.87 
This cross-party policy continuity is not evident in the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina.88 
Intergovernmentalism 
 
The theory of transnational consociation predicts that a lack of continuous cooperative 
policy would reduce the likelihood of cooperation between reference states, and vice 
versa. Thus, this would suggest that the ‘bipartisan’ policy towards Northern Ireland 
by successive governments in Dublin and London is likely to lead to stable, 
cooperative intergovernmental relations. On the other hand, the lack of such 
continuity between governments in both Zagreb and Belgrade would suggest that 
neither would be able to trust the consistency of the other. Thus, there would be little 
persistent intergovernmentalism regarding regional policy in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Each of these axes (i.e. Dublin-London and Belgrade-Zagreb) will be examined in 
turn. 
 
London-Dublin. The relationship between Dublin and London has evolved from that 
of antagonism to one that is friendlier, and from an asymmetric relationship between 
the former coloniser and colony to one of equals. The importance of the agreement of 
the two ‘metropoles’ as a foundation for the settlement in Northern Ireland is 
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discussed elsewhere in the literature.89 According to John Bruton, ‘the key elements in 
the approach of the two Governments have evolved in a consistent, organic way over 
the entire period [1972-1997].’90 
 
However, this overstates the continuity of the intergovernmentalism between Dublin 
and London. After the collapse of the Sunningdale power-sharing institutions, 
successive British governments sought a devolved framework for Northern Ireland, 
but without an ‘Irish dimension’. Nonetheless, the British Prime Minister (Thatcher), 
Irish Taoiseach (Haughey), Secretary of State for NI, Irish Foreign Minister, and 
Ministers of Finance from the two governments met in December 1980 and decided to 
explore areas of common concern, including economic and security cooperation, and 
possible institutions, though the constitutional position of Northern Ireland.91 
 
As aforementioned Prior Initiative (April 1982) for ‘rolling devolution’ had been 
rejected by Nationalists, and political parties in the Republic of Ireland were 
unconvinced. 92 In the wake of the 1981 Hunger Strikes, the nationalist tilt both in 
Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland (Fianna Fáil returned to Government 
in February 1982) resulted in a low-point in relations between London and Dublin. 
The tension between the two governments extended to issues outside Northern 
Ireland, including Ireland’s criticism of the British in the Falklands after the sinking 
of the Belgrano.93 
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In November 1984, Thatcher’s press conference on the three options proposed by the 
New Ireland Form Report (see above) underlined the gulf between London and 
Dublin: 
 
The unified Ireland was one solution – that is out. A second solution was a confederation of the two 
states – that is out. A third solution was joint authority – that is out.94 
 
However, even at this time, Dublin-London relations were improving. Fine Gael came 
back into Government in 1983. Garret FitzGerald and Margaret Thatcher re-started 
Anglo-Irish cooperation on Northern Ireland in June 1983, and negotiations starting in 
mid-1984 culminated with the Anglo-Irish Agreement in November 1985. 95  The 
change in Conservative policy soon after the Prior Initiative towards bilateralism is 
surprising.96 According to Cunningham, there were four reasons why a change of 
British policy would not have been expected: Thatcher was thought to be sympathetic 
to unionism; a relatively low death-rate meant that all-island security measures were 
no more necessary than before; the worry about the Unionist backlash if there were an 
Irish dimension; and Sinn Féin’s electoral success had supposedly ‘peaked’.97 
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However, there were a number of possible countervailing factors that may explain the 
change in British Government policy98: 
 
• Increased security in both Britain and Ireland 
• Managing the fear of the electoral success of republicans in both parts of 
Ireland 
• ‘Damage control’ after the Hunger Strikes 
• Douglas Hurd as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was more committed 
to addressing Northern Ireland on a bilateral basis 
• the British and Irish negotiators under-estimated the Unionist backlash against 
bilateralism 
• some middle-class Unionists could be appeased with increased security and 
economic prosperity in return for an Irish dimension 
• Unionist hostility to Dublin involvement could have been used as an incentive 
for internal consociation 
• Thatcher calculated increased support from Dublin and Nationalists against 
terrorism if Dublin were included  
 
The Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) contained an explicit institutionalised role for 
Dublin and included provisions to establish an Intergovernmental Conference 
between the heads of government to discuss political, judicial, ‘cross-border’ and 
security matters. 99  The bilateral features of the AIA can be found in later joint 
London-Dublin documents, such as the Downing Street Declaration (DSD), the 
Framework Documents and the Belfast Agreement. The DSD was issued jointly from 
the PM and Taoiseach. Two years later, although the positions of Dublin and London 
did not coincide: ‘In this Framework Document both Governments…describe a 
shared understanding reached between them on the parameters of a possible outcome 
to the Talks process. [emphasis added]’100  
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The Belfast Agreement represents an important signpost in the intergovernmental 
relations. As mentioned in Chapter 4, though finally approved through multi-party 
negotiations with policymakers in Northern Ireland, no representative from the 
‘Province’ actually signs the ‘Agreement’ (i.e. the 1998 British-Irish Agreement). 
 
The choreography leading up to the Belfast Agreement was done to underline 
London-Dublin intergovernmentalism. The two heads of government negotiated the 
Strand 2 institutions bilaterally at Downing Street, separately from the Strand 1 
negotiations in Belfast chaired by George Mitchell. Blair and Ahern were to only 
appear in Belfast at the very last stages to ‘close the deal’.101 
 
Some commentators suggest that the evolution of London-Dublin relations from the 
failure of Sunningdale to the current peace process was a ‘slow learning’ process. 
That is, by trial and error, the two sovereign governments developed a ‘unity of 
purpose’ of developing politics in Northern Ireland from the ‘outside in’.102  Kerr 
suggests that the longevity of certain civil servants led to the policy continuity 
examined in the last section, and also to a coherent London-Dublin strategy regarding 
the ‘Province’.103 Other work on Northern Ireland looks at the change of London-
Dublin relations in a wider context of Europe, and of international changes.104 
 
Fergus Finlay worked for previous governments in Dublin and was a part of the Irish 
Government team that negotiated the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985). According to 
him, it was routine to ‘be lectured by the Secretary of State [for Northern Ireland]’. 
However, by the early 1990s, the intergovernmental relations are much more ‘level’, 
and although there are disagreements, these are discussed as equals, not as the 
‘sovereign’ and the ‘interloper.’ 105  The institutional manifestation of 
intergovernmentalism from 1985 can be found in Strand Three of the Belfast 
Agreement. First, the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIGC) subsumes 
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the bilateral institutions from the Anglo-Irish Agreement to ‘bring together the British 
and Irish Governments to promote bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of 
mutual interest within the competence of both Governments.’ Moreover, the joint 
secretariat at Maryfield from the AIA is superseded by the Joint British-Irish 
Secretariat responsible for non-devolved matters located at Windsor House 
(Belfast).106 The first meeting of the BIIGC was in December 1999, and there have 
been regular meetings since then, meeting more frequently after the institutions were 
suspended in 2002. The most important function of these continued Conferences 
between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister are the joint communiqués that are 
public declarations of full commitment to the Belfast Agreement. For example, soon 
after the suspension, the governments declared: 
 
Both Governments reiterated their commitment to the implementation of the Agreement as the only 
way forward and the only viable future for the people of Northern Ireland. It is their determined wish to 
see devolved Government restored as soon as possible and, in any event, in advance of the scheduled 
elections. Both Governments believe that a representative Assembly and an inclusive Executive remain 
the most appropriate form of government for Northern Ireland.107 
 
Similar pronouncements of intergovernmental commitment to the Agreement have 
been made after more recent BIIGC meetings. In addition to the formal institutions 
established by the Belfast Agreement, there are other non-legislative bodies that have 
supported the London-Dublin axis. One such institution is the British-Irish 
Parliamentary Body (BIIPB), which meets twice a year, bringing together members of 
legislative assemblies from Britain and Ireland. It predates devolution in the UK, so 
plenary sessions were only attended by members of Parliament and the Oireachtas. 
However, since the advent of regional assemblies, representatives from the Scottish, 
Welsh, and (when not suspended) Northern Ireland assemblies also attend.  
 
The crucial function of the London-Dublin axis is recognised by both sovereign 
governments and by the local political parties in Northern Ireland. At the heart of the 
present Dublin-London axis is the relationship between the two heads of government, 
Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern. Blair has led a Labour government since 1997, after 18 
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years of Conservative rule in Westminster. Fianna Fáil returned to government in the 
same year in Dublin. The changes of government arguably added some momentum to 
the process, evidenced by the restoration of the IRA ceasefires and the ‘signing’ of the 
Belfast Agreement. William Stevenson (NIO) describes Blair and Ahern having an 
‘especially friendly relationship.’108 From the Dublin perspective, Finlay says that a 
change of government would change the situation, only because ‘it is not possible to 
be as involved as Tony Blair [has been].’109 Nonetheless, Finlay concludes that a 
change of government in Westminster would be one of ‘tone’, as mentioned in the 
previous section.110 The intergovernmental London-Dublin axis is more solid than the 
personal relationship of the Taoiseach and the PM. 
 
According to an official from the Irish Government: 
 
There is no progress until there is intergovernmental agreement…The two governments took power, 
and have the same aims…The two governments do not criticise each other publicly. They basically 
have the same essential policy.111 
 
The strengthening relationships between Dublin and London are confirmed by Fine 
Gael: 
 
[Over the last ten years], the relationship between British and Irish Governments has grown much 
closer. The Good Friday Agreement itself changed the nature of that relationship and strengthened the 
role of Dublin in the Peace Process…In recent years, both governments have worked closely in their 
efforts to bring about the full implementation of the Agreement.112 
 
The current leader of Fine Gael confirms the role of intergovernmental cooperation 
between officials both in London and Dublin who are ‘in so many ways the real 
architects of…[the peace] process’.113 
 
                                                 
108
 Interview with William Stevenson 
109
 Interview with Fergus Finlay 
110
 Ibid. 
111
 Interview with Senior Source in Irish Government 
112
 Written answers from Stephen Lynam 
113
 Dáil Debates, Northern Ireland: Statements, 7th May 2003.  
BIPARTISANSHIP AND INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 
 197 
From the Opposition benches in the British Parliament, there is further confirmation 
of intergovernmentalism. David Lidington suggests that there is a ‘closer and more 
trusting relationship’ between the two sovereign governments.114 
 
The significance of the intergovernmental engine for the process is also mentioned 
across parties in Northern Ireland. A sample of such comments from both Nationalists 
and Unionists is shown below: 
 
Dr. Sean Farren (SDLP) believes: 
 
[The two governments] have the role of ringmaster. The two governments are the sovereign 
governments. This place is not sovereign. They exercise the responsibilities jointly. They co-chair the 
talks…They convened the talks in the first place in 1996. They laid the grounds. Without them, there 
would not be a process. They are the key; they are central to driving the process.115 
 
Soon after the October 2002 suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly Mark 
Durkan, leader of the SDLP, called on the British and Irish Governments to ‘lead’ on 
the implementation of the Belfast Agreement through meetings of the BIIGC. 116 
Denis Haughey (SDLP) believes that the significant feature of the last 15-20 years is 
the ‘gradual growing together of the British and Irish Governments in a tight compact 
to cooperate on issues of Northern Ireland.’117 
 
For Peter Weir (DUP), Dublin and Westminster ‘are guardians or guarantors of the 
agreement.’ 118  For Dr. Esmond Birnie (UUP), ‘in practice, their role has been 
substantial, perhaps too substantial…The two governments keep being drawn in. This 
will be the pattern for the foreseeable future.’119 Graham Gudgin believes that the 
chief role for Dublin and London is to consider ‘the bigger political picture, keeping 
the process alive and pressuring the IRA.’ Finally, Steven King claims that: 
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The way that things have gone since 1985 is that papers are drafted in Dublin, and the British 
Government amends them instead of both sides coming forward with positions, and there is a coming 
together to meld the two positions. This still carries on.120 
 
Although it appears that the governments’ policies are harmonised, the situation 
should not be mistaken for joint sovereignty. Some policymakers in Northern Ireland 
(more often Unionist) see the cross-border arrangements and intergovernmental 
relations as ‘jointery’ or Dublin aspirations for sharing sovereignty. However, the 
position of the British Government is that there is no joint sovereignty.121 
 
There have been periods, even recently, when there have been tensions between 
London and Dublin regarding Northern Ireland. According to one source, the Irish 
government had a tougher time during Mandelson’s tenure, since the then-Secretary 
of State believed that Mowlam was ‘a bit tipped towards the Nationalists’, so 
Mandelson was biased towards Unionists. Thus, the then-Secretary of State pursued 
policies such as such as trying to veto certain parts of the Patten report on policing 
reform. 122  The most controversial decision under Mandelson was the passing of 
primary legislation in parliament to suspend the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, unilateral suspensions by the British Government seem to 
clearly breach Article 7 of the Belfast Agreement section on validation and review, 
which stipulates that any change in the agreement will have to be agreed by the two 
governments and the parties in Northern Ireland. In fact, some commentators have 
seen the passing of the Suspension Act (2000) as a ‘formal break with the agreement, 
and international law’.123 More worryingly for nationalists, the unilateral suspensions 
suggest that the British government sees itself as being able to revise the Agreement 
without the consent of Dublin or nationalist opinion.124 
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Surprisingly, the reaction from the policymakers in Dublin was not openly hostile. 
The first suspensions of the institutions were done unilaterally, but later ones had 
more consultation with Dublin. A source in the Irish Government concedes: ‘in the 
end, Northern Ireland is sovereign territory of the United Kingdom, so they [the 
British Government] can do it [suspend the institutions].’125 
 
This position is also corroborated by Fine Gael: 
 
Under the Good Friday Agreement and its implementing legislation, the British Government has the 
power to suspend and restore the Assembly and other institutions established under the Good Friday 
Agreement.126 
 
Despite the lack of public critique from Dublin of the unilateral British government’s 
break with the British-Irish Agreement (1999), the intergovernmental 
recommendation to repeal the Suspension Act (2000) implies that both Dublin and 
London appreciated the questionable legal basis of the British Government’s 
unilateral actions. This suggests that even if the Irish Government (and other large 
political parties in Dublin) felt that the British Government had acted illegally, it was 
important to publicly continue intergovernmentalism. 
 
The stance of the Irish Government showed that there have been disagreements with 
London, but that Dublin continued nonetheless to support the intergovernmental axis 
to implement the Agreement. 
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The position of the Irish Government is encapsulated in a speech by Bertie Ahern in 
May 2003 regarding a subsequent dispute about Assembly elections: 
 
I have stated clearly that the Government disagrees with the British Government on the postponement 
of these elections.  I re-iterated our view, which I know is shared by many members of the House, on 
this matter on several occasions directly to the Prime Minister. 
  
I believe that yet another postponement of the elections causes more problems for the process than it 
solves. 
 
However, while we do not agree or endorse this step, the closest of partnerships between the two 
Governments is essential to achieving continuing progress in Northern Ireland. 
 
That partnership remains strong and will continue. It is of enormous value as we work to overcome the 
current difficulties. 
 
The Prime Minister and I met together yesterday and restated our commitment to our shared objective 
of completing the full implementation of the Agreement.127 
 
Although there are occasional tensions or disagreements between Dublin and London, 
both are committed to the overall principles of the Belfast Agreement. The overall 
bipartisan policy in the reference states, has allowed for the intergovernmentalism to 
develop in the 1980s, since governments in Dublin and London know that agreements 
with the other reference state will survive a change of government. 
 
Zagreb-Belgrade. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Dayton-Paris Agreement (1995) 
was signed by Milošević from Serbia, Tuñman from Croatia, and Alija Izetbegović as 
the President of Bosnia-Hercegovina. There are two interesting points regarding the 
identities of the ‘local’ signatories. The first is that although the constitution from 
Annex IV recognises Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats as the three constitutive peoples of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, it is only Izetbegović, a Bosniak, that signs for all of the newly-
formed state. It is assumed that the reference states, Croatia and Serbia, speak for their 
co-nationals in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The second point is that the inclusion of Zagreb 
and Belgrade in the final signing illustrates the importance of the Zagreb-Belgrade 
axis in the geopolitics of the region. In fact, it is this axis between Croat and Serb 
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politics that has had a significant impact on regional history. For example, the 
Yugoslav Wars 1991-5 are often seen as the expansionist aspirations of Milošević 
from Belgrade and Tuñman from Zagreb. Both leaders utilised ‘historic’ justifications 
to extend their respective territories into Bosnia, leaving the ‘Muslims’ without a 
state.128 Tuñman argued that the Croatian claim is based on the 1939 agreement for 
Croatian autonomy between Yugoslav Prime Minister Cvetković and Croatian HSS 
leader Maček. Milošević based his territorial claim on majority Serb areas that had 
declared autonomy in 1990-1, and held ‘referenda’ among Serbs to exercise their right 
to self-determination. 129  There has always been speculation that Tuñman and 
Milošević convened a secret meeting in Karañorñevo to agree on a territorial division 
line in BiH between an expanded Croatia and Serbia. In October 2003, the former 
Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Marković, told the ICTY at the Milošević trial 
the details of such a meeting.130 The court transcript reads: 
 
As I had received information about the topic discussed in Karadjordjevo, that is, the division of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia, and that Milošević and Tudjman had agreed to 
carry out this division, and also there was talk of the dismissal of the Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, 
because he was in the way of both of them in implementing this division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
At my initiative, I had a meeting with Milošević in Belgrade and with Tudjman in Zagreb…The results 
of these talks were that both of them confirmed to me that they had agreed to divide up Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Milošević told me this very soon. Tudjman needed much more time to admit this and to 
say that they had reached an understanding about it.131 
 
Present-day policymakers refer to this ‘agreement’ as the central reason for the 
Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. Žarko Korać, the Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and 
Montenegro,  believes that the war was ‘a deliberate attempt to dismember Bosnia,’ 
and that Serbia was the aggressor, with Croatia joining in ‘voluntarily.’132 Finally, 
Radmanović of the SNSD (RS) connects the pre-war and post-war Zagreb-Belgrade 
influence. He says that in the first period, Zagreb and Belgrade tried to divide Bosnia-
Hercegovina together. Now, although there are changes in both places so that the 
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reference states worry about their own problems, but it is ‘still quite normal for 
[Bosnian] leaders to be in ‘“their” capitals’.133 
 
The centrality of the Zagreb-Belgrade link in the post-war context has been noted by 
policymakers in the two reference states. Ivan Vejvoda comments that the 
‘relationship between Zagreb and Belgrade is the central one in the region. When this 
links breaks down, we know that Bosnia-Hercegovina goes down the drain.’134 He 
adds that the Zagreb-Belgrade axis is important for Bosnia, in that the closer the two 
reference states move to Europe, the better for BiH, since Belgrade and Zagreb act as 
‘communication vessels’ for the rest of the region.135 
 
A day before the above comments from Vejvoda, the then-President of Serbia & 
Montenegro offered a ‘surprise’ apology, which was reciprocated by the Croatian 
president. According to one report: 
 
It was Marović who initiated the surprise apology in his statement: "I want to apologize for all the evils 
that any citizen of Serbia and Montenegro inflicted upon or committed against any citizen of Croatia." 
 
Mesić accepted the apology, and in turn offered his regrets for crimes committed by Croats "at any 
time" -- a remark interpreted as including crimes committed by Croat fascists against Serbs during 
World II: "I accept this symbolic apology. In my name, I also apologize to all those who have suffered 
pain or damage at any time from citizens of Croatia who misused the law or abused their position. I 
said, at any time."136 
 
There are occasional joint declarations from high-level officials for the two countries, 
such as the pledge to normalise relations between Belgrade and Zagreb in June 2001. 
More recently, there has been an abolition of the visa region among the states in the 
‘Dayton Triangle’, though this is a work in progress. Through the ‘special 
relationship’ protected in the Dayton Agreement, residents of RS can cross the border 
with Serbia without a passport. Serbia is in the process of negotiating with Sarajevo to 
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abolish visas for all citizens.137 At the same time, Zagreb has issued a six-month visa 
amnesty with its neighbours, but the extension of the amnesty to a permanent 
abolition of visas was conditional, subject to Belgrade returning birth and land 
registers taken during the wars. 138  The Serbian MFA hopes that easing visa 
restrictions in the region will ameliorate tensions.139 Although citizens of Serbia and 
Montenegro can now travel to Bosnia-Hercegovina for up to thirty days without a visa, 
the amnesty for tourist visas to Croatia remains temporary (lasting until the end of 
2005).140 
 
There are more salient issues that still need to be tackled before solid 
intergovernmentalism between Zagreb and Belgrade can develop. This problem can 
be highlighted by a multilateral agreement between Kostunica, Mesić and the 
members of the Bosnian Presidency during a summit in Sarajevo in July 2002. The 
two reference states promised to not have any territorial aspirations in Bosnia.141 
 
Despite the strong symbolic content of the document renouncing the vision of a 
Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia, there was no mention of more substantive areas 
of conflict: 
 
[T]he leaders shied away from the serious problems that still hamper good relationships. There was no 
mention of compensation for war damages, arrest of war criminals, property issues, or genocide 
charges filed by Sarajevo against Yugoslavia at The Hague.142 
 
There are also ongoing multilateral discussions about deciding the frontiers between 
BiH, Croatia and Serbia, which will be followed by the final demarcation of 
international borders in the region. 143  The most sensitive issues revolve around 
refugee and return of IDPs, as set out by Annex VII of the Dayton-Paris Agreement. 
Because of the patterns of ‘ethnic cleansing’ during the wars, it is crucial that BiH, 
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Croatia and Serbia all cooperate to complete the process. The status of return will be 
examined in more detail below. In this section, it is important to illustrate the lack of 
bilateralism concerning this issue. The Croatian MFA maintains that they do not have 
enough money to increase expenditure to assist refugee return. The Croatian MFA 
believes that minority return in RS should be the focus, so displaced Croats from RS 
now in Croatia can return.144 The UNHCR statistics collected from January to April 
2004 support these concerns: of the 2475 minority returns recorded in this period, 
only 78 were Croats.145 However, the Director of the HCHR in Zagreb worries that 
refugee return is ‘important propaganda’ and that Croatia has ‘used Bosnian Croats 
against other people.’146 
 
The MFA in Belgrade is concerned about the situation of Serbs in Croatia. According 
to Dušan Crnogorčević, the number of Serbs in Croatia went from 12% to 5% during 
the wars. The numbers from the last Croatian census broadly corroborate this claim, 
with the current population comprising 4% and leading to claims by Croatian Serb 
politicians of ethnic cleansing.147 Crnogorčević claims that most of these Croatian 
Serbs became refugees. Invitations for Serbs to return should be followed by return of 
property. In a rejoinder to the Zagreb position, the Assistant Minister believes that 
though return is ‘expensive’, Croatia did sign up to international agreements to 
implement refugee and IDP return.148 
 
On a more general level, there is still distrust between the two reference states. For 
example, Žarko Korać is suspicious of the aforementioned Article 10 of the Croatian 
Constitution: 
 
It is a holdover from the Tuñman era. Imagine if the US justified intervention everywhere there were 
Americans. It is possible for a state to work on the behalf of its citizens. What if China had a status 
law?149 
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The problem in Croatia is not one of lack of bipartisan continuity. As seen in the last 
section, there is little scope for ‘less conciliatory’ parties to reverse the drive to 
Europe. Although there is cross-party continuity between Zagreb governments, there 
are some open issues in which the benefits from taking a ‘nationalist’ stance outweigh 
the costs of international censure. There are issues that successive governments need 
to address, such as cooperation with the ICTY and refugee return, but there is no 
significant policy distance between the previous ‘centre-left’ coalition and the current 
HDZ-led governments. 
 
Policymakers in Zagreb worry about the political situation in Serbia and Montenegro. 
According to the Croatian Ambassador to the UK: 
 
Developments in Serbia and Montenegro are not always helpful. We do not have a serious 
partner…Territorial integrity [of BiH] is supported, but they [Serbia and Montenegro] are 
dysfunctional. This is not beneficial to Bosnian Serbs. Hopefully, Nikolić will never be close to 
power.150 
 
The concern of the ambassador links cross-party policy continuity with 
intergovernmentalism. Because of the resurgence of nationalist parties in Serbia, 
Belgrade is not a ‘serious partner’. That is, there is no reliable, continuous bipartisan 
strategy emanating from Belgrade. If Nikolić came to power, this would jeopardise 
agreements with ‘more conciliatory’ coalitions and perhaps even reverse the direction 
of the slow reconciliation in the Dayton Triangle. For example, Nikolić has threatened 
to sever ties with Croatia. In an interview on B92 during the presidential campaign, he 
said: 
 
I would remind them that they [Croatians] have to do a great deal in order to gain the trust of Serbia, 
enough trust for us to have diplomatic relations with Croatia.  I’m only reminding them that they’ve 
expelled people and not allowed them to return while, at the same time, they want trade and other 
relations with us.  We’re rather hypocritical when we want to cooperate with Croatia.151 
 
Such comments would not ease anxieties in Croatia, and suggest that a change to a 
SRS presidency would herald a return to more antagonistic relations between Zagreb 
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and Belgrade. Important areas of progress such as the symbolic apologies and the 
demilitarisation of Prevlaka may be undone. 
 
Thus, comparing the two case studies, the reliability of cross-party support for the 
Belfast Agreement in both London and Dublin has paved the way for the two 
sovereign governments to have a degree of ‘unity of purpose’ in their policies. As 
with cross-party continuity, there are occasionally issues of disagreement between the 
two governments, but the overall commitment to the Agreement ensures that 
intergovernmentalism survives. On the other hand, there is a limited degree of cross-
party consensus in Croatia. With Croatia’s candidate status for the EU, there are 
significant policy constraints for governments in Zagreb. However, nationalist 
rhetoric is still popular, which is seen disapprovingly in Belgrade.  With continuing 
progress in refugee return and cooperation with the ICTY, Croatia might be able to 
sustain a conciliatory cross-party policy regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, this 
will not consolidate intergovernmentalism with Belgrade, since Serbia and 
Montenegro is not a ‘reliable partner’ for agreements to survive a change in 
government to a ‘less conciliatory’ coalition. 
 
The differences between the two situations is encapsulated by an official from the 
OHR (Sarajevo): 
 
In Northern Ireland, an important factor is that Articles 2 and 3 were changed, so that Dublin has 
distanced itself from a ‘United Ireland’. Nationalists must work within Northern Ireland. But here, this 
is missing from both Zagreb and Belgrade. This works to the advantage of radical elements. What is 
needed is a public declaration from both governments distancing themselves, with verifiable results on 
the ground.152 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The examination in the previous sections suggests a fundamental difference between 
the intergovernmental Dublin-London axis and the Zagreb-Belgrade concerning the 
respective conflict zones. Although there have been periods in history in which the 
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British and Irish have been at war, and the former represent the one-time ‘colonisers’ 
of the latter, the two governments have a highly coordinated, cooperative policy 
towards the political process in Northern Ireland. Much of the stability of the 
intergovernmentalism between the two sovereign governments rests on cross-party 
consistency regarding the ‘peace process’ among all major parties. In Dublin, all 
major parties believe in the three-strand approach to Northern Ireland. In London, 
both the Labour and Conservative parties share a common purpose to implement the 
Belfast  Agreement. Although the Liberal Democrats have always been in Opposition, 
they also support the Government’s overall policy. Due to this stability, a strong 
intergovernmental axis has developed by which Dublin and London are the 
‘guarantors’ of the Agreement. Both ‘metropoles’ have softened their previous 
territorial claims, with the statement by Brooke regarding British interests and the 
changes in Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. They are able to play a 
constructive role in driving an inclusive political process, which would have not been 
possible if either government disengaged completely from Northern Ireland. 
 
By contrast, the wars in Yugoslavia have been all too recent, and there are still 
tensions between the states in the region. The recent memory of atrocities during the 
conflict has made it difficult for political leaders to be conciliatory towards recent 
adversaries. There have been some developments in inter-state relations among the 
former Yugoslav republics, such as the normalisation of diplomatic relations and the 
temporary abolition of visas within the region. Moreover, politicians in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina are cooperating to construct “Corridor 5C”, a 330 km highway 
that will stretch from Poland to Greece via the Adriatic. However, the two most 
important issues remain ‘open’ among Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. First, the ultimate 
goal of the Dayton-Paris Agreement is to create and consolidate rule of law such that 
those who want to return to their pre-war homes can do so. This requires extensive 
cooperation among the ‘Dayton Triangle’ (i.e. Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia). Although 
there have been joint pronouncements and symbolic apologies, the task of refugee 
return, especially minority return, remains incomplete. This issue is addressed in the 
following chapter. The other issue that requires strong cross-border cooperation is the 
apprehension of the three major accused ‘war criminals’ that remain outside the 
custody of the ICTY. One of the main constraints is that it is politically difficult for 
politicians in the Dayton Triangle to hand over these suspects. In Croatia, despite 
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continued pressure from Carla del Ponte, officials in Zagreb have been unable to 
make a commitment to find Ante Gotovina. He is still considered a ‘hero’ and 
‘defender’ of the Croat people by many in the country. The failure to hand over 
General Gotovina has led to a suspension of EU accession talks with Croatia.  The 
two other main suspects are considered ‘heroes’ by many people both in Serbia and 
among Bosnian Serbs. Both Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić remain free. 
However, Serbs in Serbia have become more cautious about their support for 
Karadžić after the release of video showing the killings of Muslim civilians at the 
hands of Serb forces at Serbrenica in 1995.153  
 
Nonetheless, the lack of intergovernmental coordination to tackle the two issues 
results in a weaker base for settlement in Bosnia-Hercegovina than the Dublin-
London axis does for Northern Ireland. By not having a conciliatory policy towards 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia makes it difficult for Croatia to see Belgrade as a 
‘reliable partner’ in dealing with the outstanding issues in the ‘Dayton Triangle’. 
Moreover, the lack of a clear cooperative message between Zagreb and Belgrade 
sends a signal to radical elements in Bosnia-Hercegovina to not look to Sarajevo as 
their ‘capital’. Although the level of bipartisanship between the ‘nationalist’ HDZ 
government and ‘moderate’ SDP-led coalitions is substantial, especially in issues of 
European integration, the aforementioned ‘open issues’ remain. Serbian authorities 
are concerned that Croatia facilitates reconstruction of Croat houses, but not minority 
Serbs either in Bosnia-Hercegovina or in Croatia. 
 
Following the theory of transnational consociation, a strong cooperative 
intergovernmentalism between reference states creates a stronger likelihood or a 
durable, inclusive power-sharing settlement. This would suggest that the Northern 
Ireland case is more likely to result in long-lasting internal consociation than Bosnia-
Hercegovina. The following chapter will examine the implementation and political 
practice of post-settlement power-sharing in the two case studies to as an illustration 
of the empirical ramifications of transnational consociation theory. 
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Chapter VII: Internal Consociation 
Introduction 
 
The ultimate objective of the settlements is for stability in the disputed area, so it is 
important to evaluate internal consociation in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. First, the development of collective decision-making procedures will be 
assessed for each case, with sub-sections for the ‘good news’ and ‘bad news’. 
Although there are many areas where the settlements have been unsuccessful, the two 
peace agreements have resulted in the cessation of the wars in Bosnia-Hercegovina 
and the ceasefires by all major paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland. The 
second section looks at the state of the ‘peace’ in both places. By using criteria for 
post-conflict power-sharing developed by Ulrich Schneckener, the subsequent chapter 
will differentiate between the two cases. Utilising Schneckener’s framework, it will 
be surmised that the presence of more of the actor-oriented factors in Northern 
Ireland make it more likely to achieve long-term stability than Bosnia-Hercegovina.  
Thus, Northern Ireland, the case study in which there is strong intergovernmental 
influence from the reference states (see Chapter 6) will be more likely to develop 
durable, self-sustaining power-sharing. 
Collective Decision-making 
 
At the heart of both accords are the ‘twin processes’ of institutional development 
cessation of violence. That is, the Belfast Agreement depended on the commitment of 
the political parties to principles of non-violence and democratic governance. The 
Dayton-Paris Agreement signalled the end of the inter-state war, and the 
reconstruction of the country (especially the return of displaced persons to pre-war 
areas) relies on the rule of law and constitutionalism. The following section will 
examine the performance of collective decision-making institutions in the two post-
conflict contexts. 
Northern Ireland: Good News 
The Northern Ireland Act (1998) established devolved legislative and executive 
institutions which were welcomed by all of the parties in the Executive (even though 
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the DUP criticises the ‘Agreement’), although for different reasons. For Unionists, 
devolved institutions represented an opportunity for local politicians to make 
decisions about local issues while ultimate sovereignty remains in Westminster. For 
nationalists, the institutions and the all-Ireland Strand 2 provisions were a potential 
stepping-stone to a united Ireland. The Assembly and Executive also afforded a new 
arena for local policymakers to participate in ‘normal’ politics. 
 
There have been examples of cooperation within the Strand 1 structures, even across 
the Unionist-Nationalist divide. During the foot-and-mouth crisis in spring 2001, 
coordination between the devolved Ministry of Agriculture and corresponding 
statutory committee showed the possibility of ‘joined-up’ government to tackle issues 
of common concern and also illustrated the possibility of a coordinated response to 
crises.  The emergency Executive meeting on 2nd March resulted in a harmonised 
response to the problem with the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales, as 
well as the two Governments. 1  The Executive also formed an Interdepartmental 
Committee under the chairmanship of Brid Rodgers to deal with foot-and-mouth.2 
The Ulster Farmers’ Union developed a joint strategy on animal health with its 
counterpart in the South, the Irish Farmers’ Union. The SDLP minister’s active 
response resulted in praise from the predominantly Protestant Ulster Farmers’ Union.3 
Even Ian Paisley, the head of the Agriculture Committee, worked with Ms. Rodgers 
and authorities in the Republic of Ireland to regulate the movement of livestock, as 
well as asked for NI to be treated as a part of the Republic of Ireland for foot-and-
mouth purposes to enable continued exports from Northern Ireland. 
 
One of the institutional innovations of the devolved institutions is the Business 
Committee. The Standing Orders of the Assembly stipulate that the order of business 
on the floor of the legislature is determined by consensus. There is no equivalent 
provision at Westminster, though there is a Business Bureau in Scotland. The 
composition of the Business Committee is based on party strength, and decisions are 
taken by consensus. Although the four major parties are represented separately, 
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2
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3
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disputes about the order of business were resolved ‘behind closed doors’ in the 
Executive meetings and presented to the Business Committee. 4  The coordination 
between the four parties in the Executive was not tantamount to ‘cooperation’ or 
‘friendliness’. Rather, the smooth operation of the Business Committee suggested a 
‘workman-like’ perspective taken by the political parties in the Executive.5 In fact, the 
mechanism for determining the order of business may be exported to other cases of 
power-sharing in post-settlement cases. According to one official at the Business 
Committee, a delegation from Bosnia-Hercegovina visited the Assembly to ascertain 
whether the Business Committee model could be used in the post-Dayton Agreement 
institutions.6 
 
Members of the Executive maintained their professionalism in the policymaking 
process, despite the DUP policy to rotate its ministers. Although the other parties in 
the Executive could have sanctioned the DUP ministers through reduced budget 
allocations or blocking particular legislation, it appears that the Executive resisted 
doing this.7 The ‘good faith’ with which the Executive dealt with the DUP ministers is 
explained by Mark Durkan: 
 
The two non-attending ministers would send  their views in writing to the finance minister as well as 
FM/DFM. I refused to take the view shared by some ministers that they were not present at the meeting, 
so 'you should shaft them'. I could not discriminate against certain services that were in need of money 
just  because I was not in full agreement or in full cooperation with a minister.8 
 
Sean Farren, the most recent devolved Minister of Finance, also confirmed this 
pragmatic approach to the DUP policy regarding the Executive. Farren believes that 
although the non-attendance of DUP ministers in the Executive meetings affected the 
budget at the ‘margins’, the allocations for the departments did not differ greatly from 
a single-party government.9 
 
                                                 
4
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5
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7
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8
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Despite the short lifespan of the devolved institutions, the Executive drafted budgets 
and Programmes for Government, which were ratified with cross-community support. 
In accordance with Article 20 of Strand 1 of the Belfast Agreement, David Trimble 
and Seamus Mallon, acting as First and Deputy First Ministers, introduced the first 
draft Programme for Government on 24th October 2000. Trimble used the 
opportunity to say that the final version of the document would become ‘the joint 
agreed declaration of policy’ for the Executive.10 The FM added that the broad policy 
objectives would create cross-cutting responsibilities so that the Executive could form 
a ‘joined-up’ response to key policy areas.11 The importance of these documents is 
highlighted in statements by David Trimble and Seamus Mallon in October 2000 in 
support of the first draft Programme for Government.12 The draft Programme for 
Government was symbolically significant, since it represented a document, like the 
draft budget, that was agreed by all of the parties in the Executive. 
 
The level of cooperation between members of the devolved Northern Ireland 
Executive was most evident within the OFMDFM. When decisions are finally reached, 
they are a compromise and represent real cross-community consensus.13  
 
A central SDLP-UUP axis gradually developed before the suspension in 2002. It is 
upon this axis that the new ‘normal’ politics in Northern Ireland was to flourish. The 
transfers from the first Assembly election showed some evidence of the electorate 
voting along a ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ agreement dimension. That is, there were some voters 
who used lower-order preferences in the Assembly elections to vote for other pro-
agreement parties, even if these parties were from the other community.14  In the 
campaign before the 2001 local elections, Mark Durkan gave a speech to the North 
Down Ulster Unionist constituency association telling voters to think tactically and 
use lower-order preferences for other pro-Agreement parties. 
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More substantially, the difficult relationship between Trimble and Mallon described 
above was replaced by an FM-DFM team of Trimble and Durkan when the latter 
became the leader of the SDLP. Trimble and Durkan reportedly formed a harmonious 
partnership of the moderates in the Northern Irish political spectrum, forming an 
environment of what the SDLP leader calls ‘cross-community stake-holding’.15 Both 
the FM and DFM suggested that the two of them could steer devolved politics from 
‘autonomous ministerialism’ to ‘consensus’.16 The level of agreement had been quite 
unproblematic in economic issues, and the OFMDFM operated on the guiding 
principle of ‘no surprises.’17 
Northern Ireland: Bad News 
Despite the seemingly rosy relationship between the FM and DFM, the interaction 
between the FM, DFM and Junior Ministers was dominated by personality politics. 
Although Trimble and Mallon issued joint communiqués about Executive 
policymaking in Northern Ireland, relations between the two leaders were sometimes 
fraught. According to a former Trimble advisor, the relationship between the UUP 
leader and the former SDLP Deputy leader was awkward, since the two were different 
‘sorts of characters’.18 One of the junior ministers from the nationalist bloc, Denis 
Haughey (SDLP), added that the consensus within the Office depended on the 
personalities of the ministers. For him, it was easier to work with Durkan than with 
Mallon on his ‘own side of the fence’, while it was easier to work with James Leslie 
than Dermot Nesbitt as the other junior minister.19 
 
In fact, there was a general difficulty in joint decision-making in the OFMDFM. 
James Leslie (UUP) commented that it is difficult to get an agreement between the 
two ministers and their junior ministers, since the two parties that comprise the 
OFMDFM still have conflicting constitutional objectives.20 Mark Durkan did ‘not like 
how the joint office [had] worked’. In particular, he disagreed with the way that his 
unionist counterpart used the office to levy preconditions on the formation of the 
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Executive and hold other issues hostage, which diverted the focus away from the 
Executive’s primary goals.21 
 
The Executive is even less united than the OFMDFM. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
allocation of the ministerial portfolios is based on the d’Hondt formula from the seats 
in the Assembly. Thus, political parties are entitled to head ministerial departments 
based on electoral strength, not the ability to command consensus among a majority 
coalition. The Executive cannot exclude unwanted ministers or political parties 
without cross-community support in the Assembly. Political parties can only exclude 
themselves from the Executive. Another unique aspect of Northern Ireland Executive 
formation is that there is no provision for ministerial oversight by other members of 
the Executive or by the FM/DFM joint ‘head’ of the coalition. Unlike their 
counterpart in Westminster, the FM and DFM cannot reshuffle the Executive. As 
mentioned above, removing a Minister can only be done by cross-community 
consensus, and the vacant portfolio is reserved for a member from the same party as 
the outgoing minister. Thus, Executive governance is tied only to the ability of the 
political parties to secure Assembly seats and not to coordinated coalition building. 
The result is a distinct lack of  ‘collective responsibility’ in the NI Executive. 
According to Michael Laver, the Northern Ireland Executive ‘looks more like a 
holding company for a collection of ministers with different party affiliations than a 
collective decision-making body.’22 
 
The lack of a united front among the four parties in the Executive was evident from 
the beginning of devolution in Northern Ireland. The DUP attempts to exclude Sinn 
Féin were doomed to fail from the start, since the SDLP was committed to inclusion. 
Thus, both nationalist parties would vote against the measure and there would never 
be sufficient nationalist support required for cross-community consensus. The 
‘preconditions’ mentioned by Durkan above refer to the exclusion of Sinn Féin from 
the NSMC by the First Minister, since decommissioning had not commenced by the 
time the Executive was to be formed. However, Sinn Féin referred this decision to the 
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courts, and won its right to attend the NSMC meetings.23 These examples represent a 
rare situation in which members of the same ‘government’ were attempting to exclude 
their coalition partners. 
 
The DUP policy of rotating ministers as a protest against the Agreement also 
illustrates the anomaly of coalition building in the Northern Ireland Executive. The 
DUP agreed to its allocation of ministerial portfolios but refused to attend the 
Executive meetings and chose to periodically change the ministers for the two 
ministerial departments it had selected after the invocation of d’Hondt in 2000.24 The 
FM and DFM criticised the DUP, concluding that ‘political stunts cannot be allowed 
to damage public services.’25 Although the DUP had attempted to exclude Sinn Féin 
based on a clause of the Pledge of Office for a ‘commitment to non-violence and 
exclusively democratic means’, it was another part of the Pledge that formed the basis 
for DUP sanction. A DUP statement claimed that the anti-agreement Executive 
ministers were not bound by the Ministerial Code of Conduct and that the party would 
divulge the proceedings of the Executive meetings. The FM and DFM decided to 
withhold Executive Committee papers from the DUP, replace the Minister for 
Regional Development at the British-Irish Council meetings on transport, and the 
DUP ministers were excluded from the Joint Ministerial Council.26 Still, the FM and 
DFM did not hand down the maximum penalty for non-compliance to the pledge of 
Office, which would have been exclusion for 12 months under the Northern Ireland 
Act (1998).27 
 
The lack of collective responsibility is most evident in the production of the Budget 
and the Programme for Government (PfG) by the Executive. 
 
Although the draft budget was supposedly agreed by the UUP, SDLP, Sinn Féin and 
DUP, the proposals were queried by Executive parties on the floor of the Assembly. 
First, Nigel Dodds tabled an amendment to the draft document to reduce expenditure 
in the North-South bodies and Civic Forum, and to reduce the regional rate from 8% 
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(as proposed in the draft budget) to the level of inflation.28 Although the proposed 
amendments by Dodds were attacked by Francie Molloy as politicking, Sinn Féin also 
called for an amendment to the budget by lowering the regional rate from 8%. 
Curiously, the DUP and Sinn Féin, along with the Alliance Party, found themselves 
agreeing on the reduction of the regional tax rate stipulated in the draft budget.29 Thus, 
representatives of two of the parties that agreed the draft budget had tabled 
amendments.  
 
The Alliance Party also criticised the first draft PfG, since it had assumed the role of 
the Opposition in the Assembly, being neither ‘nationalist’ nor ‘unionist’.30 More 
tellingly, some of the strongest antipathy towards the draft Programme for 
Government came from the DUP, one of the four political parties of the Executive 
that supposedly agreed on the draft Programme. In a later debate, Peter Robinson, the 
Deputy Leader of the DUP, referred to the first Programme for Government as ‘90% 
packaging and 10% content’.31 Nigel Dodds, one of the members of the DUP who 
was ‘rotated’ in as a Minister, provided seemingly contradictory statements. On the 
one hand, as a representative of the largest anti-Agreement party in the province, he 
declared that the Programme ‘deals with spin rather than substance’ and used his 
comments to condemn a fellow member of the Executive that ‘hold on to terrorist 
arms and ammunition, and highlight the fragmented nature of the Northern Ireland 
Executive.’32 On the other hand, Nigel Dodds said: 
 
I congratulate the Minister for Social Development on many of the issues that have been included in 
the Programme for Government, and I look forward to the introduction of free travel on public 
transport for older people. I hope that that will be implemented as quickly as possible in keeping with 
DUP manifesto commitments.33 
 
The DUP has been a pro-devolution party. One of the seven principles upon which the 
DUP based its 2003 Assembly manifesto was a commitment to devolution.34  An 
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advisor for the DUP notes that although there were many flaws with the type of 
devolved institutions, devolution offered a system better able to respond to the needs 
of the people in Northern Ireland and better access to politicians compared to direct 
rule.35  
 
Ultimately, the Programme for Government was accepted by the Assembly by a vote 
of 47-27 with the required amount of Nationalists and Unionists for cross-community 
support. However, the DUP members (from a party in the Executive that drafted the 
‘agreed’ document) voted against it. The same pattern of the DUP being both (pro-
devolution) government and (anti-Agreement) opposition was repeated for the second 
Programme for Government and draft budget, where members of the DUP voted 
against the proposals in the Assembly.36 
 
Mark Durkan has likened the relationship with the DUP in the Executive to a 
‘correspondence course.’37  That is, it was only the tolerance of the other parties 
regarding the DUP’s absence and the latter’s willingness to conduct its ministerial 
responsibilities by ‘remote control’ that allowed devolved government to continue. 
 
During his tenure as Minister for Finance, Durkan tried to encourage more ‘collective 
responsibility’ through the development of Executive Programme Funds (EPF) to be 
disbursed for cross-departmental projects. The funds themselves were to be overseen 
by the Executive, not single Departments, and fell into five areas: Social Inclusion 
and Community Regeneration; New Directions; Infrastructure and Capital Renewal; 
Service Modernisation; and the Children’s Fund.38 
 
In the first round of the EPF funding, there was £372 million available for proposals 
that fell into the above five areas. Of the 139 bids received by the Ministry, 62 were 
accepted. However, the first tranche of EPF did not  result in ‘the degree of cross-
cutting activity, interdepartmental bid development, and programme planning that the 
Executive want to see.’39 For the second round of EPF disbursement, the Department 
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of Finance received 89 proposals of which 31 were accepted. As with the first round 
of funding, Durkan felt that ‘there may not have been as many cross-cutting proposals 
as we would have liked’. 40  Thus, the EPF were designed to promote cross-
departmental projects and ‘joined-up’ government by allocating monies within five 
areas that cut across departmental responsibilities. However, according to Durkan 
himself, the successful bids still fell short of  expectations. 
 
Far from achieving collective responsibility in the Executive, the ministerial 
departments have often been called ‘fiefdoms’ by commentators on Northern Ireland. 
Instead of looking at all of the ministerial departments, the following paragraphs will 
examine the most high-profile and highest-spending department, the Department of 
Health and Social Services (DHSSPS) under Bairbre de Brun. 
 
One problem for all of the devolved ministries was the short run-up to the 
establishment of the institutions of about one week compared to 18 months for 
Scotland. 41  Clive Gowdy comments that there was a rush when the ministerial 
departments were devolved to Northern Ireland and it ‘would have been nice to bring 
people up to speed’, since there were few staff members with experience.42 Moreover, 
there is a disproportionately smaller staff in Belfast compared to London, despite the 
fact that DHSSPS needs more personnel than any other devolved ministry.43 The 
public expenditure allocated for DHSSPS for 2002-3 was £2.5 billion, which 
represented 40% of the whole block grant for Northern Ireland.44 
 
As one of the two Sinn Féin ministers in the Executive, de Brun’s party identification 
has caused some difficulty. The First Minister attempted to exclude both de Brun and 
McGuinness from the Executive, and excluding Sinn Féin ministers from the NSMC 
for lack of progress on IRA decommissioning in 2000 (as mentioned above). Gowdy 
admits that ‘party politics’ has obstructed policymaking in Northern Ireland. For 
example, the minister’s decision for health provisions for non-UK nationals was not 
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supported by both the UUP and the DUP.45 The minister herself refused to work with 
the police, and that created difficulties in implementing a strategy to tackle illegal 
drugs. The minister’s refusal to work with either the army or the police created 
difficulties in areas such as the military hospital in Musgrave Park.46 
 
Although some of the Health Minister’s difficulties were related to her ‘republican’ 
party affiliation, her fiercest critics were SDLP ministers within the statutory 
committee for the DHSSPS. The Health Minister conducted 10 consultations and 9 
reviews by mid-2002, and her approach of consultation about consultation was called 
‘paralysis by analysis’ by some commentators.47 In January 2002, Dr. Joe Hendron 
(SDLP), then-head of the committee demanded that prompt action needed to be taken 
for primary care, cancer centre, accident and emergency provision, trauma, and acute 
care. 48  Hendron also attacked the department’s policy on the transformation of 
primary care after the end of GP fundholding. Carmel Hanna (SDLP) replaced 
Hendron as the head of the committee, and shared the view that the minister had not 
been proactive in implementing policy in health. She referred to the ministry as 
appearing ‘rudderless and out of control.’49 
 
Despite these critiques from the committee, there is no way for the statutory 
committees to affect policy directly. However, Clive Gowdy believes that the 
Executive was not a government by committee, so unchecked action by the minister is 
‘right and proper’.50 Some of these issues of legislative scrutiny have been addressed 
in more recent proposals to return the institutions from suspension. The joint British-
Irish document after the four-year review of the Agreement contains provisions for 
statutory committees questioning the corresponding ministers, and petitions from the 
Assembly for the Executive reviewing controversial ministerial decisions. Thus, it 
allows some semblance of ‘opposition’ both in the committees and Assembly while 
leaving ultimate authority with the Executive.51 
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The Assembly has also been perceived as being ineffective. Some commentators 
worry that ‘the Assembly has not ‘really connected with the people…It is still unclear 
whether the Assembly can handle [contentious issues]. There is no strong yearning to 
get devolution back among the people.’52 Alex Kane comments: ‘I don’t honestly 
believe that 99% of the people can say that it [devolution] has made a difference in 
their lives.’53 The majority of respondents  in the NILT Survey (2000) felt that there 
had been no change in education, health, transport, employment, economy and 
environment.54 
 
There are at least two reasons why the Assembly was perceived to be ineffectual. The 
first is that tax-raising powers remain exclusively with the Westminster Parliament 
(unlike the devolved legislature in Scotland), so that the Assembly can only increase 
the regional rate to generate additional revenue. The amount of public expenditure 
that is transferred from the Exchequer to the devolved administrations is determined 
by a formula known as the ‘Barnett’ formula. The formula leads to a convergence 
between expenditure in England and in the devolved UK administrations, thus leading 
to lower increases in spending for areas such as health and education compared to 
England. This results in a so-called ‘Barnett squeeze’, since the percentage increase of 
public expenditure per capita to the devolved regions is being reduced annually by the 
Exchequer.  The combination of converging public expenditure for public services 
and lack of tax-varying powers prevents devolved departments in Northern Ireland 
from proposing an innovative programme for public services. 
 
Another possible reason is that few of the local policymakers have previous 
experience in government. According to Alex Kane, many members of the Assembly 
are unqualified for law-making, since they do not have a professional background.55 
Thus, Kane believes that the bad governance has nothing to do with the institutional 
design, but lack of political experience within the Assembly. A senior official in the 
OFMDFM added that there has been a ‘steep learning curve’ since the establishment 
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of the devolved structures and that the policymaking community in Northern Ireland 
is still ‘small and fragmented’.56 
 
Irrespective of whether the lack of policy innovation is driven by fiscal ‘Barnett’ 
constraints or by policymaking inexperience, both the Northern Ireland budget and 
Programme for Government had not been innovative. Most of the legislation passed 
by the Assembly has been of a technical nature, and the possibility of the Assembly as 
a site for more creative local government to deal with more contentious issues 
remains unfulfilled. In the time the Assembly operated, there was a distinct lack of 
member’s bills or from the statutory committees, and most laws were those adapted 
from Westminster.57 
 
Most worryingly, the Belfast Agreement was designed to create a political and peace 
settlement by creating a strong, stable Centre with the SDLP and UUP, but the 
institutions seem to reward ethnic flanking by Sinn Féin and the DUP. The result was 
instability in the political structures. 
 
The electoral fortunes of the two ‘Centre’ parties placed the architecture of the 
Executive in jeopardy. This is best exemplified by the difficulties in electing Durkan 
and Trimble as FM/DFM in November 2001. On the unionist side, a steady decay in 
support for the agreement including the defection of two UUP members (Pauline 
Armitage and Peter Weir) to the anti-agreement camp left Trimble/Durkan with 28 
unionist votes and needing 30 to be elected. To ensure that the SDLP/UUP ticket 
would have enough votes, Jane Morrice (NIWC) tabled an amendment to the 
Standing Orders so that there could be immediate redesignation, not the 30 days 
required (nor the 45 proposed in a failed measure by the DUP). After the motion 
passed, one of NIWC members of the Assembly designated as a ‘unionist’ and the 
other as ‘nationalist’. This still left Durkan and Trimble one vote short, until all of the 
Alliance Party MLAs decided to redesignate as ‘unionists’. 
 
The shift away from the moderate parties in each bloc is partially an effect of the 
institutional design. All ‘cross-community’ decisions are taken without the ‘Other’ 
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bloc, so the system ‘institutionalises sectarianism’. Assembly elections have been 
virtually run as two independent intra-community polls.58 In other words, with the 
current electoral system used, it is more beneficial for Unionist and Nationalist parties 
to mobilise support within their own community instead of making conciliatory 
overtures to the other bloc. Since there are a high number (six) of Assembly members 
elected from each constituency, there is a low threshold.59 This has allowed the less 
moderate parties to outflank the SDLP and UUP, since cross-community moderation 
is not necessary to gain enough support to be elected.   Although Sean Farren feels 
that the electoral shift to Sinn Féin is not only due to the institutional design, since 
there has an independent rise of a ‘strident form of nationalism’, the electoral system 
used in the Assembly elections has allowed outflanking by Sinn Féin to some extent.60 
In fact, with little cross-community voting, cooperating with the other community in 
certain issues hurts electoral fortunes. 
 
The fate of the moderate SDLP-UUP axis is best exemplified by the changing 
fortunes of the previous leader of the UUP, David Trimble. Trimble led the largest 
party into the Assembly in 1998, and for his efforts during the multi-party 
negotiations, he won the Nobel Peace Prize with the then-SDLP leader, John Hume. 
However, constant unionist misgivings fragmented the UUP and the Ulster Unionist 
Council over contentious issues such as police reform and decommissioning. The 
intermittent suspensions of the institutions were not due to the institutional design per 
se, but rather the tensions within Unionism. Intra-party factions weakened Trimble’s 
‘elite predominance’ with frequent challenges to his leadership. Moreover, especially 
with the slow pace of republican decommissioning and other alleged activities such as 
the spy ring in Stormont, disillusioned voters migrated to the DUP. In the 2005 
general election, the DUP (the only anti-Agreement party in the Executive) became 
the largest political party in the Assembly. David  Trimble lost his seat as MP to the 
DUP candidate and resigned as UUP leader. 
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Bosnia-Hercegovina: Good News 
In the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the international community had to build a state 
from the ground-up after the war. International organisations in Bosnia-Hercegovina 
seem to have a long-term exit strategy. On the occasion of the downsizing of OHR 
staff, Paddy Ashdown said that it was ‘a tribute to the progress that BiH has made in 
recent years towards full statehood.  That has always been the OHR's mission: to put 
BiH irreversibly on the road to full statehood and Europe, and then leave. There is 
still a way to go, but increasingly it will be the EU that helps you get there.’61 
 
This ‘exit strategy’ depends on the accomplishment of the primary objectives of the 
OHR, which are ‘[t]o ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a viable, peaceful state 
on course to European Integration.’62 The four ‘core tasks’ from 2004 onwards have 
been reforming the economy; reforming the security and defence sectors for Euro-
Atlantic integration; rule of law; and the capacity of political institutions, especially at 
the State level.63 
 
The gradual development of viable state-level decision-making can be observed in the 
three-person Bosnian Presidency. According to representatives from all three offices, 
there is a culture of consensus among the members. The economic advisor for the 
Serb member finds that despite initial problems, the decision-making within the 
Presidency has been quite effective.64 An advisor for the Croat member of the added 
that the Presidency governed by ‘principles of consensus and cooperation’, so the 
Croat component of the Presidency realises that he is elected by only Croats, but must 
still work for all Bosnians. 65  Finally, the Secretary for the Bosniak part of the 
Presidency asserted that decisions are passed by consensus (or even 2 versus 1 for less 
vital issues), and there are more frequent meetings and personal contact than before.66 
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To further the political reforms, the OHR establishes commissions chaired by the 
international community, but with representation of local authorities from the Entity 
level. The ultimate objective for these reforms is to centralise the institutions at the 
state level and to hand over authority to local agencies. Such reforms have been 
pursued in areas such as indirect taxation, intelligence, defence (i.e. army), police, and 
elections. Once these commissions reach a consensus, the recommendations are 
drafted into laws for the Entity legislatures to ratify. A few of the aforementioned 
areas will be examined briefly. 
 
The High Representative issued a decision in July 2004 to establish a Police Reform 
Commission (PRC) to review and draft legislation for the Entity- and state-level 
Parliamentary Assemblies. According to the High Representative’s decision, the OHR 
would appoint the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the PRC. 67  These two 
appointees were from outside the region: the former Prime Minister of Belgium 
Wilfred Martens was selected as the Chairman and former HMIC David Blakey was 
chosen as the Deputy Chairman.68 The ten other members of the PRC were local 
Bosnian politicians and police officials from the two Entities. 69  Following the 
mandate of the High Representative, the PRC met twice in 2004 and discussed police 
reform in Bosnia-Hercegovina. According to the guidelines agreed by the members of 
the Commission, decisions would be taken by consensus. Those items of the agenda 
that achieved consensus would be included in the conclusions published by the PRC. 
70
 
 
A few days before the first PRC meeting, Bariša Čolak, the Minister for Security at 
the State level, called for the unification of policing in Bosnia-Hercegovina.71 Along 
these lines, the conclusions reached by the PRC in its second meeting declare that 
BiH is a ‘single common public security space’; the police service should be 
coordinated at the state level; there should be a state-wide communication system for 
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the police; the system of police rank and salaries should be brought together at the 
state level; and there should be a common process of training and recruitment.72 These 
principles were included in a declaration from the PRC in October 2004.73  The next 
step in police reform was to agree on the legal and political procedures for 
restructuring the police. In a series of meetings at Vlasic in April 2005, 
representatives of eleven Bosnian political parties agreed on a way to harmonise 
policing in BiH along EU principles. According to the agreement, policing would be 
controlled by a State level ministry with two representatives from the RS and three 
from FBiH. 74  Thus, although shepherded by the OHR and other international 
institutions, most of the negotiations were conducted by local politicians, and 
reaching consensus on the policing restructuring at Vlasic was not achieved throuugh 
OHR imposition, but by internal consensus among Bosnian political parties. 
 
The restructuring of the armed forces is a crucial area for reform in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Each of the constituent peoples had a corresponding army after the war: 
the predominantly Bosniak ABiH and Croat-dominated HVO in the Federation, and 
the Serb-majority VRS in Republika Srpska. However, to be in line with Euro-
Atlantic integration for security matters, it was necessary to create a more centralised 
chain of command for the armed forces. Moreover, maintaining three separate armies 
that were former adversaries would be destabilising and could undermine the 
legitimacy of the new Bosnian state. Thus, the HR enacted a decision forming the 
Defence Reform Commission (DRC) in May 2003.75 The HR appointed former US 
Assistant Secretary of Defence James Locher III as the Chairman of the Commission, 
as well as representatives from NATO, OSCE and SFOR as the international 
representatives. The Ministers for Defence and an additional appointee from each of 
the Entities comprised the Bosnian delegation.76 After some negotiations, proposals 
were drawn up to adhere to European norms of military organisation. In particular, a 
single state-wide army was placed under the command of the Bosnian Presidency 
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through the newly-created state-level Ministry of Defence. The meetings of the DRC 
were then co-chaired by the new Minister of Defence, Nikola Radmanović.77 To see 
the implementation of armed forces reform to the end, the HR extended the mandate 
of the DRC in February 2004 to ‘oversee’ the fulfilment of the criteria necessary to 
join the Partnership for Peace. 78  As with recent restructuring the police service, 
defence reform follows the formula of cooperation between representatives at the 
entity level and international agencies. 
 
Although the two examples of state-building above were helped along by a ‘joined-
up’ approach (to use a phrase from the other case study) between international 
organisations and local policymakers, the most significant state-building reforms were 
agreed by the Bosnian local political parties themselves. According to the OHR, 
Bosnian politicians agreed to meet to implement constitutional reforms without any 
international pressure. This ‘shows that BiH's politicians are assuming responsibility 
and ownership, and that they are taking their obligations toward their voters 
seriously’. 79  The landmark Constitution Court decision in 2000 upon which the 
reforms are based will be examined in the next section. The principal conclusion from 
the Court’s decision was to extend the constitutional rights of the three constituent 
peoples in Bosnia-Hercegovina over the whole territory of the state, not just the 
Entities. The meetings took place in Mrakovica at the start of 2002, and were attended 
by all of the major political parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina. After nearly 100 hours of 
negotiation over the course of a few weeks, the main political parties of the ruling 
coalition, the Alliance for Change, agreed on a set of reforms in line with the Court 
ruling on 27th March 2002.80 
 
There were three significant areas of reform agreed in the constitutional 
amendments.81 The first was that institutions needed to be identical at the entity level. 
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That is, political structures would be ‘symmetric’. Thus, an upper chamber (the 
Council of Peoples) was introduced in the RS legislature to create a bicameral 
parliament as in FBiH. The second change was the insistence of equal representation 
for the three constituent peoples. In the upper houses at the Entity level, Bosniaks, 
Croats and Serbs have five representatives each. Moreover, the Entity prime ministers, 
Prime Ministers and Speakers have Deputies such that each constituent people is 
represented. 82  The third and final principle is the minimum representation of 
constituent peoples pending the full implementation of the return of displaced persons 
(Annex 7 of the Dayton-Paris Agreement). This can be achieved in two ways. The 
first is that the composition of the Entity Council of Ministers would follow an 
explicit formula: eight from the most populous constituent people, five from the 
second most populous, and three from the smallest group. The second way was to 
determine allocation of seats based on the proportions of the three constituent peoples 
from the last census before the war. Thus, the basis of the legislation for fundamental 
constitution reform was decided by local political consensus. Other areas such as 
intelligence, defence, policing, indirect taxation and customs were agreed by using a 
cooperative commissions with international and local actors. The result has been 
significant institution building, gradually transforming Bosnia-Hercegovina into a 
‘normal’ state. 
Bosnia-Hercegovina: Bad News 
The significant constitutional reforms in the wake of the Sarajevo-Mrakovica 
Agreement originated with the case (U-5/98) brought against the Entities by Alija 
Izetbegović. He claimed that the Entity constitutions contravened Annex 4 of the 
Dayton-Paris Agreement. The preamble of the RS constitution defined the Entity as 
the territory of the Serb people. Similarly, the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina only 
referred to Bosniaks and Croats as constituent peoples. However, Annex 4 defines the 
constituent peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina as Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. 
 
The pivotal conclusion of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Hercegovina (CCBH) 
came from the third partial decision. In particular, the Court concluded that: 
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[T]he constitutional principle of collective equality of constituent peoples following from the 
designation of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs as constituent peoples prohibits any special privilege for one 
or two of these peoples, any domination in governmental structures, or any ethnic homogenisation 
through segregation based on territorial separation.83 
 
Thus, the preambles of the Entity Constitutions were at odds with the state-level 
constitution. The Court concluded that Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats should be 
explicitly mentioned as constituent peoples both in Republika Srpska and in the 
Federation of BiH. 
 
Although this was a landmark decision, the legitimacy of the findings are disputable. 
The majority decision was reached 5-4, with the three international and the two 
Bosniak judges outvoting the Croat and Serb judges. Snežana Savić, a Serb judge in 
the Court argued that the international and Bosniak justices had ‘ganged up’ on the 
judges drawn from the two other constituent peoples.84 One of the Croat judges also 
had a similar complaint about the procedures of the Constitutional Court. Zovko 
Miljko felt that the international judges along with the Bosniaks would vote against 
the Serbs and the Croats, and that being a judge on the Court was a ‘punishment’.85 
Thus, the agreement to fundamentally change the Entity constitutions was not reached 
by a collective consensual decision between the judges appointed from the two 
Entities, but rather by an international vote. 
 
The HR intervened to push the implementation of the constitutional reforms at the 
Entity level following the Constitutional Court decision.86 These Commissions had to 
be imposed, since there was no movement from the Entities themselves in the six 
months after the aforementioned partial decision by the Constitutional Court.87 
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As mentioned in the previous section, the main parties of Bosnia-Hercegovina met in 
Sarajevo and Mrakovica to hammer out the shape of the final amendments to adhere 
to the Constituent Peoples’ decision. Although the Commission itself was not 
imposed, the final agreement did not enjoy cross-community support. Of the nine 
main parties of the state, only the relatively moderate Croat NHI, moderate Bosniak 
Stranka za BiH, and the multi-ethnic SDP approved the agreement without reservation, 
while the HDZ and SDA, the largest nationalist parties for Croats and Bosniaks 
respectively, did not sign the agreement.88 The Sarajevo-Mrakovica Agreement was 
concluded during the only period when the nationalist parties were in opposition, so 
the non-compliance of the HDZ and SDA is quite significant. Moreover, the four 
parties in RS (i.e. SDS, PDP, SNSD and SPRS) only accepted the proposals with 
significant reservations regarding the provisions for issues such as proportional 
representation and protection of minority rights.89 
 
The RS National Assembly (RSNA) proposed a set of amendments to the Sarajevo-
Mrakovica Agreement that were a ‘watered down’ version of the agreed stipulations. 
The RSNA amendments omitted the direct election of Bosniak and Croat vice-
presidents, and also did not have required representation for Bosniaks and Croats.90 
The decision by the RSNA to push through amendments that diverged from the 
Agreement affected the ratification of the amendments in the Federation, with the 
opposition SDA and HDZ withholding support.91 In the end, it was again the High 
Representative that imposed the changes in the Entity constitutions in two decisions 
on 19th April 2002.92  The continued imposition of significant decisions by both 
Paddy Ashdown and his predecessor has been likened to a ‘European Raj’ by the 
Geneva-based think-tank ESI.93 That is, although the situation in BiH is unlike the 
servitude of India under the British colonial period, there is a lack of consensual 
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politics between local political parties in reforming the state. This, in turn, leads to a 
delegitimation of the existing political institutions: governors are only allowed to 
govern  if they reach a predetermined outcome demanded by an unelected foreign 
statesman. 
 
As explained in Chapter 4, the Bonn Powers not only permit the HR to impose 
legislation, but also allow the HR to remove officials from office, even if they have 
been democratically elected. Thus, the electorate of Bosnia-Hercegovina only has free 
choice insofar as it reaches the ‘right’ decision. For example, the Croat member of the 
Bosnian Presidency, Dragan Čović, was indicted in March 2005 on charges of 
abusing his political position as finance minister in collecting import duties from the 
Lijanovic meat processing company. Čović did not resign, so he was removed from 
office by the HR. By doing so, it was possible for Croatian politicians to portray the 
incident as another grievance against Croats instead of allowing the democratic 
accountability of competitive elections. 
 
Still, some local policymakers do feel optimistic about the legislative process. For 
example, the Speaker of the state-level House of Peoples believed that both houses at 
the state level were ‘well-functioning European standard institutions’ that have 
provided political solutions.94 However, his positive assessment is not shared by his 
counterpart in the House of Representatives. In the lower house, members of 
parliament are told by the OHR how to act and adopt laws as is, since they feel they 
have no power.95 
 
The lack of collective responsibility and a dearth of local consensual decision-making 
are evident in all of the major reforms that have been undertaken since the 
establishment of the post-Dayton state-level institutions. For example, the legislation 
for the national anthem, unified national identification cards, national civil service, 
and Communications Regulation Agency (CRA) were all imposed by the HR in 
addition to the creation of the aforementioned ‘reform’ commissions for unifying the 
police, military, customs and indirect taxation. 
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Instead of examining each of the above areas of reform imposed by the HR, it is more 
instructive to look at the example of the harmonisation of a state-level education, 
which highlights the challenges of reform in BiH. The subject of education and 
instruction in a particular national language has been made contentious, especially by 
nationalist leaders within the three constituent peoples. In April 2003, the Bosnian 
Council of Ministers enacted legislation to bring the education system in line with 
‘European standards’ and the Bologna criteria.96 In particular, the law provided a 
single system of diplomas and certificates throughout the country (instead of the 
Entity level), and allow students to transfer between schools in any part of the state.97 
 
The law was challenged by Croat education ministers at the cantonal level who signed 
a declaration refusing to implement the primary and secondary education reforms.98 
Although the HR continued to demand the cantonal education ministers implement 
the reforms (since the choice to implement was outside the remit of these ministers), 
he ultimately imposed the decision enacting the law on primary and secondary 
education in Canton 10 of FBiH in July 2004. The draft law on primary and secondary 
education was passed in the state-level assembly, but it was challenged by HDZ 
politicians  from the Central Bosnia canton on the basis that it infringed on the 
constitutionally-protected ‘vital national interest’. In December 2004, the 
Constitutional Court of the Federation found that the draft law did not violate ‘vital 
national interest’, so the head of the OSCE mission hoped that this would end the 
legal challenges for the implementation of the law at the cantonal level.99 Still, the 
education minister in Central Bosnia Canton, Nikola Lovrinović,  refused to 
implement the reforms for primary and secondary education. Thus, the HR removed 
Lovrinović in July 2005.100 
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Even though the courts both at the state and entity levels rejected the challenges by 
Croat politicians concerning primary and secondary education, there were similar 
problems with ratifying the law to harmonise higher education in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
The draft law on higher education was produced by the end of February 2003 through 
cooperation between local and international organisations. The Bosnian Ministry of 
Civil Affairs, along with representatives of the OHR, OSCE and Council of Europe 
put together the legislation.101 It went through a lengthy consultation process. The 
draft law was first forwarded to members of government and ‘members of the 
academic community’ for their consideration.102  The provisions of the draft were 
agreed between local and international groups in September 2003 at the Conference 
on Reform of Higher Education.103 It was submitted to the Bosnian government for 
review, accepted by the Council of Ministers in March 2004, and forwarded to the 
Parliamentary Assembly for consideration.104 
 
However, the vote on the law was stopped in May 2004 by Croat deputies, who 
invoked the clause of ‘vital national interest’. The justification by these deputies was 
that the draft legislation did not provide adequate protection for the University in 
West Mostar.105 Thus, the law was delayed and the issue of ‘vital national interest’ 
was referred to the Constitutional Court. 
 
The consequences of this delay were far-reaching and underline the lack of collective 
responsibility for state institutions. By failing to ratify the law, Bosnia-Hercegovina 
was unable to join the European Higher Education Area and lost substantial World 
Bank funding (around $12 million) to help restructure the grossly underfunded 
Bosnian education system.106 It is unclear whether the funding will be offered again. 
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Although BiH did not lose the $34 million Economic Management Structural 
Adjustment Credit (EMSAC) from the World Bank as feared by international 
organisations, the obstacles to reform still send out a negative message to 
international donors upon whom Bosnia-Hercegovina is still dependent. The 
invocation of ‘vital national interest’ to protect local political power at the cost of 
crucial education funding illustrates the lack of collective responsibility towards state 
institutions. 
 
The fundamental problem with the state-building process is that the three constituent 
peoples have different short-term aspirations for Bosnia-Hercegovina: integration, 
status quo and autonomy. 
 
First, many of the majority Bosniaks envision the trajectory of post-Dayton settlement 
as undoing the territorial fragmentation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. That is the Dayton-
Paris Agreement legitimated two state-like Entities with a high degree of parallelism. 
However, running such a complex state is expensive, and more importantly, the lack 
of a common ‘Bosnian’ identity exerts centrifugal pressures on the state’s integrity. 
The predominant Bosniak perspective believes in a ‘normal’ integrated state with the 
authority (and finances) emanating from the Centre to be distributed to the Entities. 
 
The second of Bosnia’s constituent peoples, Serbs, largely see that the arrangements 
are those that were agreed by all of the parties at the negotiating table, and so it should 
not be changed. In other words, the best framework is the status quo decided in Paris 
in 1995. This includes the de-centralisation of political authority from the state to the 
entity level. According to many Serbs (and declared by their elected officials), the 
loose association between two entities and a weak Centre was the only possibility, so 
moving away from that moves away from the Dayton-Paris Agreement. Moreover, 
the RS is the insurance policy that Serbs will not be dominated by either the majority 
Bosniaks or an alliance of the two other constituent peoples. This defensive stance on 
restructuring the state has led to Serb intransigence regarding reforms. 
 
Most worryingly, Serb politicians (through the machinery of the RS) are willing to 
agree on paper to reforms, but then renege on these agreements. For example, 
although negotiators from eleven political parties agreed on police reform on 27th 
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April 2005 at Vlasić, talks broke down three weeks later since political leaders from 
the RS did not accept the EU principles for police reform.107 The government and 
opposition in the RS united against the EU-backed reforms, citing that derogation of 
power from the entities on policing violated the terms of the Dayton-Paris 
Agreement.108 The RSNA rejected the reform package on 30th May 2005, perhaps 
under orders from Belgrade.109 In defence reform, the nominal agreements within the 
DRC to restructure the entity armed forces to a unified command structure have not 
led to real changes on the ground. In a swearing-in ceremony in Manjaca on 16 April 
2005, the new VRS recruits changed the words ‘Bosna i Hercegovina’ to ‘Republika 
Srpska’, and the national hymn of BiH was jeered while the national song of RS was 
cheered. Although most residents in RS are ‘realistic’ towards the relationship 
between the Entity and the Centre, most of those living in RS do not prefer integration 
into BiH. In fact, a poll conducted in RS in July 2003 found that a majority of 
respondents wanted to ‘re-unify’ with Serbia.110 
 
Croats comprise the third constituent people in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and are less 
populous than either Serbs or Bosniaks. Thus, many Bosnian Croat leaders push for 
greater but equal autonomy for each group. That is, there is a strong sentiment within 
the Croat community, mainly based in Western Hercegovina along the border with 
Croatia, that there should be a ‘third entity’. Serbs predominate in RS, and because of 
the numerical majority of the Bosniaks, Croats are less represented in the Federation. 
Some Croats believe that this ‘third entity’ should be in Western Hercegovina with 
Mostar as its capital to ensure equal authority for each constituent people. The two 
main constitutional crises with Croats in BiH have centred around the aspirations for a 
‘third entity’. The aforementioned Hercegovačka Banka affair (see Chapter 5) centred 
on the misappropriation of funds (with influence from Zagreb) to fund parallel 
political and military structures. 
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The HDZ (in BiH) also challenged to undo the whole Dayton framework by refusing 
to acknowledge the results of the 2000 general election after the moderate coalition, 
the Alliance for Change, was able to form a government. The HDZ refused to 
nominate representatives of the state-level House of Peoples from the cantons in 
which it commanded an absolute majority, thus impeding the post-election process.111 
On 3rd March 2001, the Croatian National Assembly (HNS), largely represented by 
nationalists part of or aligned to the HDZ, voted to set up a separate entity outside the 
Dayton arrangements if reforms were implemented.112 The HNS declared that if their 
demands were not met, the separate ‘parallel’ Croat entity would be established with 
its own government and financial institutions. The borders of the parallel entity were 
to cover the aforementioned Croat-majority cantons and coincided with the war-time 
Croat-held ‘Herceg-Bosna’. The OHR intervened quite soon after, and Ante Jelavić’s 
‘separatist’ aspirations led to his removal. Soon after, the international community 
tackled the parallel institutions through separate funding through the Hercegovačka 
Banka. 
 
Thus, in both case studies, there has been a mixed record of success in implementing 
post-settlement collective decision-making. 
 
In Northern Ireland, despite conflicting constitutional aspirations, the parties in the 
Executive worked professionally to decide the Assembly agenda, and agreed on 
budgets and collective Programmes for Government (PfG). Moreover, the operation 
of the OFMDFM led to the gradual evolution of an SDLP-UUP axis, and relations 
between the FM and DFM were quite harmonious on many issues. Despite the 
drafting of the PfG and budgets by the Executive, there had been an overall lack of 
collective responsibility in the Executive before devolution was suspended. Moreover, 
there is little scope for scrutinising ministerial decisions, either by the FM/DFM or the 
Assembly. Finally, the Assembly did not make any innovative policy, since it had 
fiscal constraints (i.e. lack of tax-varying powers and ‘Barnett squeeze’), and most of 
the policymakers have little experience in Government. Most significantly, the 
institutional design may have contributed to the electoral success of the less 
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‘moderate’ parties in each bloc, though the less moderate parties are less hard-line 
than they once were. 
 
In Bosnia-Hercegovina, there has been increased cooperation between Serbs, Croats 
and Bosniaks. The decision-making procedures in the Presidency have become more 
effective, since there is more personal contact than before between the three offices. 
Although it has been just over a decade since the end of the war, joint 
local/international commissions have agreed to reforms both in policing and the 
structure of the armed forces. Most importantly, the constitutional reform based on the 
Constituent Peoples’ decision was agreed by local parties without intervention from 
the international community. However, the Constitutional Court decision itself was 
imposed by a de facto ‘international veto’, since neither Croat nor Serb judges 
supported the decision. This  veto is most evident in the powers of the High 
Representative. After the 1997 PIC, the HR has the power to remove elected officials 
and impose legislation. This has led to a feeling of powerlessness among local 
policymakers. More fundamentally, the three constituent peoples do not have a shared 
vision of ‘Bosnia’: Bosniaks want a ‘normal’ centralised state, Croats want a ‘third 
entity’ where they are in the majority, and Serbs want no changes to the overall 
structure of the state stipulated in the Dayton Agreement. 
At Least They Stopped Shooting… 
 
Despite some of the above problems with the development of power-sharing both in 
Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina, both settlements have been largely 
successful as ceasefires. That is, the accords ‘stopped the war’ in both cases. 
 
In the case of the international military response in Bosnia-Hercegovina, this is quite 
evident. The IFOR mission under NATO quickly consolidated the end of the war with 
a deployment of 60,000 troops.113 The reduction in the everyday level of violence is 
remarkable compared to other recent international interventions in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 114  The objective of the military forces changed to a 
peacekeeping stabilisation force (SFOR) also under NATO. After nearly a decade of 
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overseeing the post-Dayton peace, the international military responsibility was 
transferred to the EUFOR in December 2004, which is significant since it is the first 
joint EU military operation. The objectives of EUFOR were similar to that of SFOR: 
patrolling the country to uphold the peace.115 
 
In the case of Sarajevo, the changes in the post-war environment are quite significant. 
According to Ashdown back in 2003: 
 
Bosnia in 2003 is almost unrecognisable as the same country that emerged from the horror of war. 
 
Come to Sarajevo today, and you will find a bustling city, with supermarkets and DIY stores. Nearly a 
million refugees have returned to their homes. Bosnia has one of the most stable currencies in the 
Balkans. Freedom of movement is now taken for granted, following the imposition by one of my 
predecessors of a car license plate system guaranteeing ethnic anonymity - a change opposed by many 
of the politicians in power at the time, but widely applauded by the public.116 
 
The ultimate goal of the Dayton Agreement is in Annex 7, which lays out the 
provisions for refugee return to reverse the forced demographic changes during the 
wars in the 1990s. According to the UNHCR mid-2000 report, return to ‘majority’ 
areas had largely been completed in time for the fifth anniversary of the Dayton-Paris 
Agreement, but the report admitted that minority return had taken longer than 
expected.117 The issue is that sustainable refugee return is connected to economic 
development. 118  Especially for those who would be minority returnees, ethnic 
cleansing led to the dominance of the majority population in political and economic 
matters. Thus, the problem is not the return of displaced persons, but ensuring that 
those who wish to resettle permanently in their pre-war area can do so. In places like 
Mostar, it is difficult to count refugee return, since some returnees stay for two to six 
months, sell their property, and then leave.119 Due to local clientelist structures, it is 
difficult for minority returnees to get jobs. Thus, in Republika Srpska, though there 
has been some minority return in Bijelina in the agricultural sector, the political 
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director at the OSCE feels that refugee return is completed ‘on paper’, but in practice 
‘it is largely not completed.’120 The focus in RS is minority return for Bosniaks, since 
many Bosnian Croats have settled in Croatia, the wealthiest state in the Western 
Balkans with a GDP per capita of $4000, nearly three times that of Bosnia-
Hercegovina. 121 
 
These problems with refugee return are evident in other parts of the state. More 
homogeneous places in Hercegovina have had success. For example, those who want 
to return to Prozorama have done so, but there are some problems with employment 
for Bosniaks.122 In Mostar, there was a demographic shift, bringing people from other 
parts of Bosnia and Eastern Hercegovina that have nothing to return to, so they have 
stayed.123 In both Mostar and Banja Luka, ‘older folks come back to die’ in their place 
of origin.124 However, of the 1.1 million IDPs and 1.2 million refugees resulting from 
the conflict, the UNHCR announced in September 2004 that the one-millionth 
displaced Bosnian had returned ‘home’.125 Moreover, according to UNHCR figures, 
nearly half of the returnees since 1996 (446,795) are minority returns, including about 
two-thirds of the returns for the first half of 2004.126 Although the idea of reversing 
the demographic changes from the war is a noble one, the Deputy HR (Banja Luka) 
suggests that return is not the issue, but rather the resolution of property claims. In 
that area, implementation has been a qualified success.127 There is ‘nothing going on’ 
in the villages, so it is difficult to motivate return; there is no industry in Bosnia, so 
people have left.128 Minority returnees that want to settle in their pre-war homes (or 
pre-war regions) are vulnerable to intimidation and violence from the majority 
community. For example, there have been cases near Janja (in RS) where the local 
authorties have withheld electricity, water and sewage services from minority 
returnees.129 Although the amount of violence has subsided, there are still cases of 
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physical assaults, property damage, attacks on national monuments, and assaults 
committed against local returning minorities.130 
 
Although the war is over, the effects of corruption continue to affect the 
implementation of the Dayton-Paris Agreement. Both local and international 
authorities have turned their attention from peace-building to preventing organised 
crime and other illegal activities. There has been an increase in violence related to 
organised crime in places like Mostar over the past few years, so the international 
community is doing more to stop racketeering and trafficking. However, the 
international community is willing to look the other way as long as the perpetrators 
just kill each other.131 
 
The end of the war gave those who profited from the conflicts a chance to transform 
their fortune into a legitimate one. Those who constituted the political and economic 
entrepreneurs during the war continue to have influence today. According to the 
director of ICG in Sarajevo, the connection with business interests is most important, 
and how those who benefited from the conflict are now ‘men of peace’.132 The editor 
of Nezavisne Novine, Dragan Jerinić, says that Mladen Ivanić is a ‘criminal’ and that 
the Minister of the RS is on an EC blacklist.133 
 
A fundamental problem for both Wheeler and Jerinić is that Bosnia-Hercegovina is 
governed by ‘parallel structures’ that traverse the legal and illegal. According to the 
latter: 
 
Bosnia-Hercegovina does not have real institutions. The presidency and council of Ministers are 
fictional institutions. The real centre is in Izetbegović’s house. The RS – somewhere in the forest, 
though it has some powers now. The HDZ is somewhere in Široki Brijeg. The Bosnian institutions are 
somewhere on paper.134 
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In other words, the real locus of power in BiH is not the Annex 4 institutions, but 
rather extra-legal ‘fiefdoms’ controlled by local Croat, Serb and Bosnian elites, many 
of who have criminal ties. The international ‘blacklisting’ of Bosnian politicians 
confirms this. Hasan Ćengić appeared on a US blacklist and had been dismissed from 
the Defence Ministry for arms deals with Iran.135 The speaker of the RS National 
Assembly, Dragan Kalinić, was removed by the HR since it was unclear whether SDS 
links had been severed with Radovan Karadžić.136  For Borislav Paravac, the Serb 
member of the Bosnian presidency, there are questions about wartime activities in 
Doboj: 
 
The first complication in the case arose when the public began demanding why the former president of 
the Bosnian Serb crisis staff headquarters in Doboj was not being investigated. It was a serious 
question, because the man who held that position - Borislav Paravac - is the Serb member of Bosnia-
Herzegovina's tripartite presidency…Many Bosnians - particularly those who had been expelled from 
the area - claimed that the crisis staff headquarters in Doboj helped carry out the ethnic cleansing of the 
town.137 
 
An opposition politician in Banja Luka adds that parties such as Paravac’s SDS do not 
work for reform, since it is easier to just stoke nationalist feelings. The three 
nationalist parties use the system to keep control of their own media, police and 
army.138 Although a representative from the OSCE in Banja Luka suggested that some 
of the critique from opposition parties is from ‘sore losers’, he admitted that the 
Agreement rewarded the results of the war. Money from the Office of Refugees has 
been used to build housing at the edge of Banja Luka to consolidate the demographic 
changes during the war, though the international community has been a bit better at 
fighting clientelism since 2001.139 
 
Many high-level Bosnian Croat politicians have also been linked to illegal activities, 
most notably the aforementioned Hercegovačka Banka affair. Dragan Čović, a recent 
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member of the Bosnian presidency, was the Federation finance minister at the time 
and authorised funds from Zagreb to be transferred to the bank. Another former 
member of the presidency, Ante Jelavić, faced charges for the Hercegovačka  Banka 
affair and trying to set up a third Croat entity. He is now banned from public office 
and on the US blacklist. As mentioned above, Čović was banned from office on 2005 
for his part in another financial scandal. 
  
In the case of Northern Ireland, political violence claimed over 3000 lives over thirty 
years in a province with a population of 1.5 million. However, a decade after the 
Enniskillen bombings, the most visible markers of the conflict have vanished: security 
checkpoints on the way to Castlecourt Shopping Centre, armed foot patrols of the 
British Army and repeated bombing of the Europa Hotel. There is some evidence of a 
‘peace dividend’ in Northern Ireland. According to the Equality Unit, since 
devolution, the socio-economic indicators are ‘going in the right direction’ and ‘lots 
of gaps have narrowed’ between the communities, such as level of income, education 
and access to housing.140 
 
Improving the security situation in Northern Ireland is the primary motivation for 
unionist endorsement for the agreement in the 1998 referendum. It was republican 
violence with ‘protestant’ victims that account for a majority of the casualties between 
1969 and 1994. 141  Unsurprisingly, again assuming ‘protestant’ as a proxy for 
‘unionist’ for the NILT (1999) data, 94% felt that full or some decommissioning was 
a precondition for entering the Executive, compared to only 74% of ‘catholics’, 
though decommissioning is not an explicit precondition in the Agreement.142 The 
significance of decommissioning for unionist support in the 1998 referendum has 
been confirmed in another study.143 It was the ‘five pledges’ given by Tony Blair 
saying that the ‘writing was on the wall’ ending paramilitary violence that resulted in 
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the slim unionist majority support in the referendum. 144  The evidence for initial 
unionist/protestant optimism can be confirmed from the Northern Ireland Referendum 
and Election Study. Of the protestant respondents who voted ‘yes’ in the referendum, 
84% believed that the Agreement would ‘lead to a lasting peace in Northern 
Ireland’.145 However, decay in unionist support for the Agreement is tied to lack of 
satisfaction with the post-settlement security situation. Among protestants who would 
withdraw their support for the Agreement if the referendum were  re-run in 2000, both 
lack of de-commissioning (78%) and continued level of violence (65%) were cited as 
significant reasons for a ‘change of heart’.146 
 
More recent evidence of republican activities have continued to erode unionist 
support for the Agreement. The previous crisis that led to the October 2002 Assembly 
suspension focused on an alleged republican spy ring at Stormont, the training of 
FARC rebels in Colombia by members of the IRA, and IRA gun-running in Florida. 
More importantly, even though the PIRA (whose political arm is Sinn Féin) has not 
carried out any bombings or killings since the restoration of the ceasefire, the threat of 
republican violence remained until July 2005. In deciding to let Sinn Féin back into 
the multi-party talks after it had been excluded for violating the Mitchell Principles, 
Mo Mowlam said that ‘the peace we have is now imperfect, but it is better than none,’ 
despite IRA involvement in another murder and arms smuggling.147  This ‘acceptable 
level of violence’ has led to a significant decrease in shootings since the Agreement, 
but a marked increase in other forms of community policing, such as beatings, 
maimings and exilings.148 
 
The type of community policing that is perhaps most underreported is ‘exiling’, when 
persons deemed ‘anti-social’ by local paramilitary ‘law enforcement’ are threatened to 
leave the area or face physical harm or death. However, these practices were brought 
to light when thirteen teenagers in the Ardoyne committed suicide separately in the 
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first few months of 2004. It has been revealed that many had been subject to threats 
and punishment beatings by dissident republicans.149 In an article of The Times, Sean 
O’Callaghan, characterised the attitude of the NIO as: ‘while terrorism is confined to 
the ghettoes, why worry?’150 
 
The concern about continued paramilitary violence persists among unionists. Graham 
Gudgin feels that the IRA has a deal to not shoot security personnel, but community 
policing is seen as ‘alright’ by the governments.151 Anti-Agreement unionists claim 
the ‘appeasement’ by the British Government is to stop violence in London (i.e. not 
Belfast), and that there is an economic rationale for the ‘deals’ with paramilitary 
groups and their political arms.152 Even the Alliance party sees the Agreement as 
‘crisis management’, and does not offer a long-term solution, leaving problems to be 
addressed by local politicians.153 The disillusionment regarding the ‘peace dividend’ 
is also echoed by public opinion in both communities. According to the NILT survey 
in 2001, 57% of the protestants and 46% of the catholics believed that the level of 
violence in Northern Ireland would stay the same, irrespective of the Agreement.154 
For the NI Referendum and Election Survey, 60% of the catholic respondents and 
75% of the protestants believed that the level of violence would stay the same or 
increase if the Agreement stays in place.155 
 
According to David Ervine, the only way to reverse the overall pessimism is: 
 
The republicans have a commitment to tell us the war is over…There is no question that loyalists make 
contributions [to the violence]. The largest and most valuable key is the belief that the war is over. If 
the war is over, what is wrong with saying so? If the war is not, saying so is dishonourable. [This is the 
key] to unlock all other locks.156  
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Events in July 2005 seem to show remarkable progress in this ‘key’ area with the IRA 
announcement that its armed campaign was over. The IICD verified that the IRA 
arsenal had been put beyond use, which was confirmed by two independent 
witnesses.157 According to the British Government, the IMC will publish two reports 
investigating whether the IRA has adhered to its commitments from July.158    
Evaluating Power-Sharing 
 
There are criteria by which it is possible to judge whether one of the cases has better 
prospects for a stable consociational settlement. 
 
To differentiate between post-conflict power-sharing in the two cases, the criteria 
developed by Ulrich Schneckener will be used.159 Schneckener posits that there are 
eleven conditions that are split into ‘actor-oriented’ and ‘structure-oriented’ items. 
The ‘structure-oriented’ include: relative equilibrium, no significant socio-economic 
differences, territorial segmentation, overarching loyalty, cross-cutting cleavages, and 
moderate pluralism.160 The ‘actor-oriented’ criteria include dominant elites, respecting 
the status quo, traditions of compromise, comprehensive participation, and internal 
compromise.161 If more of the eleven criteria that are fulfilled, it is more likely that a 
long-term stable solution can be achieved. According to Schneckener’s analysis, it is 
the actor-oriented criteria that define whether or not a consociational system will be 
durable. He bases this hypothesis on the relative ‘success’ of South Tyrol and 
Belgium, and the differences between the Sunningdale Agreement and the Belfast 
Agreement.162 
 
Thus, by investigating certain ‘actor-oriented’ criteria in Northern Ireland and in BiH, 
it is possible to hypothesise the relative chances for durable power-sharing. In 
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particular, there are significant differences between Northern Ireland and Bosnia-
Hercegovina regarding dominant elites, comprehensive participation and internal 
compromise. 
 
Both in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Northern Ireland, political processes are largely 
controlled by politicians and other elites. However, the difference lies in the amount 
elites can cooperate with the ‘other’ side without losing support. The move away from 
the SDS in Republika Srpska can be partially correlated with voters trusting the other 
parties (i.e. SNSD) to ‘protect’ Serb interests in Bosnia-Hercegovina. When 
politicians are constrained by national politics, it is hard to make moderating gestures. 
The political director of the OSCE in Banja Luka comments that the ‘political 
spectrum [in RS] is quite thin…Even the more moderate element [SNSD Leader 
Milorad] Dodik sometimes says inflammatory nationalist things. All these parties can 
be termed nationalist.’163 By contrast, the DUP, the largest ‘anti-Agreement’ party 
(despite its occasional rhetoric and posture) has made overtures suggesting that their 
position is not far from the UUP position a few years ago.164 The ‘seven principles’ 
from the last election affirmed that the DUP supported devolution. Moreover, political 
advisors within the party believe ‘that Strand 2 is clearly necessary, but needs to be 
accountable to Northern Ireland.’165 Despite a relatively more moderate position, both 
the DUP and Sinn Féin have retained support. 
 
The reason for the DUP to apparently moderate is that the dominant strategy by 
Dublin and London regarding Northern Ireland has been one of ‘inclusion’. Although 
this has primarily meant the addition of the political arm of paramilitary organisations 
(that adhere to the Mitchell Principles), this also meant that there were provisions for 
parties in the Unionist community that were against the Agreement. However, instead 
of staying at the table, Paisley’s DUP and Robert McCartney’s UKUP left the multi-
party talks in 1997. However, by leaving the negotiations, they were unable to voice 
their concerns about the institutions. According to one unionist commentator, the only 
mistake by the DUP and UKUP was that they should have remained at the multi-party 
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talks.166 Thus, Kerr argues, ‘the parts of the agreement that offended anti-agreement 
Unionists in the DUP and UUP might not have been so offensive had they remained 
united and doubled their negotiating potential.’167 
 
The acceptance of the Belfast Agreement through referenda both in Northern Ireland 
and in the Republic of Ireland demonstrates the comprehensive participation 
enshrined in the document. Although support for the Agreement has eroded in both 
‘communities’ and more markedly among unionists, a majority of both Nationalists 
and Unionists did endorse the document in 1998.168 By contrast, there was no widely 
accepted exercise of popular affirmation of the terms of the Dayton-Paris Agreement. 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the signatories of the Dayton-Paris Agreement were the 
two reference states, the Bosniak President of Bosnia, and witnessed by the western 
powers. In contrast to the principle of ‘inclusion’ at the heart of the Belfast 
Agreement, there were many elements missing from the peace negotiations at the end 
of the Bosnian War. First, there were no direct representatives of either Bosnian 
Croats or Bosnian Serbs, primary combatants in the Bosnian conflict. Moreover, non-
nationalist and parties not aligned with the nationalist forces were not at the 
negotiations. 
 
Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Hercegovina also differ in the level of comprehensive 
participation by local parties. In the case of Northern Ireland, the two sovereign 
governments have been the ‘ringmasters’; this is not to say that the parties in Northern 
Ireland did not have any input. According to Robin Wilson, the Agreement was drawn 
up by the two governments, but ‘tweaked’ by the parties.169 The principle upon which 
the Agreement was concluded relates intergovernmentalism and internal consociation. 
The joint declarations by the two governments reiterated the principle of consent, 
meaning that a settlement would be one that commanded support from a majority of 
each community. On the other hand, these dynamics are absent from the case of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina. The driving force of the Dayton settlement was military 
pressure by NATO. The Bosnian constitution was written by the US Department of 
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State and imposed on the Bosnian population. In BiH, there was no negotiation of the 
final compromise like the talks chaired by George Mitchell in Northern Ireland. The 
Constitutional Court and the OHR are the sites for political reforms in BiH, not local 
actors. It is possible for the three international judges of the Constitutional Court to 
side with one of the constituent peoples and pass a decision. Thus, the appointments 
by the European Court of Human Rights play a pivotal role in the Constitutional 
Court, and judicial matters are not the internal compromise of the judges from the 
three constituent peoples. 
 
The High Representative’s extensive powers impede internal compromise in BiH. The 
current High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, challenges these claims, and replies: 
 
[M]y office is increasingly using its powers under Dayton not to impose legislation, but to help the 
local authorities reach agreement. For instance, we have established policy commissions, made up 
almost entirely of local politicians and experts, to reform Bosnia's fragmented tax system, military 
structures and intelligence sector. 
  
The legislation drafted in these commissions - stamped "Made In Bosnia" - has already started to go 
through Bosnia's parliaments. By contrast, the number of pieces of legislation that have been imposed, 
and the number of officials removed from office, far from increasing exponentially, have in fact 
dropped significantly in recent months, a downward trend I am determined should continue.170 
  
By examining the extension of the powers of the High Representative agreed by the 
Bonn meeting of the Peace Implementation council, the dearth of internal bargaining 
is highlighted by Ashdown’s own words: 
 
It is true that the High Representative in Bosnia has the power to impose or revoke laws and to remove 
obstructionist politicians. But it is not true that he is not accountable for this. The High Representative's 
authority comes from the Peace Implementation Council - made up of the 50 countries responsible for 
overseeing the Dayton Peace Agreement, including Bosnia itself.  
 
His decisions are subject to international oversight, and to the scrutiny of the country's constitutional 
court and, ultimately, Bosnia being a member of the Council of Europe, of the European Court of 
Human Rights itself.171 
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In other words, the main veto player in the institutional design of the Dayton 
Agreement is an unelected High Representative, whose most important decisions are 
not accountable in the first instance to the Bosnian legislatures or executive, but rather 
to the 55 delegations and agencies from outside the region. In 2002, the High 
Representative reformed the structure to ‘streamline’ the decision-making process, 
creating a Board of Principals for the International Community. This Body consists of 
‘OHR, SFOR, OSCE, UNHCR, EUPM and the European Commission. International 
financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UNDP are also regular 
participants at the Board of Principals.’172 Again, there are no ‘local’ voices for the 
weekly meetings in Sarajevo. The powers of both the Constitutional Court and the 
OHR (after the 1997 PIC) underline the fact that there is little room for 
comprehensive, local discussions to consolidate the Bosnian political system. 
 
Drawing on Schneckener’s ‘actor-oriented’ criteria, the above section highlighted 
differences in the ‘internal consociation’ in the two case studies. Thus, instead of 
building institutions from the outside in, the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina is one in 
which the agreement was not reached with comprehensive participation from both the 
reference states and local parties, and the veto exercised by judges from outside the 
region and the HR undermine the prospects for internal compromise. Moreover, a 
lack of a clear bilateral strategy from reference states pushing their co-nationals 
towards Sarajevo has ensured that local elites must play ‘the nationalist card’to retain 
power. Even though the GFA institutions have been in suspension since October 2002, 
the situation is more encouraging in Northern Ireland. The Agreement is founded on 
the joint bilateral commitment to the principle of consent. This ensures that neither 
side ‘loses’, so the system established, with the input from the local parties, upholds 
internal compromise. Finally, the ability for ‘anti-agreement’ parties to move towards 
internal conciliation whilst bringing along their electorate suggests that elites, though 
not immune from ethnic flanking, do exhibit structured elite predominance.173 Thus, 
using the actor-oriented criteria, this suggests that the prospects for eventual durable 
internal consociation are more favourable in Northern Ireland than in Bosnia. 
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A table summarising the evaluation of the actor-oriented criteria is below: 
 
 Comprehensive 
Participation 
Internal Compromise Elite Dominance 
Northern 
Ireland 
Yes: Multi-party talks 
leading to Belfast 
Agreement; approval 
through referenda 
Yes: power-sharing system 
based on internal consensus 
between Nationalists and 
Unionists  
Yes: more extreme 
parties have moderated 
(e.g. DUP) and are still 
electorally successful 
Bosnia-
Hercegovina 
No: Bosnian Croats and 
Bosnian Serbs did not 
participate in the Dayton-
Paris talks   
No: legal and judicial 
decisions frequently 
imposed by High 
Representative 
No: Elites susceptible to 
intra-ethnic flanking, 
especially in the RS 
 
 
Concluding Remarks: Any Hope? 
 
Thus, despite the difficulties with post-settlement institutions in both cases, the 
‘internal consociation’ in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina can be 
differentiated qualitatively. 
 
The stop-start institutions in Northern Ireland imply a lack of a durable ‘settlement’, 
but the previous sections take ‘settlement’ to mean internal, inclusive, local agreement. 
It is in this way that the context of Northern Ireland is one in which there will be an 
eventual ‘settlement’. It is true that George Mitchell and the US Government played 
an undeniable role in the conclusion of the Belfast Agreement. However, the 
responsible agents for returning the institutions from suspension are the two 
governments, Sinn Féin and the DUP. Because of the durable links shown in Chapter 
5, both Dublin and London will remain as guarantors to the Agreement. More 
importantly, there are certain political outcomes that are highly unlikely due to the 
encouragement by the coordinated policies from the reference states. The first is that 
the IRA returns to its previous level of violence in Northern Ireland and Britain. As 
mentioned above, the IRA declared an end to their armed campaign in July 2005 and 
have put their arsenal ‘beyond use’. Secondly, the anti-Agreement DUP and UKUP 
lost out by excluding themselves from the multi-party talks in 1997, and though most 
unionists are now against the Agreement, opinion polls show that there is still a large 
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consensus in both communities for devolution.174 Thus, for both the DUP and Sinn 
Féin, a return to their previous ‘less conciliatory’ position would be politically more 
costly than to continue negotiations. In other words, both of the ‘extreme’ parties in 
Northern Ireland are accommodated within the institutions, and this moderation may 
account for their electoral successes. 175  
 
Despite some pessimistic accounts from both republican and unionist commentators, 
it is likely that there will be an eventual settlement that enjoys support from both 
communities, and does not depend on the political will of external donors. The locus 
of legislative, executive and judicial politics has moved from Britain to Northern 
Ireland. According to an official in the NIO, all of the ‘sexy’ political offices are now 
in Belfast, not in London.176 Issues such as the foot-and-mouth crisis were handled in 
the devolved agriculture department with cooperation of Brid Rodgers (SDLP) and 
the committee headed by Ian Paisley (DUP). The strategy to tackle foot-and-mouth 
was executed without imposition from outside actors, not even the two governments. 
Even after the lengthy suspension, there is still no popular support for ‘abandoning the 
Agreement’, and there is cross-community support for power-sharing.  Thus, it is 
claimed that (though the institutions remain suspended as of November 2005), there 
will eventually be a self-sustaining transnational consociation involving local 
political parties and their reference states. 
 
The situation is different in Bosnia. For Graham Day, the Deputy HR in Banja Luka, 
Richard Holbrooke’s To End a War describes the problems in a nutshell. In the book, 
Bill Clinton asks his advisors how much it would take to ‘fix Bosnia’, and some of 
them said upwards of one billion dollars. One of the advisors reminded the President 
of political concessions in Congress for an extra ten million dollars for Ecuador, so 
asked how much the President would be willing to give up for one billion dollars in 
Bosnia. It was then that the decision was made to not fund any more than the existing 
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package.177 The above shows the inherent commitment problem with donor-driven 
democratisation, particularly in the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
 
It is perhaps for domestic considerations and the need for positive progress reports in 
donor states that Bosnian elections were held in 1996, soon after the end of the war. 
According to political advisors in the OSCE, the international organisation 
responsible for administering the first elections in BiH, the elections preceded refugee 
return since it was necessary to consolidate the rule of law through democratic 
elections. 178  However, senior OHR officials highlight the other political factors. 
Graham Day believes that running the elections in 1996 was a mistake, but was 
pushed by the US to coincide with the American presidential election, since the US 
had promised their voters ‘one year and out’ to fix Bosnia.179 Julien Berthoud does 
not know why the elections were held early, but believes it was probably a ‘political 
decision’ since the international community (IC) only had a 1-2 year plan in Bosnia-
Hercegovina.180 Early elections arguably legitimated the population displacement and 
the nationalist political parties in each of the three constituent peoples, but the IC did 
not and do not have the political will to implement refugee return before elections.181  
 
Graham Day also points out that the international community can eradicate the 
‘revenue streams’ of criminal elements, but adds: 
 
Why are the revenue streams not being controlled? …The problem is that many of the Europeans do 
not want to impose on the locals, and have a less committed style of ‘soft power’… However, the 
international community needs to get a hold of revenue streams. In Iraq, they have spent millions of 
dollars… [They] can spend a lot less to grab revenue streams here [Bosnia], but do not have the 
commitment to grab the thistle.182 
 
The peacekeeping in Bosnia-Hercegovina is done with military objectives and not to 
develop local structures. Although the size of the force is greatly reduced from 1995, 
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the handover from NATO to EUFOR confirmed that Bosnia, though ‘peaceful’, is 
unable to survive without a force of 7000 peacekeepers from 30 other countries.183 
 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the Constitutional Court has three of the nine judges 
appointed externally, and that they could have a pivotal role. In fact, this is precisely 
what happened in the ruling on the vital decision on Constituent Peoples upon which 
the large-scale constitutional reform in 2002. The international judges and the 
Bosniak judges found in favour of the claimant (Izetbegović, a Bosniak), while the 
Croat and Serb judges offered dissenting opinions. 184 
 
The powers given by the Bonn PIC also erode local governance. Lord Ashdown 
dismissed over 60 officials from Republika Srpska in July 2004, mainly members of 
the SDS, for not handing over war crime suspects to the ICTY. These dismissals were 
due to the failure of Bosnia-Hercegovina’s application to the PfP, which was also 
linked to cooperation with the war-crimes tribunal at the Hague. However, these 
actions would not precipitate more internal participation from Bosnian Serbs. 
According to one report, Dragan Čavić responded to the sackings by saying, ‘The 
people who devised this draconian punishment should know they will not achieve 
stability and prosperity.’185 Earlier comments by Sulejman Tihić suggest that local 
politicians believe that the HR interferes excessively with the operation of the 
institutions, and Dragan Mikerević believes that the intervention by OHR reduces the 
desire for politicians to reach solutions between themselves.186    
 
Thus, the imposition of political decisions by Paddy Ashdown has actually prevented 
internal compromise. In Ashdown’s own words, ‘the strongest check and balance of 
all is the people of Bosnia, on whose consent international authority ultimately 
depends. Opinion polls consistently show that Bosnians fully support these powers 
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and think they are used, not too much, but if anything too little.’ 187  Thus, the 
‘international protectorate’ headed by the OHR has resulted in a situation where 
people in BiH do not expect the locus of power to rest with their current elected 
officials, but rather the unelected HR. 
 
Despite the remarkable changes there since the end of 1995, BiH is still unable to ‘go 
it alone’ in four key areas. First, the continued military presence of EUFOR suggests 
that Bosnia-Hercegovina is incapable of handling the security situation. Second, the 
unaccountable role of the High Representative in dismissing officials and blocking 
laws pulls much of the legislative locus away from local policymakers. Third, 
international judges on the Constitutional Court have an effective veto in the judicial 
process as long as one of the constituent peoples concurs with their stance. Finally, 
the performance of the institutions are donor-driven, so that constraints in donor 
countries, not local needs, drive reform. If the level of funding by donors were to be 
reduced, the state would not be viable. Thus, self-enforcing durable settlement cannot 
be achieved in post-Dayton Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
 
In sum, the stability criteria of transnational consociation are present in Northern 
Ireland and largely absent in Bosnia-Hercegovina. There are significant links between 
reference states and respective conflict groups in the two cases. However, there is a 
significant cooperative intergovernmentalism and policy continuity along a Dublin-
London axis regarding Northern Ireland that is absent for the Zagreb-Belgrade axis 
concerning BiH. In both cases, the implementation of post-settlement between 
conflict groups has been mixed. There have been successes in collective decision-
making and the cessation of violence. However, there are still many shortcomings of 
the institutional development in Northern Ireland and in BiH. Nonetheless, using the 
‘actor-oriented’ criteria developed by Schneckener, it is possible to differentiate 
power-sharing in the two cases. Although the institutions are in suspension, the 
political process in Northern Ireland is underpinned by mechanisms for 
comprehensive participation, internal compromise and top-down elite dominance. By 
contrast, there is no transnational consociation in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Rather, the 
institutions in BiH are held together by external imposition through the OHR and 
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other institutions such as the Constututional Court. None of the substantive reforms 
(especially in the security sector) have been reached by local consensus, and many of 
the parties were not a part of the negotiations that resulted in the DPA. Thus, despite 
the current bleak prospects, the strong, continuous intergovernmentalism in Northern 
Ireland may allow a durable transnational consociation to emerge. 
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Chapter VIII: Summary and Further Research 
Recap 
 
The previous chapters connected existing empirical and theoretical work to develop 
the notion of transnational consociation for conflicts in which at least two groups have 
‘reference states’. 
 
In the second chapter, the concept of transnational consociation is situated within the 
wider literature on nationalism, comparative politics, and geography/international law. 
It is posited that neither a ‘pure’ form of primordialism nor any other approach in the 
nationalism literature explains both the persistence of certain ‘national’ boundaries 
but also that the time-varying salience of these boundaries. Authors such as McKay 
and Brubaker suggest that the approaches can be combined. Thus, it is possible to 
explain how peace agreements are reached at certain times and not in others, yet the 
main dividing lines between ‘nations’ are persistent. For example, although the 
political and historical terrain prevented an inclusive, durable settlement for Northern 
Ireland in 1973, it was possible in 1998, yet the main conflict groups in both cases 
remained ‘nationalists’ and ‘unionists’. 
 
The thesis then developed a theoretical framework to examine the role of reference 
states in conflict regulation. A simple informal model was chosen as the starting point. 
Assuming the rationality of the two reference states and the initial conditions 
mentioned in Chapter 1, it is possible to deduce how transnational consociation may 
result. In the model, the possible strategies for the reference states are to escalate the 
conflict with the other reference state, remain at the same level of conflict, cooperate, 
or disengage from the conflict. Since a consistent commitment is one of the initial 
conditions, it is costly for either reference state to leave. From this, conditions were 
derived in which not changing policy towards the conflict yields a higher payoff in the 
long-term, and if the reference states are using a ‘trigger strategy’, conditions in 
which cooperation are preferable to staying at the current level of conflict can also be 
deduced. The use of the trigger strategy is different from the usual treatment in the 
literature. Instead of ‘triggering’ defection, the conditions for ‘triggering’ cooperation 
SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 256 
are used. This is similar to the approach used Robert Axelrod, who showed that 
‘conditional cooperation’ is an equilibrium of the iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma.1 Once 
there is intergovernmental cooperation concerning policy over the disputed territory, 
the two states conclude an inclusive settlement in which neither side can win or lose, 
since the two states cooperate despite having incompatible constitutional goals over 
the conflict area. However, if the above framework is generalised so that there are 
more and less conciliatory governments in each, it was shown that policies must 
remain consistent irrespective of the government of the day. Thus, the four features of 
transnational consociation are: 
 
1) Intergovernmental reference state cooperation 
2) Internal consociation 
3) Policy continuity across changes in government (i.e. bipartisanship) 
4) Significant reference state/co-national links 
 
Before the empirical illustration of transnational consociation, detailed examinations 
were provide of the internal, reference state/co-national, and intergovernmental 
reference state features of the institutional architectures of the agreements. In addition 
to the detailed account of the institutions, the consociational nature of the internal 
structures were compared to Lijphart’s four criteria: grand coalition, proportionality, 
mutual veto and segmental autonomy. 
 
By examining constitutional provisions in the reference state constitutions, the 
institutions stipulated in the two agreements, policymaker statements, and illicit 
connections, significant links between Belgrade and Bosnian Serbs, Zagreb and 
Bosnian Croats, Dublin and Nationalists, and London and Unionists were revealed. 
Reference states can influence the political situation in the conflict zone through these 
links. 
 
In Westminster, there has been a policy, at least since 1993, that both Labour and the 
Conservatives not openly oppose the overall government policy on Northern Ireland. 
There have been occasional disagreements over specific issues over the last ten years, 
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such as the current British Government’s agreement with Sinn Féin regarding 
amnesty for on-the-run paramilitary suspects. There have also been disagreements 
over police reform and whether Sinn Féin should be excluded from the formation of 
the Executive. Although there are differences in ‘tone’, the Conservatives, Liberal 
Democrats and Labour confirmed that they all support the principles of consent and 
stability enshrined in the Belfast Agreement. There is a similar state of affairs in Dáil 
Éireann. Although there have been some disagreements in the chamber, this is only 
scrutiny of government policy. Fine Gael, Labour, and Fianna Fáil all have 
fundamentally the same policy regarding Northern Ireland. 
 
The ‘bipartisanship’ within reference states is less evident in the other case study. The 
former ‘nationalist’ HDZ regime was voted out of office in Zagreb soon after the 
death of Franjo Tuñman, the founder and leader of the party. The ‘centre-left’ 
coalition and international observers feared that a return to HDZ rule in 2003 would 
result in a reverse of the advances towards ‘Euro-Atlantic integration’. However, the 
HDZ party split, and the leadership was controlled by Ivo Sanader, a younger, more 
‘outward-looking’ leader than his predecessors. Sanader has made pronouncements 
about cooperation with the ICTY and symbolic gestures to the Serb minority in 
Croatia. Thus, the policy of ‘Euro-Atlantic integration’ remains largely unchanged 
after HDZ formed a government following the 2003 elections. Croatia officially 
opened negotiations for EU accession in June 2004, after the HDZ had won the 
elections.  However, the HDZ still maintained some of its nationalist rhetoric in 
traditional HDZ strongholds such as Dalmatia. In Serbia, there is a wide gap between 
the liberal ‘centre-right’ coalition, and SRS and nationalist wings of the SPS. The 
SRS is led by Vojislav Šešelj, who has been indicted by the war crimes tribunal at the 
Hague. Although the party now claims that it will achieve its territorial claims through 
diplomacy, not force, hard-line elements remain. The acting leader of the party, 
Tomislav Nikolić, has said that he would sever relations with Europe. He won a 
plurality of the first round of the last presidential elections, and his party became the 
largest party in the Serbian parliament. Although SRS is unlikely to win power in 
parliament (due to a lack of willing coalition partners), it is unclear how much 
Serbia’s regional policy would change if SRS either won the presidency or more seats 
in parliament. 
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Finding: there is ‘bipartisan’ policy continuity in both reference states for Northern 
Ireland. For Bosnia-Hercegovina, Zagreb does have a high degree of policy 
continuity, though there are still some remnants of nationalist rhetoric from the HDZ. 
However, here is little policy continuity in Belgrade, since it is unclear how policy 
towards Bosnia-Hercegovina would change if the expansionist, nationalist, anti-EU 
SRS came to power. 
 
The last twenty years have been marked by a high level of intergovernmentalism 
between London and Dublin regarding Northern Ireland. The Anglo-Irish Agreement 
(1985) may have largely been driven from the London perspective by cooperation on 
security, but later joint declarations show that there was bilateral consensus that the 
‘Irish dimension’ needed to be a part of any settlement. The Downing Street 
Declaration (1993) Framework Documents (1995), and the Belfast Agreement (1998) 
all exhibit a high level of Dublin-London coordination. The latter document is only 
‘signed’ by the two sovereign governments. This is not to say that bilateralism means 
that both governments have identical policy objectives. Even after Articles 2 and three 
of the Irish Constitution were changed to remove the territorial claim over the whole 
island, the revised articles still assert a cultural unity for all ‘traditions’ on the island. 
Though the British do not have ‘selfish [,?] strategic or economic interest’ in Northern 
Ireland, they support the continuation of the Union. For both states, the principle of 
consent is agreed. That is, Northern Ireland will remain a part of the UK as long as a 
majority of its residents so wish. There have been occasional disagreements between 
the two governments, such as the suspensions of the devolved institutions and the 
delay of the assembly elections in 2003. However, in both cases, the Irish 
Government affirmed that although the two governments may disagree about 
particular policy, there is overall agreement about the principles of consent and 
stability. This strong Dublin-London axis depends on the stable ‘bipartisanship’ in 
each state, so that successive governments have not significantly affected bilateral 
cooperation regarding Northern Ireland. 
 
By contrast, there is little Zagreb-Belgrade coordination regarding Bosnia-
Hercegovina. There are occasional joint declarations by the leaders in both countries. 
Mesić and Kostunica issued a statement at a meeting in 2001 promising to respect the 
sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, this statement like a later joint 
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communiqué (with the members of the Bosnian presidency) is only symbolic, since it 
avoids the contentious issues of refugee return and demarcation of the borders 
between the three states. Serbia still feels that Croatia has been dragging its feet 
regarding the resettlement of Serbs displaced during Operations Storm and Flash. This 
is the central justification used by Nikolić to sever ties with Croatia if he were to win 
the Serbian Presidency. The distrust from Zagreb is also evident. The declarations 
from Nikolić convince Zagreb that Belgrade is not a ‘reliable partner’, and that Serbia 
is ‘dysfunctional’. In other words, there is no certainty about the future of the state, 
because of the fundamental differences between the more and less ‘nationaist’ blocs 
in Belgrade. 
 
Finding: There has been a bilateral policy, most evident since 1993,  between London 
and Dublin that was based on the policy continuity between governments in both 
capitals. By contrast, Belgrade has fundamental problems with Zagreb’s record on 
Serb refugee return in Croatia. Zagreb believes the uncertainty of policy due to the 
domestic battle between the ‘centre-right’ coalition headed by DS and DSS, and 
nationalists headed by SRS make Belgrade unreliable. Thus, there is a significant 
cooperative London-Dublin axis, while little cooperation along the Zagreb-Belgrade 
axis on contentious issues. Moreover, bilateralism is underpinned by policy continuity 
for London and Dublin, while lack of bipartisanship (especially in Serbia) confounds 
Zagreb-Belgrade cooperation regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
 
Using some of Schneckener’s ‘actor-oriented’ criteria, it is possible to differentiate 
the likelihood of a stable power-sharing settlement between the two cases. Northern 
Ireland and Bosnia-Hercegovina differ on three aspects: dominant elites, 
comprehensive participation, and internal compromise. In Northern Ireland, parties 
have been able to ‘sell’ the agreement in both communities, and have retained support 
for devolved government. By contrast, the parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina are more 
susceptible to intra-ethnic flanking. As seen in the case of Republika Srpska, it is 
difficult to differentiate between the SDS and SNSD, since both can be termed as 
nationalist. As for the agreements upon which the institutions are based, the two 
reference states acted as proxies for their co-nationals, so that only Bosniaks were 
represented at the negotiating table among local constituent groups. By contrast, the 
principle of inclusion in Northern Ireland meant that not only were the two 
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governments present during the negotiations leading up to the Belfast Agreement, but 
also parties from both ‘traditions’ as well as the smaller cross-community parties. 
Finally, the institutions are designed such that decisionmaking is done through 
internal consensus, such as the passing of legislation, and the Executive meetings to 
decide on the Programme for Government. Although such structures exist de jure in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Bonn PIC ensured that the locus of legislative and political 
power rested in the OHR, since the High Representative can dismiss elected officials 
and block legislation. Moreover, the three foreign nationals from the European Court 
of Human Rights on the Constitutional Court are pivotal, only requiring the support of 
one of the three constituent peoples’ judges. Thus, none of the three criteria are 
fulfilled in Bosnia-Hercegovina, but they are present in Northern Ireland. The link to 
intergovernmentalism was explained by an OHR official. For Northern Ireland, 
Dublin changed Articles 2 and 3 as a part of the cooperative arrangement between the 
two governments, which helped build consensus for the agreement. On the other hand, 
neither ‘Zagreb’ nor ‘Belgrade’ have stepped back, which allows radical elements to 
succeed and undermines internal consensus. 
 
Finding: Using Schneckener’s ‘actor-oriented’ criteria for durable power-sharing, it 
is shown that Northern Ireland displays elite dominance, comprehensive agreement 
and internal compromise. By contrast, Bosnia-Hercegovina does not display any of 
these traits. Moreover, bilateral compromise between London and Dublin was the 
driving force for the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement in Northern Ireland. 
However, this process has been missing along the Zagreb-Belgrade axis, undermining 
prospects for comprehensive internal consociation in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
 
Since the prospects for ‘internal consociation’ can be differentiated for the two cases, 
the possibility of a durable settlement can be examined. The momentum of 
democratic reform in Bosnia-Hercegovina is not tied to ‘local’ policymakers, but 
rather an ‘external’ High Representative, with the financial commitment from donor-
state contributions. Thus, the survival of the institutions is vulnerable to domestic 
political pressures in donor states, outside the hands of the Bosnian people. On the 
other hand, though the institutions have been suspended longer than they have 
operated in Northern Ireland, the challenges in reaching a settlement underlines the 
difficulties in reaching a durable settlement between two perspectives that have 
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fundamentally differing constitutional objectives. However, there is little chance that 
either the DUP or Sinn Féin will reverse course and return to a more abstentionsist or 
rejectionist path. It is costly for the DUP to walk out as it did during the multi-party 
negotiations. Nor is it politically profitable for Sinn Féin to publicly renounce the 
Mitchell Principles and for the IRA to resume the ‘long war’. Thus, the thesis predicts 
that although a settlement has not been achieved, once an agreement for power-
sharing is concluded, the comprehensive, inclusive institutions bolstered by the 
principles of transnational consociation will be durable. 
 
Finding: With the current conditions, it is likely that a transnational consociation will 
emerge in Northern Ireland. By constrast, there is no evidence of an emerging 
transnational consociation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, since the reference states are not 
the guarantors of the settlement. The international community is the centre of gravity 
for governance in BiH, and there is some evidence that the institutions are inoperable 
without the OHR, EUFOR and other international elements. 
 
Putting Together the Pieces 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, it can be argued that there is a limitation to the 
comparability between Bosnia-Hercegovina and Northern Ireland, since the former is 
a separate internationally-recognised state while the latter is a region within another 
state. This means that any long-term settlement in the Bosnian conflict would require 
improved Zagreb-Belgrade, Zagreb-Sarajevo and Belgrade-Sarajevo relations, which 
is triangular. 
 
By contrast, the political process in Northern Ireland seems to be driven primarily 
through a coordinated strategy between London and Dublin. However, this does not 
reflect the triangular nature of transnational consociation in Northern Ireland. 
Although it is crucial for London and Dublin to work together with their co-nationals, 
it is also important that both conflict groups accept the role of both reference states. 
Thus, not only does Dublin need to be considered  as reliable by Nationalists, but the 
Irish dimension must be accepted by Unionists. Moreover, London must be 
acceptable to Unionists as their ‘patron’ while Nationalists accept the de jure 
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continuation of the Union (including the relationship between the Westminster 
Parliament and NI Assembly). It is only when these conditions are present will 
transnational consociation be likely. Such a configuration addresses the centrifugal 
ethno-national tension of the conflict. Recalling Figure 1 in Chapter 1, transnational 
consociation in Northern Ireland could be represented as follows: 
 
London 
  
 
Dublin 
 
Political elites in London and Dublin encourage their co-nationals to participate in 
consociational power-sharing institutions in Northern Ireland (denoted by the box). 
The London-Dublin axis ensures that the policy towards the conflict zone is 
coordinated between the two reference states. Thus, the centrifugal ethno-national 
pressure is managed (i.e. the arrows are pointed inwards), leading to the likelihood of 
a self-enforcing transnational consociation. 
 
By contrast, the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina can be represented differently: 
 
Belgrade  
  
 
Zagreb 
 
As shown in Chapter 7, the consociational power-sharing institutions in BiH  
(represented by the box on the left) can only operate with the imposition of the 
international community (e.g. the High Representative and the international judges on 
the Constitutional Court). However, this strategy does not address the centrifugal 
forces from the ethno-territorial conflict (i.e. the arrows still are pointing outwards). 
Serbs in BiH still look to Belgrade as the centre of their ‘homeland’ and many Croats 
in BiH see Zagreb in the same way. Governments in Belgrade are susceptible to 
ethnic flanking due to the strength of nationalist parties in Serbia, so that a unilateral 
gesture encouraging Serbs in BiH to participate fully in Sarajevo would be costly if it 
Unionists 
Nationalists 
Serbs in BiH 
Croats in BiH 
Bosniaks 
 
International 
Community 
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were not accompanied by similar moderation from Zagreb. Political parties in Zagreb 
are constrained in a similar way. Despite the continuing negotiations with Brussels 
regarding Euro-Atlantic integration, political elites still affirm the constitutional 
obligation to all Croats. Thus, as shown in Chapter 5, the HDZ has continued the 
process of European integration inherited from the previous government, yet continue 
to use nationalist rhetoric regarding the link between Hercegovin Croats and Croatia 
during election campaigns. The situation resembles a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The two 
reference states cannot moderate, since they would risk being accused of ‘selling out’ 
if they do so and the other reference state does not moderate. One way to ensure that 
the reference states can gradually encourage their co-nationals to participate in 
consociational power-sharing institutions in BiH is by coordinating a moderate policy 
towards BiH. The reference states must also be seen as credible guarantors by the 
other constituent peoples. The prospects for such an agreement are remote at present, 
but can be facilitated or driven by the international community (e.g. US, IMF, 
European Commission, etc.) by the following: 
 
  Belgrade  
  
 
       Zagreb 
 
The international community provides a set of constraints for Zagreb and Belgrade 
(e.g. conditional aid or membership to Euro-Atlantic organisations) such that it is 
costly to not coordinate a moderate policy towards their co-nationals in BiH. This will 
lead to Zagreb and Belgrade encouraging their co-nationals towards consociational 
power-sharing in Sarajevo. As with the NI case, it is also important that the 
involvement by Zagreb is accepted by Bosniaks and Serbs in BiH , as well as the role 
of Belgrade being accepted Bosniaks and Croats in BiH. If this is not achieved easily, 
the international community can again mediate or arbitrate. The regulation of the 
conflict is constructed ‘outside in’. With the involvement of the international 
community, the reference states are guarantors of a transnational consociation in the 
‘Dayton Triangle’. 
 
Serbs in BiH 
Croats in BiH 
Bosniaks 
 
International 
Community 
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If the role of the international community is not included in the diagram, the 
triangular relations resemble transnational consociation in NI: 
 
  Belgrade  
  
 
       Zagreb 
 
 
Most importantly, this configuration ensures that the centrifugal pressures of the 
ethno-national conflict are addressed (i.e. the arrows are now pointing inwards) and 
conflict groups are encouraged to share power in Sarajevo. Possible institutions for a 
transnational consociation will be mentioned below in the ‘Recommendations’ section. 
 
Thus, both case studies are more likely to result in transnational consociation if there 
are cooperative triangular relations between the reference states and conflict groups. 
In Northern Ireland, likely transnational consocation is likely to result with 
cooperative links along London-Dublin, Dublin-Belfast and London-Belfast axes. In 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, transnational consociation would be possible if there were 
cooperative relations along Zagreb-Belgrade, Zagreb-Sarajevo and Belgrade-Sarajevo 
axes. However, this is not the case at present. It may still possible to construct 
settlement facilitated by the international community. This strategy would regulate the 
ethno-national pressures that threaten the stability of consoicational democratic 
institutions in BiH.   
 
The above findings are not meant to preclude other types of conflict regulation. In the 
case of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo had been shelled by Serb paramilitaries and the 
JNA for over 1000 days, so the only options open to the international community 
were military ones. Only an extensive peacekeeping mission was able to quell the 
violence following the formal cessation of hostilities. Although the Dayton-Paris 
Agreement has provisions for ‘special parallel relationships’, the focus of the 
agreement was to impose internal power-sharing. However, unless contentious issues 
of refugee and property return are resolved, there can be no durable settlement. 
Moreover, the international community has not included the two reference states as an 
Serbs in BiH 
Croats in BiH 
Bosniaks 
 
International 
Community 
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integral part of the political solution. For example, though there are reforms to change 
the electoral law to prevent individuals from voting in both Hercegovina and Croatia, 
there is little political will to remove ‘diaspora’ voting in Croatia. As shown in 
Chapter 5, the 11th electoral district was used by the pre-2000 HDZ regime as a 
constant base of support. Moreover, Article 10 of the Constitution can be amended to 
explicitly uphold the sovereignty of the countries of residence for the diaspora. This is 
important not only for Croatia, but also settlement in BiH. 
Alternative Arrangements 
The theoretical formulation of transnational consociation only derives the general 
guiding principle of power-sharing within the disputed territory. Thus, those that 
drafted the three-stranded Belfast Agreement and Annex 4 of the Dayton-Paris 
Agreement had the possibility of choosing different ways to implement the general 
notion of power-sharing between the constitutionally-defined peoples within the 
conflict zone. Thus, suggestions from policymakers to improve the post-settlement 
institutions in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina will be examined in the 
following sections. 
Bosnia-Hercegovina 
 
Commentators on Bosnia-Hercegovina focus on two main areas for potential 
improvements to the institutions. First, there is a lack of ownership by local parties 
and places the impetus for change with the OHR. Although some of the preliminary 
discussions for constitutional reform in areas such as the police and military are 
carried out by local consensus, the actual implementation is imposed by decisions of 
the High Representative. Bieber suggests that the constitutional reforms in Bosnia-
Hercegovina will not be effective as long as the state operates as a ‘semi-
protectorate’.2 The Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE recommended that the HR 
place ‘greater trust’ in the decision-making abilities of local politicians, refrain from 
intervening unless absolutely necessary, and that the OHR puts together a specific exit 
                                                 
2
 F. Bieber, ‘Towards Better Governance with More Complexity?’, in Dayton and Beyond: 
Perspectives on the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ed. C. Solioz and T.K. Vogel, Baden-Baden: 
Nomos (2004): 87. 
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strategy for devolving power back to local authorities.3  The Venice Commission 
makes the specific comparison between the HR and the powers of the EU Special 
Representative in Macedonia, so that the OHR can be transformed from ‘decision-
maker’ to ‘mediator’ and allows for Bosnians to make their own decisions.4 
 
Other commentators are less enthusiastic about a withdrawal of the so-called 
‘European Raj’ in Bosnia. For example, Nowak believes that the international 
community can only leave Bosnia-Hercegovina after the threat of further conflict has 
ended. However, for the time being, the nationalist parties still control many of the 
institutions, so it is necessary for the international community to ‘facilitate’ the 
structural changes associated with reform.5 Contrary to the calls for the withdrawal of 
the IC, Dizdarević believes that the decision-making by the IC should be centralised 
to be more effective.6 
 
The second area of suggestions from the literature aim to bring the institutions in line 
with the Constituent Peoples’ Decision (see Chapter 7). One of the remaining 
anomalies are the election rules for the three-person Presidency. The aforementioned 
constitutional amendments in 2002 ensured that constituent peoples (i.e. Serbs, Croats, 
and Bosniaks) would have political representation across the whole of the state. 
However, certain persons are excluded from running for office based on their 
language/national group. Although the constitutional reforms did address these 
problems at the Entity level, the link between entity and ethnic identity persists in the 
state-level House of Peoples and Presidency. The Serb candidate for the Presidency 
can only be from the RS, while the members of the Presidency for the two other 
groups must be elected from FBiH. The Venice Commission suggested that the 
current rules governing the election of the state-level Presidency may be improved in 
one of two ways. First, the election could be held over the entire territory with the 
                                                 
3
 Parliamentary Assembly (CoE), ‘Strengthening of democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 
[Resolution 1384], 23rd Jun 2004. Online copy: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA04/ERES1384.htm.  
4
 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Powers of the High Representative’, 11th Mar 2005. URL: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/CDL-
AD(2005)004-e.asp.  
5
 M. Nowak, ‘Has Dayton Failed?’, in Dayton and Beyond: 58. 
6
 Z. Dizdarević, ‘The Unfinished State?’, in Dayton and Beyond: 44. 
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safeguard that two candidates from the same constituent nation could not be elected.7 
The Venice Commssion also suggests a more ‘radical’ approach, in which the rotating 
presidency is jettisoned altogether for one President with limited powers elected by 
the Government.8 Instead of an indirectly elected President, Hilmo Pasić suggests a 
directly elected President, since she or he could only be successful with wide support 
across national boundaries, and thus be able to speak for all ‘Bosnians’.9 The Venice 
Commission also suggests that instead of having pre-determined quotas in the House 
of Peoples, there should be a maximum number that can be drawn from a constituent 
nation. However, the Venice Commission also proposes a more ‘radical’ solution by 
abolishing the House of Peoples and leaving the decision for ‘vital national interest’ 
to be decided in the lower house, since the House of Peoples often impedes legislation 
by unnecessarily invoking ‘vital national interest’.10 
 
A third potential area of reform mentioned by commentators is ‘streamlining’ the state 
structures. The architecture of the state is a result of the wars in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
so that the existence of RS is seen by many as a ‘reward’ for the war and the result of 
ethnic cleansing.11 Holbrooke felt in retrospect that letting one of the entities retain 
the name ‘Republika Srpska’ was more of a concession than realised. 12  The 
international community had been committed to the creation of a two-entity BiH with 
51% to the majority-Serb areas and 49% to the Bosniak-Croat Federation since the 
Contact Group Plan of 1994, even though Holbrooke admitted ‘given that the Serbs 
had conquered so much territory through infamous methods, it would have been just 
for the Federation to control more than 51 percent of the land’.13  An official in the 
Bosnian MFA feels that the war left the country institutionally ‘crippled’, rewarding 
Serb aggression with the RS and others with a de-centralised FBiH, resulting in an 
‘unsustainable and ridiculous’ system.14 There is a call for Bosnia-Hercegovina to 
abolish the entities in favour of a more unitary structure so that Bosnia-Hercegovina 
                                                 
7
 ‘Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High 
Representative’. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Interview with Hilmo Pasić. 
10
 ‘Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High 
Representative’. 
11
 For example, see Z. Dizdarević, ‘The Unfinished State?’: 91. 
12
 R. Holbrooke, To End a War, New York: Modern Books (1999): 135. The name was given by 
Karadžić and Serbs in Pale. 
13
 Ibid.: 295. 
14
 Interview with Nedžad Hadžimusić 
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operates as a ‘normal’ centralised state, especially among Bosniaks. However, the 
recent conflicts make it necessary for explicit minority rights so that there are 
safeguards in place, compared to a country that does not have a recent history of war. 
To this end, the Venice Commission realises that any large-scale reform is not 
feasible at present, especially due to Croat insecurity if cantons are removed in FBiH, 
or Serb objections if there is international imposition abolishing RS. However, it is 
necessary to centralise more of the legislative function at the entity level and leave 
only the implementation at the cantonal level. On the other hand, the RS does not 
have this intermediate level of the canton, but still needs to develop local 
government.15 The Deputy Speaker of the FBiH House of Peoples concurs, saying 
that the legislative ‘bottlenecks’ at present are due to inefficient governance in the 
cantons, so more power needs to be devolved to municipalities where it can deliver 
services to citizens.16 
 
The think-tank European Stability Initiative (ESI) suggests reforming the entity 
structure by taking RS, Brčko  and the ten existing cantons in FBiH, and establishing 
a twelve-unit federal state such that each unit has the same level of responsibilities, 
thus following the Swiss federal model. 17 If these changes are instituted, the ESI 
claims ‘[t]his would represent a fundamental change to the structure of the state, 
turning it into a normal European federal system with central, regional and municipal 
governments.’18 The reaction from the Bosniak SDA was positive, since they believed 
that the current administration of the country was not sustainable.19 The Croat HDZ 
felt that the plan was a ‘good starting point’, but Serb politicians rejected the ESI plan 
outright: 
 
The ruling Serbian Democratic Party, SDS, deemed the ESI proposal “unacceptable”, while the 
opposition Party of Independent Social Democrats, SNSD, said it was a “proof that certain 
                                                 
15
 ‘Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High 
Representative’ 
16
 Interview with Vahid Hećo 
17
 ESI, ‘Making Federalism Work: a Radical Proposal for Practical Reform’, 8th Jan. 2004. URL: 
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_48.pdf.  
18
 Ibid. Such ‘normal European federal’ systems include the classical consociational cases such as 
Switzerland, Belgium and Austris, as well as other federal systems like Germany. 
19
 N. Jelacić, ‘New Reform Plan fails to Unite Bosnians’, Balkan Crisis Report, no. 476, 15th Jan. 2004. 
URL: http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr3/bcr3_200401_476_4_eng.txt.  
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representatives of the Federation are lobbying the powers around the world for reconstruction of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina”.20 
 
Another suggestion for the reorganisation of Bosnia-Hercegovina would be to change 
the state using an ‘economic logic’ rather than the local ethnic majorities, since some 
commentators believe that this is the only way to rebuild a cross-national society.21 
Hilmo Pasić believes that Bosnia-Hercegovina has been built around regional 
economic centres over the last 150 years, so these should inform the re-ordering of the 
state. Pasić identifies seven such centres: Sarajevo, Mostar (Hercegovina), Tuzla, 
Zenica, Doboj, Banja Luka, and Bihać. He believes this is the ‘only good way to have 
good organisation’ in Bosnia.22  The OHR also believes that a regional economic 
approach within Bosnia-Hercegovina is fruitful and have developed the Sarajevo 
region in this way.23 Along these lines, Jakob Finci, a Bosnian constitutional lawyer, 
believes that the economic logic along with the cultural and other factors would lead 
to a ‘Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ with regionalisation.24 However, 
at present, there is little room for any of the above alternatives. The only constituent 
people in BiH that want a fundamental change in the structures are the Bosniaks. As 
mentioned above, Croats do not want any changes to the cantons, since they will lose 
their local power base in Hercegovina, and Serbs do not want to give up RS for 
similar reasons. Perhaps the only realistic option is put forward by the Venice 
Commission: 
 
It is desirable for the citizens at some stage to decide to have an entirely new constitution based on their 
own wishes and drafted during a period without ethnic strife. This moment may not yet have arrived…. 
A consensus between Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats will be required if this is to be undertaken 
successfully. Even if this reform is not for tomorrow, one should not lose sight of its desirability.25 
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 Ibid. 
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 Interview with Vasilj Žarković 
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 J. Finci, ‘The Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in C. Solioz and T.K. Vogel eds., 
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Northern Ireland 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, the final settlement was based on multi-party talks that 
include more and less ‘moderate’ parties from each bloc and a permanent guarantor 
role of both governments. Moreover, a part of the initial agreement in 1998 was that 
there would be a review after four years. Most of the major parties contributed a set of 
suggestions for the review. The section below will not provide an exhaustive analysis 
of the review documents, but only look briefly at selected aspects of the 
recommendations related to Strand 1. 
 
The UUP refused to submit proposals for the review process in 2004. 26  The 
justifications for this were familiar: progress on the implementation of the Belfast 
Agreement and a return to power-sharing hinged on the end of the threat of republican 
violence. In other words, ‘no guns, no government.’ Thus, according to Trimble, the 
oft-mentioned ‘acts of completion’ would remove the primary obstacle for unionist 
uneasiness about power-sharing. Trimble claimed that it would be pointless to review 
and reform the existing framework with the institutions suspended. Although the 
motives are different, the main unionist and nationalist parties push for an end to the 
suspension. The DUP offers a more general statement, pushing for conditions such 
that there are not frequent suspensions.27 On the other hand, the nationalist positions 
on suspension of the Assembly were the same. Both Sinn Féin and the SDLP believed 
that the Westminster suspension act (2000) should be repealed.28 
 
On the overall constitutional future of Northern Ireland, the Alliance Party reaffirmed 
the consent principle, but, being a ‘cross-community’ party, added that alternatives 
should not be confined to the unionist and nationalist positions.29 The two largest 
parties in the virtual Assembly maintained their traditional constitutional positions. 
The DUP only envisaged a framework within the Union and not one that was a 
                                                 
26
 See for example, David Trimble’s statement at the opening of the review process on 3rd Feb 2004. 
Online copy available from CAIN: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/uup/uup030204.htm.  
27
 DUP, Devolution Now, 5th Feb 2004.  HTML version available from CAIN: 
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28th Jan. 2004. URL: http://sinnfein.ie/news/detail/3059.  
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transition to a united Ireland.30 By contrast, the Sinn Féin press release wanted a date 
for a border poll on Irish unity.31 
 
The perspectives put forward by the main parties mainly corresponded to their 
respective ‘wish lists’. All of the major parties that submitted proposals included 
suggestions about the importance of swift decommissioning except for Sinn Féin. On 
the other hand, Sinn Féin did posit that the Independent Monitoring Commission 
(IMC) was outside the parameters of the Agreement, so the IMC should be abolished. 
Both Sinn Féin and the SDLP criticise the slow pace of security normalisation (i.e. 
reduction of British troop numbers and the closing of army observation posts). On the 
issues of human rights and equality, all of the parties suggest extensive institutions 
while the DUP is silent. The DUP also defers the issue of police reform, while Sinn 
Féin demands full implementation of the Patten report. Only the nationalist parties 
specifically ask for the publication of the Cory report on alleged state collusion and 
the establishment of independent inquiries. 
 
The DUP did not mention any areas for Strand 2 institutions to change, although they 
repeated their principle that cross-border institutions are acceptable, as long as they 
are entirely ‘accountable’ to the Strand 1 institutions internal to Northern Ireland.32 
The Alliance Party takes a rather unspecific line, suggesting that the North-South 
bodies be organised to deliver ‘practical benefits’. 33  The nationalist parties both 
focused on the Strand 2 institutions. Although the SDLP did mention the ‘increased 
efficacy’ of the Strand 3 British-Irish Council, the focus of the party’s suggestions 
was on the all-Ireland institutions. The SDLP and Sinn Féin both sought to increase 
the areas of cooperation and thus create additional North-South bodies.34 Moreover, 
both nationalist parties also suggested the creation of a consultative joint 
parliamentary body mentioned in the Agreement, but not implemented as a part of the 
post-Agreement institutions.35 
 
                                                 
30
 DUP, Devolution Now: 6. 
31
 Sinn Féin, ‘Sinn Féin sets out review agenda’.  
32
 DUP, Devolution Now: 5. 
33
 APNI, ‘Agenda for Democracy’. 
34
 SDLP, ‘The Four Year Review of the Agreement’; Sinn Féin, ‘Sinn Féin sets out review agenda’. 
35
 Ibid. 
SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 272 
From the time of the multi-party negotiations, unionists have focused on the Strand 1 
institutions, not the Strand 3 East-West structures. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
DUP devoted more attention to Strand 1 reform than changes in Strand 3. The now-
largest party in the suspended Assembly suggested that the number of MLAs be 
reduced from 108 to 72, the number of devolved areas of Government reduced to 
eight, a streamlining of the OFMDFM and the creation of an Efficiency Commission 
to investigate ways to reform the current institutional framework.36 Some of these 
suggestions resemble the submission by the Alliance Party, including the reduction of 
the number of MLAs, a review of the number of devolved departments and a 
committee set up to scrutinise the organisation of OFMDFM.37 The nationalist parties 
do not mention such reorganisation. 
 
However, all of the parties do examine the devolved institutions. The DUP demanded 
that Sinn Féin should not be allowed into the Executive unless the IRA achieves ‘acts 
of completion.’ Both the SDLP and Alliance make a reference to paragraph 13 of the 
April 2003 British-Irish joint declaration, which demands: 
 
…an immediate, full and permanent cessation of all paramilitary activity, including military attacks, 
training, targeting, intelligence gathering, acquisition or development of arms or weapons, other 
preparations for terrorist campaigns, punishment beatings and attacks and involvement in riots. 
Moreover, the practice of exiling must come to an end and the exiled must feel free to return in safety. 
Similarly, sectarian attacks and intimidation directed at vulnerable communities must cease.38 
 
The Alliance Party proposed the Pledge of Office include a commitment to uphold the 
above principles. Sinn Féin’s press release is silent on the issue, simply stating that 
the Pledge of Office would allow ‘breaches of Ministerial Office’ to be ‘subject to 
sanction within the terms of the Agreement’.39 
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The suggested changes for the selection and operation of Assembly and Executive 
falls within three broad strategies: voluntary coalition, involuntary coalition, and no 
coalition. These are the three options put forward in the DUP document.40 
 
The voluntary coalition would result from ‘normal’ negotiations between political 
parties and could be confirmed by a cross-community consensus in the Assembly. 
This proposal also included in the Alliance Party recommendations.41 Although this 
seems reasonable, there are a few problems with the ‘voluntary coalition’ model. First 
and foremost is that this is tantamount to a coalition that excludes Sinn Féin from 
government. Since the republican party is now the largest in the nationalist bloc, it 
would reduce the legitimacy of the institutions and go against the inclusive guiding 
principle of the Agreement. Moreover, the SDLP would not be able to join the 
coalition, since appearing complicit in the exclusion of the largest nationalist party 
would further hurt SDLP electoral fortunes. 
 
The second option is similar to the current arrangements. That is, the Ministerial 
Departments are distributed using the d’Hondt rule. In addition to the present 
institutions, there would be provisions for the Executive and the Assembly to 
scrutinise ministerial decisions without having to refer the case for judicial review. 
Thus, there would be some collective responsibility in the Executive. However, the 
DUP adds that this involuntary coalition would not be available to Sinn Féin without 
the IRA verifiably disarming. 
 
A related issue is the election of the First and Deputy First Ministers (FM/DFM). The 
split within the unionist bloc in the selection of the FM/DFM ticket led to the 
suspensions as well as the redesignation crisis in November 2001. The current 
provision is that they are elected using ‘parallel consent’. In the composition of the 
suspended Assembly, the anti-Agreement DUP has a majority within their bloc. Even 
with the IRA announcement in July 2005 to end its ‘armed struggle’, the DUP is 
reluctant to share power with Sinn Féin. The SDLP has just over 40% of the MLAs in 
the nationalist bloc, so if Sinn Féin chooses to vote against the ticket (having been 
passed up), then there would be no possibility for resolution. 
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It has been suggested that the ‘weighted majority’ convention could be used instead, 
requiring 60% of voting MLAs and 40% from each bloc. If this rule had been used in 
November 2001, there would have been enough ‘pro-agreement’ support across the 
blocs to elect an SDLP-UUP ticket.42 The ‘weighted majority’ rule would also include 
the ‘Other’ bloc in the decision-making process. However, excluding the largest 
parties in both blocs would be undemocratic.43 On a more practical level, the results 
of the 2003 Assembly elections make it impossible to create a SDLP-UUP ticket 
using ‘weighted majority’. Even if the 24 UUP and 18 SDLP MLAs join forces with 
the six members of the Alliance Party, one Independent and one PUP MLA, there 
would still not be enough to elect a pro-Agreement FM/DFM.44 The Alliance Party 
suggests that designation should be abolished and that the ‘weighted majority’ rule be 
used for all key decisions.45 No single party has a blocking minority with the 60% 
weighted majority rule. However, if the majority is set at two-thirds (as examined by 
McGarry and O’Leary), the 33 DUP MLAs with the lone anti-Agreement UKUP 
representative almost have enough potential votes to block all key decisions.46 The 
weighted majority requiring 70% support as suggested by the DUP, not surprisingly, 
allows the DUP to block all key decisions, including the election of the FM/DFM. 
McGarry and O’Leary suggest that d’Hondt also be used for the selection of the 
FM/DFM.47 Additionally, a safeguard can be put into place such that both members of 
the FM/DFM team could not be from the same bloc. This would allow the possibility 
of cross-community ‘Other’ parties to possibly have a chance to be elected on the 
FM/DFM ticket, though the chances are quite remote at present. By using the d’Hondt 
rule, if the DUP refuses the FM post, it would then go to the next largest party, which 
would be the UUP. The potential problem would be the one that befell the Assembly 
the first time d’Hondt was run. If both the UUP and DUP refuse to join the ticket, the 
next eligible party would be the Alliance Party. The results would have little 
legitimacy. 
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Taking all of the above submissions from the parties into account, the British and 
Irish governments put forward proposals for a ‘comprehensive agreement’.48 Some of 
the above suggestions for changes in Strand 1 appear in the document prepared by the 
two governments. As suggested by the nationalist parties, the British Government 
would repeal the Suspension Act (2000).49 Moreover, the review of the efficiency of 
the number of devolved departments and the number of MLAs will be examined by 
an Efficiency Review Panel.50 The proposals contained three recommendations to 
address the lack of collective responsibility. First, the Pledge of Office would be 
changed to include collective decision-making as a responsibility of the Executive, 
and procedures could be triggered by three members of the Executive for cross-
community decisions when consensus is not reached.51 Second, the Assembly can 
sign a petition of concern regarding a Ministerial decision, which leaves seven days 
for the Executive to consider the matter. This allows for a measure of oversight by the 
Assembly regarding ministerial decisions. 52  The governments propose to use the  
d’Hondt mechanism for the nomination of the FM/DFM along the same lines as the 
article by McGarry and O’Leary.53 The other Ministers would also be selected using 
the d’Hondt mechanism, but the whole Executive would be confirmed collectively by 
the Assembly.54 The proposals did change MLA designation slightly, introducing a 
‘50:50:50’ rule for both the approval of the Executive and the selection of the 
FM/DFM. That is, in addition to a majority of nationalist and unionists approving, 
‘others’ would also have to lend majority support, thus including the latter bloc in 
‘parallel consent’. However, contrary to Alliance recommendations, the designation 
system would persist, and redesignation would not be allowed. 55  Although the 
proposals largely addressed the institutional design concerns of the parties, movement 
towards reintroduction of devolution hinged on the decommissioning of all 
paramilitary weapons. As explained in Chapter 7, the electoral strength of Sinn Féin 
means that they are the only party with links to paramilitary organisations that could 
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join the Executive. Thus, the requirement for decommissioning before devolution is 
directed at Sinn Féin. Although the IRA announced an end to the ‘long war’ in the 
summer of 2005, suspension of the Executive and Assembly continues as of 
November 2005. 
Recommendations 
Although there are some general suggestions in the previous sections, the objective of 
the thesis was not to distil a set of normative policy prescriptions. Similar to 
Lijphart’s original research on consociational democracy, there are some normative 
implications to the empirical tests of transnational consociation. For Lijphart, there 
was an uncharacteristic ‘stability’ in Dutch democratic political structures. This 
stability was ‘good’, so Lijphart’s later work takes the classical cases and uses them 
as blueprints for ‘constitutional engineering’ in divided societies around the world. 
 
However, the aims of the current investigation are more modest that Lijphart’s,  since 
transnational consociation can only be derived in very specific contexts. The one 
general policy implication of the current study is that if there are reference states for 
two or more groups, there is an opportunity to build a durable settlement ‘outside in’. 
The break with some of the literature is that the reference states are often considered 
detrimental to complex peace agreements and are thus seen as ‘interlopers’. 
Commentators in Bosnia-Hercegovina see the war as a concerted effort by Zagreb and 
Belgrade to dismember the country. International organisations see involvement from 
reference states as ‘interference’ that should be prevented. However, the irredentist 
reading of reference states leads to policy that misses an opportunity to utilise the link 
between the reference state and co-nationals. That is, if there is conciliatory policy 
from the reference state that confirms the political legitimacy of the institutions in the 
disputed area, then this is advantageous. Such pronouncements can be made by 
reference states in the well-regulated realm of interstate international politics. Thus, 
the reference state is a more reliable agent for conflict regulation than certain stateless 
nations. For example, in the cases of the Basques in Spain and in France and the 
Kurds distributed between Iraq, Iran and Turkey, there is no reference state. In both 
cases, there are no internationally recognised, accountable states that would be able to 
act as an advocate or consistent guarantor for a particular national group. 
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One possible mechanism to include reference states would be some form of inclusive, 
comprehensive, inter-parliamentary body. There are such cross-border institutions in 
the case of the ‘special relationship’ between Republika Srpska and Belgrade to 
consult on matters of common concern. In the case of Northern Ireland, Strand 2 left 
provisions for an interparliamentary forum. 
 
However, in both cases, the institutions are not inclusive of all of the important parties 
and linkages that consolidate transnational consociation. It is true that in the case of 
Northern Ireland, there are Strand 3 interparliamentary bodies such as the BIC and 
BIIPB that discuss issues of common concern. However, these bodies also contain the 
devolved institutions in the rest of the UK. Although a unionist reading of the 
situation is that Northern Ireland is equivalent to the other devolved parts of the Union, 
the recognition of two traditions, North-South dimension and intergovernmental 
dynamics and  principle of consent differentiate NI from the other devolved regions. 
The fact that Northern Ireland can leave the Union if the majority so wishes makes it 
unique. Thus, the connections between the reference states and the constituent 
‘communities’, the same parties that concluded the original Belfast Agreement, 
should be given institutional voice. Thus, the interparliamentary forum should include 
a representative sample of MPs from Westminster, TDs from Dublin, and MLAs from 
Belfast. It is the interaction of these actors that consolidate the transnational 
consociation, so there should be regular meetings to discuss some of the more 
contentious issues. A similar recommendation can be extended to institutions in 
Bosnia. Instead of a hands-off policy, a proportion of the membership from the 
Serbian parliament, Croatian Sabor, and Bosnian (federal) parliament should meet to 
discuss the open issues in the Dayton Triangle such as property, refugee return and 
the abolition of visas. In the case of this institution, there could also be an 
international community component, such as the OHR and UNHCR. However, the 
composition of these interparliamentary bodies should be predominantly ‘local’ 
parties. Moreover, since the interparliamentary forum should try to consolidate the 
institutions in the disputed area, the representation from the reference states should be 
less numerically than for the disputed area. 
 
There should also be changes in citizenship and electoral rights. In most of the Central 
European states, there are provisions for members of an ethnic group to obtain dual 
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citizenship, usually one passport from the state of residence and the other from the 
‘homeland’. These provisions are not uncontroversial. There has been a recent debate 
in Hungary regarding the granting of citizenship based on ethnicity. The fear is that 
doing so would result in an influx of ‘new’ Hungarians from parts of Europe outside 
the EU, and those in which the Hungarian minority is economically disadvantaged 
(such as Vojvodina and Ukraine). In Northern Ireland, although the claim of right 
over the whole of the island has been removed from the Irish Constitution, the 
jurisdiction of citizenship rights extends to all parts of the island. Thus, those born in 
Northern Ireland are automatically eligible for an Irish passport. Although this 
arrangement has worked in Northern Ireland, conferring automatic extra-territorial 
citizenship rights is not unproblematic. 
 
Dual citizenship is contrary to the two dominant norms in the extension of citizenship 
(excluding naturalisation). The first is by birth on the territory, which is prevalent in 
‘immigrant’ states such as the US, where there is a ‘civic’, not ‘ethnic’, definition of 
citizenship. There are provisions in other states in which members of the dominant 
‘nation’ are given citizenship. These rights may be extended across the internationally 
recognised borders. For example, in the case of the Republic of Ireland, those having 
one parent or grandparent born in Ireland (including Northern Ireland) are eligible for 
citizenship. If the aforementioned principle of automatic extra-territorial citizenship 
were applied to Central Europe, then this would lead to a permanent extraterritorial 
claim. Even though the more contentious parts of the Irish Constitution have been 
altered, the principle ties citizenship to people on a certain territory, and amounts to 
quasi-sovereignty. Although the rules of dual citizenship are compatible with the 
norms of state sovereignty, it still has some of the same problems as automatic 
extraterritorial citizenship. Citizenship is membership of a state, with the state having 
particular obligations to protect its members. This is not necessarily problematic, but 
between certain states in which there has been a recent territorial dispute, dual 
citizenship still allows extraterritorial obligations for the ‘homeland’ state. One way to 
avoid this problem is to employ the distinction used in the communist federations of 
Yugoslavia and the USSR, in which citizenship was conferred in a territorial fashion, 
and nationality is self-defined by self-identification. Thus, for those who see 
themselves as ‘Hungarian’ (the Yugoslav and Soviet passports had a place for this 
ethnic self-identification) can avail in the types of cross-border educational and 
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cultural links permitted by the decisions by the Venice Commission. Distinguishing 
between the geographic membership of ‘citizenship’ (along internationally-recognised 
boundaries) and the self-identification of ‘nation’ allows for co-nationals to express 
their minority national identities without eroding the bilateral norm between ‘host’ 
and ‘homeland’.  
Answering Questions 
The ultimate objective of the previous chapters has been to answer the questions 
posed at the end of Chapter 2, so they will be re-examined briefly. 
What modifications of the consociational process will occur because of the role of 
reference states? 
 
Classical consocational theory can explain purely internal conflicts. However, since 
boundaries of states and ethno-national groups rarely coincide, it is necessary to 
extend the theory to ‘external actors’. By developing the notion of transnational 
consociation, the previous chapters takes this concern seriously by investigating the 
roles of ‘external’ reference states in developing consociational democracy in the 
‘conflict zone’. 
 
While the thesis has primarily been empirical, there is a clear normative implication. 
If the reference states can pursue a constructive role in the disputed territory, then 
they should be included into the post-settlement institutions. In other words, there is a 
potential to build a settlement ‘outside in’. Though there are practical reasons for 
cross-border cooperation in the NSMC, Strand 2 is also important for nationalists 
since it adds an explicit connection to Dublin. For unionists, the existence of an 
Assembly subordinate to the Parliament means that the link to London remains. 
However, there should be a more ‘triangular’ approach with policymakers from 
London, Dublin and Belfast addressing issues of common concern. 
 
The intergovernmental London-Dublin axis has pushed the political process forward 
by setting penalties for non-compliance by the local parties. This has prevented the 
less moderate wings of the two communities, which now control a majority of seats in 
the virtual Assembly in their respective blocs, from simply walking away from the 
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process. This is absent in the case of Zagreb and Belgrade. Although there is some 
bipartisanship regarding a more moderate approach from Zagreb, policymakers in 
both capitals still take a less conciliatory position regarding the handover of war 
crimes suspects and the completion of refugee return. Thus, they are unable to 
encourage their co-nationals to work within the post-Dayton power-sharing structures. 
This, in turn, places centrifugal pressures from Serbs still dreaming of a ‘Greater 
Serbia’ and Croats trying to establish a ‘third entity’. Only a stronger coordinated 
Zagreb-Belgrade axis regarding the handover of suspects to the ICTY and the 
completion of sustainable refugee return will build a durable settlement in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. 
Is the influence of reference states more important than any other ‘external agents? 
 
The importance of reference states hinges on their durable commitment to co-
nationals in the conflict zone, which cannot always be promised by other international 
actors. As seen in Chapter 7, the crucial decision by the US to stop further funding in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina was not based on a calculation about the consequences on-the-
ground, but the political implications back in Congress. Similarly, when the UK 
recognised the independence of Croatia and Slovenia at the urging of Germany, it was 
not because of considerations about the effect in the dissolving Yugoslavia, but rather 
as a political favour in return for assurances about EMU from Berlin. 
 
Contrasting with other states, both Croatia and Serbia have a long-term responsibility 
as the ‘metropoles’ for their respective ‘nations’ in the ‘Dayton Triangle’. Any 
attempt to disengage from their co-nationals in Bosnia-Hercegovina would lead to 
instability in the reference states themselves and any heightened conflict inside BiH 
may result in a repeat of the devastating demographic changes in all three states. 
Although the two reference states operate more transparently regarding funding for 
their co-nationals in Bosnia-Hercegovina, this ‘pulling back’ is not equivalent to 
‘pulling out’. Both Zagreb and Belgrade see themselves and are seen as guardians for 
all Croats and Serbs, respectively. Unlike the various donor states and international 
organisations, the destinies within the ‘Dayton Triangle’ are tied to stability within the 
region in the drive for Europe, not overall global budgetary considerations (such as 
for NATO) or unrelated policy concerns of other donor states. 
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The importance of the ‘intergovernmental unity of purpose’ driving the political 
process in Northern Ireland is quite evident. Despite international attention on the 
conflict for decades, it was only when the two governments began to coordinate 
policy regarding Northern Ireland that power-sharing was possible. The US did have 
an important mediation role, but as shown above, the final choreography leading to 
the Belfast Agreement came from the two governments, which encouraged their co-
nationals to accept the power-sharing settlement. 
 
Further Research 
 
The previous chapters represent an initial investigation that can be extended in various 
manners. 
Cyprus 
 
The case of Cyprus closely mirrors the geometry of the two cases studied in this thesis. 
There are two reference states that have ‘co-nationals’ in a disputed territory, the 
island of Cyprus. There has been a longstanding antagonism between Greece and 
Turkey. In 1974, the Turkish Army invaded the island and effectively partitioned the 
island by creating the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) and expelled 
ethnic Greeks on the ‘wrong’ side of the line of control. The Turkish-held part of the 
island remains unrecognised by the international community. However, there is a UN 
peacekeeping mission deployed along a ‘Green Line’ to keep the two parts of the 
island separate and significantly reduce the level of conflict. In Greece, the co-
nationals in Cyprus are ideologically significant. The two ruling parties are the 
Conservatives and the Socialists, representing a right-left cleavage. As with 
governments in the UK, the right-leaning Conservatives portray a stronger connection 
with the Greek Cypriots. Because of the ideological importance of Cyprus, there is a 
bidirectional relationship, not just a patron-client link between Athens and Greek 
Cypriots. Thus, it would be ideologically difficult for Athens to disengage from 
Cyprus, since Greek Cypriots demand the continuation of the link to Athens. 
Nonetheless, there is an unspoken rule in election battles between the Conservatives 
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and Socialists that certain ‘national issues’ including Cyprus are off limits for the 
campaign and debates. Thus, there is a limited bipartisanship between the two main 
parties. Rauf Denktash, the leader of TRNC, is well respected in Turkey, so it is 
politically costly for any government in Ankara to ‘abandon’ the Turkish-controlled 
part of Cyprus. There is little bipartisanship between the pro-EU CHP and the former 
‘Islamic’ AKR (which won the election in 1999) in Turkey. The latter party’s power 
is tied to the military, so it is constrained from making moderating moves regarding 
Cyprus. However, for both of the large parties in Ankara, conciliatory policy towards 
Cyprus is difficult. Although there is some opportunity for détente between Ankara 
and Athens through joint membership in NATO and EU accession talks with Turkey, 
strong differences remain. The Annan Plan to re-unify Cyprus was not built ‘outside 
in’, but represented a compromise solution between the communities on the island. 
However, it did not have the support of Athens, where there was a campaign to reject 
the plan. There were some disagreements from Ankara as well, since Turkey was 
fully consulted about the plan. However, the plan was accepted in TRNC, but rejected 
on the rest of the island, which is predominantly Greek. There were two fundamental 
flaws with the Annan Plan. The first is that the dominant strategy for Greek Cypriots 
was to vote against the plan. With or without acceptance, ‘their’ part of the island was 
joining the EU, so now they do not need to share power with Turks. Secondly, there 
was no strong move from the UN to create the plan ‘outside in’ and utilise the 
reference state links. It is the latter policy from supranational institutions that may 
finally create a longer-term settlement for Cyprus based on transnational consociation. 
Vojvodina 
 
There is also a similar conflict geometry for Vojvodina in Serbia & Montenegro. The 
territory is one of the lands that were lost after World War I from Hungary due to the 
break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, leaving many ethnic Hungarians on the 
‘wrong’ side of the border. The area enjoyed special autonomous status in both the 
1946 and 1974 Yugoslav constitutions, though this autonomy was revoked in 1989 at 
the start of the Milošević regime. The conflict in Vojvodina has been described by 
NATO as a potential ‘flashpoint’ for a ground war between Serbia and Hungary, 
especially after the military action by Belgrade in Kosovo. The status of the ‘lost’ 
brethren play an important part in Hungarian politics, including the debate in the 
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parliament about the extension of dual citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living abroad. 
Although the issues of the ‘external’ Hungarian minorities remain an important 
symbolic issue, elections are won and lost on domestic socio-economic issues, 
especially after accession into the European Union. Hungary had to moderate its 
policies toward its external minorities in order to join NATO. Still, the conservative 
opposition in Budapest used the recent referendum on extending dual citizenship to 
ethnic Hungarians outside Hungary as a platform for nationalist issues. The plan was 
supported by a majority of those who voted, but failed to achieve the threshold 
turnout to be valid.56 In line with the norms established by the Venice Commission, 
Budapest and Belgrade signed a bilateral agreement in October 2003 regarding cross-
border links between Budapest and their co-nationals in Serbia (predominantly in 
Vojvodina).57 However, there are difficulties with consistent cooperative bilateralism 
between the two governments. There was anti-Hungarian violence in Vojvodina in 
2004, increasing tensions between the two states, since Budapest was not content with 
the level of protection for the minorities in the region. Nonetheless, because the 
conflict never escalated as in Bosnia-Hercegovina or Kosovo, there is no international 
presence in Vojvodina. Moreover, the process of Euro-Atlantic integration might 
induce further cooperation between the reference states. 
Kashmir 
 
The case of Kashmir would be an interesting study, since none of the factors for 
transnational consociation are present. Bose presents a framework modelled on the 
Belfast Agreement by using the various axes discussed above, paralleling the 
interplay between London, Dublin and Belfast and finding the corresponding 
geopolitical foci of New Delhi, and the two capitals of their respective areas of 
control in Kashmir.58 There have been some encouraging signs of negotiation between 
the two reference states and thawing of the relationship in other areas, such as the 
Indian cricket team travelling to Pakistan on tour. The region has been a flashpoint 
since the partition and independence of the Subcontinent in 1947. With the 
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development of a nuclear arsenal by both states, international observers fear a 
devastating conflict between India and Pakistan. Although there are strong pro-
Pakistan and pro-Indian elements in the region, there is also a sizable population that 
prefers an independent Kashmir (i.e. neither ‘Indian’ or ‘Pakistani’), since both rule 
from Islamabad or New Delhi would be equally exploitative. 59  Not surprisingly, 
neither sovereign government favours the ‘third option’. Any eventual 
ceasefire/settlement would have to balance all three predominant perspectives. 
However, any agreement will also have to include a complex, transnational 
component to include New Delhi and Islamabad. Otherwise, the two governments and 
their supporters in Kashmir will push to undermine governance in the region. Creating 
accountable, cross-border structures based on bilateral cooperation will consolidate 
any settlement in Kashmir. However, recalling the criteria for transnational 
consociation, there is no bipartisanship in Pakistan, since the current President heads 
the government on the basis of military force, and may not be able to influence the 
actions of certain co-nationals who are in paramilitary organisations operating in 
Kashmir. Moreover, a change in government, as a result of a coup d’etat, will lead to 
a high degree of uncertainty. If a more ‘extremist’ government wrests power, any 
agreement between Musharraf and the Indian Government may be null and void. Thus, 
none of the features of transnational consocation are present for a durable power-
sharing settlement enforced by New Delhi and Islamabad to develop. 
 
In addition to examining other cases of conflict regulation in which reference states 
are present using the current version of transnational consociation theory, it is also 
possible to improve the theory itself.60 
Improving the Theory 
 
The initial conditions for transnational consociation were selected such that the 
dominant strategy for each reference state was to seek a cooperative policy with the 
other reference state, while maintaining differing constitutional positions. The last 
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Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdniestria. Also, going one level deeper with one of the current cases, FBiH 
can be investigated with Sarajevo and Zagreb as the ‘metropoles’. 
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step in the theory demanded that there was policy continuity between the more and 
less conciliatory governments in each reference state for stable intergovernmentalism. 
As the theory stands, it is bipartisanship that starts a chain reaction leading to durable 
settlement in cases in which there are significant reference state/co-national links. 
However, the present model, though parsimonious, is quite rigid. 
 
There is variation in the level of policy continuity in the case studies, yet 
‘bipartisanship’ is a binary variable in the theory derived in Chapter 3. In both of the 
reference states for Northern Ireland, there has been a high degree of bipartisanship 
over the last thirty years. Croatia represents an intermediate case in which there have 
been some changes between the two HDZ regimes, but the party still relies on its 
nationalist credentials in Croatian elections. In Serbia, since there is little policy 
continuity, a sizable amount of the electorate and the largest party in parliament still 
dream of a ‘Greater Serbia’, while a loose coalition of parties seeks a gradual ‘tilt 
westward’. A follow-up inquiry to the present thesis is whether it is possible to 
correlate the different levels of bipartisanship with different factors present in a 
reference state. Such a study could be executed by using the definition of reference 
states, identifying reference states throughout the world (larger N), and create an 
appropriate statistical model to test the significance of various factors. The addition of 
this statistical model will extend the current model to a predictive one. That is, 
transnational consociation as it is described in Chapter 3 posits an explanation for the 
interconnections between the factors, but it does not predict when transnational 
consociation will be triggered. An explanatory model for bipartisanship in reference 
states may shed light on this. 
 
The second area to extend transnational consociation theory is by making different 
assumptions than the ones used to reduce the variables. In Chapter 5, extensive cross-
border links between reference states and the co-nationals were confirmed in the two 
case studies. If the assumption of durable reference state/co-national links is relaxed, 
or it is not assumed that these links exist, it would be instructive to examine contexts 
where the reference state connection is not as strong as in either of the case studies in 
this thesis. For example, there are few verifiable and durable reference state links 
between Tirana and Kosovor Albanians. Similarly, although Moldovans assert a 
difference between their post-Soviet country using a language with Cyrillic script, 
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there are political parties that espouse a connection with Romania. However, these 
reference state links are largely unheeded by Bucharest. If cases with and without 
significant reference state/co-national links are considered, it may be possible to 
conduct a more probabilistic statistical investigation of transnational consociation. 
 
The final improvement of the model is formalisation of the existing framework. The 
theory as it is currently explained relies on a static solution concept. In other words, if 
the payoffs from the various strategies result in the dominant strategy of cooperation, 
then that condition will hold for the duration of the game. Moreover, the most 
elementary version of the theory assumes that the government in each reference state 
makes a perfect appraisal of the payoffs from playing various strategies, and never 
makes ‘mistakes’. These changes in the assumptions require a formal game theoretical 
model. Thus, starting from the current simple model, it may be possible to create a 
more rigorous formal model about reference state action in conflicts. The second 
improvement is that the theory can be derived using an evolutionary game, which can 
account for time-varying changes in payoffs for pursuing different strategies. 
Final Remarks 
 
Starting from a simple informal model of  ‘ethno-territorial cross-border conflict’, the 
thesis develops a parsimonious yet instructive theory of transnational consociation. 
The development of the framework and examination of post-settlement power-sharing 
in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia-Hercegovina represents a significant exercise in  
theory-building. Much of the conflict regulation literature constructs a theory through 
the examination of a particular case study. By contrast, transnational consociation was 
derived using a general statement of the conflict geometry and then illustrated using 
case studies. The research demonstrated that reference states need not be ‘interlopers’ 
in a disputed territory, but can potentially represent reliable guarantors of a long-
lasting durable post-conflict settlement. 
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Appendix I 
 
Appendix I.A 
 
Initial assumptions: 
 
i. The option of escalating the conflict is costly, either through direct hostilities 
with the other reference state or an attack on the conflict zone, or through 
indirect escalation by arming co-nationals. 
 
ii. Disengaging from the conflict is even more costly, since it would have 
negative effects for both the reference state and the co-nationals. 
 
iii. The  matrix of payoffs is approximately symmetrical for the two reference 
states 
 
iv. The payoff for the reference state is higher if the co-national has more political 
power in the disputed territory. 
 
Although there are numerous strategies that be pursued by a reference state, the 
potential actions will be simplified to four possibilities: 
 
• The reference states can invade or arm the co-nationals in the disputed 
territory, thus escalating the level of conflict (ESC). 
• The reference states can reach a cooperative settlement (COOP). 
• The reference states can do nothing, and stay at the status quo level of conflict 
(SQ). 
• Finally, the reference states can quit the disputed territory (GO). 
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The relative payoffs for reference state α are described as Pij, where i denotes the 
action of reference state α, and j the action of reference state β. The four actions will 
be indicated as: 
 
ESC = 1 
COOP = 2 
SQ = 3 
GO = 4 
 
For example, the benefit for reference state α when it  escalates the conflict (ESC) and 
the other state stays at the status quo (SQ) is P13. The matrix for the payoffs for the 
situation can be represented in the table below. The entries in the cells are left in the 
most general form, since the constraints will follow in the rest of this appendix. The 
choices for reference state α are in the first column, and the choices for β are in the 
first row. 
 Esc Coop SQ Go 
Esc P11, Q11 P12, Q12 P13, Q13 P14, Q14 
Coop P21, Q21 P22, Q22 P23, Q23 P24, Q24 
SQ P31, Q31 P32, Q32 P33, Q33 P34, Q34 
Go P41, Q41 P42, Q42 P43, Q43 P44, Q44 
 
The analysis assumes that both reference states play simultaneously. Since the payoffs 
are approximately symmetric, the following investigation will only be done for 
reference state α, and the strategies would also hold for reference state β. 
 
If both sides pursue SQ, then neither side will be better or worse off at the beginning 
of the game, so α receives P33. 
 
If both sides decide ESC, the result will be a high cost exacerbation of the conflict. 
The payoff will thus be lower than the status quo: 
 
P33 > P11 
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If both sides come to a compromise settlement, then they will both be better off than 
the status quo dispute, and it follows that they will also be better off than escalation. 
 
P22 > P33 > P11 
 
Finally, if both sides leave (GO), then, according to the payoff criteria above, the 
reference states will be worse off than any other scenario along the diagonal of the 
payoff matrix (i.e. the two reference states make the same move). The game is set up 
this way to underline the difficulty of unilateral departure from the disputed territory. 
The territory may have a vital strategic and symbolic function for the reference state. 
However, even when the legitimacy of the state does not rest on the retention or 
contestation of the disputed area, it is difficult to leave. The co-national inhabitants 
may not wish for the reference state to leave, either fearing the vulnerable position 
with respect to the other groups in the area or the other reference state. In the 
postcolonial international context, reference states cannot simply ‘divide and quit.’ 
Thus, the relative payoffs along the diagonal are: 
 
P22 > P33 > P11 > P44 
 
The investigation now turns to the cells of the payoff matrix that are not on the 
diagonal (i.e. when the two reference states make different moves). To apply 
Tsebelis’s terminology, if one reference state escalates the dispute (ESC), and the 
other does not, the latter is a ‘sucker’. Moreover, the second reference state is more of 
a ‘sucker’ if it cooperates (COOP) rather than staying at the status quo (SQ), and less 
a ‘sucker’ if it stays at the status quo (SQ) than if it leaves (GO). This order of payoffs 
within COOP, SQ and GO is the same for the other scenarios not on the diagonal. The 
relative payoffs if reference state α pursues escalation (ESC) will be: 
 
P14 > P12 > P13 > P11 
 
On the other hand, if reference state β escalates the dispute (ESC), then reference state 
α will have the relative payoffs: 
 
P11 > P31 > P21 > P41 
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If reference state α decides to cooperate, then its payoff is highest when the other 
reference state unilaterally leaves the disputed area. The payoffs are more for mutual 
cooperation (P22) than the other state remaining at the status quo (SQ). The lowest 
yield results if the other state decides to escalate (ESC). The relative payoffs are: 
 
P24 > P22 > P23 > P21 
 
If reference state β decides to cooperate, the relative payoffs for reference state A are: 
 
P12 > P32 > P22 > P42 
 
If reference state α does nothing (SQ), then the highest payoff is received if the other 
reference state leaves, and the next highest is if the other state decides to cooperate. 
The payoff is lower than both playing SQ if the other reference state escalates the 
dispute (ESC). Thus, the relative payoffs are: 
 
P34 > P32 > P33 > P31 
 
If reference state β remains at the status quo level of conflict (SQ), then the relative 
payoffs for state α are: 
 
P13 > P33 > P23 > P43 
 
Finally, if the reference state leaves, the relative payoffs are: 
 
P44 > P42 > P43 > P41 
 
If the other state disengages from the disputed territory (GO), then the relative payoffs 
are: 
 
P14 > P34 > P24 > P44 
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Then, compiling all of the inequalities from above: 
 
P22 > P33 > P11 > P44 
P14 > P12 > P13 > P11 
P11 > P31 > P21 > P41 
P24 > P22 > P23 > P21 
P12 > P32 > P22 > P42 
P34 > P32 > P33 > P31 
P13 > P33 > P23 > P43 
P44 > P42 > P43 > P41 
P14 > P34 > P24 > P44 
 
One possible solution is: 
 
P14 > P34 > P24 > P12 > P32 > P22 > P13 > P33 > P11 > P31 > P23 > P21 >  P44 > P42 > P43 > P41 
 
Appendix I.B 
 
Before proceeding with further calculations, it is useful to introduce the concept of the 
discount factor. The notion originates from the literature on sequential bargaining, and 
refers to the time-value of money.1 That is, the relative value of receiving a payoff 
now is higher than receiving the same payoff at a time interval t later. Reference states 
are impatient, so getting the payoff now will be more valuable than receiving the 
same payoff in the future. The concept is akin to a constant rate of inflation over set 
intervals of time, so that the value of receiving what is offered immediately decreases 
by a constant rate for each time period. Thus, the discount factor δ will fall between 0 
and 1. The less impatient the reference state is, the closer the value will be to 1. 
Moreover, if the reference state receives a payoff P now, it will get δP after one time 
period t, and δ2P after two time periods, and so on. Thus, the total payoff for the 
infinite iterative game is: 
 
                                                 
1
 R. Gibbons, A Primer in Game Theory, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf (1992): 68-9n. 
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Σ δtPt summed over the time period t, where t is an integer from zero to infinity 
 
This discounting of the future is modelled by a simple constant reduction, but could 
be modelled in many other ways, such as assuming an exponential or other reduction 
in payoffs over subsequent time periods. 
 
Using these concepts, it is possible to estimate the payoffs. Once the first state 
escalates the conflict from the status quo, the defecting state receives a short-term 
payoff, but then, when the other reference state also escalates, then the payoffs will be 
reduced from the status quo until the end of the game. Thus, the payoffs, starting at 
the status quo, for defecting and provoking the other state to fight are: 
 
P33 + δP13 + δ2P11 + … (escalation) 
 
If, on the other hand, the reference state α stays at the status quo, then the payoffs will 
simply be: 
 
P33 + δP33 + δ2P33 +… (status quo) 
 
Since the discount factor is between 0 and 1,the expressions above containing infinite 
series can be simplified: 
 
P33 + δP33 + [(δ2)(P33)/(1- δ)] (status quo) 
 
P33 + δP13 + [(δ2)(P11)/(1- δ)] (escalation) 
 
The payoff from initial defection will be offset by the reduced payoff if the long-term 
payoff to stay at the status quo is greater than escalation: 
 
P33 + δP33 + [(δ2)(P33)/(1- δ)] > P33 + δP13 + [(δ2)(P11)/(1- δ)] 
 
It has been assumed that pursuing ESC increases the payoff if the other reference state 
remains at the status quo level of conflict, so P13 is greater than P33 (see Appendix 
I.A). 
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Simplifying the inequality above: 
 
(δ/1- δ)(P33 – P11) > (P13 – P33) 
 
The right-hand side of the equation represents the short-term gain from defecting. 
This is offset by the left-hand side. If the reference state strongly discounts the future 
and would much rather have a payoff in the present rather than in the future, the value 
of δ will be low. Thus, the left hand side will be smaller, and the inequality less likely 
to be true, which makes escalation more likely.  
 
On the other hand, if the payoff from escalating the conflict (P13) increases, then, 
unsurprisingly, it is more likely that the reference state will escalate the conflict. If the 
benefit from staying at the status quo level (P33) is sufficiently high, then the 
reference state will not exacerbate the conflict. That is, if P33 is higher, then the right 
hand side decreases and the left-hand side increases, making it more likely that the 
inequality holds (i.e. no escalation). Finally, as the cost of war is lessened (or, in the 
notation above, P11 increases), it becomes more likely that the reference state will 
choose to escalate. 
 
The impact of the change of the relative payoffs between staying at the status quo 
(P33) and escalating to mutual antagonism (P11) is weighted by the (δ/1- δ) term, so 
that if δ is more than 0.5 (indifference), changes in (P33 – P11) are magnified, so that 
whether the conflict escalates or not is highly sensitive on changes for P33 and P11. 
This means that if the reference state does not discount the future as much, then small 
changes have a major impact on the likelihood of escalation. On the other hand, if δ is 
less than 0.5, then the term (δ/1- δ) tends to zero, so that changes in (P33 – P11) do 
not drastically change the likelihood of either staying at the status quo or escalating 
the conflict. 
 
If the above inequality holds, then the reference state, calculating the long-term 
payoffs of staying at the status quo versus escalation, will choose the former. 
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Appendix I.C 
 
The strategy that needs to be in place for long-term cooperation is the  trigger strategy, 
so called because the reference states play the same thing (SQ) until one of the states 
switches to another action (COOP). This action results in a switch for the other 
reference state from SQ to COOP, such that the outcome will be mutual cooperation 
at every stage for the infinite repeated game between the reference states. 
 
Following Gibbons, it can be shown that if the discount factor δ is close enough to 
unity (i.e. the reference state does not discount the future much), then it is a Nash 
equilibrium for both reference states to follow the trigger strategy.2 
 
Assume that both reference states start at the status quo level of conflict and that 
reference state β has adopted the trigger strategy. Thus, if reference state α moves 
from status quo (SQ) to cooperation (COOP), this triggers reference state β to also 
cooperate. Thus, reference state α receives the payoff P23 in the first time, which is 
less than the payoff at the status quo (P33). In the second time period onwards, 
reference state α receives P22. Then, the total payoff for triggering mutual 
cooperation is: 
 
P23 + δP22 + δ2P22 + … 
 
Since 0 < δ < 1, the infinite series reduces to: 
 
P23 + (δ/1- δ)*P22 [trigger] 
 
On the other hand, if reference state α decides to stay at the status quo in the first 
period, it will have the same choice in the next period, so that the infinite series for 
the payoffs can be expressed as: 
 
P33 + δx  x = P33/(1- δ) [status quo] 
 
                                                 
2
 Ibid.: 91. 
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Thus, triggering mutual cooperation is only optimal if doing so yields higher payoffs 
than not triggering cooperation at the first time period. This can be expressed as: 
 
P23 + (δ/1- δ)P22 ≥ P33/(1- δ) 
 
Solving for the discount factor, the above simplifies to: 
 
 δ ≥ 1 – [(P22 – P33)/(P22 – P23)] 
 
This expresses the critical value of δ such that it is above a certain level of ‘patience’ 
for long-term payoffs that results in adopting a trigger strategy.  If the above criterion 
for δ holds, then it is a Nash equilibrium for both players to seek mutual cooperation. 
 
Both of the terms (P22 – P33) and (P22 – P23) are positive, and P23 > P33 (c.f. 
Appendix I.A). Thus, the quotient of the two falls between 0 and 1, such that the 
right-hand side will be between 0 and 1. If the payoff for staying at the status quo is 
higher, then the right-hand side of the inequality is higher, which means that a higher 
critical discount factor is required to trigger mutual cooperation. That is, reference 
state α will be more impatient about receiving payoffs. On the other hand, if the 
payoff for making a unilateral move for cooperation (P23) increases, then the 
difference between mutual and unilateral cooperation decreases. The critical discount 
factor is lower, such that the reference state is more willing to wait for long-term 
payoffs. Finally, if the payoff for mutual cooperation is higher, the critical value of δ 
for reference state α to pursue the trigger strategy decreases. In sum, if one of the 
reference state uses the trigger strategy from the status quo, and the discount factor is 
above the critical value, then the other reference state also pursues the trigger strategy. 
 
The result is that if the above conditons hold, reference states will pursue long-term 
coordination with the other reference state instead of maintaining the current level of 
conflict. Moreover, if this is coupled with the conditions from Appendix I.B, there are 
conditions under which mutual cooperation is the preferred strategy for reference 
states. 
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Appendix I.D 
 
There are four possible scenarios for the settlement offer to the conflict groups, 
depending on the group in government in the two reference states. To simplify the 
calculations, it is assumed that the two reference states have the same negotiating 
leverage, so the final offer will be the arithmetic mean of their ideal positions. If the 
settlements are considered along a one-dimensional axis, offers that are ‘fair’ will 
have a value of close to zero, offers that are biased towards the co-nationals of α will 
be represented as a negative number, while offers biased towards the co-nationals of β 
will be represented as a positive number. See diagram below: 
 
  | 
 A+ A- 0 B- B+ 
 
The ideal position of the conciliatory groups of the reference states are closer to zero 
than their less conciliatory counterparts. 
 
As an instructive example, consider the four groups in the reference states. The 
notation from the introductory chapter will be used.3 If the ideal policy positions (in 
some arbitrary units) are: 
 
A+: -30 
A-: -15 
B+:  24 
B-:  15 
 
Then, the four possible settlements will have fall along the axis in Diagram I.D.1: 
 
The reference state governments are both more conciliatory (A- and B-). The offer 
will be (-15 + 15)/2 = 0. 
 
                                                 
3
 A+: Less cooperative group in α; A-: More cooperative group in α; B+: Less cooperative group in β; 
B-: More cooperative group in β. 
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The reference state governments are both less conciliatory types (A+ and B+). The 
offer will be (-30 + 24)/2 = -3. 
 
The government from α is more conciliatory and the government from β is less 
concilatory (A- and B+). The offer will be (-15 + 24)/2 = +4.5. 
 
The government from β is more conciliatory and the government from α is less 
concilatory (A+ and B-). The offer will be (-30 + 15)/2 = -7.5. 
 
Notice that the offers between one conciliatory and one antagonistic group in the 
reference state governments are more biased towards the co-nationals of the 
antagonistc government, compared to offers when both governments are the same 
type. Examining the offers when the governments are both the same type (+ or -), the 
comparison is dependent on the values of the numbers. In this example, when both 
sides are conciliatory, the final offer is biased towards the co-nationals of β. If the 
ideal position of A+ were –24 instead of –30, then the offer from A+ and B+ would 
be the same as that from A- and B-. The important thing to note is that from the 
standpoint from the conflict groups, the best offer results when their reference state 
has a less concilatory government and other state has a more conciliatory one, the 
worst-case scenario is when their reference state has a conciliatory government and 
other state has an antagonistic governmnent, and the two other scenarios are 
somewhere in between. 
 
The conflict groups, like their counterparts in the reference states, calculate the long-
term benefits of pursuing a particular action. At each stage, the two reference states 
offer a settlement. Each of the conflict groups, a+, a-, b+ and b- consider the offer and 
can make one of two choices. If the conflict group decides to accept the offer, then it 
will receive a payoff (W). However, for accepting the offer, conflict groups will have 
to pay a political cost (L) for cooperating with the ‘other side’. The conflict group can 
also refuse to take the offer from the reference states, obtaining a payoff (S). However, 
to push the conflict groups to settle, the reference states levy a penalty (T) on the non-
compliant conflict group. The political cost (L) is higher for antagonistic conflict 
groups (+) compared to conciliatory groups (-). The payoff for non-compliance (S) is 
higher for antagonistic groups (+) than it is for conciliatory groups (-). Finally, as 
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indicated above, the payoff from accepting the offer depends on the group that is in 
government in the reference states. For the conflict groups, the payoffs will be 
indicated as Wij, where i is the type of government in their own reference state, while 
j is the type of government in the other reference state. For example, if there is a 
conciliatory government (-) in ‘their’ reference state, and a less conciliatory one (+) in 
the other state, then the payoff from accepting the offer will be W+-. 
 
As in Appendix I.B, is is assumed that the conflict groups are impatient like groups in 
reference states. Thus, the discount factor will be included in the analysis. 
 
The first thing to consider is the situation in which conflict groups compare non-
compliance and accepting a settlement. The worst payoff that a conflict group can 
receive from accepting a settlement is when their reference state is conciliatory, and 
the other reference state is not, yielding W
-+. 
 
The benefit from non-compliance in the long-term is: 
 
(S –T) + (S-T)δ + (S-T)δ2 + … 
 
The benefits from taking the worst-case settlement in the long-term is: 
 
(W
-+ - L) + (W-+ - L)δ + (W-+ - L)δ2 + … 
 
If the relative benefit from accepting the settlement (W
-+ - L) is higher than the gain 
from non-compliance (S –T), then the conflict groups will accept the settlement. The 
gain from non-compliance (S) is determined by the conflict groups and their followers, 
the political cost (L) is levied by the supporters of the conflict groups, and the payoff 
from the settlement (W) is set by the average of the policy positions. The only 
parameter for which the reference states have discretionary power is T, the penalty for 
non-compliance. In the simplest case, this means that reference states will set the 
penalty such that: 
 
T > (S + L - W
-+) 
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This result is quite intuitive. The left-hand side suggests that the penalty (T) must be 
set higher as the political cost for ‘selling out’ (L) is higher for the conflict groups. 
Moreover, the higher the benefit from non-compliance (S), the higher the critical 
value of the penalty (T) needs to be. Finally, the higher the gains from compliance 
with the reference states (W), the lower the penalty (T) needs to be for the conflict 
groups to prefer settlement. The settlement will be inclusive if the conditions above 
are fulfilled for both conciliatory (-) and antagonistic (+) conflict groups. 
 
If the penalty (T) is high enough for all of the conflict groups, then they will choose 
an option that will involve eventual settlement. Before proceeding, it is instructive to 
introduce a modification to the derivation. It is assumed that the reference states can 
increase the penalty (T), and that this does not affect the level of the other parameters. 
However, if we introduce a correspondence between the penalty levied by the 
reference states (T) and the benefit of non-compliance (S), there is a critical penalty 
Tc above which there is an increasing function S(T) for non-compliance. In other 
words, once the penalty is high enough, the conflict group becomes marginalised, and 
it gains more credibility outside the institutions from its supporters. Thus, though 
reference states can levy penalties, setting them too high may exacerbate the situation. 
However, there are other ways to encourage acceptance of an accord. 
 
If the conflict group accepts the ‘worst-case’ settlement immediately, it will benefit 
by: 
 
(W
-+ - L) + (W-+ - L)δ + (W-+ - L)δ2 + … 
 
However, the conflict group may want to wait out for a better offer. The best-case 
scenario is that their reference state has an antagonistic (+) government in the next 
period, and the other reference state has a conciliatory government (-). The long-term 
payoffs for taking the ‘worst-case’ settlement is (as above): 
 
(W
-+ - L) + (W-+ - L)δ + (W-+ - L)δ2 + … 
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Since the discount factor is between 0 and 1, this reduces to: 
 
(W
-+ - L) + (W-+ - L)δ/(1- δ) 
 
On the other hand, if the conflict group waits for the next period, it will pay a penalty 
for non-compliance, but will get the higher benefit in subsequent periods for agreeing 
with the better settlement: 
 
(S -T) + (W+- - L)δ + (W+- - L)δ2 + … 
 
Since the discount factor is between 0 and 1, this reduces to: 
 
(S -T) + (W+- - L)δ/(1 – δ) 
 
The conflict groups will accept the settlement, even if it is the worst possible deal, if 
waiting for favourable set of reference state governments does not cancel out the 
penalty from non-compliance. In other words: 
 
(W
-+ - L) + (W-+ - L)δ/(1- δ) > (S -T) + (W+- - L)δ/(1 – δ) 
 
which is equivalent to 
 
(W
-+ - L) - (S -T) > (W+- - W-+)δ/(1 – δ) 
 
The left hand of the inequality is just the difference between taking the worst-case 
settlement and not complying. The benefits from non-compliance (S) and the penallty 
from ‘selling out’ (L) cannot be set by the reference states. For the reasons outlined 
above, increasing the reference state penalty (T) may marginalise the conflict groups. 
The only parameters that remain are the payoffs associated with the settlements (W). 
Looking at the right side of the inequality, the term (W+- - W-+) simply represents the 
difference between the best and worst settlements. Thus, if this approaches 0, then it 
is more likely that the inequality will hold. Since the settlement is related to the policy 
positions, this means that the ideal policy positions of the groups are similar, 
irrespective of whether there is an antagonistic (+) or conciliatory (-) reference state 
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government. For the right-hand side to approach zero, there needs to be harmonisation 
of policy towards the conflict zone in both reference states. Thus, given that the 
worst-case settlement is more beneficial than non-compliance, there are conditions 
under which waiting for a better deal is not preferable to taking an inferior settlement. 
If the best possible scenario still results in lower gains than the ‘worst-case’ 
settlement, then any other combination of reference state governments (i.e. both states 
have antagonistic or both states have conciliatory groups) will also be less preferable 
than taking the inferior settlement in the first period. In particular, if the policies 
regarding the disputed area are harmonised in both reference states, then it is more 
likely that the conflict groups will settle. Thus, bipartisanship within reference states 
is important in reaching an accord.   
 
Appendix I.E 
 
The reference states are assumed to be risk-averse. Mathematically, the utility 
function for the reference states regarding the payoffs from settlement is concave. The 
marginal gain in the payoff from extra political authority is not worth the risk of 
possibly losing the same amount of marginal political authority. There are two general 
types of settlements that the reference states can jointly offer the conflict groups a 
majoritarian settlement. That is, there is a political system in which the largest group 
receives the most political offices in elections. There is a probability PWIN that the 
reference states ‘own’ co-nationals will be victorious (WIN) in a majoritarian system, 
and a probability (1-PWIN) that the same co-nationals will be defeated in a majoritarian 
system. Then the expected utility in the majoritarian system is: 
 
PWIN*U(WIN) + (1-PWIN)*U(LOSE) 
 
Majoritarian systems are assumed to be designed such that the payoff from winning is 
much higher than from losing. If there is an overwhelming numerical majority of one 
of the conflict groups, then the probability for victory is quite high. Thus, it is not in 
the interest of the reference state of the group with a numerical minority to advocate a 
majoritarian system. However, if the numerical difference between the two conflict 
groups is low, and the groups are intermixed (as assumed at the beginning of the 
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discussion), then there are motives for the reference state with a numerical majority to 
also move away from a majoritarian solution. First, other groups in the disputed area 
may join the minority group to out-poll the majority group. Second, though one group 
has an overall majority, it may be a minority at the sub-national level, so that the 
majority group might be dominated in certain local districts. The result would be local 
ethnonational fiefdoms, where one group would hold most of the power, and the other 
group(s) could be marginalised. 
 
The reference states have differing best outcomes. Each state would receive a higher 
payoff if the conflict area were more integrated into their state. However, if the two 
states are coordinating, then neither side will win in this zero-sum situation. The 
reference state will try to ensure that the other state does not win either. One way to 
achieve this is to offer the conflict groups a non-majoritarian system in which the 
payoffs between winning and losing are small. Thus, the expected utility can be 
expressed as above. However, if the possible outcome of parity (PAR) is introduced, 
where both groups receive the same payoff, then the expression can be written as: 
 
PWIN*[U(PAR) + W] + (1-PWIN)*[U(PAR) – L] 
 
Where W and L are both positive and close to zero, and represent the divergence from 
parity for winning and losing in the political system, respectively. The payoffs do not 
change much whether the conflict groups win or lose in the political system. The 
coordinated reference states will offer a settlement to the conflict groups such that 
irrespective of the election results, the payoff is approximately unchanged. Suppose 
the payoff from winning in a majoritarian system is significantly higher than in a non-
majoritarian system. Furthermore, assume that the payoff from losing in a 
majoritarian system is much lower than parity. Then: 
 
U(WIN) > [U(PAR) + W] > [U(PAR) – L] > U(LOSE) 
 
Graphically, since the reference state is risk-averse, its utility function plotting the 
outcomes (X) against the utility (U) is concave. The point at which the line 
connecting U(WIN) and U(LOSE) crosses XPAR at a point lower than U(PAR). Thus, 
at X = XPAR: 
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PWIN* U(WIN) + (1-PWIN)* U(LOSE) < U(PAR) 
 
The above is simply the condition for strict risk aversion. Since the payoff from either 
winning or losing in a non-majoritarian system are quite close to the utility received at 
parity, so it is assumed that: 
 
PWIN* U(WIN) + (1-PWIN)* U(LOSE) < U(PAR) + W 
 
PWIN* U(WIN) + (1-PWIN)* U(LOSE) < U(PAR) - L 
 
In the above situation, the reference states will prefer a political system that is near 
parity, and opt for a non-majoritarian system in which, even if the co-nationals of the 
other reference state win, there will be a little change in the payoff. 
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